BP Macondo Blowout - Static Top Kill vs. Bottom Kill: Weighing the Risks

This post was up yesterday, but the discussion may have gotten confusing, because it was part of an open thread. I am putting the post back up, to facilitate discussion in a more organized manner. - Gail

Author's Note: Art Berman (aeberman) is an Oil Drum staff member and geological consultant whose specialties are subsurface petroleum geology, seismic interpretation, and database design and management. He has been interviewed on CNN and BNN about the Deepwater Horizon disaster. William Semple collaborated on this post. Mr. Semple is a drilling engineer and independent drilling consultant with 37 years of experience in the oil and gas industry. He worked for 16 years with a major oil company and has 24 years of experience as a drilling supervisor. He has been a guest contributor on The Oil Drum writing about the Deepwater Horizon (June 19, 2010).

A permanent solution to the BP Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico may be achieved soon but there are risks. Admiral Thad Allen announced on Monday, July 26 that a static top kill would be attempted on August 2. The schedule may be accelerated to July 31 or August 1 according to an announcement today (July 29). The sealing cap has successfully stopped the flow of oil and gas from the well and the pressure continues to build slowly. Temperature at the wellhead has not increased, and seeps near the well are mostly nitrogen and biogenic methane unrelated to leakage. BP Senior Vice President Kent Wells’ technical update on July 21 explained these findings and showed how the well will be killed.

There are risks involved in both the top and bottom kill procedures. The purpose of this post is to describe those risks. There are two risks associated with the static top kill. First, it may not work at all and second, it may rupture the casing by pumping heavy mud under pressure (“bull heading”).

Kent Wells described the static top kill as a process of continuously pumping mud into the well until the oil is pushed into the reservoir. This is clearly erroneous and must be a simplification designed for the general public. What will more probably take place is a practice called “bleed and lubricate”. Heavy mud is pumped into the well through the choke and kill lines on the blowout preventer (BOP) and allowed to sink to the bottom of the well. Hopefully, the mud will retard the flow so that some of the pressure can be bled off by producing oil to the surface for a short period. Then, more heavy mud will be pumped into the well, and the process repeated as necessary until the well contains enough mud to kill the well.

The first problem with stopping the flow from the top is that it has to be an annular kill: the flow was coming up the annulus outside the production casing. This is a very narrow space so mud will have to pumped at high pressure to achieve entry. It will initially be working against a full column of gas and oil and the shut-in pressure at the well head. On the positive side, if produced sand has accumulated in the annulus, the operation may not have to contend with the full force of the reservoir pressure in addition to these obstacles. On the negative side, the well head seals might prevent or restrict downward flow, or the pumping pressure could rupture the 22-inch casing, or reach a pressure high enough to call off the operation.

Figure 1a (based on a government document) shows that the upper part of the well bore is protected by three strings of casing (36-, 28-, and 22-inch) and cement down to 7,937 feet (measured depth below sea level). A fourth string of 16-inch casing extends nearly from the well head to where it is cemented at 11,585 feet, but it is apparently hung inside the 22-inch casing at 5,227 feet, leaving a gap of 160 feet. The 16-inch pipe has a burst rating approximately equal to the current shut-in pressure of 6,900 psi (80% of rating), but the 22-inch pipe does not meet this standard.

BP has said that the relief well DD3 plan will continue regardless of the success of the top kill operation. The main risk with a bottom kill is that it may take considerable time to accomplish. Because of the recent tropical storm, crews are just removing the storm packer today, and it will take time to re-enter and condition the hole before drilling resumes. BP estimate that the DD3 will intersect the Macondo well around August 10. Most efforts to intersect a blown-out wells require several attempts. The recent 2009 Montara blowout in the Timor Sea required four attempts that took a month after the relief well was near the blow out and cased. The bottom of the first Macondo relief well is currently located a few feet from the target at approximately 17,220 feet measured depth (based on Wells’ update and shown in Figure 1b).

The good news is that, in this case, the relief well does not, apparently, need to intersect the well exactly--it just needs to be close. Once the relief well penetrates the reservoir, enough mud can be pumped to hopefully overcome flowing pressure and kill the well. The bottom-kill option has the same annular flow path liabilities as the top kill, but it has the capacity to deliver higher flow rates directly to the reservoir. This approach will not cause significant pressuring near the well head and should not, therefore, pose a risk of rupturing the 22-inch casing.

The bottom kill option involves considerably less mechanical risk than the top kill, but time is the enemy, so the top kill makes sense. Maintaining the objectivity to abandon the operation rather than risk casing rupture will be critical.

Yesterday B K Lim posted the following articles explaining his concerns about the top kill.

Full article, Why is BP's Macondo blowout so disastrous & Beyond Patch-up, which includes his assessments of events including both MC252 A (or #001) well and MC 252 B (or #002) well, emails from congressional testimony and news stories, and the "media" show:
http://bklim.newsvine.com/_news/2010/07/30/4781973-why-is-bps-macondo-bl...

He also posted the geologic graphics only which summarize what he believes is probably happening in the formation and on the sea floor and at the well head(s) over time:

http://bklim.newsvine.com/_news/2010/07/30/4788392-diagrammatic-illustra...

Does anyone care to comment?

Lim supposes a salt diapir, not supported by seismic and not typical in deep water.
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6791#comment-690263

It's true that Thunder Horse was a salt dome play, but Macondo is not AFAIK, unless we're being lied to on a rather colossal scale of cover-up which is always a possibility. BP hasn't released much about the geology. The only thing we know for sure is lost circulation at the reservoir top and decision to TA with a long tapered production liner that blew out.

It might be a dome. I believe that the well is in the east where the geology trends away from salt canopy to isolated domes. What little seismic we've seen shows little or no salt but the lines could be strike lines near isolated salt bodies.

But Lim's article has many other flaws. He expends lots of words on the ridiculous speculation that BP executives sold shares because they knew a blowout was imminent. He doesn't understand that lost circulation is a common problem. He harps on the "two wells" A and B. In short, the usual garbage.

KLurker, if you don't think that highly placed corporate executives suddenly selling off shares or any other subtle forms of "borrowing a lifeboat and abandoning ship in the middle of the night"; then you have plainly not been around long enough, or dating Polyanna too long.

Nessus,

This speculation is a joke. If BP had known the well was going to blow out catastrophically they would have taken mitigation steps (unless the reservoir pressure was 60K psi, as in other wacky theories but clearly it wasn't because they know the mudweight to hold the well at TD). The conspiracy theory is plainly silly - people on tod have argued this but really, it's not even worth arguing about.

KLurker

They didn't have to specifically "know" anything, but inside information that there was potentially a large problem is all it takes. BP knew full well that there were many unknowns associated with drilling this formation and were warned of the potential for problems long in advance. As we and the world get more and more desperate to find the remaining reserves, the associated risks will increase sharply. It can be hoped that most people with the power to do so, will do so with attention paid to the risk. But History has shown that greed many times knows no bounds, and yes, the "small people" are and have been considered expendable.

You are free if it comforts you, to be "Optimistic", but I'll stick with a bit of wisdom from the previously quoted author, the Late Robert A. Heinlein, who said via one of his most famous characters..."it is impossible to unpleasantly surprise a pessimist". Following this well said advice has saved me many a disappointment where people are concerned...

That world view isn't wisdom at all it's pessimistic and a little cynical. Don't be afraid to be dissappointed or be a fool for saying yes.

Heiro

The young ones mostly seem to start out enthusiastic and optimistic then time and experience drag that pesky reality into the picture. You are welcome to all the optimism your worldview permits, but I'm staking my own view on the cynical side, as as been said before "the truth will set you free" (but it will first piss you off).

Nessus, I like Heinlein too and don't forget he also said this:

Don't ever become a pessimist... a pessimist is correct oftener than an optimist, but an optimist has more fun, and neither can stop the march of events.

As to your theory, it is all wet. First of all, to a supermajor like BP, a single well positive or negative can't move the stock 1/1000th of a pence. Second, the trifling amount Hayward may have made from selling a few shares is NOTHING compared to his net worth reduction overall. He was only 50 yrs old when he became CEO, typically that job would last a decade or more, and his compensation during that time would be in the hundreds of millions. You're saying he was so brilliant that he threw it all away for a 50% return on $1million? Nope if he had ANY inkling this was a wild well he'd have thrown every resource he could into solving it, as the $32Billion hit to the company has demonstrated. LOL

Widelyred

Yes, I know that one too, however "I've paid my money and chosen my frame of reference", to paraphrase a bit.
I am highly inclined to be pessimistic AND cynical based on my own experience. I'm sure I would have lots more fun to take more advice from Polyanna, but at this point in life I'm simply trying to take some of Carlin's advice as well...be amused whilst the population merrily crowds itself into the proverbial handbasket...

One of the instances that helped my own cynicism along was working in the Photonics/Fiber Optics arena for a bit, well until the Telecom Bubble burst. In that case I knew the Titanic had already hit the berg when one of the close associates of the company founder decides to take a "two year sabbatical" on her 30' custom yacht a year or two before the company folded.

As to ongoing process of disintegration, that we "Doomers" see, I'm fortunate that I'm an old retired guy who no vested interest in the "future of mankind" (no kids, no grandkids) and I take the advice given to Richard Feynman long ago, that paraphrased, was to the effect that "the state of the world and its population was not his fault, and therefore you should not feel any personal guilt or responsibility for its state". A very loose paraphrase but this advice was given to him by another Physicist of considerable stature, just can't remember which one right now.

And along those lines, I have been seeing alot of those "MBBs" but even the GLP guys aren't wrong all the time, so I'm officially renaming them "B.I.Bs" (Blobs In Black).

Nessus -- It's actually very easy to disappoint a pessimist: just show them where they are wrong. Everyone takes ownership of their predictions. And no one likes to be wrong even if the outcome turns out to be good. Your defensive reactions stand as a good example of that fact.

The majority of folks on TOD have made a very concerted effort to educate themselves on the situation in the GOM. That's the main reason I don't spend much time debunking some of the foolishness that floats thru here at times: they can make judgment calls on their own and do so quit well IMHO.

AMEN RM~You told me not to even try, but I am so damn hard headed I tried anyway. Apparantly I am not enlightened or awake enough to understand. And I do agree about wanting ownership of a prediction, the local nut has been telling his "people" as he calls them for the past 2 weeks that his source told him we were going to be hit again soon.......well, I don't know if you read the continuation of the other thread, but I posted pictures of what looks like a swimming pool today and it's looked extrememly good for weeks. But, not a shot in hell of trying to tell someone who'd raking in money from those who are addicted to the doom and gloom that they are wrong, otherwise they would have to find a new job than being employed by the GOM LOL.

And as a resident of the GOM coast I am so grateful to have TOD and the contributors here who hold our hand while we try to learn. BBIC festival a few weeks from now RM, let me know if you can make it!!

Bravo, Rock - well stated.

I would like to echo Beachmom's post after yours.

Living here in Mobile, AL we have heard, since the beginning of this ordeal, so much hype & BS. TOD has been a wonderful place for help in sorting out/thru the loads of info we are bombarded with. I thank you and the many other knowledgeable professionals who take the time to help us who want to understand this situation. I agree with you ref debunking some of the garbage put forth here, too much time arguing ridiculous posts almost lends some validity to them.

Thanks again to all on TOD who so tirelessly give of themselves for the betterment of all.

tommegee

Rockman

Remember the quote is that it is "impossible to UNPLEASANTLY surprise a pessimist", if it turns out better than we expect we're PLEASANTLY surprised...

If the species doesn't destroy itself in the next few years and does manage to wake up sufficiently to at least minimize a global collapse, then I'll only be pleasantly surprised, otherwise I take a "Dr. Evil" amusement when they do:)

At least if I do manage to live another ten years, the "direction" the species has taken between extinction and at least somewhat enlightened self preservation will be known. Don't take my word for this, there was a PBS special which featured Dr. Sylvia Earle and two other notables (aired within the last month) who were all in agreement on that ten year timeline.

Ness -- I don't know you so I wouldn't be so rude as to clump you in with some pessimists I've met along the way. I've seen more then a few really despair when their prediction didn't come to pass. They would rather be right then have matters turn out OK. That's what I was teasing about. BTW: we haven’t been talking much about PO and the future of "civilization" since the blow out. But if you were to check my old posts you would find I'm one of the more pessimistic (read: realistic) folks on TOD. I just don't tend to go on about it much. Actually, from your limited posts, I would guess you're much more the optimist than I. Trust me: once you give up all hope life gets much easier as you await that sweet release death promises. LOL.

Rock

Over time, since I'm new here, I'll try to remove any doubt that I'm a true Pessimist (or at least a consistent Pragmatist:)).

What I do try to do when possible is to "get the facts", then make a decision whether the "facts" are good or bad. Unfortunately in so many cases such as this we're operating in an information vacuum most of the time and the MSM has gone on to more important matters such as "who's Snooki", rather than PO and the ensuing "Ragnarok" that would push us over the cliff edge that seems to have some strange instinctual attraction.

