Matt Simmons suspects that a lot of the recent increase in NGL production is due to a number of gas caps being blown down, in oil fields that are in terminal decline.
In any case, since we talk about prices in terms of crude oil and since about 98% of the input into refineries consists of crude oil (C+C), I think that it makes sense to talk about the volume of C+C.
And the best way I have found to handle the monthly data, in what IMO is the early stages of the world decline, is to look at the cumulative shortfall between what the world would have produced, at the 5/05 rate, and what we actually produced. This shortfall is now in excess of 700 mb through August (EIA, C+C).
And more importantly, what other obscure technical reasons might be trotted out to explain away further increases above and beyond the projected declines?
Maybe it's not so obscure to those in the industry, but I find it amusing how people are wedded to certain ideas to the point of dismissing any alternative scenarios, and then something like this happens and all of a sudden there are new rabbits in the hat to explain away what has happened. Explanations that were previously not even on the radar screen.
This is a good early 2005 presentation by Matt, which describes the three primary drive mechanisms. He also talks about the Yibal case history and Ghawar.
As they say, the simplest explanation is often the best. And the simple explanation is that it is a virtual certainty that every oil field that has ever produced one mbpd or more of crude oil is now in decline.
Texas and the Lower 48 couldn't match their early Seventies peak production rates, because of the declines from the old large oil fields, and so far Saudi and world crude oil production numbers are showing the same pattern as Texas and the Lower 48.
There are three principal drive mechanisms in oil reservoirs: solution gas drive, water drive and gas cap expansion drive. To some extent, gravity drainage is a factor, especially in gas cap expansion drive reservoirs.
Not all oil fields have a water leg and not all oil fields have a gas cap, but let's assume a large field with a water leg, an oil column and a gas cap--gas on top of oil on top of water, e.g., Prudhoe Bay.
The best way to produce an oil field with a gas cap is to minimize the gas production from the cap and to produce the oil from the lowest practical point in the oil column. As the oil is withdrawn, the gas cap expands, pushing the oil down, aided by gravity drainage. Frequently associated gas is processed, to remove the NGL's, and the dry gas is reinjected back into the gas cap. Also, in many cases supplemental water is injected into the water leg in order to keep the reservoir pressure up. Prudhoe Bay is unusual in that water is also being injected into the gas cap in order to keep the pressure up.
In time, the oil column thins to the point that so much water, from the underlying water leg, and gas, from the overlying gas cap, is being produced that it is no longer economic to continue producing the thinning oil column. At that point, the operator will deliberately produce the gas in the cap, which is basically the final stage of depletion in the field. This would result in a short term boost in NGL production.
So, Matt's point is that a lot of the recent increase in NGL production comes from oil fields in their death throes.
Another factor is that it seems that KSA is now selling more Arab Heavy they increased the markdown to make viable for simpler refineries to handle it.
I think most people agree that its known that KSA has excess capacity that consists of heavy sour crude that its been unable to sell at the price it wants.
The combination of this entering the market blowdown of gas caps and some increased production from Iraq would explain all of the current increases if they are real. I'm not saying that these are not new increments but its not clear yet if they are enough to have overcome drops in other places. I'm guessing that the increase in how heavy oil is which drops the amount of gasoline per barrel is being offset by increased production of the lighter NGL's. So overall even though it seems that light sweet crude is decreasing the combination of NGL and heavy oil is in a sense offseting the loss of light sweet at least for now.
I guess this shows up as processing gains ?
I'll admit I don't know enough to understand NGLs vs heavy etc etc maybe one day Robert Rapier could post on the finer points of oil.
Interesting regards gas caps and depleting fields. Big bid up now for big Nat'l Gas pipeline from...Alaska. Canadians, yanks and Chinese bidding on it. Have a friend up there working that area. North Slope has been in pretty steady decline (no news there) and...they've been cross drilling over into ANWAR. Not getting as much as they would have liked.
That's dead serious that this valuable oil is now used for consumption. We actually need it as an energy input for all those future projects required to de-carbonise our economy. NASA climatologist James Hansen has calculated that if we burn all oil and gas WE MUST PHASE OUT COAL OR USE COAL ONLY IN COMBINATION WITH CO2 SEQUESTRATION.
