332 comments on The Path from Petroleum Shortages to Electricity Shortages
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332 comments on The Path from Petroleum Shortages to Electricity Shortages
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GAIA Host Collective
Engineer-Poet,
you make many a good point and in order to argue against, you also had to simplify.
So, let's try to make it more complex, shall we.
Now, again, to restate - this doesn't mean that one is automatically doomer, believes in collapse or thinks the world will end tomorrow.
This is just a way to think about big risks, with perhaps even small probabilities, but potentially very big and hard to predict consequences.
With that away, let's consider a real world scenario of chained events.
Now, above is just a one example of chained and causally reinforcing effects.
What is the probability for that? I don't know, but I'd guess it to be fairly low. Of course, there are geographical, national and fuel mix based differences between various places where that kind of situation might happen.
What I can say, that people who plan these are aware of these, but often they don't really know what to do with them.
Everybody's relying on things like SPR and other backup fuel reserves, but the logistics and coordination hasn't really been tested, in the case of multiple downside risks materializing roughly at the same time.
So, do I personally lose sleep over the above type situation? No.
Do I think that they will never happen? No, they might - even if the likelihood is probably very low.
Do I think the the consequences might be bad? Short term and for some actors, possibly yes - very hard to predict for systemic and esp. mid-to-long term effects. Is the situation recoverable: highly likely.
What I do know that such systemic risks cannot be cured or removed overnight.
Even if I had all the capital, knowledge and manpower in the world, it would indeed take a fairly long time to remove the major systemic risks from above scenario. It would mean a lot of rebuilding, redesigning and adding new capacity - not to mention reducing demand. Some of the risk factors (like peaking of oil, crunch on gas, etc) might not be removable at all. From an economic planning point of view, removing all risks is most of the times not worth it.
So, I think it is good to think about these situations, as I currently believe that the likelihood of such risks currently grows as a function of time as we continue doing BAU.
This does not of course mean that you necessarily think differently about this or that I'm some how arguing against you. This is merely a clumsy way to find some middle ground here.
Very well said and I think this applies to a lot of other systemic risks as well. Our ability is currently perhaps the biggest unknown :)
I'd say approximately zero, because steps 9 and 11 would be forestalled by load-shedding if the grid managers are at all competent. That's what was done in 2003 (SE Michigan was brought back on line in phases), and I doubt the lessons could be forgotten anytime soon.
If we're looking for scenarios for collapse, we need to consider things either beyond our control or (like Cape Wind) where opposed interests block the necessary actions.
Might I remind you that's exactly what the operator's in Italy and Finland thought after the US east coast black outs "pfftt... incompetent, we know our stuff". Then they had their own blackouts, in Finland with a much much more up-to-date infrastructure, mind you.
BTW, the gist of those scenarios above are not my invention. They are by people in the operative side of the business.
I claim not to know the future, but I'm always weary of anybody who says the probability is 0% or 100% for any complex system with a human error built-in :)
I'm just telling you that a grid operator ready to use rolling blackouts to manage demand isn't likely to be caught flat-footed by a demand surge. A sudden plant or line outage, sure, but not excess demand. And the sort of staged return of power already used in 2003 is proof against re-collapse (which you'll note did not occur).
There are ways to manage this even further. If major loads all had control units which sensed voltage and phase and cut back if either suddenly dropped (easily done within a couple cycles), even a line outage such as the one which triggered the 2003 blackout would have failed to create a cascade. If we had substantial demand from (PH)EVs with V2G capability, it would take an even bigger upset to cause the system to fail.
Those protections are in place on the major lines and generators (phase, voltage, power angle, etc). The problem is they are not integrally coordinated across the vastness of the interconnected systems. After all, the grid is an analog system and failure propagations can be difficult to isolate with the amount of power flow involved.
There are regional coordinating committees to handle these interconnection issues, but that is no guarantee the optimal systems and methods are in place.
Here's a decent analogy: If the grid were thought of as a mesh of cables, (which it is electrically, but I'm using mechanical here because it is more visible), as load and generation is increased it is like putting more tension on the cables. More load and generation, more tension until the cables near their snapping point. One fails, or has to disconnect and the rest of cables can start to cascade fail.
The protective switching and control equipment attempts to prevent these cascading failures, but the higher the voltage (hence power transfer) the faster it has to respond. >230 kV requires 3 cycles or less from detection to trip and that can be challenging to accomplish in complex networks - but it gets done every day.
And as they get near their snapping point, controls can drop some of the weights. The weights themselves can detect sudden accelerations downward as neighboring cables go, and reduce their pull to what the mesh can sustain.
This makes no sense whatsoever.
The loads on the grid include a large fraction of electric motors, mostly induction and synchronous motors. One of the great features of motors is that their load drops as the grid frequency drops; if you get a sudden slip in phase, all the motors will pull less power for a fraction, and reduce the immediate grid load. This gives an energy buffer whose duration is independent of the size of the grid connection.