At "at the end" maybe the funnest way to go would be the way Slim Pickens "Went" in Dr. Strangelove...:).

Ness - Glad you're here. Hang around and when the BP mess is behind us we'll get back to the prime discourse. I suspect you'll enjoy TOD more so then.

"Goldie, did you say Wing Attack Plan 'R' ?!?!"

Nessus,

It's nothing to do with optimism. Honestly, I realize there are examples of corporate corruption - many. But I don't really care if CEO Hayward is another example. It's a millionth percent of the daily news for me. It's just that I like my crime stories to be about something - to be believable. When people float "not even wrong" theories for the sole purpose of creating villainy out of thin air, powered by winking but daffy insinuations, then we'll have to agree to disagree.

Okay... not a dome.

Personally, I'm not saying it is, and I'm not saying it isn't. But if it's not a dome, what exactly are these things labeled as domes on the Google Earth graphic? Is it the Wikipedia effect, where you have to filter out the mundane chatter to find the truth of the article?

I've puzzled over these structures for quite some time, and have always assumed that they were salt formations.

The small map on the graphic is the one from the Macondo planning document with the lat-lon reference points lined up with the larger chart. What is interesting is that the contour lines don't match well with the contour data that Google uses... I think someone wrote a lengthy piece on that somewhere else.

There is a second overlay on here, it's a magnetic anomaly plot from a Gulf of Mexico geologic analysis that I ran across. From that I was able to find the Pearl River Transfer Fault as well as some other features. (that fault is going to be in the basement rock down below the sediment build up)

Hmmm...looks like a dome to me. I think GN disagrees though. Maybe he is saying that Macondo is in close proximity to a dome but is not on the flank(??). In the mini-basin?

Possibly.... but the contour for the two overlain plots don't completely agree.

Lin wrote about that here:

http://bklim.newsvine.com/_news/2010/07/24/4744365-is-there-something-wr...

And, that was one of the reasons that I went and did the plot overlays myself. Double checking an such. I tried importing the drill planning chart into Dplot, converting the contours into a dataset, but it's gonna require a bit-o-photoshop to remove the annotations, so I gave up.

Followed your link. It appears that BK Lim has the correct position for the Macondo location relative to Google maps image on Fig 2 and Fig 5, but he has scaled the BP EP filing contour map incorrectly (it's way too big), and that's why it appears the contours don't match the Google maps image. That's Mickey's right ear southeast of the wellsite.

Sorry, KL.

You or Google has mis-registered something.

The prominent seafloor features that you indicate are indeed near-surface salt bodies, but the Macondo wellsite is roughly 20 miles to the WNW of the location you indicate.

Can you find Mickey?

The well site is in that big (~10 mi) gap NW of Mickey's right ear in between the large salt bodies. There is no salt near the seafloor at the location (cf. seismic posted on the house commerce committee website), Yeah, I know that's a 2D cut, but same is true in 3D - the Macondo structure is a low relief anticline, possibly cored by deep autochthonous salt or possibly a turtle structure (don't remember offhand, I could find out, but don't really think it's that important in any case).

GN.

Sorry again. I see that Lurker not KLurker posted those maps.

BTW here is a rather famous old paper on the emplacement of the Mickey salt.
Fletcher, Hudec, and Watson, 1995.

Via Google Books - preview worked for me on the excerpt from the AAPG Salt Tectonics Memoir 66:

http://books.google.com/books?id=yHsXuW9N9gMC&pg=PA78&lpg=PA78&dq=fletch...

Must be dyslexic today. That's Mickey's "right" ear if he's face down in the mud.

Okay, I can buy that. I have always been a bit suspicious the mismatch with half the contours fitting and the rest being out to lunch.

(3 x Elevation)

Macondo is about 16 miles away from where you have located it on that map.

Your map is not rectified properly and is in the wrong place.

I've had a properly located (rectified) map on this for a while (it's the same map, only rectified properly) if you want one. It's a KMZ file.

Lemme know.

Got a link?

Thanks, I had to unrar the KMZ and use the KML, but it seems to work fine... and does match my second iteration of the "fudged plot". At least it means I'm in the right area. The contours are a much better fit too.

Totally bogus, but highly entertaining (cf. "pervious updipping beds").
And no, Macondo is not on a salt dome flank.

First of all hats off to aeberman great thread. I think he knows what kind of pressure it would take for this this to work. Given we all see the weak points in the ww and don't know for sure the integrity of the down hole casing. On top of that putting more pressure in the resevoir might stir things up again. Has anyone seen if they asked for data readings from the Texaco Rigel 1999 well, for changes in their pressures? I thought bullhead was used for dead wells (depleted)? Any comments?

Hmmm. He makes some interesting points. I vetted the vitae-guy doesn't hide behind a screen name, so he puts himself on the line professionally. 30 years experience. I appreciate anyone who goes to that much trouble. Best graphics I've seen anywhere, and I've spent a lot of time on Macondo.

http://bklim.newsvine.com/?more=About
"...Happy to contribute and share my 30 years work experience and knowledge as a geohazards specialist towards averting geohazards disasters..."

www.sut.org.au/perth/perth.../RPS_Energy_The_need_for_QC_Geophysical_int...
The need for QC on Geophysical Interpretation ofGeohazards and Engineering
Site Surveys

http://bklim.newsvine.com/_news/2010/07/24/4744365-is-there-something-wr...
"A year before the BP’s oil spill disaster, my colleagues and I at RPS had already felt the need for post-survey independent QC’s in view of the number of fundamental mistakes made during and after the geohazards site investigations. A paper was presented by Dr. Fiona Fittzpatrick on our behalf at the Geohazards Geophysics Seminar at Perth, Australia on 25th March 2010, less than a month before the fateful Deepwater Horizon Blowout. On 11 June 2010, another paper stressing the need for independent post survey QC to check the failures of geohazards predictions was presented by me at the National GeoScience Conference at Shah Alam, Malaysia. Clearly there is a need to check on these fundamental mistakes if another disaster is to be averted in the near future.

http://bklim.newsvine.com/_news/2010/07/13/4671812-the-imminent-threat-o...
"...Abnormal drilling losses, complicated well cementation, erratic test results and gas influxes such as those observed while drilling the Macondo Well, are indicative of the problematic GWSF zones..."

k3d59- that is what bothers me. You vetted him, and I must confess that I did, too, today after reading the entire link that Nelle left.

BK Lim is certainly out there with his true name no less- a geohazard specialist who is putting his reputation on the line with this theory. Since I have absolutely no understanding of any of this stuff, I have come to The Oil Drum in the past two weeks wanting the truth rather than conspiracy theories, and because there are really no alarmists here to speak of, which was comforting for me. While that was comforting at first, I also now must admit that there are a lot of oil men on this site, and that leads me to the next point. The one thing that I remember from the early days of fear-mongering surrounding the spill was something someone said about oil men- that they'll take their secrets to the grave. So I must admit that although there are people here with a great deal of knowledge, some could be working for BP and the others of course are protective of their industry , and understandably so.

As an outsider who has nothing to contribute to the technological conversation here, I will say this. I do have a great deal of common sense and my intuition has been in high gear from day one. As an artist that uses oil with which to paint and not to drill, I use my right brain and not my left, and the one thing that ran true to me were the last 6 paragraphs of his theory at the link that Nelle provided at the beginning of this thread.

http://bklim.newsvine.com/_news/2010/07/30/4781973-why-is-bps-macondo-bl...

Although I know nothing about drilling, I and many other people were pretty incredulous when out of the blue on July 11th or 12th we suddenly learned that there was going to be some sort of cap that could possibly stop the gusher. That after weeks and weeks of pollution, when rumor had it that BP officials themselves had admitted that the well was damaged 'down hole'. So why in the name of heaven would they risk a cap if there was a possibility of down hole damage,at a point where they were purportedly very close to completing the relief wells?

So dumb as I am , I said, WTF? Something is just not feeling right about all this. If you follow the last 6 paragraphs, the smoke and mirrors that we have seen all along suddenly begins to make perfect sense.

That's what really troubles me.

I know I'm going to get stoned for this comment, but I'm ready, especially since I have more to say.

Paintdancer:

I'm no oil-person, as my questions and comments have probably revealed all too well, but I would like to speak to your concerns about oil-person secrecy, and about the sudden reversal of direction on the cap that has concerned you and others.

My understanding of oil-person secrecy is that it is very real in certain, pretty well defined areas of their work. When, for example, they are trying to identify potential areas to explore, the seismic and other data they gather would be very helpful to their competitors, so they keep a tight lid on that information. I can believe also that with regard to certain techniques they've developed that give them an edge on competitors they might be very reluctant to share that with the competition. At the same time, I suspect that there is a huge reservoir of information that is pretty common knowledge in the industry, especially regarding most of the commonly used procedures for exploration, production and safety, including shutting down wells.

On the other hand, there can be so many variables involved, that there are likely to be easily defensible but mutually exclusive approaches to resolving a problem like this. My impression is that BP was so overwhelmed by this blowout, and the possibility that they might make the situation far worse if they made the wrong decisions, that they were reluctant to approach it in any but the most conservative fashion. I was of the profoundly un-informed opinion at the beginning, that the right approach would have been to immediately cut off the old BOP, and replace it with a functional one, much as they have done, only lower down. I still suspect that such a course of action would have saved the gulf from a considerable quantity of the leaking oil, but I'm not prepared to criticize them for moving the way they did, incrementally, especially because I'm aware now of some factors of which I was not cognizant earlier.

So I believe the path they chose was understandable, not nefarious, that as they gained more confidence in their understanding of what was going on they became more comfortable with capping it, rather than employing any of the other approaches that were available, including the ones they had already tried.tried.

It is so difficult to perceive the motivations behind behaviors, especially when we only have limited relevant data, that it is very easy to interpret actions as being almost the complete opposite of how they were intended. Is she being nice to me, or trying to set me up? Is he lazy or laid-back? What's behind that attractive mask, is it the devil? If I were the devil, I would call up someone and say "this is God speaking, here's what I want you to do." How would that person decide whether to follow those directions or not?

But it's time for me to go to bed and get some greatly needed beauty sleep. Would that the prospects were better.

Take care,

Dave

Regarding Lim's theory, let's just consider this for a moment, and give our government the benefit of the doubt. The people here have basically admitted that the WH does not have any people in the administration that know anything about oil, drilling, engineering, or geology and seismology. Chu's area of expertise is nuclear energy or physics, I believe, so he has been in over his head from the beginning.

So what if BP pulled the wool over our government's eyes? What if they told them in early July that in view of the carnage that was being perpetrated every day as a result of the pollution and the world seeing the gusher on every news channel, what if they told the WH or the coast guard or Chu or whoever is in charge that they had a cap that almost certainly would stop the leak until the relief wells were done? So the administration says, 'Okay that sounds great but what about all the rumors that have surfaced that the well has lost its integrity and is damaged down hole? Wouldn't it be dangerous to cap it if that were true?'

And what if BP then totally convinced the administration that they now had this great cap that would most probably work where all the others had failed and the American public will be overjoyed and can start getting on with their lives, and people including Obama, too, can go back to their normal day jobs because the relief wells are almost done within a few feet, and that very soon the well will be capped, the relief wells will finish the kill and that will completely be the end of the Macondo debacle. And so the administration thinks some more, and sees the benefit in the cap idea, but continues with inquiring about the rumors that have been coming from anonymous whistleblowers at BP and Senator Nelson's office that the well is damaged beneath the sea floor, and are still concerned that even the Thomas Jefferson has recorded some anomalies when it went out at the beginning of June that has the administration concerned. (Wasn't there a report, unverified possibly, that there were cracks in the sea floor?)

Then BP comes out with the erroneous fact that even if there is some 'minor' damage down hole the worst that can probably happen is that some gas and oil will flow into the rock formations beneath the sea floor, and maybe a couple little tiny seeps may also occur, but in light of the carnage that has already occurred, isn't that negligible, especially since seeps are naturally occurring in the GOM anyway?? So the gov't decides (with reservations) to let them cap the well and at first everything looks pretty good and people are overjoyed. Then those annoying little seeps start occurring but again BP has already reassured the gov't that this would be a probable result of capping the well, and anyway they are not related to Macondo, so they are nothing to be alarmed at. And what if the Coast Guard starts doing the seismic tests and realizes that there really are problems in the sea floor and that the leaks are getting worse and that the lack of rising pressure seems to indicate that the well lacks integrity?

Well what are the governments choices at that point?

