What is wrong with running a very large grid and only fracture it into as large icelands as possible when it is overloaded?

My impression from the grid failures in Sweden is that each large grid failure has resulted in three reactions. Better maintainance, that then often slides in some other area after a few years. More interconnects to add redundancy, some of that overcapacity is then lost as electricity use grows. And better automatics for icelanding of the grid and house turbine running of powerplants to make rebuilding the grid much easier.

It seems like the system has constantly become better in three steps forward one or two steps step backwards way. I expect this cycle to be repeated. Each addition require brain power and not much energy compared to the previus investments or the power the system distribute since the basic infrastructure is sound.

And if the whole grid goes down there is of course a plan for restarting it from a situation with no running powerplants. Its not a perfect plan. For instance in the analysis done after a large failure it was discovered that important switch yards had too few hours of emergency power to manover the remote controlled switches etc. So more accumulators, emergency diesles and larger diesel tanks were added. The abandonment of much of the civil defence has probably left some things lacking. On the other hand do manny municipial combined heat and power plants trust the central grid less and is both ecouraged and willing to add black start and icelanding equipment. In my home town we got a pair of marine diesels used as peak district heating and power plants that also can be part of the local grid and supply the slaghterhouse and McDonalds hamburger patty factory with power and steam. We got our burgers on UPS  :-) (Partly, we had a better system during the cold war. )

This also ought to work for continent sized grids. Why destroy an efficient system when it can be made more resilent? There is no conflict between running it as a whole and taking care of the parts. You only need to react in an intelligent way each time the system breaks down and reality tells you what is wrong with it.

Texas today is an electrical island, with only one small DC connection (~600 MW from memory) with the rest of the US and none with Mexico.

BTW, in Swedish and Icelandic, "Island" is the nation & island of Iceland (English) (where pure Old Norse is spoken).

In English, an isolated bit of land in the sea is an island.

Best :-)

Norway, Sweden, Finland and eastern Denmark, Själland, is one syncronized grid.

There are DC connections Norway - western Denmark, eastern Denmark - Germany, Sweden - western Denmark, Sweden - Germany,  Sweden - Poland and Finland - Russia

http://www.svk.se/upload/3756/SVKK030121.pdf (Second page is in english)

Not all new projects are on the map. There will probably be new DC lines eastern Denmark - western Denmark, Finland - Sweden, Finland - Estonia, Finland - Russia. I do not know about the status for Norway - Germany.
Inside Sweden there will probably be a new 400kV or HVDC interconnect from north of the long lake to Malmö and there are also some smaller upgrading projects planned. The investments are sized for energy trading and reliability goals.

I do not get why it should be hard to make the US grid more reliable. A non functioning grid means 0 income for power sellers, power distributors and power users. Should not the free market fix most of this? Much like insurance companies work.

I do not get why it should be hard to make the US grid more reliable.- This would be Redundancy.

Redundancy is opposite on the spectrum from "Growth".

Optimizing one is neglecting the other.

Ackerman*s Law is expressed by the ratio: e =
Energy/Population.

For systems theorists the first message of their
eerily smooth distribution curves is clear: big
blackouts are a natural product of the power
grid. The culprits that get blamed for each
blackout - lax tree trimming, operators who
make bad decisions - are actors in a bigger
drama, their failings mere triggers for disasters
that in some strange ways are predestined. In
this systems-level view, massive blackouts are
just as inevitable as the mega quake that will
one day level much of Tokyo. (Fairley, 2004)

The connection between chaos and
blackouts began to tighten when
researchers started to work with actual
[blackout data. www.irecusa.org/articles/static/ 1/binaries/IEEEblackoutarticle.pdf]

In other words, because the Power Grid is a Self Organizing Critical (SOC) System, it's very nature begs for blackouts the way
a forest begs for fire, a sand pile begs for avalanche.

The best way to combat all three scenarios is to initiate/force
change at the smallest level possible, while making every critical
system as isolated as possible.

James