These sequestration projects are huge projects requiring free-flowing diesel for construction equipment. A 1 GW coal fired power plant generates 150 Kb/d of liquid CO2 to be sequestered away. Geological surveys, drilling rigs, pipelines etc. If that has to be done on the backside of peaking oil and gas curves how will that work?
I repeat again we have to set aside oil and gas fields for the sole purpose of serving as an energy input into those de-carbonisation projects.
That's what my guy told me. Also told me that Prudhoe is pretty much tapped out and has been in death throes decline for 5yrs. He's lived and worked up there going on 40yrs.
Figure this; they can drill deepwater, horizontal drill tech isn't in its infancy. Why not X-drill long distances on land? Alot easier than dealing with 1,000s of meters of water and liquid salt caps (like the new Brazil field) even more 1,000s of meters down. Kuwait X-drilled far enough into the Basra area to cause a noticeible decline in Iraqi field pressures and thus set themselves on a crash course with Iraq in '89. Why not slide horizontal into ANWAR? Actually less impact that way.
Did anyone really think they'd just go "Oh well..." and let that crude just sit there?
Now, that doesn't mean that they're going all the way in, but if they can get at what's on the perifery, why wouldn't they?
Like I said, this was just my source. I don't have reason to doubt him, but I'm not up there. So there it is for what it's worth.
Back several years ago, I downloaded a document from Alyeska Oil website that indicated that without drilling into both NPR-A and/or ANWR (Area 1002), the pipeline would reach it's transport minimum by 2017 (200,000 BPD) and ready for "abandonment in place" status.
The combined effects (and building the required infrastructure, particularly for ANWR since it's a long way from the TAP) of NPR-A and ANWR could extend the life to roughly 2034 if the USGS Mean estimates we actually found and recovered. A temporary boost in throughput up to a level between 1.4 and 1.5 million BPD would be likely if the oil from ANWR really exists.
The oil resources in NPR-A are bit more certain because of the greater amount of drilling and seismic work in NPR-A and some of the reserves are currently being drilled and being readied to be brought online to slow the decline caused by the Prudhoe Bay fields reaching the end of their lives (average water cut is now greater than 75%).
The argument (in Alaska at least) really is less about a Wildlife Refuge turned into a Wilderness Area (although there are some fairly strong opinions about THAT process), than it is about the availability of infrastructure to move any oil that might actually exist. It seems pretty clear to me that once the TAP is shutdown, oil in ANWR (1002) becomes a moot point.
Well, since you've depreciated the pipeline, why not just turn the gas in place into GTL and send it south on the pipeline? When the oil is gone, just convert the pipeline to methanol. A lot better than just scrapping it for the molybdenum alloy steels.
it might be of some benifit to point out that for an oil reservoir, pressure depletion(solution gas drive) is not very efficient. and this is because low viscosity gas is not very efficient in displacing higher viscosity oil (typically 15 - 25%). water is more efficient than gas and a typical water displacing oil efficiency is 40%.
gravity drainage trumps all.
for a gas reservoir, depletion (or blow down) is the most efficient mechanism. a gas reservoir generally behaves according to the real gas law, pv=zNRT. so the lower the pressure, the fewer moles, N, of gas remaining and the higher the recovery. recoveries from depletion of a gas reservoir are typically in the range of 85% or better. typical water drive recoveries from a gas reservoir is about 65%, about the same as an oil reservoir produced by gravity drainage.
ghawar is produced by gravity stable pressure maintence by water injection and a reasonable recovery estimate is about 65%.
"Matt Simmons suspects that a lot of the recent increase in NGL production is due to a number of gas caps being blown down, in oil fields that are in terminal decline."
What is the source of this statement by Simmons?
What recent increase in NGL production? the OPEC dataset is the only one that breaks out monthly NGL. It only shows a recent 50,000 bpd increase.
What is meant by recent? The data we are talking about in this thread or does Simmons simply mean "in general the last few years"?
In other words, is Simmons suggesting that NGL production the last few months is the reason for a new liquids peak?
