A couple of years ago I read that Titanium refining had a big breakthrough and so Titanium was about to become as "cheap" as stainless steel. Has anyone got an update?

Let me offer a view of the common economic analysis of maintenance investments. It actually serves to describe analysis for essentially all oil patch investments such as drilling, refinery modifications (such as to handle heavy/sour crude), pipeline expansions, etc. In particular, this has been, and will continue to be, the driving metric of the decision making process for public companies. This is not just a mundane discussion of investment economics: it is, IMHO, one of our biggest impediments to preparation for PO.

It is “net present value” economics. For those not familiar it’s the method which allows for the value of future cash flows to be adjusted for the time factor. It’s easy to visualize: just think of it as a reverse interest rate. The discount factor (interest rate) is typically 10% to 15%. A simple example: you invest $1 million and recover $150,000 per year from the investment (15% per year) FOR EVER. The net present value of that investment (with a 15% discount rate) is ZERO. Yes…you add absolutely nothing to your bottom line. The cumulative net present value is zero and thus you have lost the company $1 million of asset value even though you just generated $15 million of cash flow for the next century. Wall Street’s primary valuation of companies (as well as most capital sources) is based upon increased asset value over time. Cash flow isn’t completely ignored but that’s not where growth is typically measured. Some may be aware of what poor condition the North Slope Oil Pipeline has fallen into under the management of BP. Metal erosion due to poor maintenance has thinned the steel to dangerous levels along many sections. Of course, I haven’t been privy to internal discussions at BP but I have listened to the same conversations with other operators: “we can’t afford to spend today’s capital on projects with little or no NPV”. I suspect BP decided long ago that there was a limited future for the p/l as they expected little new development of the North Slope reserves. Thus why maintain a system which has little to no NPV beyond the immediate future. Today, one of the arguments against expanding NS production is the question of the future utility of the p/l without additional billions of $’s invested in it. Not an invalid argument by any means IMO.

How does infrastructure maintenance fit into such analysis? Spend $X million this year to maintain (or even increase cash flow) in the next 5 years = a likely attractive increase in NPV. Spend the same $X to enhance future cash flows 10 to 15 years down the road and you’ll probably calculate a negative NPV…yes…on paper you’ve lost money. This valuation method also explains why we’ve seen such a drastic decrease in the unconventional NG plays. With most of the revenue coming in the first 5 years they have great NPV and thus attractive rates of return…if NG prices are high initially. When prices fall (as they just have) the NPV goes to zero or less. Even though many of these wells will produce 15 to 20 years the NPV of those reserves add nothing to NPV and are thus completely ignored. Many UNG projects are still profitable(5% to 10% rate of return) at current prices but not when discounted at 15%.

We’re all aware of the geopolitical and recessionary factors adding to the volatility of PO. Now add to the mix the free market approach to infrastructure maintenance as well as all other oil patch investments. As a result, it appears we are destined to even greater volatility making any efforts to adjust to PO in advance nearly impossible. Even today we’re seeing earlier efforts to expand the alternatives being hit had by NPV economic analysis. Perhaps gov’t intervention could be an approach but I would have little hope that any would work. That isn’t so much a condemnation of the government’s inability as it is recognition of the complexity of the system. Perhaps there is only one gov’t that has overcome the drag of NPV economics: China. They have been investing for more than a decade in oil reserves around the globe which might actually look rather poor from a NPV valuation. But they are looking at securing oil production 15 to 25 years down the road. Being a communist gov’t they are not encumbered by NPV. They have no board of directors demanding a y-o-y increase in asset value. IMO, they are simply looking at the greatest single source of societal strength in the future decades: access to energy. Today they have the financial strength to secure those assets. And the weapons to prevent those assets from being usurped in the future. Short of internal disruption I have little doubt they will win this game.

It seems to me that long-term, these NPV calculations will more and more put an end to investment.

The problem is that NPV calculations normally assume a fairly long life for investments (30 or 40 years). Admittedly, the last part of this life is not worth much in NPV calculations, but the long term value of at least some investments becomes even worse, and our ability to keep networked systems going unravels. If this happens, I would argue one needs a much shorter amortization period.

Suppose one has a farm of wind turbines, that one expects to operate for 30 years. If those turbines need to be maintained every five years, and after ten or fifteen years, you can no longer obtain the parts made overseas (or your roads are no longer adequately maintained so that the big equipment can make the trip), the wind turbines may become inoperable after only 10 or 15 years. Thus, the proper amortization period is the length of time you really expect to be able to use the investment--much less than 30 years.

With oil, the problem may not be quite as bad, if there is little maintenance required on the new infrastructure. It could still be a problem, though, to the extent the new infrastructure is part of a networked system, and some other part of the system (electricity ?) fails early on.