At that point the gov't is literally between a rock and a hard place. If it forces BP to take off the cap, which if you recall it alluded to in the early days as a definite probability after the well was capped, then the public will be outraged. In addition, while I am not an attorney, I would think that the gov't could then be breaking some serious laws against the environment in requiring BP to remove the cap and allowing the vile stuff to spew again. Also the government would then become liable for all further financial damages since BP had managed to stop the leak and the pesky gov't made them take it off. So the WH or Coast Guard or Chu, or whoever is in charge decides to take its chances and hope that the earth beneath the seafloor will stay intact and that the seeps will be minimal and eventually the reservoir will deplete itself and that nothing horrible will happen even if the well is losing small amounts of gas and oil into the undersea layers. In fact, it would be a win-win for the Gov't , BP and the Gulf- or at least that's the way they'll rationalize the decision. The public never knows the danger, the gov't doesn't need to worry about evacuating millions and everyone lives happily ever after. Hopefully.

Interesting item this week was the fact that on Thursday House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) stripped out authorization for an independent investigation into the Gulf disaster from HR 3534, The Clear Act, which passed in the House Friday by a small majority. Why? Why not give the American public some transparency if you have nothing to hide? Why not allow independent engineers, and scientists investigate rather than the government?

I think BP has trapped our government into a situation that is untenable. They (the administration) have had no choice other than to go along at this point and hope the relief wells and static kill will do the job required . They are playing against the clock.

Dave,

Thanks for your kind and thoughtful reply. I certainly hope you and Rockman and the rest are right. As I said, I am right brained so I am better off painting pretty scenes of the gulf then trying to figure out what's going on beneath the surface. I was feeling much better about everything until I read Lim's report this morning. I guess it's all hogwash in view of the remarks. Thanks again, and I apologize if I took up any one's time with my thoughts.

I take it you believe BP "pulled the wool over the government's eyes". Seems to me that's pretty hard to do when government personnel are inside BP's offices, and individual engineers and managers working for BP know there are potential criminal liabilities if they hide the facts.

Your post is long and complex, but in general I find it quite off the mark.

You have this bassackward. It is Ken Salazar's boot that is on BP's throat, not the other way around. It is extremely hard to talk with someone's boot on your throat. It has been the government that has consistently succumbed to the wildest flights of the imagination by know-nothings and restrained BP from doing what should have been done.

The NY Times interview with Secretary Chu had him admitting that he alone stopped the original top kill procedure before it was done. The Times' inside source acknowledged that despite initial concerns about the procedure, even (s)he would have seen it through to its proper conclusion. Do you think BP used mind control to get Chu to say that? Or do you think that was something that just slipped out in a friendly interview for a puff piece in the NY Times? And it only got promptly shoved down the memory hole by the editors of the Times when the article was picked up on the blogs as proof of government interference?

Why was David Axelrod on the Sunday talk shows saying it would take 10 days to install the capping stack (the exact period of time it would take Harry Reid to pass "Cap & Tax") when it actually took a only a few days? Ever heard the phrase "Never waste a crisis"?

It is because of right-brainers like you that the Administration has gotten away with their schemes so far. It's well past time you awakened your left brain and put on your thinking cap!

It is because of right-brainers like you that the Administration has gotten away with their schemes so far. It's well past time you awakened your left brain and put on your thinking cap!

Bruce, Thanks but my cap is firmly in place, though it does admittedly have some tin foil in it.

If you had thoroughly read my comment and used your left brain to read between the lines,(and especially the part about Nancy Pelosi) you would have realized that I am no fan of this administration. That being said, the last administration stunk to high heaven, too, IMHO.

It was simply easier for me to wrap my right brain around the idea of BP being at fault, rather than to admit that the gov't has nefarious intentions in all this.

But yes, "crisis= opportunity" and I am ticked as hell that this gov't is using this crisis to forward a cap and trade or carbon tax agenda. In addition, if you read HR 3534, The Clear Act, you'll realize that this bill contains a huge US government land grab stuck inside of it, to the tune of $900 million annually for the next 30 years. Dare I say re-wilding? What place to best start using all that new money than right here on the Gulf coast, where beach front prime real estate was once in demand prior to Earth Day 2010. After all, the Florida panthers are down to the last 100 and they need a lot more land to roam, since males don't like to share their space with each other. Oh yeah and wait, won't there now need to be a lot more land taken back for all the endangered species that are going to be placed on the list thanks to the indiscriminate use of Corexit? See, now you've got me started again.

Google the Tierra, the gold standard replacement, and look into Representative Ohmert of Texas's comments to Congress two weeks ago regarding the Clear Act. Then you'll get as mad as I am, and want some answers other than the smoke and mirrors that we have been seeing for over one hundred days from both BP and the Obama administration.

Sounds a little paranoid. It is kind of funny that you take Chu's word for what happened when it suits you, but insist he is lying the rest of the time. Chu may or may not have been responsible for halting the May "top kill" operation and anyway no one knows whether it might have worked. The way the regulatory process works is the company proposes avenues of action and the government approves or denies them. AFAICT The Top kill lasted the length of time that it was proposed to last -maybe even a little longer.

Eventually this well will be cemented shut and then the BOP stack will be removed and analyzed. At that point there will be more information on what went wrong in the first place and what the paths of flow were available for a kill operation.

I think the government, BP and many people in the oil industry feared that the well bore had been damaged similar to how the Ixtoc well had been damaged when its rig collapsed on top of its wellhead.

The well bore being damaged is an ultimate doomer scenario and there were plenty of people that bought into that scenario. If the well bore was indeed damaged this could have been every bit as bad as anything Matt Simmons dreamed up. Given that it could have been a much larger disaster if the well bore was broken, I think the same people who are now claiming the government exaggerated, would be the same people who would be complaining that the government underplayed the true extent of the calamity. If the well bore had been severely damaged and it may have turned out that even the bottom kill was a long protracted process. And then you would be screaming the government should have told you how bad it was. Unfortunately neither BP or the government have the clairvoyance that you seem to expect. The best they can do is reveal how much they know and don't know.

I have been impressed throughout this the extent to which the government representatives have been willing to say "I don't know". BP OTOH has been extremely devious and cryptic in their revelations and made all sorts of predictions for success that have turned out to have not been true. And the one thing that turned out to be successful BP never once predicted that it would work.

my colleagues and I at RPS

Credibility shot right there.

nelle -- I will. You might not know this but I've spent a good bit of time answering tech questions here on TOD. It’s a obligation I take seriously. I certainly don't know everything but I've been a petroleum geologist for 35 years so I've picked up a bit along the way.

This will sound rude so I’ll apologize up front. I don’t want to take the time to go into detail. I read his entire first article. It is crap IMHO. Just that simple.

It is crap IMHO

It's crap whether I'm humble or not.

delete

I know that it was the wisest decision to delete it even though I never read it. I can almost imagine what your response was.

Is there a hint of any outside third party agencies being able yet to enter the waters around the Deepwater Horizon? Would The Oil Drum field a team to do so, given unrestricted access, if the opportunity arose?

I'd love to get in a submarine and go down to 5000 feet, just to be able to say I did it. But that would be one heck of a boondoggle. Why would anybody want to go around the well? It doesn't really give us good information.

On the other hand, I would love to have the kill procedure with sketches and drawings ;-)

A super duper boondoggle!

Err... to look at ship's floating around the area?

I've done that before. It looses it's entertainment value quite fast.

These videos seem to show a lot of black blobs flying up from the seafloor today. Can anyone explain what they are?

http://www.floridaoilspilllaw.com/july-31-mysterious-black-blobs-rising-...

They are mysterious black blobs, known as MBBs in the industry. Some have attributed them to large fish going to the bathroom, some say they are faked, and some say they are coming from the giant oil lake which somehow clings to the seafloor in the Gulf of Mexico.

I'd go with the one that is more likely mostly the fish going to the bathroom scenario or that it was faked.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100731/ap_on_bi_ge/us_gulf_oil_spill
Also the headline for this looks interesting, nothing major, just a minor setback with the relief well. Apparently, it has debris in it.

The blobs just look like debris kicked up with bottom sediment by the rov. Normally the deep bottom of the Gulf is very fine mud that is easily disturbed. Unless a current is present it obscures vision from a sub or rov for a while.
At a drill site the bottom also has a layer of cuttings mixed with some discharged drilling fluids. It is common for a white bacterial film or mat to form on this material due to organic compounds in the drilling fluid. If disturbed the film breaks up in chunks. Oil seeping from the bottom looks very different. The bottom around the blown well will also have a layer of drilling mud on it from the failed top kill. Depending on how much stuff has been layered on top of natural mud, the cloud kicked up by rov's can be different place to place.

The term debris implies it's something similar to rubble. This refers to (usually small) pieces of the well's wall which fall in due to earth stresses or chemical effects (the rocks absorb water, swell, and pop out of the wall).

Well no matter the Static Kill will still begin on Tuesday as planned.

Some have attributed them to large fish going to the bathroom

(belly laugh)
(continuing gasps and snorts punctuated by further eruptions of guffaws)
(close to going to the bathroom myself)

Well the fish that made this must feel relieved!
Photobucket

The uniformity in shape and color clearly demonstrates a mediocre job of photoshop editing. The fish passing the gas on the other hand is surely relieved... :)

Your welcome to the source of the video if think you can prove it's fake....
http://s765.photobucket.com/albums/xx296/meisje_bucket/?action=view&curr...

didn't think so....

meisje,
I watched all 10 min of the video. The brief burst of globs (which enter the field of view at the bottom and rise) occurs at t=6:02. Before and after that there are numerous smaller globs rising from near the same place. Looks to me that they could be oil rising through the water. I suppose anything could be faked, but at least the smaller blobs have the same annoying video compression artefacts as the marine snow seen floating around in the field of view. I'm willing to believe its oil or some other fluid that is less dense than sea water.

The main problem I have with interpreting this video is that the blobs all rise from the below the field of view, and could be coming from the ROV itself, or from something that the ROV is holding.

Who knows. And if they arise from the sea floor, that doesn't contradict anything that BP or the Feds have been saying.

12 bubbles-gap- same 12 bubbles, easy to see.

Oops, I was confused, did not see the time, it`s a loop, but still a fake. Why not show more, a seep would be a steady stream of bubbles.

I don't know if the loop is a fake, but I can say that a BBC documentary on Lake Baikal which showed oil seeping from the sediment on the bottom of the lake looked very similar. It leaked in discrete blobs, not as a steady stream.

Seeing that pretty much convinced me that it`s bull, then linking to the web site furthered that first impression along. Whale shit sometimes does float to the top:) I would like to be linked to
seeps in Lake Baikal, to increase my knowlege. Thanks Aardvark. (Without searching through pages of Googly)

W.R.:

I concur - really bad fake. There is plenty of manure here without bringing in a new herd of horses....

Real oil seepage in the GOM: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m4S9uazWAB0

Do you realize these fish could be a new source of energy? They're passing gas at 2200 psi. If we could just get one of them to the surface intact, then we could hook one up to a microturbine and generate wind power.

paintdancer,

For what it's worth, here's my opinion on the blobs in the videos to which you linked. In both videos the ROV is kicking up sediment from the bottom. Towards the end of the first video a cluster of dark objects move upward. If you set the video on full screen and freeze it at an appropriate frame you can see that the blobs pass in front of the metal T-bar thingies that the ROV is carrying, so they are close to the camera and not illuminated by the ROV's lights, making them they appear black no matter what color they actually are. They also have angular shapes that are not consistent with them being bubbles of liquid or gas. Therefore, I'd say that they are chunks of sediment blown upwards by the ROV. I don't see anything except what appear to be flying chunks of sediment in the second video.

I wouldn't interpret anything in any ROV videos as oil or gas escaping from the sea floor unless the ROV was sitting very still for a long time and it was clear that the stuff was coming from the seabed and rising through still water.

I watched a BBC documentary on Lake Baikal today.

The lake has natural oil seeps and the oil comes out of the sediment in black blobs very similar to the gif posted by meisje above.

I see we're back to "tear um a new" here on TOD.

I see we're back to "tear um a new" here on TOD.

Any consideration of confining pressure? Casing is not in open air at sea level.

Hello,
Why is it believed that a top kill procedure will now work, when it failed to shut the well in the last time it was tried?

Thanks

Rossco, I believe they know substantially more about the hole now then they did before, they also have the back pressure caused by the cap and numerous valves that they can use to control things they didn't have previously. They also have a relief well days away in case something goes wrong, which is becoming less and less likely as time goes on.

The first time they attempted a topkill, they were ordered to stop by the government, we really don't know whether it would have worked or not. What they should have done even then was put some kind of cap over it before they attempted the top kill to keep from losing all the mud out the BOP top. With the cap on it has nowhere to go but into the formation. They're using a light mix of mud so they don't inadvertently fracture the formation. Even this topkill isn't the finish, they will STILL use the relief well (RW) to finish the job with tons of cement, but the mud will have stopped any flow. Personally I think it is a good plan, because they have multiple levers to deal with eventualities.

Rossco,

There's one enormous difference between the static top kill now being contemplated and the previous top kill of the flowing well. In the previous kill attempt they were trying to inject mud into the raging flow, knowing that nearly all of it would be immediately flushed out into the ocean along with the oil that was spewing out.

