Nate, I imagine all these statements apply to parts of the global production stack that matter most to those who made the statements.

It is not possible to make coherent sense out of Chapter 10 of this report because it is incoherent.

Two things though that bother me:

1. IEA make an allowance for higher decline rates in the 69,200 fields not included in their data base and this seems a reasonable thing to do that sets them apart I believe from CERA. Its just that this allowance of +0.9% disappears in their final analysis (Chapter 11) and in their charts.

2. IEA are forecasting decline to accelerate going forward by 1% (on part of the stack) while CERA concluded that decline was constant.

So my best guess right now is that 4.5+0.9 = 5.4% may be a good figure to use right now and that this may increase to 6.4% by 2030. I think it unlikely that the current observed global average is much higher than 5.4% or it would not have been possible to have grown production this year.