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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2008/03/02/ccliam...
Russia is emerging as a global economic giant
By Liam Halligan
So, what happens when Russian oil production starts, or more accurately, continues to decline? Our (Khebab/Brown) projection for Russian net oil exports:
Hi WT--I would expect oil price to climb as output falls, thus keeping current income in a rough balance. Add to that revenues from NatGas, and Russia is going to exhibit BAU-type growth for at least a decade. This means that internal consumption will grow and thus reduce exports even more than the decline rate, thus driving up export price still more. Pricing energy exports in rubles will cause them to increase in value against other currencies, increase Russians' purchasing power and their rate of consumption. My question are, How long can/will this burst of economic affluence last, and what will the Russians build during this period--US Style sprawl, or infrastructure to sustain Russians after their hydrocarbon wealth is spent? Then there is the question, What will Russia's hydrocarbon customers do when its exports decline to zero?
Russia is on track, within two years, to become the largest market for new car sales in Europe. Note that Midland, Texas in the Seventies--benefiting from high oil prices even as production fell--reportedly had the largest Rolls Royce dealership in the world outside of the UK.
I have compared a gradual post-peak production decline to a commercial airliner doing a gradual descent for landing. A net export crash is more akin to a terrifying near vertical dive into the ground.
IMO, the lifeblood of the world industrial economy--net oil export capacity--is draining away in front of our very eyes.
Once net export capacity drains away, what of regional industrial economies instead of one that is global based on the production of renewable energy devices? Or do you see resource wars detering any chance of fundamental systemic change?
You are just repeating the myth that has been drilled into your head by the western media. Russia's GDP growth took off in 2000 (industrial production went up by 11% in 1999) and was growing fast before 2005 when oil prices changed significantly. In fact the GDP growth took a hit from high fossil fuel prices. One of the key changes under Putin's administration is that people and businesses started to pay fair taxes so the government and the economy could function.
When oil production starts to decline it will not be at the expense of domestic consumption (transportation fuel is not subsidized in Russia). Since the fraction of the oil and gas sector in Russia's GDP is declining steadily from year to year (less than 6% now) the impact of downsizing in this sector after 2020 is not going to have the impact that some are wishing for.
The economy in Russia is just too diversified to be governed by oil and gas. It is, like all economies, dependent on fossil fuel energy to function. But Russia isn't going to run out of energy any time soon. It is building the BN-800 fast breeder and has plans for commerical BN-1800 by 2020. For the next 30 years at least it has all the natural gas and oil that it needs.
Regarding the rapid growth in GDP since 2000, you might want to compare it to the net oil export chart shown above. I agree with you that Russia has a much better tax system.
If oil production continues to decline, I agree that importers will be hit much harder than exporters. Russia, IMO, is in what I call a Phase One decline--where cash sales from declining oil export volumes increase, because of rising oil prices.
Using the production data through 1984 to construct a HL model suggests that Russia--at least from mature producing basins--is roughly at the same stage of depletion as the Lower 48, in the vicinity of 85% or so. Cumulative Russian production has recently "caught up" to where it should, based on the HL model. Excluding the Sakhalin-1 Field (which was not producing in the Eighties), daily crude output in Russia has been down year-on-year since May, 2007 and very recent data show declining total production.
My premise is that frontier Russian basins are to mature Russian basins as Alaska is to the Lower 48--it helps, but it's no panacea.
I agree with you that Russia's oil and gas production will decline, sooner rather than later. Oil export revenues did not jump in 2000, they jumped after 2004. The post collapse production decline was already over by 2000. But the export revenue increase in the last three years is only part of the general increase in government revenues and private sector profitability in the last eight years. Also, until Putin's second term a major part of the oil revenues was being siphoned off into offshore banks by oligarchs like Khodorkovsky. Much like in Venezuela until "petrotyrant" Chavez and his "socialism".
One of the biggest factors in the 2000 GDP growth was import substitution driven by the devaluation of the ruble in the wake of the 1998 financial collapse. The 1998 financial crisis was the best thing to have happen since the collapse of communism. It killed off the monetarist voodoo economics that was destroying Russian industry and turning people into paupers.
Perhaps all the sanctimonious windbags in the western media and punditocracy should take into account the experience of the average Russian in the last 20 years when trying to explain the political evolution of the country.
We may be looking at different net export graphs. I'm looking at the one just up the thread.
Granted, world oil prices did not move out of the teens to twenties until 2004, but Russian net exports started a steep increase in 2000.
