Thanks again for some penetrating analysis guys. You are indeed close to the root of the problem now. We have been running a field by field model for some institutions close to the action for almost ten years now so we can learn a lot from observation of our own results versus the assumptions made early on. The bottom line here is that running models for several hundred new (post 1997) fields (actually close to 800 now) for some years shows that the assumed profiles for each type are almost all falling well short in terms of achieving peak capacity, maintaining any kind of plateau and sustaining a gradual decline from peak.

Instead, the offshore fields are a) often late b) fall below peak, c) have almost no plateau and d) decline much faster than expected. The trend is progressive so that later fields are performing worse than ever, short lives with faster decline. One might reasonably conclude that advancing technology achieves an objective set by the companies running the projects (in our system mainly private oil companies): get oil out fast, maximise cash and spend as little as possible after the big cash outlay at the front-end.

We have been drilling for cash, harder and faster, and the price of max cash and return is often less oil. This happens first because of what these profiles do to recovery of the nameplate recoverable reserves at project startup, second because the smaller fields don't make financial sense and third because the potential exploration and appraisal of prospects around the existing producing infrastructure offshore is not happening as it might in an maximised oil supply strategy.

We continue to look at oil and liquids supply from the wrong end of the telescope. Consumer states do not have fiscal policies that put oil supply maximisation first. Companies that do the work are employed by their shareholders who want better quarterly results from a long term capex type of business. Exporting countries will adjust capacity where they can to favour orice and then volume, but revenue anyway. From this end of the telescope everything is going to plan: our product is going up in value, there is little or no substitute of any scale and demand has nowhere else to go right now, because oil like most other energy is cheap, cheap, cheap.

Those badly hurt by high energy costs don't really get a vote here (never did really) and by the time demand takes a dip as it did last time around (1980 et al), it will be too late to make smooth adjustments because of the lead times to cranking up high cost (very hight) new liquids.

You guys have seen it coming and so have we. Did anybody listen? Fat chance, since those in a position to make a difference would only lose either fiscal income, windfall profits or share value in the phantom rush to save the world's consumers from supply dislocation and other unpleasant problems.

What next? That's tricky to get right. But if supply does not react quickly at all (and it cannot for lots of reasons), then only demand can move...downwards.

Thanks for an interesting comment. What's your estimate for the decline rate?

Hello Rkshepard,

Well said. Please contact Khebab or SS offline if you are reluctant to post your decline rate on this public forum.

Oh yeah--almost forgot--two terrific keyposts by the TopTODers--Big Kudos for this bleeding edge analysis! Cheers!

Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?

We based our model templates on sets of fields of various sizes and development systems offshore on those developed in various eras, mainly those in the decade prior to 1997 and applied them to new fields with revisions after five years. We then measured actual behaviour in each field where the data was credible against the model profile. Result: there are big variations of coure especially in smaller fields, but in general for a set of say 50 Gulf of Mexico fields, the result was between 15% and 20% lower than we projected.

Taken as a whole, the offshore fields around the world have been declining at about 11-12% over the last five years or so,including old and new,big and small, roughly matching the capacity additions coming on stream in each year, until 2005 when we mapped the first absolute net decline more or less since offshore oil took up its position as the main contributor to growth during the long OPEC capacity overhang.

We calculated back in 2000 that the large difference between declared new capacity additions around the world, OPEC and non-OPEC would mean that the surplus capacity would disappear sometime in 2004, which it did, leading to a price spike. So far, so good.

Then non-OPEC offshore net production (new field starts versus declining older fields) dipped into absolute decline in 2005 for the first time and although the new capacity was still coming through, it looked as if that decline would start to accelerate by 2009-10 which looks to be the case.

That shifted the burden for growth back to OPEC and the FSU since onshore non-OPEC is not great either. OPEC has steadily failed to match declared new capacity to actual performance. That is for a good reason: many of the OPEC field projects are just that: projects with no contracting commitment and thus no drilling. No drilling,no oil.