You will have to contact Matt directly if you want his supporting evidence. He addresses the issue on Slide #12, in his ASPO-USA presentation. Go to www.simmonsco-intl.com and click on his speeches and look for the ASPO presentation.
In any case, Euan just provided a concrete example of a giant oil field, now in its death throes, showing an increase in gas and NGL production.
It is a little ironic that the cornucopians are probably celebrating increasing NGL production as evidence of the "death of Peak Oil," while in fact it is probably just a side effect of many oil fields being in terminal decline.
My cornucopian aspect wants me to remind everyone that 'cornucopian' means that humanity can solve problems, NOT that oil is inexhaustible OR that peak-oil is not imminent.
My doomer aspect thinks my cornucopian aspect is stupid anyhow, and really doesn't care.
A Perpetualist believes in one or more of the following:
1. Peak Oil is just a hoax to help the oil companies game the markets and make gazibillions of dollars.
2. Planet Earth is filled at its center with a creamy-naugot of biotic and abiotic oil-generating gnomes. They replenish the reservoirs every time the markets say pretty please. It's always been that way. Always will be that way. (We've been at the Malthusian ha ha end point five times before and will be there again an infinite number of times in the future.)
3. Progress is forever. "We" have always had progress and always will. Besides, anybody with half a rational mind knows the "World is Flat" and is heading inevitably towards the "Singularity" if they read their Thomas Friedman and Kurzweil Bibles.
4. Human ingenuity solves all problems. Always has. Always will.
5. God will not allow the human race to go extinct because God is perfect, God is forever, and God created man in his own image. Therefore because God is perfect and infinite, He will never admit that creating man was an environmental mistake and He will never let mankind go extinct. (Oh, and as for the dinosaurs, Satan made those, not God. Why do you think they looked like dragons anyway? They were Satan's creation. Good had to triumph over evil and thus the dinosaurs went extinct. There is an "ingenious" explanation for everything. Always has been. Always will be.)
=those who account for real things (i.e., EROI, barrels of economically recoverable crude left in the ground and number of rigs (straws) and men (suckers) available "above ground")
This is opposed to the other kinds of people:
"fictioncountants"
=those who account only for fictional things (i.e., money, the everlasting perpetual compound interest and the ever growing, strong and robust free market)
I left out *realists* for a reason..
It's a prefered subjective way of looking at oneself.
Of course my accounting is realistic. I just happen to be counting beans and the other is counting peas...
Cheers, Dom
Yes So! You're looking at IEA numbers. I'm looking at EIA numbers which are 4.50 and 4.55. 50,000 barrels. Regardless, it is only roughly 10% of the overall increase which was more to my point.
But the EIA is not the one showing the sudden surge in October production. We are talking about this new record reported only by the IEA. Also, you are looking at the EIAs Short Term Energy Outlook. That is just a preliminary guess by the EIA. Their official figures come out in their International Petroleum Monthly.
You cannot mix apples and oranges GC, if you are talking about what Simmons was talking about, (the new IEA record), then you must look at the natural gas liquids he was talking about, those reported by the IEA and they report OPEC NGLs increased by 160,000 bp/d in October.
I believe strongly that there will be no new EIA record set in October, not in crude + condensate anyway. And it is highly unlikely that they will find any new "all liquids" record either. At any rate, when the EIA data comes out for October we can discuss it then.
The EIA (International Petroleum Monthly) data go only up to August 2007 (published in November) which was a minimum month. So we have to wait until January 2008 to get their October figures.
With all respect, since you obviously follow these numbers, they are all guesses. EIA, IEA, or BP. And anybody else. They undoubtedly all get their figures from the same dubious sources. In reality, you will admit that the "preliminary guesses" never change much.
There are revisions, to be sure, but not very many and they don't add up to much. I already know your objection(s) - but please, hear me out, I can prove it.
make a database of preliminary figures and one of "final" revised. Run a training moving average on both columns (12 months). Then tell me by how much they differ on average and make a graph of the two lines.
Then try to make a monthly graph that spans back to 2002(5 years) where you can see daylight between the two lines.
