There has been nothing short of a monumental flood of money bet in the oil and gas industry over the last two years, and almost all of it has been bet in one direction: LONG.

This is absolutely incorrect. In natural gas, the spec money has been short.

If you're going to blame speculators for expensive oil, you have to also write speculators a thank you note for cheap natural gas.

Also, the fact that the price went up to $148 and then down to $105 doesn't mean that the high price was due to a flood of money from speculators. The real reasons for the high price were the factors that triggered the flood of money from speculators. In my opinion, there were several triggers. One important trigger was that the market is getting information about supply and demand a lot more slowly, probably due to the increase in the length of the effective pipeline to the U.S. markets, due to the decrease in exports from VenMex. The market's also missing a lot of information, or getting it later than it used to, because a lot of the new big players in these markets have no transparency whatsoever. The market is in the position of constantly guessing about China's inventory, the intentions of China's top bureaucrats, the question of whether India is ever going to deal with its power shortages, etc. It's going to take market participants some time to adjust for these factors, and prices will probably never get set as efficiently as they used to.

So, very small changes in the timing of supply and demand make for huge changes in price, and these huge changes are amplified further by the lack of transparency in the markets and the delay in getting info about supply and demand. Even if you take speculators completely out of the picture, we're still going to be seeing really scary volatility in these markets.

A couple of points about Nate's interesting article. First, why don't these hedge funds hire someone who knows how to trade? They need to read up on Kelly betting principles as well. A first-year card counter understands more about bankroll management than these guys. In.ex.cus.a.ble.

Second, although a hedge fund might have enough money to control an amount of oil equal to lost production from Gustav, they're not gonna buy it just for the thrill of owning it. They're buying it because they have some signal that others are going to bid it up, not because they think they can profit by driving up the price themselves. And you don't want the others bidding it up to be ma and pa speculators, because by the time the squares are buying, an entity as large as a hedge fund has to be getting out, otherwise they will get caught without anyone to sell to and lose all their money, a la Ospraie. This is Trading 101.

That essentially means you're buying because you think commercials will be buying. I know Nate knows this, but I want to emphasize the point. There is nothing that any sensible hedge fund manager should fear more than the possibility that money is manhandling energy, rather than following energy.

I completely understand why speculators drive everyone crazy, because they drive me crazy too (even though I'm a speculator). But I'm strongly against position limits because I think they're unenforceable and I think transparency is more important. If we really want prices to be set more efficiently, what it will take is some real diplomatic pressure on China. The last thing I want is masses of spec money running around controlling supply where I can't see it--that would be even worse than what we're dealing with now.

Also, just because the markets drove the oil price up to $148, doesn't mean society was paying $148 for oil. Society never paid anywhere near that much. If you own a royalty trust like Permian Basin Trust (PBT) for example, you frequently see months where the prices you got for your oil or natural gas were pretty far from the headline prices. The June price for Permian Basin Trust oil was $127, even though WTI futures were in the $130s. A month earlier, when the price for natural gas was below $12, Permian Basin shareholders were getting over $14.

So, there are markets and there are markets.

Moe, thanks for posting the buy signals. Speaking to your point about these funds hiring experienced traders, I was just thinking that maybe most of these funds really have a structural incentive problem more than an issue of talent. The may know how to trade well enough, but the traders don't get paid to manage their risk (unless they're one of the top guys). If they bet it all and win, they get a massive payout and if they bet it all and lose, they move on to the next fund. One the funds high water mark is breached, the incentives become even more skewed. You want to keep betting till you're back in the green cause you're not getting paid if you're not.

If they were trading with their own money, like we are, bankruptcy risk has real consequences. I don't think anyone blows up their fund deliberately, but where's their downside? Not sure if traders at Ospraie had any of their own money in the till....do you know if they did? I heard some of the newer funds require that traders drop some cash in to keep them there and keep their trading reasonable. Anyway, thanks again for the informative posts.

In every half-decent hedge fund senior traders have own money in the fund.

I doubt very much that it's enough money to make it hurt. I was referring more to the rank and file (guys running their own books but not the entire fund). The head guys usually are pretty well established and filthy rich. Putting in 1 or 5 or 10 million if you have 200 million in the bank still doesn't mean you're putting yourself on the line. One of the lessons that most of the intelligent guys at the top learned (since LTCM) was to not bet their net worths on their fund's performance. Dwight Anderson, for example, has another 3 funds that he's currently running. I'm sure he's utterly heartbroken over losing this one. I like your point about us only hearing about the bad ones, and Amaranth certainly fits that mold, but the shocking thing about this fund was the fact that it was run by a guy with a fairly clean reputation and a respectable pedigree (as far as hedge funds go anyway). He doesn't seem to be the one who would take outsized risks, so it's surprising to see a blowup there. Nobody will know for sure what really happened for months (years?), so this is all just speculation at this point. Whatever happened, I'm sure there will be tons of stories about what went wrong this time.

Then again, no investor will bet his own net worth on one hedge fund. You might have confidence in your employer, enough to buy some stock but would you really invest all your savings in it?

Imagine you're looking to invest in a high-risk-high-return fund, would trust one where everybody handling your money is in, all-or-nothing? That's not an investment vehicle, that's a sect.

Good point, but if I was the CEO or the third guy from the top, I don't think it would be unreasonable for equity holders to expect that my firm's bankruptcy should be mine as well. Only real way to align incentives. Given the size of most of the large hedge funds, I can see how your argument makes sense if you're a small fish in a big pond, but if you're running a book at a mid-sized or small fund, you're what...3-5 guys away from the top (maybe even less). If you're the head trader of a major strategy, you're probably one guy away and have an incredible amount of leeway to do whatever you like. You should be held accountable personally for the results. The fact that you're not is what leads to reckless betting and bad risk management. In any case, if I had enough to invest in these funds, I would only go in if the head guys were putting a MASSIVE amount of their own net worths into the fund. That's the only way to make sure they're properly motivated to manage the bankroll and to take measured risks. This isn't always 100% effective (see LTCM), but at least I know that they'll be obsessing over the markets the way I do when my own money is on the line. The other strategy is, as you suggested, to diversify your hedge funds and have a little in each...a blowup here or there could be offset by a star performer elsewhere.

why don't these hedge funds hire someone who knows how to trade?

They do - just ask anyone trading at a bank, refiner, producer or utility. Their best traders are invariably lured to the funds, and they don't suddenly lose their skills when they get there - they are just given more freedom to take bigger positions. You have to realise that there are many hedge funds around and the only ones you hear about are those that blow up spectacularly.

You will not gain any insight if you only study hedge fund failures - or only listen to the success stories. Hedge fund blow ups are part of the industry in any part of the cycle because their mandate is to take big positions in every possible direction. Banks blowing up, now there's cause for concern.