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42 comments on Well, Hello Dolly! (Aw C'mon, Someone Had to Say It): Updated--Putting Dolly to Bed and Hoping She Causes Little Suffering
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42 comments on Well, Hello Dolly! (Aw C'mon, Someone Had to Say It): Updated--Putting Dolly to Bed and Hoping She Causes Little Suffering
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GAIA Host Collective
rage et al:
There is actually a very detailed protocol for shutting down both production and drilling operations offshore as mandated by the Feds. The prime consideration is placing plugs ("storm chokes") in the well bores that would prevent oil/gas from being released to the surface should the whole facility be destroyed. Depending on the facility size this can take 24 to 36 hours. The same is true for a drilling well even if no hydrocarbons have been penetrated. And on any given day there are 25,000+ personnel working offshore. Most of the transport is by helicopter and there are only so many. This is the biggest problem with evacuation plans: it takes so long to completely shutdown and remove all personnel it has to be started before anyone is certain where the storm is going or how big it might get. Turning the production back on can take a couple of days also. So even a small storm that doesn't hit a heavily producing area can shut down all production for 4+ days. So a bunch of small storms can collectively hurt cumulative production as much as a big one.
Thanks for the detailed explanation. The company's statement "no impact to production" is what I had an issue with. I guess I'm skeptical of that.
I think that translates to "don't sell our stock until we know for sure," or something to that effect.
Nobody wants to cry wolf.
No workers means no production from what I read in rockman's post. The company's statement is misleading. Pemex also has misleading and contradictory statements - one article says "operating normally" and another says an export terminal is closed.
Hello Rockman,
Thxs for the detailed explanation on how cumulative 'non-events' can still pileup over time eventually causing possible GoM platform production shortages hitting the refineries ashore.
In the same vein, if closely-spaced, sequential 'non-event' GoM storms really start to backlog VLCCs from GoM refinery docking: how long can they wait before a tankerload, say originally intended for Houston, is then sent to some other port [Rotterdam or some other Europort]?
I have no idea as to the answer to this question, but I would suspect that Lloyd's of London, and other ship insurance cos. do not want VLCCs to traverse very high seas in a GoM 'non-event'. More profitable to send the tanker elsewhere because the only escape routes from the GoM is the Yucatan Slot or the Florida Strait.
Does this post have any merit, or do the VLCCs routinely run safely through very high seas spreading out around the outside periphery of a GoM storm?
Bob Shaw in Phx,Az Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?
Hadn't though about tanker traffic disruptions. Off La. the big boys don't usually come into port anyway. There's an offshore transfer system they'll tie off to and unload. I'm sure it shuts down just like the platforms. The tankers can try to scoot around the storms but they may not always be able to avoid a fast storm. I don't know but I would bet they keep them out of the Gulf when a big one is coming. I doubt they reroute them very far unless there is a long term disruptions...those big boys burn a lot of fuel when they're loaded. As far as TX goes I'm not sure the big ones come up thru the bay. I vaguely remember hearing that they transfer to smaller tankers offshore. Living within sound of the tanker horns you'd think I'd know for sure (I live across the highway from the biggest refinery in the US)
Here's a link to an image of the current positions of registered merchant marine traffic in the GOM. Traffic has pretty well cleared out of the path between Cantarell & the TX/LA coasts. Don't have any data on what "normal" traffic looks like for this region, but this is a pretty cool tool.
For example, scroll down on the page an click on "Gaschem Juemme." You'll see that it's a liquid tanker and is moving north as quickly as it can from its prior position at 0000 GMT at the latitude of the TX/MX border to the latitude of Corpus Chirsti at 1800 GMT.
Jeff,
Thanks for posting that. I knew there was something I needed to get from you. (sorry...)
http://www.sailwx.info/shiptrack/shiplocations.phtml?lat=22.878025859441...
Far-fetched example?
Imagine a VLCC with a broken rudder being helplessly storm wave pushed towards the Thunderhorse Platform. The seafloor is too deep for any anchoring. The owner of that ship would be money ahead to evacuate the crew, then have the USAF sink the ship BEFORE it hits Thunderhorse. It would still make a hell of a mess, but far less of a mess than having a mega-tanker repeatedly bashing into a mega-platform until both sunk.
San Francisco did the same strategy after their 1906 earthquake: explode housing to try and create a firebreak to halt the firestorm.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1906_San_Francisco_earthquake
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...Worst of all, many were set when firefighters untrained in the use of dynamite attempted to dynamite buildings to create firebreaks, which resulted in the destruction of more than half of buildings that would have otherwise survived.[9] The fire chief, who would have been responsible, had died in the initial quake. The dynamited buildings themselves often caught fire. The fires lasted for four days and nights...
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