The IEA October 2007 spike came about in this way:
in mb/d Oct07-Sep07
Saudi Arabia 0.1
Russia 0.07
Iraq 0.12
Nigeria 0.09
OPEC NGLs 0.16
UK 0.09
Others FSU 0.26
China 0.2
Angola 0.1
Brazil 0.04
Others Asia 0.08
Australia 0.04
Others 0.05
Total change 1.4
The main characteristic was that the total increase was the result of many increases spread over many countries and that there were no significant drops elsewhere in the supply system. The question of course is now whether those increases can be maintained and/or are not canceled out by those other disruptions in the next months.
I have the entire IEA dataset going back to Jan 2004 and there is approx. 1mnpd more NGL now than there was nearly 4 years ago. But it doesn't explain last months sharp increase.
I think the saying goes: "A single swallow doth not a summer make". In other words, this new elevated production level now needs to be maintained, month in and month out for years to come, otherwise any decline will only be more visible. If I was IEA director I would have thought long and hard about releasing that number. Maybe I would have spread it over 6 months or something. This brings me to the my next point: the veracity of the data.
I am an accountant. I have spent my life interpreting and presenting figures and I have seen enough to know that what you see is not necessarily what you get. WSI-NN-WYG if you like. I have wondered for a long time about the consistency of the data. The data is more a political statement than a statement of fact. It is hard otherwise to explain the consistancy of both the EIA and the IEA data, even the noise! However to be fair, both agencies are using a wide variety of data sources including estimates for tanker movements and the like and there will be a great deal of interpretation and adjustment going on.
I have even wondered whether KSA for instance would go so far as to fill tankers with water to mislead production estimates.
So for a long time I have tended to take the data from both agencies as components in a trend. It is much harder to provide false data that is also credible over a period of time than falsify a single data set. Lets see what this month brings, then next month etc. If production levels hold we should try and find out why. If they don't, it was just noise.
Trust me and I'm a super doomer their is enough slop in the numbers that we will probably be in bad shape well before we actually get the numbers to prove it. KSA is already playing games by increasing shipments to the US and decreasing to Asia and vice versa. Non-OECD demand could have dropped because of prices by 1-4mbd and we would never really know. We do get the reports eventually of shortages but most of these countries also have storage facilities so that means the actual shipments started decreasing before the final shortage hit the papers. Without invoking any nefarious actions the worlds oil supply is so badly accounted for your basically losing the exports of Mexico in the noise. Thats pretty bad.
It is much harder to provide false data that is also credible over a period of time than falsify a single data set
This is a very important statement from an accountant. I doubt it is possible to fudge data consistently in such a way that one does not leave a statistical signature in the data set ultimately providing clues where the fudging was done. So Stuart's exercise is one valuable contribution towards this analysis.
Liquid natural gas production is rapidly increasing. A byproduct of LNG liquefication is natural gas liquids/condensates production. Since natural gas production has not peaked, the supply of NGL's is increasing. Some natural gas to synthetic oil/diesel will produce more liquids. The rapid increase in natural gas discovery in West Africa, Egypt, Australia, and other parts of the world is a positive sign for the energy consumer. New technology may make heavy oil production more profitable. The ASPO peak oil forecast includes the increase of natural gas liquids expected.
Natural gas is being substituted for oil wherever economically feasible.
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“It is only through labor and painful effort, by grim energy and resolute courage, that we move on to better things.”
Matt Simmons suspects that a lot of the recent increase in NGL production is due to a number of gas caps being blown down, in oil fields that are in terminal decline.
In any case, since we talk about prices in terms of crude oil and since about 98% of the input into refineries consists of crude oil (C+C), I think that it makes sense to talk about the volume of C+C.
And the best way I have found to handle the monthly data, in what IMO is the early stages of the world decline, is to look at the cumulative shortfall between what the world would have produced, at the 5/05 rate, and what we actually produced. This shortfall is now in excess of 700 mb through August (EIA, C+C).
WT - Can you explain to someone with an MBA what a 'gas cap being blown down' means? Thanks
And more importantly, what other obscure technical reasons might be trotted out to explain away further increases above and beyond the projected declines?
Maybe it's not so obscure to those in the industry, but I find it amusing how people are wedded to certain ideas to the point of dismissing any alternative scenarios, and then something like this happens and all of a sudden there are new rabbits in the hat to explain away what has happened. Explanations that were previously not even on the radar screen.
www.spegcs.org/attachments/studygroups/11/SPEGCS_RSG_Matt%20Simmons_2-24...
