170 comments on DrumBeat: October 18, 2008
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170 comments on DrumBeat: October 18, 2008
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No argument about the mistake of focusing on the headline number (BTW, I assume you mean "negligible").
In any case, some more numbers. If we assume that my 2008 estimates are more or less correct (and with the Cantarell crash the production number might be somewhat optimistic), and if we assume that production drops at -5.4%/year, if Mexico wanted to maintain 1.0 mbpd of net exports, the 2012 numbers would look like this:
Production/Consumption/Net Exports
2.5; 1.5; 1.0
Mexico would have to cut their consumption at -18.5%/year.
I meant what is Mexican consumption declines over that 5 year period (which, by year end 2008, it will be less than 2.0). The ELM is based on declining production and increased internal consumption in exporting countries. The example you've chosen supports my observation that the core of ELM (95% of it) is just depletion/declining net energy*. The 'increase in consumption' part is largely extranneous.
*when I say declining net energy, I say it in a non-scientific sense. We KNOW that depletion has trumped technology in the US based on research by Cutler Cleveland, but outside US (and even currently in US), we don't have data in energy terms. But $ costs can approximate the trend towards more expensive oil. The reason we can't just use $, is because they are abstract concepts, and one day, a change in the international finance system will rewrite how petroleum is priced, but the energy return will remain roughly the same
Net energy and export land get really complicated but fascinating at the same time.
Consider a factory in china that exports to the US most of the oil imports are actually used for goods and services destined for exports. Do you split this energy use between China and the US ? The point is when you add in the value add product flows on top of the net energy flows between countries it gets a lot more interesting. Looking at the oil exporters that are growing their internal economies one sees they are also increasing imports of all sorts of value add products that have significant embedded energy with a lot of that resulting from oil consumption.
The US obviously sucks in far more energy then is normally assumed via the net inflow of imports. Again looking at the middle east you can look at the food imports and see a large net flow of oil energy back into the region. Mexico also imports a lot of food from the US. So maybe its not so obvious we are actually trading food for goods.
If you combine these concepts the situation is grimmer than assuming they are unrelated. The amount of real excess energy thats available to support our debt economy seems close to zero once you include the movement of value added goods and their embedded energy.
Mexico could already not be a net energy exporter for example consuming as much energy or more then its producing in the form of imports.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3723/is_1_16/ai_114328146
The import export web is exceedingly complex and difficult to figure out but it seems to me that by including the embedded energy that returned back to oil producers in the form of goods and services makes a lot of sense in the full EROEI/export land model.
This also explains to some extent how China could continue to grow even as oil supplies remained flat the energy was put into export goods that where then sent to other markets. In these markets local production of these goods and services declined using less energy so on the energy flow side we see that eventually everything balanced out and its just a changing of the flow pattern so one nations growth has resulted in declines elsewhere.
Once you include the embedded energy value added goods and services that are flowing back into the oil exporting nations and calculate net energy exported the result looks interesting. For wheat and corn for example we have a pretty good idea about the net embedded oil used in their manufacture. ( I don't consider modern farming a natural process ).
I've got no idea what the real numbers are but just looking at the situation indicates that the total energy available for real growth might be quite small inline with the fact that we have seen no significant increases in oil. What seems to have happened is a good bit of the economy is now stuck in a cycle of extracting oil and converting it to value added goods with a net flow of energy back into the original producers leaving close to zero total value add.
A stab at figuring out how much energy we actually send back to Mexico in the form of corn.
This
http://newfarm.rodaleinstitute.org/news/2005/0705/070705/ethanol.shtml
Give .87 gallons to a bushel lets make it 1 gallon for this exercise this would include transport drying packing etc.
http://www.truthabouttrade.org/content/view/1063/51/
Give Mexican corn imports at 10.2 MMT or 10.2*36.74 = 374 million bushels.
Assume 20 gallons of gasoline to a barrel and 1 gallon =1 bushel 374/20 = 18 million barrels
18 million barrels /365 = 0.05 mbd or 50kbd removed from the net energy.
I'd guess wheat is similar so maybe 100kbd per day for food ?
Anyway its not unimportant as Mexico's oil exports decline this is like 10%
The core of my ELM argument--which seems blindingly obviously, but as we have discussed, is widely overlooked--is that production declines in exporting countries magnify the net export decline, because domestic demand tends to be satisfied before oil is exported.
Just use the Rule of 72 and consider the initial conditions for Export Land--production of 2 mbpd and consumption of one mbpd (and net exports of one mbpd). With no increase in consumption, and a -5%/year production decline rate, production would be cut in half in about 14 years, to one mbpd, when consumption would equal production, so net oil exports = zero. So, a 50% drop in production would be a 100% decline in net oil exports.
BTW, I looked up the 10 year consumption increases for the (2006) top 10 net oil exporters. It looks like it was about +2.6%/year, from 8.7 mbpd in 1997 to
11. 3 mbpd in 2007 (EIA). Saudi Arabia increased at +5.1%/year over the 10 year period, but their recent consumption is higher, +7.2%/year. In any case, the previous 10 year rate of increase is probably a conservative estimate for the next 10 years, especially if we assume an upward trend in prices as export volumes decline.
Jeffery,
I think you missed Memmel's point. Think of it like an energy balance a ChemE would use when designing a plant. I believe his thrust was that although Mex exports oil to the US, the US exports "oil equivalents" via grain to Mex. Therefore, it isn't a simple one way street and that these "equivalents" have to included in the calculation.
Todd
I'd only count the portion that actually gets used as fuel (and not as human or animal feed). Otherwise you're on the slippery slope of saying that you have to include X as it is a product of the import and it is exported to Mexico.
Of course, getting those stats could be a bit tricky.
Why does it matter what goes back? What keeps the system going is the input...and that is barrels of oil. Everything else is derived from that.
It's like having two mirrors facing each other. Sure, the reflections and counter-reflections go on forever but take away one mirror and everything stops.