According to your graph the exports were 4 million bpd in 2000, which is about the same as in 1999 and they hit 6 million barrels per day in 2005. Convolving a linear increase of 50% over 5 years with an exponential increase in price after 2005 produces a spike in revenues after 2005. So your graph does not back up your claim that Russian oil revenues shot up in 2000. Like I said, Khodorkovsky and friends were shipping the money out of Russia until Putin's second term (i.e. after 2004).
Believe whatever you want.
I've been researching Peak Oil for the better part of four years now and at no time has there been such a disconnect between what the news and government agencies have been reporting and what is actually happening. Now that's really saying something as, so far, the IEA, the EIA, and other thinktanks have been mostly wrong on all their predictions.
1. Your points on Russia and the following article piqued my interest:
http://uk.reuters.com/article/marketsNewsUS/idUKN0229469320080303?rpc=40...
According to these statements, Russian production is now in decline. But we have the EIA predicting a substantial increase in Russian output (around 800,000 barrels per day) by the end of this year.
2. Saudi Arabia is supposed to increase net oil production, according to the EIA, by about the same amount as Russia. But, according to the Saudis, we are seeing lower output from new projects in addition to delays. This coupled with OPEC threating to cut or keep production steady in the face of record oil prices does not inspire confidence and begs the question -- is OPEC even able to increase production for significant periods of time?
3. Biofuels are feeling the crunch due to food shortages and high food prices. So one wonders if biofuels will be able to grow at the pace predicted for 2008.
4. We had a bump in supply at the end of last year and early this year. But what I want to know is do you guys think it's sustainable? If you read the reports at face value it seems to be the usual fluff. But look a little deeper and things get a little scary. For one, the EIA keeps revising its estimates downward and while stocks are building in the US, they're falling everywhere else.
In all, what I want to know is where is all this expected new supply going to come from? Maybe it's a little too early to call but it seems 2008 may shape up to be a Peak Oil year after all.
IMO, Deffeyes was right and crude oil (C+C) peaked in 2005. Like the initial 48 decline we have seen two years of slow declines worldwide.
As Simmons pointed out, a lot of the total liquids bump is probably coming from oil fields blowing down their gas caps and temporarily boosting NGL production.
But the big problem is net exports.
How long does this added gas last in a mature field?
And I have to hand it to you guys RE the Export Land Model. It really helps put the problem into perspective.
Unfortunately, the first perspective many Americans will have ont he problem will be looking down out of their SUV window at a gas pump with a "No Gas" bag draped over the nozzle.
Ah, the dreaded out of gas yellow plastic bag with black lettering. That will be the last day for the Cornucopians when everyone is forced to become a Peak Oiler, whether they like it or not.
Oil exports are a curse for the exporting country - in this case Russia. It raises the value of their currency and makes domestic industries uncompetitive.
True. in Britain oil has pushed up the pound to levels which have made manufacturing uncompetative. Output in the sectors has hardly grown since the 1970's, when North Sea oil first came online. Now it is starting to run out the pound is falling, so hopefully the sector will revive, but there may be too big a hole to plug.
Hello Dissident,
See my posting downthread--Do you have any news on why Gazprom is raising sulphur prices 7-fold, or is this a journalistic mistake?
TODer Samsara had a good point the other day that there are huge stockpiles globally from the oilsands, sour crude and gas, coal scrubbers, etc. This should make sulphur products dirt cheap, but prices are rising rapidly--why isn't this stuff moving through the supply chain on a timely basis to where it can be used? Thxs for any reply from you or other TODers.
Gazprom is to increase the price of sulphur from 400 rubles ($16)to 3000 rubles ($120) in 2008
The reason for the price increase is the world market price ~ $600
The Russian consumers prepare to fight the price increase.
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=847157
The only thing I can think of is transportation costs. Food prices are also being affected by transportation costs. I am not sure that the tar sand syncrude producers care enough to try to sell it. As noted by MYXOMOP Gazprom's price is still cheap.
Hello MYXOMOP & Dissident,
Thxs for the replies. I wonder what the correlation is between Peakoil and sulphur, since sulphur is such a crucial, strategic element in chem-mining metallic ores and activating industrial fertilizers. I suppose if the very worst happens: you would like to have a small stockpile for making matches--sure beats rubbing sticks or trying to get sparks from rocks. :(
You could always light a fire during the daytime using a lens and keep the fire burning into the night.
Bravo! Russia's economy is going strong because of the wonderful flat tax program, mostly. How is the economy in Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Iran?
