To reduce supply in the current situation without placing into effect a demand side plan that replaces fossil fuels with alternative energy sources is to beg for disaster on a massive scale. The above paper overlooks entirely the deep dependency that all current human socio-economic structures have upon fossil fuels. The author is in reality proposing that we accomplish by directive precisely what Mother Nature will require through the natural terminal decline of productivity inherent in the concept of Peak Oil. Soon global production of oil will begin its steady terminal decline, providing the restriction upon supply that the Vernons propose. Why take years convincing 30 nations to cut back on production when Nature will do that anyway? And who would enforce this? No one would have the incentive, neither producers, nor consumers.

The article reveals a shocking lack of perception of the catastrophic effects that would ensue upon the heels of such a decision. The global economy would suffer greatly, critical services and food supplies would be at risk, transport upon which 90% of global commerce and we all now depend so heavily upon would be negatively affected and immense pressure would be brought to bear upon the producing countries to increase production. The stronger nations might well say, "Sod it. We'll just take what we need with our military". Weaker nations would likely get very little and people will starve. To the rather naive suggestion that producing countries be compensated for cutting back, just how will that be done when the economy is going to hell in a basket?

Bottom line. It's just not that simple. The things that will help the most to cushion us against the approaching disaster via peak oil are (1) conservation and (2) heavy investments in alternative energy.

We don't have much time. Climate change is no longer humankind's most immediate problem.

Hi Biff,

We haven't been introduced, but Chris has mentioned fondly the Lincolnshire life.
I believe empowering the leaders of fossil fuel nations to forgo production is not just 'not easy' but impossible without the backing of the majority of the global community.

While I suppose one could imagine circumstances in which people are aware of the problem, insist on the capping of production in oil-rich countries, and yet decide not to change their own behaviour, I struggle to think of an individual example where someone who fully understands the gravity of this issue has not changed their behaviour where they felt able. It seems that if you are convinced that individual action / government action on the demand-side does nothing, you lose the platfrom from which you could insist suppliers cut their production.

On discussing this further with Chris, I better understand that there are grounds on which to say that right now, the choice not to fly (etc.) does not directly stop any particular quantity of oil being extracted owing to the divergence of the cost of extraction and price of oil as you say, however the direct effect is inconsequential if it builds on the culture that is necessary to make direct caps and reductions. On both demand-side and supply side, attitude change is the most crucial factor, but I adamantly believe that if an attitude change can be achieved, the demand-side changes will happen as a consequence. If an attitude change cannot be achieved, attempts by a few enlightened individuals to try to cap supply will be either short-lived or have adverse consequences.

A well considered response, sorry to catch you off guard so early this morning!

I'm more pessimistic about the (UK) government's response than the grassroots, seeing as the government continues to be lagging behind both citizens and emerging scientific data, but that's another story.

I will carry on not flying, while I lobby King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz to stop all this oil producing nonsense :)

As a campaigner for the climate policy framework of "Contraction & Convergence"
(and for many years the Rural Development Liaison for the framework's founding organization,
Global Commons Institute www.gci.org.uk)
I too am a supply-side activist.

I should point out that the author seems to have heard George Monbiot on an off day -
he too is a supply-side activist in that he is one of C&C's most vocal staunch supporters.

Given our society's complicity in the unprecedented scale of genocide-by-famine which is now likely unavoidable,
with the predicted 50% cut in Africa's food production by 2020,
( www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74481 )
we need to cut the supply of sources of GHGs at the most rapid pace that can avoid causing geo-economic collapse.

C&C will achieve this by defining nations' rights to emit GHGs,
thus limiting the global volumes of fossil fuels it is profitable to extract in any given year.

Campbell's Oil Depletion Protocol was very carefully designed for another, very specific, task -
and I've yet to see any suggestion that he feels it should, or could, be applied instead to re-stabilizing the climate.

The core difference between it and C&C is that it focusses on Nationally Owned (fuel) Resources, not on (emissions to) the Global Commons of the Atmosphere.

The core of C&C's negotiability lies in its phased equitable distribution of national rights of emissions to the atmospheric commons,
according to the size of national population (the convergence concept),
under an agreed annually-declining GHG budget (the contraction concept).

The Protocol offers no such basis in per capita equity of rights (de facto) to fossil energy usage,
nor the prospect of significant income from the S > N trading of those rights to maximize the rate of change out of fossil fuel dependency,
and thus it lacks the requisite incentives for sufficient support to gain critical mass.

By contrast, C&C now has the endorsement of the Nobel Laureates,
of the EU Parliament,
of the Africa Group of Nations at the UNFCCC,
and of India, Pakistan, and others.
(See Endorsements at GCI website).
Notably, we also have increasingly strong hints that China will adopt C&C at some point of its choosing.