ROCKMAN -

I have some familiarity with NPV analyses and am inclined to think that the fundamental weakness of this approach lies in the discount rate and how it is set. In most cases it is some arbitrary figure arrived at as an expression of what level of profitability is or is not acceptable to a company's management. You can make the NPV be almost anything you want merely by selecting a given discount rate.

Theoretically, the discount rate is determined by considering whether an equivalent return could be obtained by doing something else with the money. (Perhaps such as investing in credit default swaps and the like?) But therein lies the rub. In times like these how realistically is it to expect a 15% return on capital over a long time span?

This impinges on the question of whether there is something fundamentally flawed in our concept of the time value of money, but this is a subject that has been already covered by people such as Nate Hagens who are far more knowledgeable about the matter than I.

Since the interest rate on borrowed money is still very low, a discound rate of 10-15% would be ridiculous. Four percent is more reasonable. And when your do these analyses, you should be able to argue that the future value of the energy you are bringing in will be extremely high. (You can cite a few sources from this site, including Simmons.) That will help your bottom line.

sf -- OTOneH, you're right. OTOtherH, we can argue all we want but the companies will still use 10% or 15% DR. And as far as future price expectations don't expect much relief there. Last year when oil was bouncing around $130/bbl+ most companies were still using $70-80/bbl future prices. And many companies were actually using lower prices (by 10% or so) for Years 2 and 3 with rather modest increasing expectations for the remaining years. Turns out even at that they were a tad optimistic, weren't they? Trust me: no one but an utter idiot in the oil patch expected those prices to hold any length of time. And don't imagine there are many CEO's pounding the board room tables demanding that such optimistic price expectations as you suggest be used in the current decision making process. And that's not to argue Simmons is wrong. But future pricing optimism has always been viewed in the oil patch as the crutch of a poor manager.
We tend to leave such arm-waving theatrics to the stock brokers. Also, consider this: I deal with companies that drill in Federal waters and they are starting to discount those numbers even harder. They're anticipating, as deficets rise, the gov't will be getting greedier when it comes to revenue sharing and are thus scaling back expectations (and budgets) accordingly.

But I think you get my original point: the prevalent decision making process will be of little value dealing with our long term energy needs. The “free market” Wall Street view controls the process whether it serves the country’s long term needs or not. Really no different then how the gov’t policy of pushing sub prime home loans helped the economic short term and has now crippled us long term.

The discount rate used in a project evaluation does not have a direct connection to the fed interest rate. It's actually referred to as an IRR (internal rate of return) and has more to do with what the company regards as an acceptable number. As ROCKMAN says, it's been 15-20% for some time. Up until very recently any company could waltz out, find a hedge fund, and do that well.

Pick a lower number, and more long-term investments become possible. The problem is that everybody gotten used to gigantic ROIs and doesn't want to go back.

I agree with you joule. But to be exact, it's not so much an expectation of a 15% return on capital. A 15% return discounted at 15% = 0% return. Thus the current crunch is even worse then you describe. The 15% isn't so much arbitrary but has been accepted as the right value (more or less) for as long as I’ve been in the oil patch (33 years). It supposedly takes into account the borrowing cost of capital. Often it's also used as a ranking mechanism when there are more projects then capital.

Gail -- as far as future maintenance costs of wind turbines including decommissioning, the oil patch does handle such matters fairly well. The cost to decommission infrastructure, such as removing platforms and plugging wells, is always used in the economic analysis (future negative cash flow). And for public companies those same forward expenses are also part of the valuation. Some fudging occurs, of course, but the SEC and capital sources typically require certified estimators to generate these numbers. Your point does make me wonder how inclusive some of the cost estimates for the various alts take into account (or don't) those future deducts from cash flow.

Goes back to an old Texas saying: sometimes the cheapest part of owning a horse is what you paid initially. Such matters quickly come to mind as just last week I paid a vet another $200 for my "free” dog I rescued.

Nobody depreciates equipment over 30 year time periods, either. Most is usually front-loaded into the first few years.

yes, I think especially within US corporations the discount rate has too often been set unrealistically high which essentially devalues the future to the point where it is not really being considered after about a decade or two. I believe this has been because of their unrealistically high growth rate assumptions which in today's economy look pretty much unsustainable. By now, many people's expectations have been reset and I'll bet that future discount rates will drop.

Most companies do not use their cost of debt to determine the discount rate but instead use the "after tax weighted average cost of capital" (WACC). This takes into account what they believe is their long term optimal capital mix of debt and equity as well as the cost of each component of capitalization.

