The Oil Drum

"Equally flawed is the concept that the atrocities are
African-only problems that require African-only
solutions. The well-documented abuses that continue to
occur demand broader and more robust international
efforts aimed at enhancing the AU's ability to lead. In
view of the Sudanese government's abdication of its
sovereign duty and to the extent that the AU cannot
adequately protect Sudan's civilians, the broader
international community has a responsibility to do so.

Civilian protection needs to become the primary
objective. Crisis Group recommends the following
immediate steps, building on AU efforts, to deploy a
multinational military force with sufficient size,
operational capacity and mandate:

1) agree on a stronger mandate. The AU must
strengthen AMIS's (AU mission in Sudan) mandate to enable and
encourage it to undertake all necessary measures,
including offensive action, against any attacks or
threats to civilians and humanitarian operations,
whether from militias operating with the
government or from the rebels. Without a
stronger mandate, the ability of AMIS -- or any
other international force -- to provide
protection will remain extremely limited,
regardless of its size;

2) recognise that many more troops are needed.
12,000-15,000 should, in Crisis Group's estimate,
be on the ground now to protect villages against
further attack or destruction, displaced persons
(IDPs) against forced repatriation and
intimidation, and women from systematic rape
outside the camps, as well as to provide security
for humanitarian operations and neutralise the
government-supported militias that prey on
civilians;

3) support a much more rapid reinforcement of
AMIS. The current AU plan is to reach 7,731 --
including 1,560 civilian police -- by September
2005. The AU believes this relatively small
force could largely stabilise the situation and
that it might then need to go up to 12,300 by
the second quarter of 2006 in order also to
facilitate the eventual return of the displaced to
their homes. Crisis Group believes even the
latter number is at the low end of what is
required first to provide stability in a still lethal
situation, that these troops need to be appropriately
equipped, trained and of a quality to undertake
a dangerous civilian protection mission and that
the AU should consequently approve and
commence an immediate increase in AMIS to
12,000-plus highly ready personnel, to be incountry
within 60 days. The need for civilian
police is especially urgent;

4) provide strong, immediate international
support. To meet these objectives, the UN, EU
and NATO must offer the AU additional help
in force preparation, deployment, sustainment,
intelligence, command and control,
communications and tactical (day and night)
mobility, including the deployment of their own
assets and personnel to meet capability gaps as
needed;

5) develop a Bridging Force Option. If the AU
cannot meet these objectives -- numbers and
quality of troops, and time -- NATO should
work closely with the AU to deploy its own
bridging force and bring the total force up to
12,000 to 15,000 within 60 days and maintain it
at that level until the AU can perform the
mission entirely with its own personnel. The AU
should agree that until such time, its units would
come under command and control of the NATO
mission. The UN Security Council should
authorise the mission with a civilian protection
mandate but if it does not, the AU and NATO
would need to assume the responsibility and
agree on an appropriate mandate. If the
Sudanese government does not accept such a
mission, NATO and the AU would need to
prepare a much larger one to operate in a nonpermissive
environment; and

6) enforce the Security Council ban on offensive
military flights. The AU and NATO should
agree on enforcement measures to be applied if
Khartoum violates the prohibition in UN
Security Council Resolution 1591."