I don't think dwindling Russian oil production will necessarily have any special effect on Russia, beyond the broader overall effect shared by everyone. The US didn't suffer any particular problem resulting from going from a net exporter to a net importer. Not that Russia will be a net importer anytime soon, mind you. There are a lot of countries that are heavy importers, due to the lack of domestic resources, and obviously someone must export to them. Russia is a likely candidate for some time. Already there is some effort to normalize fuel prices in Russia, to reduce overconsumption. In the end, probably everyone will reduce their consumption somewhat, and Russia will continue to export to western Europe.
There is a popular myth or metaphor here at TOD, which is that the economy is like some sort of machine that runs on fossil fuels, and without fossil fuels the machine stops working. Actually, and "economy" is just what people do all day. It doesn't judge between one thing or another.
With a little imagination, it is easy to think of an abundant, prosperous economy that uses perhaps 20% of today's total energy use. Instead of an economy (what people do all day) with a heavy focus on driving 6000 lb SUVs, and all the associated roadways and parking lots, and gigantic houses and excessive consumer goods, you could have an economy focused on something else.
For example, you could have a teahouse economy. Japanese history has funny periods in which the elite classes got very serous about tea, and their teahouses. They would spend ridiculous sums on tea and teahouses. OF course this was just a silly game among the aristocrats. But, I'm not sure that expending one's economic effort on exquisite teahouses is any different than expending one's effort on personal automobiles and giant suburban houses, and all the other stuff such as buying about 10x more clothing than one can possibly wear out, along with all the other home furnishings. Both are really just a matter of aesthetics. For whatever reason, people today prefer the aesthetics of cars and suburban houses and constant shopping for generally mass-produced low-quality goods (compared to handmade artisan pieces) to the aesthetics of teahouses. Thus, the economy today is organized to create enormous quantities of cars and suburban houses and mass-produced low-quality goods. However, you could have an economy organized to create exquisite teahouses.
In a teahouse economy, there might be a very large teahouse industry. Many, many people would be involved in the design and construction of exquisite teahouses. This does not necessarily mean a large number of teahouses. You can just as easily put effort into making very expensive and labor-intensive teahouses. There are some teahouses in Japan that are completely covered in gold leaf, for example. And, since each one would be completely original and artisan-built, they would be very expensive.
There is no distinction, in economics, between building one gold-leaf covered teahouse for $10m or building 10,000 plastic Home Depot teahouses for $1000 each. Both are perfectly valid ways to spend one's time. Indeed, it could well be argued that it makes more sense to build one $10m teahouse, as that could be a work of art appreciated for centuries, while the 10,000 plastic Home Depot teahouses are really just a bunch of disposable junk.
I'll stop there, but we can see from this example that, perhaps, making one $10m teahouse, by hand, could be much less energy-intensive than making 10,000 plastic Home Depot teahouses in a factory in China. Also, it would be much less energy intensive than buying 200 $25,000 SUVs (for $5m) and then burning up $5m of petroleum driving around the countryside. And yet, all three options are counted as "$10m of GDP" by statisticians. (Not that statistics are the last word on anything, but you see the point.)
Which is not to say that there will not be a "collapse of civilization as we know it" corresponding to the period of declining fossil fuel production. However, you don't need declining fossil fuel production to have an economic collapse. The Soviet Union collapsed just fine despite sitting on huge quantities of fossil fuels.
I use the example of teahouses because teahouses are a "thing", and most people still imagine an economy as creating "things." However, there is no distinction between things and services. Creating a $100 tennis racquet and offering a $100 tennis lesson are both counted as $100 of GDP.
You could have, for example, a back massage economy. Half the population works all morning to create all the necessities of life, such as shelter, food, education, medical care and the like. Then they take the afternoon off. The other half of the population takes the morning off, then they spend all afternoon giving back massages to the first half. After all, the first half is tired from providing all the necessities of life, except for back massages.
If you think of an economy as how people spend their time, it is clear that one can spend their time giving back massages, or even just doing nothing at all, instead of making things or consuming energy.
FWIW: I seriously doubt that KSA will continue to pump at the maxiumum rate for much longer. While mathematical models can show potential future production, it does not factor in the unpredictable human equation.
1. High oil prices means KSA can maintain high export income buy pumping less. When Oil was about $10 bbl, KSA had to pump 10 times the amount to reach the same revenue of $100 bbl oil.
2. I doubt KSA will sell its last barrel of oil. Its far more likely that KSA will cut back production to make its remaining reserves last. Is also likely that internal domestic issues will also shape the way KSA exports oil. Whether its terriorism, or just the kindom's population forcing policy changes on the gov't.
