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209 comments on DrumBeat: December 17, 2007
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209 comments on DrumBeat: December 17, 2007
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There has been a lot of stuff coming out of Russia suggesting flat to lower production, starting with the Alfa Bank report this summer warning that the country's large old oil fields were beginning to water out at an alarming rate, and Renaissance Capital brokerage said that excluding the Sakhalin-1 Field, daily crude output in Russia has been down year-on-year since May.
In any case, based on our mathematical model, Russia is primed for a production decline, which could be fairly severe. Our middle case shows them approaching zero net oil exports around 2024, same time frame as Norway.
Why would the severity be any worse than in the USA?
"Why would the severity be any worse than in the USA?"
Because the nearest swing supplier is one the moons of Saturn..
Of the 27 European nations 25 import most (more than 90%) of their oil and gas.
There is a good reason that the French have so much nuclear, they have almost no fossil fuels!
We are very vunerable even in the UK where our North sea resources are disappearing rapidly.
Based on the HL model, Russia is at roughly the same stage of depletion as the US, but the recent rebound in Russian production was primarily just making up for what was not produced immediately following the Soviet collapse; therefore, the decline rate should probably be pretty severe, at least the decline rate from mature basins.
Regarding the “We have peaked” comment by the Lukoil VP:
http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/1/27/14471/5832
One of my comments (slightly edited for typos) regarding my original January, 2006 post on net exports:
IMO, the HL model should be assumed to be approximately right, until proven otherwise. This suggests that the very lifeblood of the world industrial economy--net oil export capacity--is draining away in front of our very eyes.
And there has been a lot of other stuff coming out of Russia - increasing production of oil. Russian oil production in October was 10.14Mb/d, which is a full 3% higher than it was just 6 months before.
Whatever a few people have been saying, the plain fact is that Russian oil production has been growing fairly quickly in recent months. That doesn't mean it'll continue, but it does mean that the sources you refer to aren't looking terribly credible at the moment.
And that was two years ago - the decline rate would need to be about 15% now to fit your prediction.
Can you name any large, mostly-onshore producer that has ever experienced a geologically-caused sustained decline rate in excess of 10%? Any? Because it looks like you're insisting Russia will behave very, very differently from what the historical experience of similar regions has been.
You're fond of comparing oil-producing regions to the US, and that does seem to be the closest fit for Russia - similar peak flow rates, similar cumulative productions, similar huge, diverse land area...and yet decline rates that differ by nearly an order of magnitude? How is that at all plausible?
Are you going to believe me or the Vice President of Lukoil? Of course, I guess we are saying the same thing.
The most recent EIA C+C data (September) show production to basically be the same as October 2006, and based on Russian data, November was down to the lowest level since May.
As I have previously outlined, the post-1984 Russian production and post-1970 Lower 48 cumulative production were basically been what the HL model predicted they would be, using only data through 1984 and through 1970 respectively to generate the models. Of course, they had wildly different production curves, which results in the anticipated higher decline rates for Russia.
So, let's see if the VP of Lukoil is correct. And if he is correct, we'll find out what kind of decline rates we see because of the rapidly rising water cuts in the old Russian fields.
Excerpt from an e-mail from a European energy analyst (I don't have the link):
But regardless of all of the above, the fundmental point is that the top five net export decline rate--as our model and recent case histories suggested--appears to be accelerating.
I'll certainly believe that the VP of Lukoil wants his government to invest in his business sector. I don't believe your prediction that Russian oil production is going to enter a 15% annual terminal decline. And I also don't believe that he's saying that, either.
Besides...
Peak oil production is still decades away, according to Lukoil's top executive.
...I think you'll agree that we shouldn't take what Lukoil execs say as gospel.
The article isn't available online, at least based on googling for select phrases.
Two problems with that analysis:
Intuitively, I would expect to see the relative share of the top five exporters decrease as oil gets scarcer, as their big, easy fields are used up and more players are enticed into the game with more marginal supplies.
To a certain extent, that's exactly what we see. The net exports from the countries which are currently the top 5 exporters fell in 2006 to 50.2% of net exports, from a recent high of 52.4% in 2003 (EIA data). It's far too early to call that a trend, of course, but it suggests that looking only at the top 5 might not give the full picture.
From the January, 2006 post:
The 11% number was a rough guess. As noted down the thread, Khebab's most recent work that I presented at ASPO-USA shows a middle case decline of about -7%/year.
We can continue to argue about "why" as the Titanic sinks, but the net export decline by the top five--accounting for about 50% of world net oil exports--is almost certainly going to show an accelerating decline rate, as suggested by our model and recent case histories.
We shall see what future production and export data show.
As I've previously given the calculations for, the decline rate would need to be ~13% for the cumulative production given by HL to be right. And if it's wrong, what reason do we have to assume a high rate of decline?
We're arguing whether we're on the Titanic - Russian production has been growing strongly, and has shown little sign of an imminent and rapid decline.
The top five are accounting for a decreasing share of net exports, so an analysis that fixates on them is likely to systematically overstate the problem.
So, I guess when the top five net exports have dropped by 90%, against an overall 75% net export decline, we are in fine shape, because the current top five would account for a small percentage of net exports at that point. Makes sense to me.
Straw Man fallacy. Is it that hard to address what people actually say?
Of course that would be a problem, and I've said as much repeatedly. It would be a 75% net export decline problem, though, and not a 90% one.
If the United States peaked in 1971 and some 36 years later we get about half the production we got then, where in the world are you getting an 11% decline rate from? Russia is not an individual oil field, but a vast continental land mass with numerous fields composed of autochthonous and allochthanous rock units. There are new rigs on order. Eastern Siberia and the Pacific Margin are yet not fully explored. The Arctic Ocean is yet a frontier. Heavy oil tech. is the new, new thing. There is potential for a slower decline in Russia as a whole than is expected with Cantarell, Mexico.
Some people have panicked and without much research are trying to convert 6 billion bushels of corn out of a total 13 billion bushel corn + wheat harvest to get little more than 5% of our gasoline needs met (New U.S. Energy Bill to require seven fold increase in ethanol usage 12/2007). It was a bipartisan mistake to push this bill. Unless people push back hunger will stalk the land.
I have acknowledged that we are principally talking about the mature Russian basins, but I suspect that the new plays, e.g. Eastern Siberia, may be to total Russian production as Alaska was to the US. Furthermore, there have been reports that the new Eastern Siberian fields are both smaller than expected and being developed too slowly to offset the decline from Western Siberia.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/07/10/042.html
Tuesday, July 10, 2007. Issue 3695. Page 5.
The Moscow Times: Alfa Report Sees Trouble Looming in Russian Oil Sector
By Anatoly Medetsky
Staff Writer
http://mnweekly.ru/local/20070927/55279368.html
27/09/2007 | Moscow News,№38 2007
Russia's Geology in Dire Straits
BTW, Khebab's most recent work on Russia (used for ASPO-USA) shows the middle case long term decline rate, out to 2028, to be about -7%/year. This is a decline to about 2 mbpd from about 10 mbpd (C+C+NGL), or an 80% decline. If instead we see a 90% decline by 2028, we would see about a -10%/year decline rate, but again we are principally talking about the mature Russian basins.