Their only hope of successfully getting the mud to stop the flow and begin forcing the oil back down into the well relied on the fact that they were injecting the mud at the bottom of the BOP(though the choke and/or kill valves). They were hoping that there was enough of a constriction in the flow path above their injection point that they could generate sufficient pressure at the bottom of the BOP to reverse the flow in the well. It seemed like a long shot at the time.

If I recall correctly, a BP spokesman stated at one point that they had successfully gotten mud at least 1000' down the well bore, and recently they have been making statements that have led some people to infer that the top kill would have succeeded if Chu had not chickened.

But where is their evidence that they ever got any mud into the well, and how could they possibly know how far down the well the mud got? Until the details are made known (e.g., the location of pressure sensors in the flow path and what they recorded during the kill attempt) I remain very doubtful about the claim that any mud ever got forced down the well.

The top kill attempt is now a totally different thing. The well is shut in, so any mud that they pump must go down the well....

Unless of course the BOP, capping stack or the well itself spring a leak during process.

Of all the videos I've seen of alleged seepage, the second one at this link is the strangest. There appears to be an explosion and a rip current. But with all things at these depths, it's hard to know what's going on. It might be sediment kicked up violently by the ROV:

http://www.floridaoilspilllaw.com/july-30-rov-films-explosive-black-stor...

Looks like silt kicked up by (very) nearby ROV.

Art,

Regarding the “bleed and lubricate” procedure (L/B), I still don’t get it. In your response to my post on yesterday’s closed thread you said in part, “You make many good points that I agree with. Again, the point of the post is not to take a position but to try to explain the well configuration, what is being planned and the relative risks.” http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6790#comment-691285. You covered all of those points consistently both yesterday and today. You also described what you call a bleed and lubricate procedure consistently both days. Specifically, you say that, “Heavy mud is pumped into the well through the choke and kill lines on the blowout preventer (BOP) and allowed to sink to the bottom of the well.” I accept that you are not taking a position about L/B, but I do question both the accuracy and the feasibility of it as described.

Actually, I only made two points. First you describe pumping in an unstated quantity of drilling mud and allowing it to settle to the bottom (presumably covering the production zone). Next you describe bleeding off a quantity of oil that has migrated to the wellhead. My first point was that in my opinion that will not work. When you repeat this process with the next slug of mud, the mud already on the bottom will be forced into the formation. This will immediately build up a filter cake, thus stopping additional flow from the top unless you are willing to pump hard enough that something goes pop either in the producing zone or maybe some other zone.

My second point was that traditional L/B (lubricate first, and then bleed) requires a gas column to pressurize and compress. I think now most here believe that the Macondo column is liquid phase at the top, so there is no gas to compress. You will have to use vastly more pump pressure than the usual 200 psi max with an L/B against a gas column. I might add that an L/B is considered to be complete when the kill fluid begins to come out on the bleed cycle, whether the well is killed or not. The not so obvious implication is that people who do this kind of thing are not expecting the well fluids to turn upside down with the kill fluid (in this case, mud) on the bottom. I posted several links to L/B in my previous post. http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6790#comment-691181.

Art, I am neither adequately qualified nor inclined to argue with any of the experts here on TOD (Simmons ver.2.0 and DougR beta version excepted). So please read this post in the spirit it is given. My wife says I don’t get much of anything so that could indeed be the case here. I have no direct experience with well pressure control or blowouts. I have ancient experience with exploratory wells (mostly on land) in SE Texas. A lot of procedures have changed over the years, but the underlying principles have remained largely the same. What I know or think I know about many of the topics here on TOD is a result of book learning: informed posts here, internet searches, prior studies from my time in the oil business and so forth. The caveat about that is book learning can be a dangerous thing. And, often it is a poor substitute for practical experience. So, if I am missing something that should be intuitively obvious to a normal person, feel free to let me know. I am still teachable.

God bless,

KarmaDave

It doesn't sound like BP plans to the "Lubricate and Bleed" procedure. That procedure would be used if there is a large pocket of gas at the top of the well bore.

The procedure if it were to be used would be to pump in some mud and let it settle to the bottom of the gas pocket and then bleed off the gas. After the gas pocket is bled off, mud would be pumped in to push the oil back into the reservoir.

It sounds like BP's current thinking is the well has been producing up the production casing and getting by the BOP through the drill string.

Yes that BP likely does not intend to use a lubricate and bleed procedure. Not only would they need a large gas pocket, it is a requirement for a lubricate and bleed. Macondo is not a candidate for this procedure because there probably is no gas pocket to compress and even if there were it would be too small.

And yes, you pump some mud and let it fall to the liquid interface. You don’t bleed off all of the gas; just enough to drop the added pressure back down to what it would be after the first addition of the mud. You repeat this as many times as it takes to get the wellhead pressure down to a point that the well is killed or mud comes out of the bleed line. Yes, if the well is not dead you will have to switch to a bullhead procedure and pump against the formation. Your lubricate and bleed ended when mud came out the bleed line.

I hope they are right about HC just coming up the production casing. Thinking about all of those other leaks, fractures, twists and turns and whatnot gives me a headache.

I don’t know if Art wants to address my concerns. If you read his post he devotes one of his two paragraphs on the static top kill to lubricate and bleed and states that probably lubricate and bleed is what BP will do. I just think that his description is incorrect and that it would fail if he tried it. Otherwise I think the post is fine and quite informative.

KarmaDave and everyone else who have posted comments on this thread,

I was traveling yesterday so I come in a bit late on this discussion and will not attempt to respond to all the many thoughtful comments and observations made.

Dave, you are right that the bleed and lubricate method works best on a gas column rather than an oil column. We are not optimistic that the static top kill will work, although we wish BP all the luck in the world. We stated in the post (delicately) that the idea of "pushing oil back into the reservoir" propagated by Kent Wells and perpetuated in the press over the past several days, is totally wrong. It defies the laws of physics. What has to happen is to balance the reservoir pressure with heavy mud to stop the flow. How you get there with a top kill is less clear because you have to reduce the pressure created by bull heading mud by producing the displace oil.

The scenario described by Wells is accurate in one respect: to overcome reservoir pressure effectively means exceeding the fracture gradient and pushing mud into the formation.

We are somewhat pessimistic about the top kill because:

1. An annulus is not as favorable a flow path as a well bore.
2. Lubrication is really best applied to gas wells not oil wells.

The process of getting mud to the reservoir face is essentially passive--bull head and wait for the mud and oil exchange places in the annulus and the mud falls to the bottom of the well. Then, you bleed off pressure until you get mud returns or at least mud contaminated returns, then stop and bull head more heavy mud into the well. Repeat as necessary till the well is dead.

It may not be possible to bull head mud because the surface casing (mainly the 22-inch casing exposed in the upper 160 ft of the well and that does not have high burst capacity) may not be strong enough to withstand a high pump rate. We don't know this until we try.

This method means that heavy mud would settle and reach the reservoir before oil and gas can be bled from the annulus. This could increase pressure to the point that casing burst limits are reached.

The bottom kill option has the advantage that much higher flow rates can be applied more-or-less directly to the reservoir without having to rely on gravity settling, and without pressuring the well head.

I did not know about Lim's work previously but my understanding is that he is a shallow hazard expert. Hazard experts deal with the shallowest part of the geological section. Conditions at depth are different. Here are a few observations based on a cursory reading of Lim's articles:

1. Salt domes don't look like the diagrams that Lim shows. These are antiquated representations based on models developed before high-quality revealed that most domes are tear-drop features that are severed from their roots. The idea that multiple vertically stacked reservoirs can communicate along the flank of a vertical salt feature is not supported by modern data. Reservoirs are separated by sealing shales.

2. Lim's thesis is that any salt dome flank well is effectively doomed from the outset because of pressure communication. Thousands of wells have been drilled on salt dome flanks in the onshore and offshore Gulf Coast over the past 80-90 years that do not support this assumption.

3. Lim's models assume reservoir beds that dip steeply against salt--we don't that this is the case in Macondo and, in fact, I doubt it. It is more likely that the Macondo prospect was based on a sub-salt anticlinal structure in which dip rates are more modest that Lim presents. In his scenario, it is buoyancy that creates the possibility of pressures at or near the frac gradient from below in any given bed against the salt, and not pressure communication downward from the salt.

4. Lim's model assumes that oil and gas can pass freely across thick sealing shales (along faults) to the sea floor once the Macondo sealing cap was put in place. Faults or not, this is an unlikely geological model. It further assumes a limitless supply of pressure in the reservoir--far greater than the actual pressures measured at shut-in or assumed from mud weights while drilling. It also assumes that the seeps did not exist prior to the Macondo well--clearly false.

5. There are sea floor surface salt features all around the Macondo well and throughout the Mississippi Canyon and Green Canyon MMS protraction areas. This is nothing new. Most, if not all, of these salt features have had oil seeps for millions of years, or at least long before the BP Macondo well was drilled.

6. Please go to my blog and view the presentation: Oil Seepage: An Inconvenient Truth: http://petroleumtruthreport.blogspot.com/2010/08/oil-seepage-inconvenien...)

Art

I thought Kent Wells made it pretty clear in the technical briefings I have heard that their expectation that the static kill (top kill) is going to work is because they now believe the flow from the reservoir is all coming up the production casing.

If that assumption is not correct then the static kill won't kill the well and the bottom kill will. But that is the point one way or the other they will have more info in preparation for drilling into the well at the bottom.

Aeberman, thank you very much for your thorough reply regarding Lim's model and theories. It is all I had hoped for . . .

This is unbelieveable.They want to seal the top,then the Great Neptune king of the sea grants a wish for cement to flow upwards. Well it may have been the good fairy I don't know for sure. The propaganda they issue don't make a bit of sense to anyone with a brain. Sorry Thad you fail!!!The proper procedure is creating a flow in a "U" shape with the q4000 in production pulling (relieveing) the pressure. When they acutally get mud back then 24 hrs circuation to clean the well bore casing .Then you start cementing. Has anyone drilled into a cylinder with 6900+ pressure on it ? It's not a proper thing to do.I for one would really enjoy watching this, because I can't believe it til I see it.I really think that BP don't want to start production of this well ,so that the Gov (our buds) can capture the flow rate.
Any Commments?

etoil - I've drilled into pressures exceeding 14,000 psi dozens of times with no problem The pressure isn't a problem as long as you mud weight produces a pressure a little higher then the container's pressure. High pressures aren't a problem...high pressure differentials are.

Your cmt flowing upwards comment: Are you talking about pumping cmt down the RW into the base of the WW? Not sure if that's the current plan once they stop the flow with the top kill. But that's a very standard technique for cmt a well. The cmt will be pumped at a sufficient pressure to force the mud in the well back up thru the cap. This is basically how ever string of csg as been cmtd in every well ever drilled. But again, I'm not clear on the plan and just speculating.

BTW: this well will never be produced and have 100% of the flow measured. Physically impossible. More importantly if they could magically measure the flow to be 30,000 bopd it would say nothing to how much was flowing 4 weeks or 3 months ago. It's virtually impossible to calculate how much oil has been dumped into the GOM from the start. Lots of guesses can be made but nothing proven. Just MHO.

That last bit kind of threw me off, are they still going to use this well after they kill it?
As for the rest of the news that has been reported thus far. I'm excited. The static kill will begin Tueday and hopefully that will mean the kill operation will be complete toward the middle of August.

HOS -- Nope...the blow out well will never be a producer. But there was some talk about using the second RW if they don't need it. They could suspend the well and come back in a few years to drill and produce the reservoir. But a lot of ifs to get from here to there.

Actually if the top kill goes as I understand it the WW could be killed in a matter of hours. That would be great news and should end any further oil dumped into the GOM. But the ultimate plugging and abandoment of the well could take quit a few months.

No way the OH will ever be used, but sometime, down the road, a future operator would consider using the top hole sections of the relief wells to sidetrack back to the reservoir for producer wells. Of course that would be the smart thing to do to get full value, but PR might cause the relief wells to also be permanently plugged and unusable - will be interesting hear the sturm and drang over this -- if there's any noise, BP will P&A rather than TA, unfortunately degrading the value of the lease to no one's benefit.

It seems that the original BP description of the "static kill" process, which the first post in this thread disputes, may actually be reasonably accurate. It seems to describe a "bullhead" approach, where the mud is forced into the well from the top, at the higher pressures that the wellhead exhibits "naturally", in its shut-in state. The boundary between mud and HCs is maintained as the original HC column is forced into the reservoir and the entire well is filled with mud.

The level of higher pressure that would be required is clearly a function of reservoir permeability or porosity, which acts like an artificial viscosity to "slow down" the fluid dynamic response in the well, desired rate of mud fill and, to a lesser extent, to HC compressibility. The initial higher pressure will go down and finally be equal to ambient water pressure if the procedure is successful and the right mud density is chosen.