3. I doubt that KSA will beable to maintain a decline rate of 8.4%. From some of the reports posted on TOD, it looks like KSA is holding declines by drilling for oil trapped in large pockets. Its very likely that with in the next 12 to 18 months, they will run out of the big pockets and start chasing after the small ones. If the smaller pockets are on average half the size of the large pockets, KSA will need to double up on drilling. If the smaller pockets average out at 25% of the large pockets, they'll need to quadruple drilling.
I think sometime between 2010 and 2012, KSA will radically alter its oil export policies. We might see some small changes happen in 2009. Just a hunch.
Saudi Arabia: No Exports of Natural Gas Today, No Oil Exports Tomorrow?
http://english.daralhayat.com/business/03-2008/Article-20080302-6fdd43ef...
Chances of Launching an Arab Market for Gas Weakened in the Absence of a Declared Regional Price
Walid Khadduri
Al-Hayat 02/03/08
>It's time the conspiracy theorists accepted that oil had nothing to do with the
>US invasion of Afghanistan.
It is my understanding that economic interests want to build a (natural gas) pipeline through Afghanistan.
There was a lot of discussion of this prior to the invasion.
The trans-Afghanistan pipeline? Yes, they were trying to but the project stalled BECAUSE of the US-led overthrow of the taliban.
The Taliban were being uncooperative at the meetings they attended in Texas during Clinton's last term. Unocal did a lot of manuvering to get a competitor removed from the game, and its VP for overseas operations actively lobbied and testified before congress to help implement the pipeline plan. The plans for Afghanistan's invasion were drawn up PRIOR to 9/11. 9/11 provided the necessary "Pearl Harbor" element called for by the PNAC plan to invade Iraq for its hydrocarbons. After that, the remaining dominoes would fall and "The Prize" as termed by Cheney in 1999 would be in Neocon hands. If Afghanistan was the only game in town, you can be sure the Neocons would have consolidated control and the pipeline would be finished by now. History of the Afghan pipeline is detailed in Ahmed Rashid's book about the Taliban, and the Unocal exec's testimony is widely available online. The alledged "Carpet of Gold, or Carpet of Bombs" threat hasn't ever been proven, but sounds like a BushCo/Neocon negotiating ploy.
As for the Rove quote regarding oil going to $200 if we correct his crime and withdrawl, he's absolutely full of Bantha pudu. The same is true of sanctions on Iran. Withdrawl the troops and lift the sanctions and oil will fall as above ground factors abate and facilitate an increase in below ground extraction rates. The increased supply and lessened war premium would allow oil to drop back to about $80, perhaps; but it certainly won't go to $200, yet.
"The increased supply and lessened war premium would allow oil to drop back to about $80, perhaps."
Posted by Karlof 1
For a year or two, perhaps. We would remain on the "Bumpy Plateau" for a while longer, while worldwide demand would continue to grow and the older fields would continue to decline. We would just kick the issue down the tracks a couple of years, after which we would remain in the same jam we are now; trembling on the brink of the dropoff at the edge of the Plateau.
Antoinetta III
Afghanistan is a strategic location. It borders Iran, the Caspian and a number of oil producing countries to the north. The pipeline through Afganistan was not the only oil project in the region. I think it's pretty small minded to say that oil wasn't a factor in the invasion. Certainly, Al Qaeda was there and we were going to go after them no matter where they were. But holding Afghanistan has strategic benefit when it comes to oil.
You don't say.
People that expect the end of the oil age to be a slow decline don't pay much attention to the strategic moves made by the US.
imo, there is little doubt that viet nam was also an attempt to secure oil supply.
take a look at what is happening there today. and how did the cia know there was oil off vietnam ? .......................probably had something to do with the terms "mekong" and "delta" in the same sentence.
I've often thought there was a connection between the Vietnam War and oil. At the very least, there was the oil in Indonesia, which the Japanese had tried to corner when they jumped into WW II. We surely didn't want the Red Dominos to fall that way. Then too, ideas like Plate Tectonics had not been accepted in the geology world, so I can imagine those Texas oil guys looking at the Mekong River and thinking Mississippi/Gulf of Mexico. Another idea I've often thought to be plausible was that the U.S. got into the war to show the Soviets that we were really seriously bad nasty enough to Drop The Big One, should things get down to that level.
E. Swanson
The French were very keen to hold on to Vietnam and fought a long war ending in 1954. Strange because the place was worthless. Perhaps the French liked rice.
But holding Afghanistan has strategic benefit when it comes to oil.
Don't forget the poppies!
(I would not be shocked to see, as a suggestion, here - all the free heroin you want - forget about the trials of PeakOil! Gettign high and tuning out will be a reaction for many)