This is a good early 2005 presentation by Matt, which describes the three primary drive mechanisms. He also talks about the Yibal case history and Ghawar.
As they say, the simplest explanation is often the best. And the simple explanation is that it is a virtual certainty that every oil field that has ever produced one mbpd or more of crude oil is now in decline.
Texas and the Lower 48 couldn't match their early Seventies peak production rates, because of the declines from the old large oil fields, and so far Saudi and world crude oil production numbers are showing the same pattern as Texas and the Lower 48.
There are three principal drive mechanisms in oil reservoirs: solution gas drive, water drive and gas cap expansion drive. To some extent, gravity drainage is a factor, especially in gas cap expansion drive reservoirs.
Not all oil fields have a water leg and not all oil fields have a gas cap, but let's assume a large field with a water leg, an oil column and a gas cap--gas on top of oil on top of water, e.g., Prudhoe Bay.
The best way to produce an oil field with a gas cap is to minimize the gas production from the cap and to produce the oil from the lowest practical point in the oil column. As the oil is withdrawn, the gas cap expands, pushing the oil down, aided by gravity drainage. Frequently associated gas is processed, to remove the NGL's, and the dry gas is reinjected back into the gas cap. Also, in many cases supplemental water is injected into the water leg in order to keep the reservoir pressure up. Prudhoe Bay is unusual in that water is also being injected into the gas cap in order to keep the pressure up.
In time, the oil column thins to the point that so much water, from the underlying water leg, and gas, from the overlying gas cap, is being produced that it is no longer economic to continue producing the thinning oil column. At that point, the operator will deliberately produce the gas in the cap, which is basically the final stage of depletion in the field. This would result in a short term boost in NGL production.
So, Matt's point is that a lot of the recent increase in NGL production comes from oil fields in their death throes.
The Brent Field being a good example! An oil field that became a gas field and will likely be decommissioned as a gas field within a couple of years.
Another factor is that it seems that KSA is now selling more Arab Heavy they increased the markdown to make viable for simpler refineries to handle it.
http://www.peakoil.com/fortopic34425.html
I think most people agree that its known that KSA has excess capacity that consists of heavy sour crude that its been unable to sell at the price it wants.
The combination of this entering the market blowdown of gas caps and some increased production from Iraq would explain all of the current increases if they are real. I'm not saying that these are not new increments but its not clear yet if they are enough to have overcome drops in other places. I'm guessing that the increase in how heavy oil is which drops the amount of gasoline per barrel is being offset by increased production of the lighter NGL's. So overall even though it seems that light sweet crude is decreasing the combination of NGL and heavy oil is in a sense offseting the loss of light sweet at least for now.
I guess this shows up as processing gains ?
I'll admit I don't know enough to understand NGLs vs heavy etc etc maybe one day Robert Rapier could post on the finer points of oil.
Interesting regards gas caps and depleting fields. Big bid up now for big Nat'l Gas pipeline from...Alaska. Canadians, yanks and Chinese bidding on it. Have a friend up there working that area. North Slope has been in pretty steady decline (no news there) and...they've been cross drilling over into ANWAR. Not getting as much as they would have liked.
Old Wash Post piece on Prudhoe decline; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/06/AR200506...
That's dead serious that this valuable oil is now used for consumption. We actually need it as an energy input for all those future projects required to de-carbonise our economy. NASA climatologist James Hansen has calculated that if we burn all oil and gas WE MUST PHASE OUT COAL OR USE COAL ONLY IN COMBINATION WITH CO2 SEQUESTRATION.
Implications of "peak oil" for atmospheric CO2 and climate
http://arxiv.org/abs/0704.2782
These sequestration projects are huge projects requiring free-flowing diesel for construction equipment. A 1 GW coal fired power plant generates 150 Kb/d of liquid CO2 to be sequestered away. Geological surveys, drilling rigs, pipelines etc. If that has to be done on the backside of peaking oil and gas curves how will that work?