If the current lower and VERY slowly rising pressure is indicative of partially or zonally depleted reservoir, the rate of increase would seem to indicate low or very low reservoir permeability. That, in turn, would point to a potentially high or very high pressure would be required to initially force the oil currently in the well column into the reservoir.

The concern, of course is whether this additional pressure will finally compromise the well structure (if we assume the current pressure level did not compromise/compromise further the upper well integrity). The other concern (not disregarding the cautionary note not to jump to conclusions on BP's actions in the previous thread)) is BP's apparent custom to disregard the cautionary approach to pressure build up and go "full bore" right upfront. This is what happened in the current "well integrity tests", after a careful, step-by-step, pressure increase followed by hours of evaluation process has been agreed upon with the government.

While it is likely the current tests gave relevant information, it remains VERY difficult task to calculate at what pressure one would get reasonable HC motion back into the reservoir - there is simply too many uncertaintees. This is the number I would trust the least, because several consecutive analyses are required to generate it, each using the output of the preceding one, potentially compounding the errors. It would seem that the critical pressure value required for functional success will remain unknown until the "static kill" is actually occurring.

I certainly hope there is better control of the pressure buildup in "static kill" than exhibited in "well integrity tests". My other hope is that this well system doesn't hide some highly non-linear pressure behavior on flow reversal, which we have not seen yet because all of our experience have been one way only. I would certainly look extra carefully at the developed pressure trace from the "well integrity tests" and if it really doesn't match well-behaved models, I would assume some nasty behavior. If that is potential conclusion, than "bottom kill" via relief wells would seem a less risky option.

I guess low permeability is as low permeability does. The well flowed in excess of 25,000 BOPD, and this tells me the permeability is high enough to pump back in. The buildup could be affected by reservoir shape and layering (model it as banana shaped, two layers separated by a tight barrier, rather than a neat circle).

Also reservoir compressibility is likely to change the curve from a "normal" build up (the hydrocarbons are very compressible, it's a 2000+ GOR volatile crude, and I bet the rock compressibility is 20 microsips or even higher). Finally, there could be some cross-flow taking place.

Unfortunately Mr Kent Wells is coily saying the buildup matches their projections. To this I say they probably ran 30 alternatives and the buildup is matching closely one of them. But we don't know what it is. And I doubt "low permeability" in the near well region is in any of these solution sets.

The basis for determining integrity is the shape of the pressure curve not the actual pressure. Kent Wells said the rise in pressure follows a Horner plot. That is, pressure is rising along a logarithmic curve.

The "top kill" that they are now contemplating could have been done July 15 soon after stopping the flow. In fact it seems likely it could have been done May 15. There is no reason I can see why a capping stack could not have been installed 2 months earlier if putting a cap on the well had been made a priority to do so. The only reason I can see why it wasn't made a priority is because of the belief that it was unlikely the well had integrity.

When BP started to close the valve on the capping stack, I believe they fully expect to reopen the valve within 6 hours. If the pressure had risen to some initial level and stayed constant or had risen to some peak level and started to fall they would have immediately relieved the pressure by reopening the valves. BP was surprised when the pressure continued to rise after 6 hours. They were even more surprised when it continued to rise after 24 hours. It was at that point that I imagine they slapped their foreheads and said " Geez we could have done this a long time ago and saved ourselves billions"

The reason they didn't pursue capping the well earlier is because they were convinced it wouldn't do anything but reveal the true extent of the damage to the well bore. If the well bore was damaged (and they thought that it was) then they felt they were better off not revealing the truth until the relief well was close to completion.

On July 16 BP's entire outlook and demeanor changed. BP no longer was behaving like a desperate company that was slowly bleeding to death.

Great summary at the top aeberman, but I think Wells is right and it's perfectly possible to bullhead this well in a day without seriously challenging the integrity of the casing. And thanks jinn for pointing out that it's the shape of the build-up curve that points to well integrity, not the final pressure. Stopped a long post getting even longer.

Here's my stab at rate and pressure calculations for the static kill. Disclaimer: I've taken the input numbers from postings here and elsewhere, but not checked them for exactness and some are from memory. This is an order-of-magnitude test so unless it leads to a borderline answer, it doesn't matter if some of the numbers are 10% or even 100% off. In the spirit of order-of-magnitude calculation, I'll assume that the average density of the static oil column in the well is the same as when it is flowing, and ignore friction.

Assume that the wellhead pressure is 7000psi. I recall 4000psi as a flowing wellhead pressure before the cap was put on, but maybe there was a 2000psi somewhere as well, depending on erosion, cutting off the riser, reservoir depletion etc. Let's split the difference and say 3000psi, 4000psi below the shut-in pressure. Assume that this represents the drawdown on the reservoir when the well was flowing 40,000 barrels per day. That's a productivity index (P.I.) of about 10 barrels per day per psi. BP/Gov has quoted a reservoir permeability of 300mD from the pressure pressure build-up test currently being conducted (the Horner plot Wells referred to). Possibly disappointing to those who worked on the exploration prospect, but not unreasonable if the sand is fine-grained/cemented/clay-bearing. The main reservoir sand is 60ft thick which gives a permeability-height (kh) of 18,000mDft. Not unreasonable for the well rate observed. Like the P.I. of 10 it's not world-class, but it's the pressure that makes the rate. In a shallow, normally pressured reservoir you'd be lucky to see 10,000 barrels per day.

Looks OK so far. Dimitry suggests that the slow build-up suggested a low permeability reservoir, but it's the kh that determines the build-up rate and at 18,000mDft it will take weeks to fully stabilise. Remember these gauges are accurate to a tiny fraction of a psi, kh is calculated from the build-up rate, and late in the test pressure rises very slowly (asymptotically). In a normal PBU, all you want to know is the kh and reservoir pressure so you'd stop a test on an 18,000mDft reservoir after a couple of days and extrapolate the Horner plot. Here they also want to look for deviations from the extrapolated trend, which might indicate leaks. Plus of course no-one wants to start polluting the Gulf again.

Suppose they start pumping mud at 10psi above the shut-in pressure. They'd have to be really unlucky for a weak point to hold at 7000psi but fail at 7010. With a P.I. of 10 that should give 100 barrels per day flow back into the reservoir. In 6 hours they'll have pumped 25 barrels, about 1% of the quoted well volume of 2,000barrels. They're pumping at the sea floor, so there's about 13,000 vertical feet of hole above the reservoir and 1% of that is 130ft. Replace 130ft of oil (say 0.5 S.G) with 13ppg mud (say 1.5 S.G.), a differential of 1 S.G. which corresponds to a difference in pressure gradient of about 0.5psi/ft. The wellhead pressure is now 65psi below your starting point (and 55psi below the shut-in pressure so you're already safer than you were at the start). You could then add 50psi at the wellhead for a 60psi pressure differential at the reservoir, giving 600 barrels per day flow into the reservoir. In six hours you've replaced another 150 barrels of oil with mud for a total of nearly 10% of the wellbore volume or 1,300ft vertically. Now your wellhead pressure is down 650psi from startup and you could add another 500psi. With a P.I. Of 10 and > 500psi pressure differential at the reservoir, you'll get > 5,000 barrels per day inflow and displace the remaining oil (90% of 2,000 barrels) to mud in under ten hours. At which point the well is dead and it's all over bar the cementing.

In practice the staging would be more gradual and in my example I've ignored the increasing bottom-hole pressure during each stage, as oil is replaced by mud. You'd have to choke back the mud supply otherwise the flow rate back into the reservoir would run away as the oil column was displaced. I assume they want to take it gently and retain control rather than just 'let it rip'. But all in all, it seems perfectly do-able.

KarmaDave and everyone else who have posted comments on this thread,

I was traveling yesterday so I come in a bit late on this discussion and will not attempt to respond to all the many thoughtful comments and observations made.

Dave, you are right that the bleed and lubricate method works best on a gas column rather than an oil column. We are not optimistic that the static top kill will work, although we wish BP all the luck in the world. We stated in the post (delicately) that the idea of "pushing oil back into the reservoir" propagated by Kent Wells and perpetuated in the press over the past several days, is totally wrong. It defies the laws of physics. What has to happen is to balance the reservoir pressure with heavy mud to stop the flow. How you get there with a top kill is less clear because you have to reduce the pressure created by bull heading mud by producing the displace oil.

The scenario described by Wells is accurate in one respect: to overcome reservoir pressure effectively means exceeding the fracture gradient and pushing mud into the formation.

We are somewhat pessimistic about the top kill because:

1. An annulus is not as favorable a flow path as a well bore.
2. Lubrication is really best applied to gas wells not oil wells.

The process of getting mud to the reservoir face is essentially passive--bull head and wait for the mud and oil exchange places in the annulus and the mud falls to the bottom of the well. Then, you bleed off pressure until you get mud returns or at least mud contaminated returns, then stop and bull head more heavy mud into the well. Repeat as necessary till the well is dead.

It may not be possible to bull head mud because the surface casing (mainly the 22-inch casing exposed in the upper 160 ft of the well and that does not have high burst capacity) may not be strong enough to withstand a high pump rate. We don't know this until we try.

This method means that heavy mud would settle and reach the reservoir before oil and gas can be bled from the annulus. This could increase pressure to the point that casing burst limits are reached.

The bottom kill option has the advantage that much higher flow rates can be applied more-or-less directly to the reservoir without having to rely on gravity settling, and without pressuring the well head.

I did not know about Lim's work previously but my understanding is that he is a shallow hazard expert. Hazard experts deal with the shallowest part of the geological section. Conditions at depth are different. Here are a few observations based on a cursory reading of Lim's articles:

1. Salt domes don't look like the diagrams that Lim shows. These are antiquated representations based on models developed before high-quality revealed that most domes are tear-drop features that are severed from their roots. The idea that multiple vertically stacked reservoirs can communicate along the flank of a vertical salt feature is not supported by modern data. Reservoirs are separated by sealing shales.

2. Lim's thesis is that any salt dome flank well is effectively doomed from the outset because of pressure communication. Thousands of wells have been drilled on salt dome flanks in the onshore and offshore Gulf Coast over the past 80-90 years that do not support this assumption.

3. Lim's models assume reservoir beds that dip steeply against salt--we don't that this is the case in Macondo and, in fact, I doubt it. It is more likely that the Macondo prospect was based on a sub-salt anticlinal structure in which dip rates are more modest that Lim presents. In his scenario, it is buoyancy that creates the possibility of pressures at or near the frac gradient from below in any given bed against the salt, and not pressure communication downward from the salt.

4. Lim's model assumes that oil and gas can pass freely across thick sealing shales (along faults) to the sea floor once the Macondo sealing cap was put in place. Faults or not, this is an unlikely geological model. It further assumes a limitless supply of pressure in the reservoir--far greater than the actual pressures measured at shut-in or assumed from mud weights while drilling. It also assumes that the seeps did not exist prior to the Macondo well--clearly false.

5. There are sea floor surface salt features all around the Macondo well and throughout the Mississippi Canyon and Green Canyon MMS protraction areas. This is nothing new. Most, if not all, of these salt features have had oil seeps for millions of years, or at least long before the BP Macondo well was drilled.

6. Please go to my blog and view the presentation: Oil Seepage: An Inconvenient Truth: http://petroleumtruthreport.blogspot.com/2010/08/oil-seepage-inconvenien...)

Art

Although this thread is currently on very technical issues, I have some questions, and hopefully the answers will help me get a better grasp of problems and solutions.

Kent Wells, in the July 21st technical update (http://bp.concerts.com/gom/kentwellstechupdate_072110a.htm) clearly demonstrated the injection of cement during the planned static top kill (bull head) operation. The animation first showed the injection of mud, which resulted in the wild well, WW (presumably casing), not only being full of mud, but some quantity of mud having been forced into the reservoir. At that point, I assumed that the WW was killed. The animation continued, and then showed an injection of cement, followed by more mud, which mud forced the cement to the bottom of the WW, where it would remain and set.

Questions

1. Absent issues with the annulus, wouldn’t the above obviate the need to pierce the WW’s casing from the relief well?
2. There has been some discussion about the effect of injecting mud into the reservoir. The concerns centered on the porosity of the reservoir, and whether the injected mud, due to its consistency, would gum up the reservoir, and prevent further injection of anything at the risk of reservoir fracture or forced loss of integrity of the WW. If those risks are high, how could one inject the cement into an already “full of mud” WW? Getting the cement to the bottom of the WW would require displacing the mud already in the WW into the reservoir. No? So, if the WW column will hold roughly 2,000 (edited) bbl of mud, what is the likely hood of the reservoir being able to absorb or accommodate that quantity of mud, and the WW being able to withstand the pressure necessary to force that mud into the reservoir without complete loss of integrity to the WW?
3. When the bull head plan was announced, some expressed surprise at the low density (13 ppg) of the mud. Is it possible to formulate the chemical composition and density of the mud so that it will be absorbed by the reservoir, and not gum it up?
4. Was the BP animation misleading in that that the cement would actually be injected shortly after a small amount of mud, and then followed by the rest of the mud? If so, how could one be assured that the requisite amount of cement was finally located where it was supposed to be; at the bottom of the WW?
5. What’s Kent Wells’ telephone number? :-)

I appreciate your patience.

