A few points by Cutler are wrong or need to be explained :

1/ Nabucco consortium says the pipe will get its first gas from Iraq -but it probably won't.

The main problem here is a political one : there is no agreement so far about the oil&gas revenues between the central government (Baghdad) and the KRG autority (Kurds) ruling the gas area. This trouble was the reason why DNO stopped its oil exports last summer.

The other problem is technical : is there enough gas available from Khor Mor and Chemchemal fields for exports as one third at least of the expected gas is already booked for local power plants ? Probably not.

OMV and other members of the venture know all this stuff but they have to keep the line as they need to convince investors the pipe will be fill as planed.

2/ Nabucco will get no gas from Azerbaijan as long as Turkey is playing hardball with Baku about the transit fees (of the gas to be exported to EU through Nabucco) and the gas prices (to be sold on its local market).

Turkey's intransigence is definitely Nabucco main hurdle today. This comes from Turkish new ambitions :
First, Turkey wants to be an energy hub, able to re-export gas wherever wanted, and not only a transit corridor. So it clashes with EU energy policy -and feed the quagmire with Azerbaijan).
Second, Turkey wants to be more influent in the Caucasus, and to be seen by EU as a mediator for peace and stability in the area. That's why Turkey works on a deal with Armenia -which infuriates Azerbaijan and complicates the gas deal with Baku.

We can guess the tricky days for Nabucco won't stop soon as Turkey is backed on its double-level policy by Russia. It is in Russia's interest to nurture the situation : both countries are now developing a strategic partnership, mainly in energy (the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline MoU was announced in this sense).

However, Turkey is playing with fire as the expected rewards for backing the Russian projects are not understandable or not secured : the South Stream pipeline will go through Turkish waters in the Black Sea, but it will definitely be a "bypass" of Turkey to Europe. There is no biding agreement about Rosneft/Lukoil participation in the Samsun-Ceyhan project -so it can stay an empty shell.

3/ Azerbaijan will send 0,5 bcm of gas to Russia starting 2010 -which can be seen as a retaliation for Turkish attitude about transit fees and gas prices.

But the gas will come from Shah-Deniz phase One, note phase Two as Cutler said. This is the point : phase 2 will be acted once a deal is found between Turkey and EU/Azerbaijan. Without any agreement, phase Two will is postponed and Nabucco stays a dream.

4/ Knowing how much gas will be available from Turkmenistan is not a prority as for now there is no legal way for Ashgabad to export its gas through the Caspian Sea.

Even if Turkmenistan gets support from EU, it won't solve the problem : the legal status of the CS hasn't been decided so far (is it a sea, or a lake?). It can be fixed only by consensus between the 5 countries sharing the banks –as expected Russia opposed any decision. This means no pipe can be built there.