WACC = (Cost of equity capital) x (% of equity capital) + (after tax cost of debt capital) x (% of debt capital)

Publicly owned entities often use a much lower discount rate than private corporations to reflect the longer term life of their assets. There has been much debate about which discount rate to use in valuing the future costs of climage change and several economists have argued for a very low discount rate... just above 1% to take into account the impacts on future generations.

I am all for lower discount rates which are much more realistic in the way they take the distant future into account.

RE: Alaska pipeline

The observation that the oilcos are apparently unwilling to do what it takes to keep the pipeline operational indefinitely leads me to wonder if we shouldn't go ahead and try to get what we can out of ANWR, while we can. "Get while the getting is good" is about the only convincing argument that I can consider.

This also leads me to conclude that it doesn't matter how much oil there is theoretically recoverable in the ground, it is now likely that ALL of it WILL NOT be recovered. There will be oil that we know about, but that we'll never be able to get to, because the resources to maintain the necessary infrastructure will not have been allocated, and that infrastructure will have been abandoned before the last of the oil is extracted, leaving it stranded. We will then lack the resources to rebuild the infrastructure necessary. If there are fatal flaws in the analyses of organizations like CERA or the IEA, this is likely one of them.

Interesting observation. I happened to be in Alaska during the construction of the pipeline. At the time I voiced concern regarding the life expectancy of the line and how it would be dismantled and removed at the end of its service. No one seemed to have satisfactory answers to my questions. Since its completion there have been a number of serious maintenance problems, including significant leaks. I question the soundness of the TAPS to transport an increase in oil flow possibly resulting from ANWR reserves. Chances are that it would require a major overhaul of the entire pipeline.

WNC,

I work for an oil company, I am actually at work on the North Slope of Alaska as I write this, I have worked up here for 28 years, and I am a corrosion supervisor for the Kuparuk and Alpine Oilfields, a few km west of Prudhoe Bay where the transit line leaks ocurred in 2006. So... I think I am as qualified as anyone to describe the situation up here.

I beg to differ about the oil companies being unwilling to do what it takes to keep the "pipeline" operational indefinitely. The industry is spending millions of $ inspecting and repairing the infrastructure here. It is a constant battle but I think we are doing a pretty good job. I believe where the industry got into trouble was we underestimated the life of these assets, especially when oil prices were low back in the late 80's and throughout the 90's. We thought we would be shutting down soon after 2000, but that didn't happen and now we think we will be here until 2040 or later. This was a worldwide problem not unique to Alaska- it happened in the North Sea too. There is certainly some embedded damage (corrosion)from those days, but we have been catching up over the last decade with an agressive repair program, and I have not much trouble getting the budget I need to keep doing this.

As far as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline which (I think) you are refering to (this is NOT the transit lines that leaked in 2006), that is operated by a different company (Alyeska) but they are taking good care of it too. It probably won't last indefinitely (what will?) but it will certainly last for decades longer. We have a much larger problem finding the oil to keep it operational as the big fields (mostly Prudhoe and Kuparuk) are in steep decline and the smaller fields aren't making up for it. There is still a fair amount of oil up here, but not the huge fields. So... Peak Oil is alive and well here in Alaska too.

Our biggest problem of all is the high cost of doing business here, particularly taxation from the State of Alaska and environmental regulations, but those are another issue entirely.

regards,

AlaskaMark

NPV economics and the ruthlessness of the market in seeking short-term gains is definitely a big issue. We are not going to achieve sustainability in any sense just by tinkering with rules around the edges. The monetary system itself is what drives this kind of thinking and so we need a new kind of monetary/financial system. That has been my view for several years, but the current crisis brings the debate much further forward. I recommend reading "The Future of Money" by Bernard Lietaer.

It's also one of the reasons why many renewable energy technologies struggle economically - the costs are all upfront with very low operating costs. Even if they have better Energy Return ratios over their lifetime, their economic valuation looks worse. If we had a different financial system that actually valued the future properly, then many types renewable energy would be much more viable.

Incidentally, in my experience Discount Rate is 5-10% rather than 15%, but it makes little difference.

A couple of years ago I read that Titanium refining had a big breakthrough and so Titanium was about to become as "cheap" as stainless steel. Has anyone got an update?

I wouldn't hold your breath!

Pity. It ranks just below silver on the Galvanic series.

Platinum (most noble)
then
Graphite and carbon
Mercury (suprise)
Gold
Silver and
Titanium

All other metals are sacrificed to it.

On second thoughts lets go with Carbon/Carbon (carbon fibre with carbon matrix.)
If we extract the carbon from the air, even better!

That was a decade ago. It'll never be as cheap as steel, but it might be comperable with aluminium. The problem is there are large supply chain issues that need to churn before it gets there. Maybe 20 years.