How long does it take for a slug of mud to fall to the bottom of the well?

How do you know it made it there?

"How long does it take for a slug of mud to fall to the bottom of the well?"
How do you know it made it there?

Put a radioctive or magnetic trace in the cement that can be detected from the RW perhaps?

I have been asking sort of the same question since day before yesterday. Art's starting condition has two immiscible fluids with the more dense fluid on top. I sure can't prove it, but I suspect that if the mud will move throught the HC at all its terminal velocity will be not much greater than its starting velocity which is zero. Maybe somebody can prove me wrong.

1. Salt domes don't look like the diagrams that Lim shows. These are antiquated representations based on models developed before high-quality revealed that most domes are tear-drop features that are severed from their roots. The idea that multiple vertically stacked reservoirs can communicate along the flank of a vertical salt feature is not supported by modern data. Reservoirs are separated by sealing shales.

Care to provide some references? That's a sweeping and bold claim that all dome structures are shallow. If you read Lim's post it clearly states that salt domes are only one of the possible structures that will disrupt the sediment layers in such a way that drilling at their edges is asking for trouble.

2. Lim's thesis is that any salt dome flank well is effectively doomed from the outset because of pressure communication. Thousands of wells have been drilled on salt dome flanks in the onshore and offshore Gulf Coast over the past 80-90 years that do not support this assumption.

Another big claim. Do you have the exact statistics on the number of wells drilled at the edges of salt domes or other sediment layer protrusions? Lim clearly points out that a well drilled 1 km away was not subject to the issues of BP's disaster.

dissident -- Have to make this short. First, the BP well wasn't drilled on the flank of a salt dome. Second, if you want references that show how absure some of Lim's statements are here you go: Society of Petroleum Engineers, Americans Association of Petroleum Geologists and the Gulf Coast Association of Geologic Societies. All of their tech reports are available to the public. There are many other sources but the many hundreds of papers in these journals disputing much of Lim's offering. They should keep you busy for a couple of months of full time reading. When you're done with those come back and I'll offer another list.

1) Berman is correct, the salt bodies in this area are detached tablets of allochthonous salt rather than cylindrical stocks (which do exist in other places).

Here is a rather famous 15 yr old paper that describes emplacement of the salt tablets just east and south of Macondo:

Fletcher, Hudec, and Watson, 1995.
Via Google Books - preview worked for me on the excerpt from the AAPG Salt Tectonics Memoir 65:

http://books.google.com/books?id=yHsXuW9N9gMC&pg=PA78&lpg=PA78&dq=fletch...

Read the whole book: "Salt Tectonics: A Global Perspective" - It was the first published volume summarizing modern salt tectonics, which was revolutionized by seismic studies in the 1980's.

2) Yikes, just look at a map of oil wells from SE Texas, S Louisiana, or the Louisiana Shelf - All of those black rings are thousands, yes, thousands of wells that flank most of the salt domes - The salt dome flank has been a major play setting in the Gulf Coast (and elsewhere) since Roy Cullen drilled on the flank of the Pierce Junction dome south of Houston in 1920. From 1901 up to 1920, most salt dome oil fields were on top of the domes, not on the flanks (e.g. Spindletop 1901, the well that kicked off the age of oil - oil wasn't discovered on the flanks of Spindletop until 1925). Having the idea to try the flanks made Cullen one of the richest men in the U.S. Have a read of "The Big Rich" by Bryan Burroughs for the history of the four greatest independent oil fortunes of Texas.

Here are a couple of the classic Gulf Coast salt dome papers:

Howard A. Johnson, and D. H. Bredeson
Structural development of some shallow salt domes in Louisiana Miocene productive belt
AAPG Bulletin; February 1971; v. 55; no. 2; p. 204-226

Derrell A. Smith, and F. A. E. Reeve
Salt piercement in shallow Gulf Coast salt structures
AAPG Bulletin; July 1970; v. 54; no. 7; p. 1271-1289

LA DNR base maps - zoom in and have a look at wells in coastal parishes, e.g. Plaquemines, Lafourche, Terrebonne, St Mary, Iberia
http://sonris-www.dnr.state.la.us/www_root/sonris_portal_1.htm

Texas RR Commission base maps are here - zoom in to see wells on dome flanks from Brazoria to Beaumount
http://gis2.rrc.state.tx.us/public/startit.htm

Similar 3rd party maps are available for the Louisiana shelf, but i can't quickly find a free one.

Sounds good, assuming this well hides no pressure surprises!

But do they have capability to pump mud very slowly at a pressure differential of 10 psi?

The attempts I have seen so far involved massive, high rate pumps and very high flow rates, with the goal being higher rates and higher pressure.

My concern is a less than controlled pumping rate, with no means of a quick shutoff in case of spiking pressure. The result may be a large pressure spike, if the well refuses to move and the pumps refuse to stop on a dime. This pressure system is quite long and it takes time for news to travel back and forth and for new conditions to manifest themselves.

I think they plan on using the choke line which has the adjustable valve they used to gently shut in the well, which should give some control. How refined that is, if it was designed to cope with much higher rates, is of course unknown (to us). Once the mud weight starts to work they should be able to stop pumping (or rather just pump enough to fill the lines) and control it with the choke. With the pumps so remote - three vessels and 5000ft away from the wellhead - I'd think they'll pump at slightly above the required pressure and use the choke to impose a back-pressure and control the flow rate downhole.

I suspect the 13ppg mud is selected to have some margin below the fracture gradient, although the kill won't necessarily fail if they fracture the sand - as long as they don't lose mud so fast they can't keep it topped up. Would make cementing more difficult. They got a 16ppg FIT at the previous casing shoe and the shale fracture gradient will be higher than that, but the sand will have been lower and is lower still now it's depleted. No doubt that is one scenario being considered, with responses (e.g. use loss control material or just let it fracture) laid out in a decision tree.

I beg to differ about the choke line giving them the kind of control that is required to inject mud to raise the pressure 10 psi. I think they will need a really excellent pressure controller that can consistently operate with psi descrimination at the 7 ksi base range. I don't think such a thing exhists.

The original "well integrity test" also promised to use the choke line to gently "shut in" the well. In practice the "gentle" part took a few minutes, as the pressure spiked to 6.7 ksia very quickly.

My point is that the "well integrity tests" gave ambiguous results. Bullheading the shut-in well is a technique that is used on wells that have proven integrity and can stand up to very high temporary pressures.

I'm not on board with your scenario.

You want complete access to the well bore, not through some choke. Bad idea. Consider the well bore to be a very long piece of rubber hose. Pressure changes are NOT going to be sudden. You have a margin of at least a couple of bbls of fluid to generate significant pressure changes. Relax and enjoy your coffee, its going to be a very long night once we start to kill this sucker.

The stimulation systems in use here (that's a frac boat guys, it does similar operations all the time) are capable of pumping v-e-r-y slowly. They also have an auto shut off once you hit a target pressure. Important to realize this has been done for 70 years, the people involved in the pumping operations are professionals and have a huge amount of data to fall back on.

I expect we are going over the fracture gradient to establish an acceptable injection rate. The injection tests being described are an industry standard and have been forever.

First decide your maximum acceptable injection pressure. Set your overpressure gauges to this level so they trip automatically and shut the operation down if pressures get too high. This is the single most dangerous part of the operation, because if we go "too high" "bad things" can happen, for various values of "too high" and various values of "bad things".

Establish you minimum injection pressure. You will see it 'break' where pressure stops rising and you are able to continue pumping slowly with no further pressure rise.

Next, pump at 1 bbl per minute and establish an injection pressure. Repeat for values desired up to perhaps 3 bbls per minute.

Apply those real world pressures to your kill model.

Start pumping at a fixed rate you are comfortable with. Or a fixed target pressure. Doesn't much matter which, but fixed rate may be easier to handle and monitor variations in the plan.

Once you have dropped the wellhead pressure by x amount, redo your injection test for higher pump rates.

Continue your kill operation at the higher pump rates and watch for anomalies.

Once you have the leading edge of the kill mud to the formation, you will likely see some variance in pressures. Keep a very careful record of volumes at this point, because this is going to give you the best testimony as to what your blowout path really was. You also REALLY need this volume info for your upcoming cementing operation.

Once you have 100% kill mud into the formation, your pressures should settle down for any given flow rate, so repeat your injection tests. Continue this injection test for long enough you are sure your values are sound and you aren't going to get bitten on the ass during your cementing operation.

Mix and pump cement, at a guess something like 300 bbls or so. Don't go small and cheap here, lots of cement is a great idea!! After all, even if it flashes on you, big deal.

Displace the cement to the formation (likely the reservoir) with kill mud. Once the cement is into the formation, you may consider using a squeeze technique, or just displace the amount most likely to get some of your cement past the edge of the formation.

This is a difficult judgment, although you should have acquired some useful volume data by watching for pressure changes once the kill mud hit the formation. It likely generated a pressure change moving from oil to mud at the formation edge. Or not.

Mixed into this procedure are going to be 'flow-check' intervals where everything stop and we look for changes in pressure that shouldn't be there. This is also important.

JTF

What is the realistic "target pressure" that is common in these operations on a well with pressure of 11.9 ksia?

I don't think you can reliably regulate to 1 psi at 7000 psi base, at least not through thousands of feet of connections and on a pressure tube miles long.

What are the real numbers we are talking about here? Numbers have been all over the place on this important point...

I don't think BP has a good track record here - they promised a gradual pressure increase in the "well integrity tests" but delivered a very fast one-time rise.

Dimitry, I agree with you completely.

Anyone that is talking pressures more exact than 50 psi either side of target is speaking through their hat. With the greatest respect... We have a problem measuring much better than that once we start the pump operation. The gauges involved are designed to tolerate abuse, not the utmost in precision.

Planning for this job requires someone with in-depth experience on the pumping side, coupled with a good geology/reservoir engineering team to deliver the best guesstimate they can based on the information they have been able to divine.

I do the pumping side just fine, but because I am clueless on the geology/reservoir side is why I'm putting x's in for exact pressures.

IMHO, and it is just a guess, no more than that, we need to be thinking about 500 psi higher than the current shut in pressure to get an acceptable injection rate. Possibly 700 psi. The 10 psi thing is dreaming, IMO. But I do wrong regularly as my wife points out from time to time. :)

Its going to take way more than casual chatter on this forum to determine where that pressure sits in the realm of "bad things". I simply don't know and am even having a hard time guessing. The flex-joint ratings and abuse delivered over the last 100 days or so makes me twitch. And I'm not even on the job site...

JTF

I guess 500-700 psi greater doesn't sound VERY bad. If they commit to backing off, if it doesn't go right at these pressures, perhaps it is a worhwhile risk to take, if the "weeps" at the quick disconnect haven't gone much worse over the last few days.

I hope they have it all written down in a plan, with a realistic assessment of their capability to deliver control per agreed upon range.

I am concerned they are not making their "target pressure" public, nor talking specifics here.

I think you can reasonably expect to have a very good plan written down for this event.

http://www.pe.tamu.edu/schubert/public_html/DOE_SLB%20short%20course/1.1...

Slide 33 and 34 illustrate what the pressure buildup is likely to look like as they go over the fracture gradient. You first reach the fracture pressure, represented by the peak, then often get a reduced pressure shortly thereafter at which point you are propagating your fracture away from the well bore.

It is common to do a leak off test after drilling out each casing shoe, at least once you're past the initial surface casing.

The difference in what we are doing here is that we keep pumping instead of stopping after establishing leak-off pressures.

I wonder if any of our geologists/reservoir guys would care to tackle the pressure calculations?

Note that a leak-off chart can have many different shapes, the one I posted is the classic model. For various other graphs see slide 33 onwards in the presentation.

JTF

But do they have capability to pump mud very slowly at a pressure differential of 10 psi?

The attempts I have seen so far involved massive, high rate pumps and very high flow rates, with the goal being higher rates and higher pressure.

A good question, and added to this, is the impact of 5000' of mud fed from the surface, so they will need a very clever sort of pump: one that can hold back a large back pressure {Surface to bottom mud difference], and regulate a flow, to build a controllable lowish pressure differential.

Do they have that sort of mud pump (or is it better called a Mud-brake?) ?

I'm really confused. Why would they need a "mud brake"? The mud column from the surface to the sea floor doesn't have the density to overcome the current shut in wellhead pressure. The pump will see a pressure of ABOUT 3600 psi with a 13 pound per gallon mud in the riser connecting the pump to the wellhead. I guess I'm missing your point.

I think he meant after the column of mud is established in the well bore. When the column gets to about 16000 feet long it would start pulling mud from the pump if it were uncontrolled. If it were uncontrolled at that point it would siphon all the mud from the boat down into the well until it started sucking air and then the column of mud would stabilize with it's top somewhere around 2000 feet below sea level.