We don't have any better data than anybody else on decline in OPEC's onshore fields in the Gulf but it looks like decline rates are perhaps half that of the offshore set, say 5-6%.

At the IEA, Birol says we need three barrels of oil (liquids) to offset decline for every one barrel to meet new demand growth. There are simply not enough rigs, not enough people, not enough service contracting equipment and certainly not enough investment commitment to handle the hundreds of new projects that are still in the pipeline (or on the waiting list) to match thatlevel of new capacity requirement.

The irony is that the offshore contractors have committed tens of billions of dollars to new offshore rigs because of high day rates and asset values. But how many companies want to take a flyer on exploration and small fields when a well in deep water would cost at least $50-70 million? At the deep water frontier in the sub-salt plays those wells can cost $100 million plus each jn the exploration, appraisal and test phases.

Yet it still takes four to five years after a successful discovery to get production started on any scale and if the field is big and difficult, the cashflows are a long time going positive. It doesn't look like a great proposition on Wall Street (better to buy into some old oil somewhere) and it doesn't look great for global liquids supply in general.

I didn't answer the question, but I do know that defining decline is now the primary target for the international institutions these days and I do not think they know the answers either.

rkshepherd,

But how many companies want to take a flyer on exploration and small fields when a well in deep water would cost at least $50-70 million? At the deep water frontier in the sub-salt plays those wells can cost $100 million plus each jn the exploration, appraisal and test phases....The irony is that the offshore contractors have committed tens of billions of dollars to new offshore rigs because of high day rates and asset values. It doesn't look like a great proposition on Wall Street (better to buy into some old oil somewhere)...

This article over at Rigzone says that upcomming lease sales in the GOM had the potential to see big money. And then in October, I think it was, they actually hit record levels, according to Starr Spencer from Platts. I couldn't locate an article that she wrote on this topic, but she did give a podcast interview on 10/05/07 stating the record numbers and recalled the feeling of amazement by observers.

Please comment on the difference between your position and the latest record lease sales in GOM. I am very interested in your response.

Sounds like your seeing what I noticed time at peak production has decreased substantially and post peak declines have increased. As for as the max production rate being lower than predicted thats not something I could have easily found.

Overall of course this results eventually in a shark fin curves as exponentially increasing decline rates kick in.

Any comment on my conjecture that GOM production will actually go into steep decline effectively now ?

RKS - I think part of the problem is the rise in production (larger number of wells), the rise in the % that are off shore and the offshore drilling and service industry being under-sized for coping with service demand.

With rig rates where they are - how many comapnies will be doing sub-sea well workovers etc?

So I think with a massive expansion in service capcity, we will see a reversal from current Production Erosion levels - but in how many years time is the question? But this will just be manifest as a slowing of decline!

There will be over-supply of well service and subsea intervention vessels as well as rigs. The new equipment of all sorts is very expensive so that E&P costs across the board are probably rising much faster than oil price. Further, the financial analysts still reckon that there is a big speculative factor in the paper market that over-values oil and so their consensus still suggests a "real" price level of closer to $65 for 2008 and onwards. The debate in these columns would suggest the opposite: namely that oil is still under-priced in terms of the returns on capital expected by large oil companies.

You are right that there will be a period when offshore rig and service vessel rates will fall as supply gets out of synch with actual upstream spending. But I doubt there will be a huge reaction on the new oil investment side from players who are seeking to protect their returns. It will take time until the Chinese and other importer state companies get up to speed to charge in to new field development at the lower rates of return that their own priorities will allow.

Hello Rksheperd,

Thxs for posting more. Perhaps you might be interested in placing a keypost? I think you could be a valuable, contributing TopTODer.

Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?

Instead, the offshore fields are a) often late b) fall below peak, c) have almost no plateau and d) decline much faster than expected. The trend is progressive so that later fields are performing worse than ever, short lives with faster decline. One might reasonably conclude that advancing technology achieves an objective set by the companies running the projects (in our system mainly private oil companies): get oil out fast, maximise cash and spend as little as possible after the big cash outlay at the front-end.

Yikes. Matt Simmons was right. o_O