I repeat again we have to set aside oil and gas fields for the sole purpose of serving as an energy input into those de-carbonisation projects.
Oh, really?
How far do you have to drill to get there? 1 Mile? 50 Miles?
He's not really serious about that, now, is he?
Cheers, Dom
That's what my guy told me. Also told me that Prudhoe is pretty much tapped out and has been in death throes decline for 5yrs. He's lived and worked up there going on 40yrs.
Figure this; they can drill deepwater, horizontal drill tech isn't in its infancy. Why not X-drill long distances on land? Alot easier than dealing with 1,000s of meters of water and liquid salt caps (like the new Brazil field) even more 1,000s of meters down. Kuwait X-drilled far enough into the Basra area to cause a noticeible decline in Iraqi field pressures and thus set themselves on a crash course with Iraq in '89. Why not slide horizontal into ANWAR? Actually less impact that way.
Did anyone really think they'd just go "Oh well..." and let that crude just sit there?
Now, that doesn't mean that they're going all the way in, but if they can get at what's on the perifery, why wouldn't they?
Like I said, this was just my source. I don't have reason to doubt him, but I'm not up there. So there it is for what it's worth.
Could be. Evidence would be that production stops falling, for instance.
Just ask him how far they have to drill. I have an email address..-), just in case it takes a while..-)
Cheers, Dom
Well, you've got pipeline to Badami. 20-30 miles to ANWAR from there. I'll see what moroe i can find out. Who knows up there.
Back several years ago, I downloaded a document from Alyeska Oil website that indicated that without drilling into both NPR-A and/or ANWR (Area 1002), the pipeline would reach it's transport minimum by 2017 (200,000 BPD) and ready for "abandonment in place" status.
The combined effects (and building the required infrastructure, particularly for ANWR since it's a long way from the TAP) of NPR-A and ANWR could extend the life to roughly 2034 if the USGS Mean estimates we actually found and recovered. A temporary boost in throughput up to a level between 1.4 and 1.5 million BPD would be likely if the oil from ANWR really exists.
The oil resources in NPR-A are bit more certain because of the greater amount of drilling and seismic work in NPR-A and some of the reserves are currently being drilled and being readied to be brought online to slow the decline caused by the Prudhoe Bay fields reaching the end of their lives (average water cut is now greater than 75%).
The argument (in Alaska at least) really is less about a Wildlife Refuge turned into a Wilderness Area (although there are some fairly strong opinions about THAT process), than it is about the availability of infrastructure to move any oil that might actually exist. It seems pretty clear to me that once the TAP is shutdown, oil in ANWR (1002) becomes a moot point.
Well, since you've depreciated the pipeline, why not just turn the gas in place into GTL and send it south on the pipeline? When the oil is gone, just convert the pipeline to methanol. A lot better than just scrapping it for the molybdenum alloy steels.
it might be of some benifit to point out that for an oil reservoir, pressure depletion(solution gas drive) is not very efficient. and this is because low viscosity gas is not very efficient in displacing higher viscosity oil (typically 15 - 25%). water is more efficient than gas and a typical water displacing oil efficiency is 40%.
gravity drainage trumps all.
for a gas reservoir, depletion (or blow down) is the most efficient mechanism. a gas reservoir generally behaves according to the real gas law, pv=zNRT. so the lower the pressure, the fewer moles, N, of gas remaining and the higher the recovery. recoveries from depletion of a gas reservoir are typically in the range of 85% or better. typical water drive recoveries from a gas reservoir is about 65%, about the same as an oil reservoir produced by gravity drainage.
ghawar is produced by gravity stable pressure maintence by water injection and a reasonable recovery estimate is about 65%.
"Matt Simmons suspects that a lot of the recent increase in NGL production is due to a number of gas caps being blown down, in oil fields that are in terminal decline."
What is the source of this statement by Simmons?
What recent increase in NGL production? the OPEC dataset is the only one that breaks out monthly NGL. It only shows a recent 50,000 bpd increase.
What is meant by recent? The data we are talking about in this thread or does Simmons simply mean "in general the last few years"?
In other words, is Simmons suggesting that NGL production the last few months is the reason for a new liquids peak?