That won't happen because it won't be uncontrolled. All you need to do is throttle the flow at the well head to control it. The manifold that feeds the mud into the riser would be most likely where it is controlled. Essentially close a valve at the sea floor and any negative pressure above the valve disappears.

If I'm not mistaken, all the current formation pressure estimates are based on the density of the oil/gas column in the well currently.

Does anyone have a really good idea of the current fluid density? I would guess somewhere between 5 and 7 lb/gal, but would be hesitant to pin it down.

This matters as its highly relevant to the density of the mud column that is going to be required for the final kill.

JTF

I've seen .35 pounds/ft for the oil (but can't say if it is accurate). That would be 4550 psi from the 13000 feet of oil plus 6900 would be a total of 11,450 Psi at the bottom.

Maybe I lost track of the point of your calculations. But this reservoir just dumped something like 3 million barrels of oil at a rapid rate. It is hard to imagine that it doesn't have room to accept 2000 barrels pumped in the reverse direction at a much slower rate. You would have to construct a scenario where something is acting as a check valve for to support the idea that the oil can't be pushed back into the reservoir.

The mud will initially enter the well at a very slow rate, but as the weight of the mud starts to assist the flow process as the column fills. The heavier mud will cause the flow to accelerate (assuming pumping pressure is held constant). At some point long before the well is full they will need to put on the brakes and greatly reduce pumping pressure so that the flow will slow down to zero as column approaches the bottom. Of course that is an overly simplified description because it ignores friction and friction does change with flow rate.

I haven't seen anything definitive on this but I'm guessing the 13 ppg mud is designed so that a column of mud will hold the well in equilibrium with the ambient sea pressure at the well head. That would mean the column of mud will balance the pressure of the reservoir with something like 3000 feet of mud in the kill line.

Would it be unprecedented for a well system to exhibit very different fluid dynamic behavior for different flow directions?

I would guess that most of the work in this area is limited for outflow scenario, for obvious reasons.

With all kind of uncertaintees as to what is in the bore below the floor, it would seem very prudent to expect some interesting behavior and try to prepare for it. Especially given the fact that they really didn't reach their calculated wellhead pressure...

It's very common for water or gas injectors to behave differently from oil producers, but then you're introducing multiple fluid phases and perhaps injecting above the fracture gradient. The flow behaviour will of course be very different once the oil is gone and you're trying to push in mud. A non-return-valve behaviour is more likely to be due to debris or other mechanical aspects of the hole. E.g. maybe some lumps of cement get suspended above a restriction when flowing at high rate but get packed together when injecting.

There seems to be plenty of debris in this well...

jinn -- If you haven't seen it before here's a handy way to convert a mud column to bottom hole pressure:

pressure (psi) = 0.052 * mud weight (#/gallon) * mud column height (feet).

So a 13 ppg mud will exert about 12,200 psi from a 18,000' column. The pump pressure can easily add another 3 ppg to the ECD (effective circulating density) but that disappears when they turn the pumps off. BTW original reservoir pressure was about 11,900 psi or 12.6 ppg.

I really like your post. It is logical, reasonable and easily understood. Plus, you threw out some guesstimated numbers that help a lot. Thanks for that. My lack of actual field experience would have made my planned post on this topic look pretty lame by comparison.

Couldn’t they start by adding wellhead pressure equal to their extrapolated shut-in value, sit on it a day or so and see what happens? Seems to me that if the pressure held they could conclude that there are no leaks at that pressure. If it started to decrease then they have an incomplete flow into one or more formations somewhere. If it continued to increase then they don’t have an asymptotic curve as assumed and should think on it a bit more. They may not need to know the actual shut-in pressure to do the top kill, but it could still give them more information about well conditions. Does this make sense?

How are they going to go about "adding wellhead pressure equal to their extrapolated shut-in value". If they pump something into the well (for example heavy mud) then close the valve and stop pumping and check pressure they hope to see less pressure than they started.

BTW, that is exactly what they said they will do. they will pump mud in for a while and then stop and check static pressure. If the static pressure is below the ~6800 they started with then they will know its working and will continue with more confidence.

That's what I get for writing imprecisely around a bunch of engineers, :) I will try again. And forgive me if I misuse or forget some oil field terms…it’s been a long time.

I meant to say that they can directly and accurately measure the current wellhead pressure and its increase over time. They have enough data points to calculate static wellhead pressure assuming asymptotic behavior of the data points. They could pump just enough mud to raise the wellhead pressure to the calculated steady state condition and sit on it there for a day or two. Surely that would be far below any maximum safe wellhead pressure (or, maybe not). Pressure holds implies no measurable leaks at that pressure. Pressure falls implies incomplete leakage into one or more zones. Pressure increases implies something needs more investigation. Depending on what happens they may have to sit on it only an hour or two. I don’t know exactly how long.

Good thought KarmaDave but the extrapolated pressure is what they entire reservoir would settle at if left shut in for infinite time. Away from the well the pressure is higher than that value, close to the well, lower. Oil reservoirs are big (think city-sized rather than pond-sized) and even with 300mD permeability, it takes weeks for pressure to transmit end-to-end. from top to bottom of the wellbore pressure equalises very quickly (probably seconds to minutes). As soon as they add mud and increase the bottom-hole pressure the well should start to flow, and then, even if you didn't pump but just poured it into a funnel at the top, it would flow at an accelerating rate. Hence the use of the choke line with a variable valve. If nothing else they need the ability to shut it in if flows so fast the pumps can't keep up. The 5000ft water depth helps here, because they'd have time to shut it in with mud still in most of the lines, and just open it up gently once they've re-filled the system.

With hurricane season upon us I'd be inclined to get it over with asap. Even if nothing happens to the well, having that flotilla of ships in such close proximity must carry a risk of 'routine' industrial injuries or fatalities, especially if the weather turns nasty in a hurry.

Thanks for your comments. I tried to correct myself in a post a little above this one. I got into trouble by not writing carefully. Do that all too often. I meant to talk about static wellhead pressure.

“Oil reservoirs are big (think city-sized rather than pond-sized).” I’ve seen a few operators set casing on discoveries that went from city size to pond size between the first and second wells. What an unpleasant surprise they had!

“As soon as they add mud and increase the bottom-hole pressure the well should start to flow….” How can you make a blanket statement that the well will start to flow back into the formation as soon as you add mud and increase bottom hole pressure? Don’t you have to pump at an unknown pressure over the static wellhead pressure that hasn’t even been reached yet?

“… even if you didn't pump but just poured it into a funnel at the top, it would flow at an accelerating rate.” Sorry, but don’t see how that can happen. Fundamentally, what you are talking about is gravity. Wouldn’t you have to first pump in enough mud of the proper weight such that the pressure exerted only by the mud would exceed the pressure that the reservoir sees at the borehole? Otherwise you gotta keep the pumps on. Besides, this seems to be a bad way to do it. I think you want to run out of wellhead overpressure just before you run out of hole to pump mud into. Am I wrong?

“With hurricane season upon us….” Yep, I agree. Get it over ASAP. Since there isn’t any real weather danger right now they need to hook everything up and get with the program. Only thing I say is take a slow and steady approach which means 24-48 hrs to a bullhead killed well. Even if they have to stop before that every foot of mud in the well column translates into that much less pressure at the sea floor.

Thanks Quaking -- I was about to ask that question. When I heard Mr Wells talking about pumping 1 or bpm, was wondering about how much overpressure would be needed. My concerns, and I'm not an oilman btw, had to do with excess pressures making things go pop. But this sounds like words of wisdom ...

"They'd have to be really unlucky for a weak point to hold at 7000psi but fail at 7010."

I think Kent Wells is giving a simplified version.

The target flow rate may be 1 or 2 barrels/minute but that can't happen instantly. To minimize stress to the well it might take hours to build to that rate of flow. As the mud goes in, the weight of the mud adds to the pressure pushing the column of oil down and accelerates the process. That means the same amount of pressure going in will pump more more and more mud as time goes by. When it reaches the target flow rate then they will start lowering the pumping pressure (or throttle the flow) to keep the flow rate constant. At that point the top of the well will see less pressure than it does now and the pressure will continue to decline as the mud goes in. In the end the pressure at the well head will be reduced to around ambient.

Wells also mentioned that they will stop the process at some point(s) in time to analyze the static pressure of the well.

Would someone explain the capabilities of the now existing plumbing at well head?

Can mud be pumped via choke / kill lines selectively into either the annulus, or into the production casing, or does a path exist internal to the BOP and new added piping that connects annulus and production casing with a flowpath that can't be shut off?

Also, I don't understand why the RW kill won't stop flow within minutes of encountering an actual flow path; given that the reservoir should see basically a full pressure offset.

If it is correct that annulus and production casing don't have a flowpath at wellhead, if flow is actually through annulus after an annulus-RW flow is established the reservoir should see 18000+- feet of mud.

Alternatively, if flow is only through production casing, same situation when annulus has been cemented (which is what I suspect will occur) once production casing-RW path is established.

Obviously if the wellhead already connects annulus and production casing with a flow path, and/or the connection exists at bottom hole, different possibilities open up.

It does seem to me that the most likely flow is through production casing and the drill pipe within if drillpipe is hanging from the pipe shears rather than being on bottom.

hammegk,

Mud will go where it goes from the choke or kill line--there is no way to control it. There is some possibility that, if the casing seals are still intact after all of this flow, that they could impede or block the flow of mud into the annulus. If that is not the case, and we assume that this needs to be an annular kill, then the mud must go into the annulus between the 9 7/8-inch upper part of the production casing and the 16-inch liner.

(Some commenter on the previous thread was very upset with me for saying that I thought that the flow was up the annulus. I guess that I should always use the subjunctive or something so I don't sound categorical, but I thought it was a fairly mainstream assumption that the reason there was a blowout was because of channeling through or around the cement between the production casing and the 9 7/8-inch liner.)

Anyway, the path gets more convoluted down the hole as successive liners narrow the space available. That is my take on the plumbing.

I have read all of the commentary on why it seems reasonable to push the oil back into the reservoir by bull heading mud down the annulus (or whatever pathway). I'm just a lowly geologist who doesn't fully grasp all of the engineering, but it seems like this involves forcing a more-buoyant fluid with a denser, less-buoyant fluid and that involves working against gravity and is, therefore, hard and requires more pressure, especially if the mud must be forced through progressively narrower spaces in the annulus. There is something like 1000 barrels of oil in the well and it seems more reasonable to me to displace this in stages with mud by producing the oil and bleeding off pressure, but if better engineering minds think that this is wrong, fine.

I agree with your view that the relief well gets around most of these problems that some others don't seem to see in the same way that I do.

So, the question is, Why attempt the top kill now and not wait for the relief well in a few weeks, especially since the cap is preventing oil from leaking?

Possibly to end this nightmare as soon as possible. If it does no harm, I have no problem with that. I fear the law of unintended consequences.

Art

From where I sit, geologists are gods! If you have time, please respond to my questions posted at noon or so, EST.

Billyd

I’m new here too and can see that you have some reasonable questions. I’m no expert, but I may be able to help. I’m sure someone will jump in to straighten both of us out if I goofed up too badly.

First, I watched the video and your summary is spot on.

Regarding questions 1 and 2, I think Mr. Wells got a bit confused. Seems he made a presentation that has errors and it should be disregarded. Between July 21 and today a lot has changed. In addition to being wrong the update presented then does not reflect current plans

Regarding question 3, it probably is possible to formulate such a mud. But, this mud still needs to act like a normal drilling fluid because there are other formations all along the well bore that potentially could have communication with the well. You want the mud to be able to gum up a porous rock. They do that by adding bentonite (at least in my day). The overpressure against a porous rock would cause the rock to act as a filter. Mud would try to pass into the rock causing what is called a filter cake to build up on the surface and filtrate would pass into the rock relatively close to the well bore. The filtrate is mainly just saline water. The filtration process would end when a thick enough filter cake built up to seal off the formation. If you still want mud to enter the formation you can increase pump pressure sufficient to fracture the rock. You could also inadvertently fracture another rock and pump the mud into the wrong place.

Regarding question 4, again the animation is now 10 days old and things have changed. It is misleading in that now they appear to want to pump mud all the way down to the bottom. There is talk that they may have to fracture the formation with pump pressure just to get the oil back into the reservoir. That sounds risky to me. Let’s hope it is not necessary. Since they can’t circulate mud out of the hole, if they want to pump cement the only place for the mud to go is indeed into the formation. I don’t think they could verify by direct measurement any cement location below the top of the hardened cement plug. I guess they could re-enter the hole, shoot some holes through all of the casings just above the cement top and try to squeeze some cement. In my opinion this would add information, but would not be definitive.

Regarding question 5, I just looked up his phone number with an internet search. Easy to do. I called the number and the guy on the other end claimed he is not THAT Kent Wells, but I knew better. I gave him a good tongue lashing for both of us.