If the Oil Depletion Protocol were re-written to allow the global distribution of an agreed annual ration of a set mix of fossil fuels according to per capita parity,
with agreed rights to trade surplus national fuel allocations (with revenues' spending ring fenced to GHG mitigation)
it would in fact approximate C&C and offer some of its incentives.

Yet negotiating that deal would mean nations' abdicating ("commonizing"?) their Ownership of their (ill-defined) strategic National fuel Reserves . . .

which looks likely to be a discussion needing rather more decades than we have available . . .

Regards,

Backstop

sorry to butt in.

This question of optimism and pessimism is very subjective. Which usually is taken to refer to individual interpretation of their experience and prediction of their future. On such a scale this is easily dismissed for either side of the discussion.

However, when large groups of people side with optimistic/pessimistic views then momentum for action is not easily dismissed.

In simple terms this could be called "mood".

To change the mood of many people is not easy and can be a slow attritional
process. Sudden shock can work more abruptly.
However, the actual shock must be easily recognisable. For the majority on this planet PO and GW are still abstract concepts, if known at all.

Until Katrina I thought single events could move opinion. It did, temporarily, but now I realise we are hardwired into 'moving on' individually, and as groups.

You may have to affect 6+ billion people directly to change them.

Only after the second world war did such an immense effect on humankind change the mood so strongly.

Dear Chris,

I wrote this out to clarify my own thoughts, but I deemed it worth posting.

Clearly the earlier fossil fuel supply limits - whether geological or voluntary - are reached the better for climate change, but the more painful the 'Peak Oil' adaptation problems. Since in a technical sense demand (moderated by price) can never exceed supply, the Peak Oil question really is how painful the demand destruction will have to be to bring demand down to meet the limited supply. The earlier supply limits are reached the worse this pain will be. The oil price thus becomes a rough measure of this pain (and at almost $100 it is already a fatal level of pain for many around the world).

However, since CO2 concentrations are also threatening to reach fatal levels for even more of the world (as you have highlighted there is enough coal to take us way past acceptable levels, even, to my understanding, in light of the latest coal reports), you are suggesting that we need to bring the fossil fuel supply limits forward, despite the increased pain of higher prices and even more vicious demand destruction this would cause. This becomes the lesser of two evils. Sadly I have to agree. And of course we would both agree that any demand-side improvements that can be made (such as those that TEQs would stimulate) to lessen the viciousness would also be most desirable.

No-one seems to have pointed out the revious attempt at limiting production, OPEC and their production quotas, begun in the early 1980s.

The quotas were to be based on reserves. The idea was that quotas would give price stability, and ensure that all the OPEC countries used up the last of their oil at about the same time. Now, their intention was simply financial, with no consideration of peak oil or climate change, but it's similar to what you're proposing, in that it was an international agreement among oil exporters to limit those exports.

And what do we find with the history of OPEC? We find that as soon as they'd agreed to limit production to proportional with their reserves, their stated reserves jumped by hundreds of billions of barrels. And quite a few countries - tempted by high prices - regularly produced over their quotas.

What was lacking from the OPEC agreement was what we have in arms reduction treaties - international inspectors for verification, and provisions for action on violation. OPEC ought to have had some international body which would determine and verify the reserves, and some mechanism for penalties for overproduction, just as in arms control we have international inspection teams, and provision for sanctions, and so on.

So OPEC's production quotas shows us an attempt at restricting oil consumption solely by a supply-side approach.

What was also missing from OPEC's quotas was bringing the buyers into it. We need to look at both supply and demand. The OPEC quotas demonstrated that there's no sense agreeing to limit production if others won't limit their consumption, because the temptation will always be there for the producers to violate the agreement. If supply is deliberately limited to 100 units, and the demand is 101 units, this drives the price up, and then one of the suppliers is definitely going to break.

You're quite right that the supply side has been largely ignored. But honestly, if you're only going to look at supply or demand, it's better to look at demand. It's best of it to deal with both supply and demand, but if you really must focus on just one, focus on demand.

Lastly, I'd note that I think demand is most focused on because it can be looked at through lots of levels. As an individual I can change my demand for stuff; as a community or company I can change my demand; as a country I can work to change our demand. But I can only change supply at an international level, by treaty. Focusing on demand lets me do something whether I'm just some average Joe, a town councilman, a CEO, an MP, or diplomat. But unless I'm a Prime Minister there's really nothing I can do about supply. So demand has got the focus because it offers almost anybody the chance for real action. Whether it's effective action or not is of course another question.