This is a guest post by WebHubbleTelescope.

Scientific theories get selected for advancement much like evolution promotes the strongest species to survive. New theories have to co-exist with current ones, battling with each other to prove their individual worth [Ref 1]. That may partly explain why the merest mention of "theory" will tune people out, as it will remind them of the concept of biological evolution, which either they don't believe in, or consider debatable at best. Generalize this a bit further and you could understand why they could also reject the scientific method. If we admit to this as a chronic problem, not soon solved, the idea of accumulating knowledge seems to hold a kind of middle ground, and doesn't necessarily cause a knee-jerk reaction like pushing a particular theory would.¹

Below is a summary of my presentation, The Renewables Gap, from the ASPO 2009 conference. The intent of my presentation was to highlight the political challenge of affecting a societal transition to renewable sources of energy. In particular, I focus on wind and solar, though it seems to me that the problem will be largely the same (if not worse) if we attempt to rely on other “renewables.” My initial presentation focused on attempting to illustrate the Renewables Gap as an energy problem. While I briefly addressed the political aspects of this problem in my presentation, on reflection I’ve chosen to focus more carefully on this aspect of the Renewables Gap.

Frankly, I've never been very pessimistic about our theoretical ability to adapt to peak oil. It’s what I fear we will actually do in response—or, rather, what we won’t do—that concerns me. I feel the same way about our ability to transition to alternative sources of energy—the challenge that I’ve termed the Renewables Gap. I’m quite confident that we have the theoretical ability to deal with the problem. However, if you accept that “politics” is the process of allocating scarce resources in a society, then it is the political problem posed that appears most daunting. Like many things involving peak oil, we’re sure to have all the political will that we need to deal with the problem at only some point after our window of opportunity to act has closed. The challenge is figuring out how to spread awareness of the nature of the problem and willingness to commit scarce resources to its solution before there is a crisis. Here, again, my pessimism is grounded in what I fear we will not do. I don’t pretend to offer any easy solution (the desire for which gives much insight into the nature of this very problem). My goal here is only to provide a framework for thinking about this problem:

The Government and Opposition today voted against a Greens motion in the Senate calling on the Government to plan for peak oil.

Mexico oil output rises slightly in Oct from Sept

MEXICO CITY, Nov 20 (Reuters) - Mexican oil production increased slightly in October from the previous month, lending credence to the government's argument that a steep decline in output appears to be stabilizing.

Mexico produced 2.602 million barrels per day of crude oil in October, state oil monopoly Pemex said on Friday.

That was a decline of 5.6 percent from a year earlier but was a hair above the 2.599 million bpd produced in September. It was the second straight month showing a slight increase.

Mexican oil production is down by about a quarter from a 2004 peak because its once-largest field, Cantarell, is declining.

The November 2009 edition of Oilwatch Monthly can be downloaded at this weblink (PDF, 1.24 MB, 33 pp).

Figure 1 - OECD Crude Oil & Product Stocks from January 2002 to September 2009

The Oilwatch Monthly is a newsletter that is available free of charge with the latest data on oil supply, demand, oil stocks, spare capacity and exports.

A summary and latest graphics below the fold.

This is a guest post from Robin Lovelace (email: www (dot) lovelacerobin (at) yahoo (dot) com), a PhD student in energy research at the University of Sheffield, UK. Robin has recently set up RobRod's Repairs, a mobile bike repair business.

1. Introduction

Many of the articles that discuss the causes and effects of humanity's unprecedented energy use are entirely theoretical, offering little practical guidance for the everyday reader.

This essay offers respite to all the people who confront our collective energy problems with a furrowed brow and an expression that is puzzled by the continuous stream of theoretical insights that explain our current circumstances. This essay confronts our collective energy problems in more practical terms - with an adjustable spanner and a puncture repair kit at the very least.

We the Six Billion: The Ammonia Economy

His presentation, entitled "The Gulf of Maine: What Lies Beyond the Fossil Fuel Horizon," was billed as "describing the role that off-shore wind can play in reducing Maine's unsustainable dependence on fossil fuel based energy resources."

At the Strand he pulled no punches in describing the challenge he believes we are facing. According to Simmons, heating oil will probably not even be available in five or ten years. Not only is oil running out, but fresh water is running out too, with even more dire consequences. Then he proposed a solution: floating offshore windmills that will produce both fresh water and liquid ammonia.

I found it fantastical. I do not doubt that increasing demand for oil, combined with its limited supply, is bound to make it more expensive over time, and that Maine's dependence, especially on heating oil, is a disaster in the making. What I find incredible is the idea that we are going to solve the problem by fueling our cars and heating our homes with ammonia, and that this ammonia - let alone a significant supply of fresh water - is going to be produced by windmills in the Gulf of Maine.

One of the features of many models that are used to predict future events is that they focus on target years. Decadal years are the most common target years, so that whether talking of climate or the amount of oil or natural gas available, models focus on, for example, the amount that will be available in 2030. The problem with this approach is that it leaves the public to think that a problem is not yet serious. For example if the prediction is that the production of oil will only be 75 mbd, in 2030 then there is an implication that until 2030 that the situation will remain fine.

However the world does not reach those levels by continuing in the business as usual mode for the next 21 years, and then suddenly have production drop off a cliff one Friday night. Rather it is a problem that inexorably will grow, year on year, between now and then. I was struck by this thought as I looked through the latest comments from CERA/IHS on their view of the future of oil supply. Their view, as we have come to expect, is an optimistic one, and though we are not still living in the days of $30 oil that they had, at one time predicted, it is worth looking into so as to provide some explanation of the difference between their view and mine.

The Peak Oil Crisis: Accusations

Not many years from now, there will be a huge uproar over who missed the coming of peak oil. There will be Congressional hearings and much finger pointing and protestations that the peaking of world oil production was impossible to predict.

It will all sound much like current discussions of whether our great recession was foreseeable. The uproar will come amidst very high gasoline prices and still greater economic difficulties and, hopefully, widespread understanding that the final energy crisis has begun.

We've recently heard more veiled threats from Putin about Ukraine being unable to pay for gas (thus presumably leading to new attempts at cutting them off), which suggests that Russia is getting itself ready to start a new crisis. That means two things:

1. the internal infighting between groups of powerful Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs for the control of unofficial Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine (more on this below) is still not conclusively settled, and requires "action" using official levers of State and interference with Gazprom's export deliveries through Ukraine;
2. Russia thinks it stands a better chance to focus European blame on Ukraine and, even more importantly, to get Europeans to buy off the Ukrainians (thereby increasing the available unofficial gas loot for the players involved).

While Russia's actions are not easily understandable when considered as those of a country, they are much easier to interpret rationally when you look at who the actual players behind the scenes are. Conversely, public European reactions which sound logical are, in fact, incredibly naive if you know the industry a bit and, given that the people involved are certainly not naive, they are other things at stake.

So let's try to make some predictions and unravel what's actually going on.

Originally posted on European Tribune. See also my full series of articles on earlier episodes of the Russian-Ukrainian crises here