You will have to contact Matt directly if you want his supporting evidence. He addresses the issue on Slide #12, in his ASPO-USA presentation. Go to www.simmonsco-intl.com and click on his speeches and look for the ASPO presentation.
In any case, Euan just provided a concrete example of a giant oil field, now in its death throes, showing an increase in gas and NGL production.
It is a little ironic that the cornucopians are probably celebrating increasing NGL production as evidence of the "death of Peak Oil," while in fact it is probably just a side effect of many oil fields being in terminal decline.
My cornucopian aspect wants me to remind everyone that 'cornucopian' means that humanity can solve problems, NOT that oil is inexhaustible OR that peak-oil is not imminent.
My doomer aspect thinks my cornucopian aspect is stupid anyhow, and really doesn't care.
:-)
Cornucopian means that one doesn't believe in limits, that resources are going to be plenty forever, because substitution or new advances in science.
Today they are called "Perpetualists".
A Perpetualist believes in one or more of the following:
1. Peak Oil is just a hoax to help the oil companies game the markets and make gazibillions of dollars.
2. Planet Earth is filled at its center with a creamy-naugot of biotic and abiotic oil-generating gnomes. They replenish the reservoirs every time the markets say pretty please. It's always been that way. Always will be that way. (We've been at the Malthusian ha ha end point five times before and will be there again an infinite number of times in the future.)
3. Progress is forever. "We" have always had progress and always will. Besides, anybody with half a rational mind knows the "World is Flat" and is heading inevitably towards the "Singularity" if they read their Thomas Friedman and Kurzweil Bibles.
4. Human ingenuity solves all problems. Always has. Always will.
5. God will not allow the human race to go extinct because God is perfect, God is forever, and God created man in his own image. Therefore because God is perfect and infinite, He will never admit that creating man was an environmental mistake and He will never let mankind go extinct. (Oh, and as for the dinosaurs, Satan made those, not God. Why do you think they looked like dragons anyway? They were Satan's creation. Good had to triumph over evil and thus the dinosaurs went extinct. There is an "ingenious" explanation for everything. Always has been. Always will be.)
A good term, actually - in part, because it actually seems fair and accurate. Without being condescending or insulting.
Now if we can just find a good term for people who don't believe in that framework.
.finalists..fatalists..fatualists..finitalists..entropists..party poopers..manic depressivists..alarmists..limitists.? exaustionists ?
"realitycountants"
=those who account for real things (i.e., EROI, barrels of economically recoverable crude left in the ground and number of rigs (straws) and men (suckers) available "above ground")
This is opposed to the other kinds of people:
"fictioncountants"
=those who account only for fictional things (i.e., money, the everlasting perpetual compound interest and the ever growing, strong and robust free market)
Ahh, yes, the old "pro-life vs. pro-death" sophistry. Nonsensical, self-serving labels only serve to mark you as irrational and arguing in bad faith.
Ahhh God. You've thrust the mark of Cain upon my forehead.
I am irrational.
I am invincible.
I am sophist man.
Thank you for setting me straight oh pitted one.
;-)
I left out *realists* for a reason..
It's a prefered subjective way of looking at oneself.
Of course my accounting is realistic. I just happen to be counting beans and the other is counting peas...
Cheers, Dom
Not so! Opec Natural Gas Liquids increased from 4.83 to 4.99 mb/d September to October. That is an increase of 160,000 barrels per day.
Ron Patterson
Yes So! You're looking at IEA numbers. I'm looking at EIA numbers which are 4.50 and 4.55. 50,000 barrels. Regardless, it is only roughly 10% of the overall increase which was more to my point.
But the EIA is not the one showing the sudden surge in October production. We are talking about this new record reported only by the IEA. Also, you are looking at the EIAs Short Term Energy Outlook. That is just a preliminary guess by the EIA. Their official figures come out in their International Petroleum Monthly.
You cannot mix apples and oranges GC, if you are talking about what Simmons was talking about, (the new IEA record), then you must look at the natural gas liquids he was talking about, those reported by the IEA and they report OPEC NGLs increased by 160,000 bp/d in October.
I believe strongly that there will be no new EIA record set in October, not in crude + condensate anyway. And it is highly unlikely that they will find any new "all liquids" record either. At any rate, when the EIA data comes out for October we can discuss it then.
