Engineer-Poet,

you make many a good point and in order to argue against, you also had to simplify.

So, let's try to make it more complex, shall we.

  • All risks have probabilities. If we say things can happen, we do not necessarily mean with 100% likelihood. Agreed?
  • Risks can have primary, secondary, tertiary, etc. effects. Some instant. Some delayed. Often most with negative feedbacks. Some may have positive feedbacks. Agreed?
  • A highly hard coupled system (i.e. not able to reconfigure in real time on the fly) with a high level complexity (many parts, distributed responsibility) and high pressure on utility (utilization with near max capacity, with decreasing safety margins) is more likely prone to catastrophic failure. Agreed?

Now, again, to restate - this doesn't mean that one is automatically doomer, believes in collapse or thinks the world will end tomorrow.

This is just a way to think about big risks, with perhaps even small probabilities, but potentially very big and hard to predict consequences.

With that away, let's consider a real world scenario of chained events.

  1. Fast growing economy (US and worldwide) meaning high level of oil and electricity use. Utilization rates are high for all systems.
  2. A statistically colder and longer winter, increasing heating and electricity use of all fossil fuels
  3. Tight margins and very little spare capacity in oil and natural gas supply vs demand.
  4. Already relatively high prices, but for the past relatively steady prices (i.e. not driving a lot of demand destruction, like price spikes do)
  5. A fairly big, unexpected and unmitigated drop in availability of oil for refineries, transport and power generation (back up fuel).
  6. Increased pressure on natural gas demand, leading to rationing and shortages.
  7. People start compensating with electricity to heat their homes and buildings as availability of fossils for heating is limited.
  8. Lack of natural gas and back up supply leads to local electricity rationing.
  9. System utilization rates go near 100%, local power outages start to occur.
  10. A failure in a grid causes a cascade that spreads fairly wide.
  11. An attempt to raise production back online is crimped by remaining electricity load waiting for power to come back online. Power goes up only to be overloaded by demand on the network instantly and going down again.
  12. Continued oil and natural gas shortage diminished back up fuel storage for power generation
  13. Increased competition among fuel transporters to haul coal and oil to all demanding parties, esp. power generators.
  14. Lack of back up fuel causes smaller local power generators not be able to come back online
  15. Lack of proper emergency communication policy, downing of several mass media channels makes it harder to coordinate electricity load from residential buildings in order to get some power plants back online, when priority is given to commercial operators and those who pay most.
  16. A lot of people act in uncoordinated manner and try to solve the situation ad hoc on the fly, as standard emergency and other procedures do not immediately bring desired result
  17. Things continue chaotic for a while, until load is removed, backup fuel is deliver or the shortage of main fuels eases.

Now, above is just a one example of chained and causally reinforcing effects.

What is the probability for that? I don't know, but I'd guess it to be fairly low. Of course, there are geographical, national and fuel mix based differences between various places where that kind of situation might happen.

What I can say, that people who plan these are aware of these, but often they don't really know what to do with them.

Everybody's relying on things like SPR and other backup fuel reserves, but the logistics and coordination hasn't really been tested, in the case of multiple downside risks materializing roughly at the same time.

So, do I personally lose sleep over the above type situation? No.

Do I think that they will never happen? No, they might - even if the likelihood is probably very low.

Do I think the the consequences might be bad? Short term and for some actors, possibly yes - very hard to predict for systemic and esp. mid-to-long term effects. Is the situation recoverable: highly likely.

What I do know that such systemic risks cannot be cured or removed overnight.

Even if I had all the capital, knowledge and manpower in the world, it would indeed take a fairly long time to remove the major systemic risks from above scenario. It would mean a lot of rebuilding, redesigning and adding new capacity - not to mention reducing demand. Some of the risk factors (like peaking of oil, crunch on gas, etc) might not be removable at all. From an economic planning point of view, removing all risks is most of the times not worth it.

So, I think it is good to think about these situations, as I currently believe that the likelihood of such risks currently grows as a function of time as we continue doing BAU.

This does not of course mean that you necessarily think differently about this or that I'm some how arguing against you. This is merely a clumsy way to find some middle ground here.

our ability to organize our technical abilities to meet this threat is the biggest unknown.

Very well said and I think this applies to a lot of other systemic risks as well. Our ability is currently perhaps the biggest unknown :)

What is the probability for that? I don't know, but I'd guess it to be fairly low.

I'd say approximately zero, because steps 9 and 11 would be forestalled by load-shedding if the grid managers are at all competent.  That's what was done in 2003 (SE Michigan was brought back on line in phases), and I doubt the lessons could be forgotten anytime soon.

If we're looking for scenarios for collapse, we need to consider things either beyond our control or (like Cape Wind) where opposed interests block the necessary actions.

Might I remind you that's exactly what the operator's in Italy and Finland thought after the US east coast black outs "pfftt... incompetent, we know our stuff". Then they had their own blackouts, in Finland with a much much more up-to-date infrastructure, mind you.

BTW, the gist of those scenarios above are not my invention. They are by people in the operative side of the business.

I claim not to know the future, but I'm always weary of anybody who says the probability is 0% or 100% for any complex system with a human error built-in :)

I'm just telling you that a grid operator ready to use rolling blackouts to manage demand isn't likely to be caught flat-footed by a demand surge.  A sudden plant or line outage, sure, but not excess demand.  And the sort of staged return of power already used in 2003 is proof against re-collapse (which you'll note did not occur).

There are ways to manage this even further.  If major loads all had control units which sensed voltage and phase and cut back if either suddenly dropped (easily done within a couple cycles), even a line outage such as the one which triggered the 2003 blackout would have failed to create a cascade.  If we had substantial demand from (PH)EVs with V2G capability, it would take an even bigger upset to cause the system to fail.

Those protections are in place on the major lines and generators (phase, voltage, power angle, etc). The problem is they are not integrally coordinated across the vastness of the interconnected systems. After all, the grid is an analog system and failure propagations can be difficult to isolate with the amount of power flow involved.

There are regional coordinating committees to handle these interconnection issues, but that is no guarantee the optimal systems and methods are in place.

Here's a decent analogy: If the grid were thought of as a mesh of cables, (which it is electrically, but I'm using mechanical here because it is more visible), as load and generation is increased it is like putting more tension on the cables. More load and generation, more tension until the cables near their snapping point. One fails, or has to disconnect and the rest of cables can start to cascade fail.

The protective switching and control equipment attempts to prevent these cascading failures, but the higher the voltage (hence power transfer) the faster it has to respond. >230 kV requires 3 cycles or less from detection to trip and that can be challenging to accomplish in complex networks - but it gets done every day.

as load and generation is increased it is like putting more tension on the cables. More load and generation, more tension until the cables near their snapping point.

And as they get near their snapping point, controls can drop some of the weights.  The weights themselves can detect sudden accelerations downward as neighboring cables go, and reduce their pull to what the mesh can sustain.

the higher the voltage (hence power transfer) the faster it has to respond.

This makes no sense whatsoever.

The loads on the grid include a large fraction of electric motors, mostly induction and synchronous motors.  One of the great features of motors is that their load drops as the grid frequency drops; if you get a sudden slip in phase, all the motors will pull less power for a fraction, and reduce the immediate grid load.  This gives an energy buffer whose duration is independent of the size of the grid connection.