Hope this helps!

KarmaDave, thank you.

Interestingly, this afternoon, in the 2:30 CDT teleconference (http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/doc/2931/838395/), Admiral Allen addressed the static top kill. The dialogue between the Admiral and David Mattingly of CNN follows:

David Mattingly: Hi, Admiral, we're triple teaming you today.

Thad Allen: Go ahead, David.
David Mattingly: Just some more detail regarding the static kill, at what point will you deem it a success and how much mud are you using and how much cement are you using? Is it all going in at one time, do you put them in at separate intervals, how does that work?

Thad Allen: Well it will start out with just mud going in and a decision whether to put cement in will be based on the pressure readings and the performance we get with the mud. We have the option to put the cement in but we also have the option just to put the mud in and hold off on the cement and do that when we come in with the bottom kill.

And that will be a decision that will be made as we go through the process. The final steps for this entire process were gone over by the science team over the last two days. They've had a lot of meetings in Houston making sure they understand every step of the process moving forward.

I think – we should probably know right away. We're going to be talking – this is not going to be days. This will be hours until we know that something is going on and we'll be passing on updates and in fact I'll be in Houston myself...

It looks like the Admiral doesn't know what's going down, and won't know until it happens. Clearly, though, injecting cement to finish the static top kill (bull head) is still on the table.

I suppose that if the bottom of the well is cemented during the bull head procedure, the casing will still be breached during the bottom kill, if only to verify the cementing success of the static top kill. No?

I'm more inclined to believe that they know what they're doing since they have team of scientist who are apparently okay with this. But have faith this crisis will end with the kill operation so we can all live again.

I wouldn't put too much faith on scientists when it comes to this part. I'd rather put my faith on engineers.

Billyd,

I found your questions from this morning.

If the static top kill succeeds in cementing the reservoir then, yes, it would seem to obviate the need for the relief well..as long as it could be verified by some test that the cement seal were sufficient. It seems that it would be necessary to get in there with a drill string to test for flow and pressure.

The way that I understand it (and somewhat contrary to Cecil B. De Well's video), if you could force oil and then back into the reservoir--and I'm still not convinced that this is feasible but think that the mud must swap volumes with oil in the well--it would occur by exceeding the fracture gradient of the formation, in which case porosity and permeability shouldn't matter too much. I really doubt that the oil can be pushed back into the reservoir through 300 md maximum rock with high pressure coming the other way without fracturing based on the petrophysics that I understand. There are obviously commenters who don't think that this is a problem. None of the drilling engineers that I consult with think it is reasonable either, for what it's worth.

The lower-than-expected mud weight question has been addressed by other commenters for the most part. I think it is a viscosity issue--it takes more pressure to pump down heavier mud against lighter fluids under buoyancy. It is probably the minimum mud weight that was calculated to kill the well with all of the mud foot-pounds, etc. that were mentioned in a previous comment.

I don't think that cement will be injected until after the well is killed or at least until they are confident that they can pump under the pressures required without exceeding burst capacities.

I hope that this helps.

Art

It does and thank you for your contribution.
Though one more question, if the static kill works would it kill the well thus making it unusable to BP? Or will this just keep the well under control for it to be pumped back to tankers on the surface?

Heiro,

I see no possibility of using this well to produce oil. BP wants and needs to plug this well and be done with it. Future plans for the discovery will be controversial.

Art

Good Morning Aeberman~I was catching on on news on my bloomberg terminal under SPILL GO, and you are quoted in an article by Katarzyna Klimasinska story "BP to Start Permanent Plugging of the Macondo Well This Week. I was just browsing thru and recognized you from reading and some posting on TOD............so my question is what is a reasonable change in stated as a percentage if you could quantify it that way.

TIA

Mummsie

Art, many thanks.

I didn't see your post before I responded to KarmaDave. My mistake brought to mind the old "read the whole article before you begin to answer the questions" instructions from grade school. Some of us never learn!

Thanks for taking the time to respond.

Bill

I don't understand your comments. You maker it sound like a column of mud will apply more pressure than a column of oil with 6900 psi at the top. The column of oil is applying more stress to the well everywhere except at the bottom. At the bottom of the hole the mud and oil columns will apply the same pressure.

Your comment about lower the expected mud weight doesn't make sense either. Originally at the time of the DWH explosion they were using heavier mud because the mud column was only 10000 feet in length and above that was sea water. The explosion occurred while they were filling the top 8000 feet with seawater in preparation for a lock down sleeve and final cement plug.

art -- Not being a production engineer I'll take a risk and pretend I'm as smart as one. The 60' reservoir with 300 md of permeability could easily take an injection volume of 5,000+ bbls per day. Water would be easy. Light oil, like that in the csg, would be a little slower but not by much. But injection dynamics are rather different than production. But I've seen thicker zones with less perm take 30,000 bbls of water per day. Heck, I once saw a DW well lose 60,000 bbls of oil-based mud to a formation once...and the operator was doing everything they knew to not let it happen. As far as mud weights go they can pump 13 ppg mud down but use the mud pump pressure to crank the bottom hole pressure beyond the frac gradient of 16.2 ppg. Just a guess but that may be their plan: inject back into the reservoir as long as it takes the fluid at a reasonable rate. But if the reservoir won't take it properly then crank the mud pumps up beyond frac gradient and they can inject the entire csg volume in less than an hour.

I doubt that they would do anything very risky with this static kill operation. I would think the main purpose would be to find out more information about the state of the well before tackling the bottom kill.

I think gently injecting some mud into the top at this point is fairly low risk. What people don't seem to understand is that drilling into the bottom is not risk free. It took 3 months to kill the Ixtoc well after they had connected with a relief well.

They don't know what is going to happen when the drill into the WW with the RW - it could open a can of worms. Depending on the results of the static kill they may know more and be better prepared to make the RW intercept work. OTOH the results of the static kill may be inconclusive and they know no more or less than they did before.

"I think gently injecting some mud into the top at this point is fairly low risk."

Pumping mud just hard enough to get the HC moving back down is about as safe as you can be if you are going to do anything beyond watching pressure slowly build on the shut-in well. I don't understand any reason to rush things beyond a slow pump. If it is even possible to pump mud as slow as 1 ft/min at the end of a day you will have a mud column of at least 1440 ft. Any amount of mud you can inject makes the wellhead that much safer. Also, I am having a problem with Art's contention that injected mud will somehow swap places with the HC below it and end up on the bottom. I can't prove that either way, but it seems that not only would you not want that to happen, but also it will stay on top with a defined interface for quite a long time. But, I am surely no expert.

KarmaDave

What you have missed (and I do not see anyone else discussing) is that if they wanted to kill the WW by pumping mud into it through the RW without a connection to the surface, they would need to use a heavier weight mud. Having a direct connection to the surface means they can use gravity to do a very slow and gentle top kill using 13 ppg mud.

Do this

Mutliply 13 x 18,000 to get desired ft-lbs at the formation. With the well filled with mud and 5,000 feet of ocean above you have 13,000 x 13 + 5,000 x 8.5 which ain't enough. So they would have to increase the mud weight. Then, to get the heavier mud from the RW into the WW, the RW would have 18,000 x 16 ppg, which would frac the formation. Plus the RW would have a loss of circulation event and it would need to pump much faster than 1 bpm to replace the mud flowing from the RW up into the WW and down toward the formation. (note that the section of the WW below the intersection will be undergoing a top kill as the part above is undergoing a bottom kill.

So if you are doing a top kill anyway, why not do it the easier, more controllable, slower, with less overpressure way?

They should have done a full top kill in May, which is why Chu was alone in his decision to stop it then. He was wrong and the pending success of the top kill will prove it.

_________________________________________________________________________________
They should have done a full top kill in May, which is why Chu was alone in his decision to stop it then. He was wrong and the pending success of the top kill will prove it.
______________________________________________________________________________________

You have no way of knowing that. Your claim is not supported by any facts.

If BP had first installed a capping stack in May then the probability that a top kill would have worked in May is about the same as now. But for a top kill to work with no cap requires much higher pumping pressures to overcome the pressure losses out the riser.

Jinn -- Obviously your correct. There has, AFAIK, been no successful top kill ever performed on a well flowing wide open. Thousands of top kills have been performed on shut in wells. I’ve probably had a couple of dozen performed on wells I had been involved in. I’ll offer that the original top kill effort had no chance of working regardless of the pressure. With the huge leak in the cap increasing the pressure would have only pumped mud out the leak faster. I recall they pumped at least 30,000 bbls of mud and ever ounce went into the GOM. There were two paths the injected mud could flow: against the 7,000 psi or so of the wild well or the 2,300 psi of the water pressure. No contest. There’s no reason this top kill won’t work. Except for the BIG IF. IF they don’t lose circulation thru the rupture of the cap, the csg or a shallow csg shoe. What they will be attempting is done many times every year in the OCS. Done on shut in well, of course.

Good, just the kind of news I needed, so this will work, right? Please say yes.

If they don't lose circulation, like DWH did. Ooops.

All in good humor, I presume?
No matter, the well is capped and we have a greater chance of this working. But we have to be cautious just in case.

Disclosure: short BP October puts @ 20. I'd prefer to lose that bet.

Where did you get that quote or statement front who do you want to be wrong your or I?

Sorry about the shorthand. I hope this succeeds. Not for BP's sake, but for all the other Gulf operators, drillers, and offshore support people. If they bungle the top kill, which I deem to be inordinately reckless, then the U.S. Senate will have no choice but to adopt HR 3534 and Obama will sign it, banning BP for seven years and killing off the independents. There's a lot riding on these shenanigans, starting tomorrow.

Well I hope it succeeds, one of the above posters gave us a postive testimony saying that this was likely to succeed due to the well being capped.

I pray for the gulf's health.

I think it will work. I would feel a lot better if they were using clear brine rather than mud. I guess I'm missing something.

Here we go again, why not take a aimless potshot at Chu, right? It's free...There is nothing more important in this world than putting down a democrat.

Your basic understanding of pressures and corresponding mudweight for RW kill is flawed. The total height that determines the pressure is the same - including the leg to the surface. All that is needed is a little back pressure at the wellhead to compensate for pressure difference - a lot less than they have been subjecting the wellhead to all the time during "well integrity tests". For an "ideal" mudweight for RW kill, the WW wellhead pressure is a bit above 3 ksia.

I think it is undisputed that the RW kill requires less pressure at the wellhead than the "static kill", though this pressure increase is temporary.

"Having a direct connection to the surface means they can use gravity to do a very slow and gentle top kill using 13 ppg mud."
"Mutliply 13 x 18,000 to get desired ft-lbs at the formation. With the well filled with mud and 5,000 feet of ocean above you have 13,000 x 13 + 5,000 x 8.5 which ain't enough"

""Mutliply 13 x 18,000 to get desired ft-lbs at the formation."

These number quoted here are not correct at all13 times 13000 == 234000lbs.+5000 =239000 botom hole pressure. NFW . 13 ppg mud does not give 13 lbs per foot pressure. Actually 13 Ppg gives only 0.67 ppft

At the top of the water the pressure to over come would be 7000Lb flowing pressure plus 2000' of sea water8.45x 5000 2250 or about 9500psi. 13.5 mud at 18000 gives about 12600 psi bhp

Why is it that no one in the press has asked Admiral Allen to confirm or deny the New York Times story that provided the original interview with Chu?

The various actors will all be in Houston for the static kill. Let them tell the story with all the other witnesses present, including those from the BP operations room (e.g the guys from Wild Well Control) to the events that occurred in May, in the room with them.

Or is there a JournoList conspiracy to not ask that question?

Boy won't the pundits just love BP v. New York Times et al?

It ought to rank right up there with Tavoulareas v. Washington Post except the right of a free press to protect confidential sources is no longer free, just ask Judith Miller!

(Edit)

BTW Dimitri the easiest way to get about 3,000 psi at the BOP is to fill the choke (or kill) lines from the Q4000 with 13 ppg mud. 5,000 feet of 13 ppg mud will do that. Which is confirmation that the extant 2,250 psi static head due to sea water falls nearly 1,000 psi short. In effect you would displace sea water from the replacement riser (AKA the choke line) with mud to come back to a close approximation of the status quo ante

The National Incident is over, Admiral Allen can go on into his well earned retirement. Nothing to see here Chu, move along!!

QED

Units, units, units. We really have to clean up the way we use units.

“Also, I don't understand why the RW kill won't stop flow within minutes of encountering an actual flow path; given that the reservoir should see basically a full pressure offset.”

Since the relief well communication is below the shoe of the 75/8 at 17168 any communication there will be killed.

If it is correct that annulus and production casing don't have a flowpath at wellhead, if flow is actually through annulus after an annulus-RW flow is established the reservoir should see 18000+- feet of mud. Including into formation around base of production casing shoe if the leak is thru the 7 7/8 into the 9 5/8 annulus the formation pressure BHP MUD will still be high enough to kill all flow from the reservoir will be killed.