Lower 48/World Comparison: http://static.flickr.com/45/145186317_215cd1247f_o.png

This graph, from our Lower 48/Texas article was basically in support of Deffeyes' prediction that 2006 was the most likely year for a crude + condensate decline, within the context of a predicted peak in the 2004 to 2008 time frame. Note that Khebab used BP's crude + condensate + NGL's, which is pretty closely matching the crude + condensate graph. (Khebab did the technical work, I am primarily responsible for the conclusions.)

The Lower 48 and the North Sea peaked and declined after crossing the 50% of Qt mark. In other words, based on Deffeyes' plot, the world in 2006, was at the same stage of depletion at which the Lower 48 and the North Sea started declining (all three are crude + condensate plots).

Assuming that Ghawar is declining 100% of the oil fields in the world which are, or were, producing one mbpd or more are now in decline or crashing. This is happening just we hit record levels of crude oil production. In the past, when super giant fields declined, there were always other super giant fields showing stable or rising production. So, the only question right now is whether 93% or 100% of current and former super giants are in decline. This is supposed to lead to higher crude oil production? (According the Oil & Gas Journal, Kashagan, which is not even producing yet, is the only new one mbpd and larger field on the horizon, and at best, it won't cross the one mbpd line until the 2020 time frame.)

What is particularly odd about the Super Giant debate is that the key characteristic of a peak is when all or almost all of a region's giant fields start declining.

After reflecting on yesterday's Chapter 150 of the "Yes we have peaked; no we haven't debate," I can only conclude that Peak Oil Denial and Cognitive Dissonance are almost insurmountable obstacles, even on a Peak Oil website, of all places.