This Asian Times article is excellent, not least because it underscores the futility of attempted US control of Caspian Sea oil. This is not a major geopolitical shift because the US had only tenuous political control in the region anyway. Greater cooperation between Kazakhstan, Russia, China and Iran is a natural development. The US will continue to focus its efforts in West African (Gulf of Guinea) deepwater oil where the competition is less stiff. Estimated URR there is about 24 Gb. The US "encirclement" plan had little chance of success in the Caspian Sea area. The Sultan of the Steppes, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is not only selling to the highest bidder--he is also making a RealPolitiks assessment of who he needs to do business with. With the US half a world away and the insatiable oil demand of China right in his back yard, the policy choices were obvious. Really, all you have to do is look at the map.

Now, I find the Iran/China connection most interesting because this is a case where China is really thumbing their nose at the US.
A second phase in the Iran-China strategic energy cooperation will involve constructing a pipeline in Iran to take oil some 386 kilometers to the Caspian Sea, there to link up with the planned pipeline from China into Kazakhstan.

On signing the deal, Iran's Petroleum Minister announced that Tehran would like to see China replace Japan as Iran's largest oil importer. As well, Iran has what are estimated to be the world's second largest reserves of natural gas after Russia. Iran is a place of enormous strategic importance to China, to Japan, to Russia, to the European Union, and for all these reasons, to Washington as well.
The US had adamantly opposed all deals that had connected Iran to Kazakhstan via new pipelines. So, the US had been shut out on all counts. So, to all those Neoconservatives in Washington and at the World Bank, welcome to the Brave New World of oil supply & demand.
You people are CRAZY if you think you can understand what is going on in geopolitics by reading articles that are nothing more than propaganda from either side of the issue...

==AC

Lay off the drugs, see a psychoanalyst, read some relevant sources like The New Great Game: Blood and Oil In Central Asia by Lutz Kleveman and get back to us in a few years when you've regained your senses.

I'm serious.
Oh good. Then I will know as much as you Dave, thanks...
Actually, I apologize for my impetuous remarks directed toward you. I was annoyed because I put forth a serious analysis of these latest developments based on my own research in studying the geopolitical issues and you simply told me (and HO, others) that we were CRAZY. In fact, our knowledge is incomplete--no one knows everything. If you've got something constructive to say, then say it.
Dave and Heading Out: good posts as always (often the best of the regular posters on this website).

The U.S. played its "Caspian Chess" with the simple-minded objective of "pipelines through anywhere but Iran and Russia."  Now that we are analyzing the end-game, it's interesting to review some of the forced moves along the way.

1.    Brought the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.  The U.S. let its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia help the Taliban consolidate power in the late 1990's because it needed a unified Afghan government for the Afghan-Pakistani pipeline scheme.  (The U.S. support for the Taliban, in part because of Unocal's lobbying, is explained in Ahmed Rashid's Taliban and to a lesser extent in the movie Fahrenheit 911.)

2.    Weakened the reformist Khatami government in Iran.  In 1997 the Iranians offered an innovative way of bringing Caspian oil to the market.  The idea was to swap up to 500 kB/d of Kazakh & Azeri oil (sent to Tabriz, Reyy and Isfahan refineries) for an equivalent amount from Iranian oil from the Persian Gulf.  This would have required minimal pipeline construction, since most of the Caspian crude transport would be via barges across the sea.  American companies active in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were enthused because it offered a way around the trade sanctions (swaping via Iran would be a way of getting Iranian crude while paying the recently independent Soviet republics).  But the U.S. government did not allow American companies (who were major partners in all the major Caspian consortia) to participate in the scheme.  The conservative Islamic Republicans still refer to America's undermining of this initiative as an example of the U.S. hostility to Iran.

3.    Brought Russia and Iran closer together.  Iran and Russia clearly did not see eye to eye after the independence of the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.  All that changed after the two old powers realized they shared the same interest in stopping U.S. meddling in a region of the world which was historically part of the Iranian (Persian) or Russian empires.  The consequences of a stronger Iran-Russia alliance are still being shaped.

4.    May have been a reason for invasion of Iraq.   Returning to the Chess analogy, the U.S. assets in the Caspian region (e.g. Azerbaijan) were isolated pawns.  There was no way for the U.S., as a naval power, to defend these in case of an attack.  Also, the Caspian Sea policy was authored by the Clinton administration.  Cheney, as a self-proclaimed military strategist and an oil-man, knew that the real prize was not Azerbaijan but Iraq and Iran.
     

Well, heck, Fire, I thought we were fighting the war on terrorism. [wink]

So if Cheney has screwed up, and gets neither Iraq nor Iran, where does that leave the U.S. in the grand chess game?

Hoping oil shale works?

And I really do not understand the people that minimize the openning of IOR. Imagine, a good part of the Caspian Oil and most of Iran's beeing traded in a currency other than the US$!

And after that the Moscow Oil Exchange wil open. How can that leave everything as before!?!?

There's something here I don't understand. If Iran's oil fields are in the desert South, how can they connect it to the Caspian with just 386 Km of pipeline? Is there a chart of this pipeline anywhere?
The large oil fields in Iran's Khuzestan province are pipelined to the major refineries in the north near the Caspian coast (Tabriz and Reyy), and also to the large oil shipping terminals of the Persian gulf.  So relatively little additional pipeline is required to complete an Azeri or even a Kazakh route to the Persian gulf via Iran.

The 386 km the Asia Times article talks about is to to tap these northern Iranian refineries (which are connected to the southern producing fields) to the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, thus enabling Iran to sell to China via pipeline instead of via sea.  

The website Rigzone.com has maps of the Iranian/Caspian pipeline system (and many other regions as well).  But they are difficult to read since they are meant to be ordered.

I completely agree with the potential impact of the opening of the Tehran (Euro-based) oil exchange in March '06 on the U.S. dollar. Yet another consequence of the way we chose to play the Caspian pipeline game.

(I wonder what history books will write about the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and whether it was worth all this.)