Ron Patterson
The EIA (International Petroleum Monthly) data go only up to August 2007 (published in November) which was a minimum month. So we have to wait until January 2008 to get their October figures.
With all respect, since you obviously follow these numbers, they are all guesses. EIA, IEA, or BP. And anybody else. They undoubtedly all get their figures from the same dubious sources. In reality, you will admit that the "preliminary guesses" never change much.
There are revisions, to be sure, but not very many and they don't add up to much. I already know your objection(s) - but please, hear me out, I can prove it.
make a database of preliminary figures and one of "final" revised. Run a training moving average on both columns (12 months). Then tell me by how much they differ on average and make a graph of the two lines.
Then try to make a monthly graph that spans back to 2002(5 years) where you can see daylight between the two lines.
Am I right?
The IEA October 2007 spike came about in this way:
in mb/d Oct07-Sep07
Saudi Arabia 0.1
Russia 0.07
Iraq 0.12
Nigeria 0.09
OPEC NGLs 0.16
UK 0.09
Others FSU 0.26
China 0.2
Angola 0.1
Brazil 0.04
Others Asia 0.08
Australia 0.04
Others 0.05
Total change 1.4
The main characteristic was that the total increase was the result of many increases spread over many countries and that there were no significant drops elsewhere in the supply system. The question of course is now whether those increases can be maintained and/or are not canceled out by those other disruptions in the next months.
That's a good catch Matt. In my mind that tends to make it seem more random, rather than some systematic change.
I have the entire IEA dataset going back to Jan 2004 and there is approx. 1mnpd more NGL now than there was nearly 4 years ago. But it doesn't explain last months sharp increase.
I think the saying goes: "A single swallow doth not a summer make". In other words, this new elevated production level now needs to be maintained, month in and month out for years to come, otherwise any decline will only be more visible. If I was IEA director I would have thought long and hard about releasing that number. Maybe I would have spread it over 6 months or something. This brings me to the my next point: the veracity of the data.
I am an accountant. I have spent my life interpreting and presenting figures and I have seen enough to know that what you see is not necessarily what you get. WSI-NN-WYG if you like. I have wondered for a long time about the consistency of the data. The data is more a political statement than a statement of fact. It is hard otherwise to explain the consistancy of both the EIA and the IEA data, even the noise! However to be fair, both agencies are using a wide variety of data sources including estimates for tanker movements and the like and there will be a great deal of interpretation and adjustment going on.
I have even wondered whether KSA for instance would go so far as to fill tankers with water to mislead production estimates.
So for a long time I have tended to take the data from both agencies as components in a trend. It is much harder to provide false data that is also credible over a period of time than falsify a single data set. Lets see what this month brings, then next month etc. If production levels hold we should try and find out why. If they don't, it was just noise.
Trust me and I'm a super doomer their is enough slop in the numbers that we will probably be in bad shape well before we actually get the numbers to prove it. KSA is already playing games by increasing shipments to the US and decreasing to Asia and vice versa. Non-OECD demand could have dropped because of prices by 1-4mbd and we would never really know. We do get the reports eventually of shortages but most of these countries also have storage facilities so that means the actual shipments started decreasing before the final shortage hit the papers. Without invoking any nefarious actions the worlds oil supply is so badly accounted for your basically losing the exports of Mexico in the noise. Thats pretty bad.
This is a very important statement from an accountant. I doubt it is possible to fudge data consistently in such a way that one does not leave a statistical signature in the data set ultimately providing clues where the fudging was done. So Stuart's exercise is one valuable contribution towards this analysis.
Liquid natural gas production is rapidly increasing. A byproduct of LNG liquefication is natural gas liquids/condensates production. Since natural gas production has not peaked, the supply of NGL's is increasing. Some natural gas to synthetic oil/diesel will produce more liquids. The rapid increase in natural gas discovery in West Africa, Egypt, Australia, and other parts of the world is a positive sign for the energy consumer. New technology may make heavy oil production more profitable. The ASPO peak oil forecast includes the increase of natural gas liquids expected.
Natural gas is being substituted for oil wherever economically feasible.