Re: "It [the CIBC report] chooses, as does ASPO, to consider Deepwater oil as an unconventional source.

Bullshit. Sorry, I'm not buying that assumption. Deepwater production is no different from any other kind of conventional source--it is a matter of economics and new "plays". In fact, I was shocked to see that ASPO has deepwater production at 12/mbpd by 2010 as you recently noted citing their latest newsletter. A lot of things have to go right for that to be true.

There seems to be a lot of playing around with definitions here and this only adds to the general confusion about available supply in the 2006 to 2010 period.

To be clear, an unconventional fossil fuels source, at least for liquids, includes IMHO
  • oil (tar, bitumen) sands eg. Alberta, Canada
  • extra heavy crude resources eg. Orinoco, Venezuela
  • Coal-to-liquids (CTL) or (gas-to-liquids) GTL
  • Oil shales (marl rock containing kerogen - sigh)
Now, this is an important point. Cornucopians like Michael Lynch would argue that new "plays" involving my list above make the future look good (aside from very questionable assumptions that EOR technology increase URR yields over time in mature oil provinces -- in almost all cases, technology only pushes the production curve to the left (immediate gratification) and results in a sharper drop-off in the tail (junkie runs out of drugs more quickly) without increasing the ultimate yield. As we've noted on previous threads recently, NGLs should be taken more seriously as far as future all liquids supply goes. Fine. But really, for conventional crude oil, which is the greatest thing that ever happened energy-wise, there really is no substitute at this point in time, is there?
in almost all cases, technology only pushes the production curve to the left (immediate gratification) and results in a sharper drop-off in the tail (junkie runs out of drugs more quickly) without increasing the ultimate yield.

Do you have any scientific evidence to substantiate this statement? I don't mean anecdotal evidence.

In terms of pushing the production curve to the left, I believe that if, for example, you consider the Shaybah field, where simultaneous water flood and maximum reservoir contact wells are used, they have increased production from around 3,000 bd with conventional horizontal to 10,000 bd with MRC.  Since the absolute volume of oil hasn't changed one has to accept that this is shifting production to the left.

In regard to the increased rate of decline that this gives after major production you have only to look at the two major Russian fields (Romashkino and Samotlar), Yibal, and the North Sea to see examples where the decline rate gets over 10%.  Incidentally as Cantarell goes over the top that is also what is being predicted for it (14%).

Since the absolute volume of oil hasn't changed one has to accept that this is shifting production to the left.

I agree with you that the OOIP does not change. The question is whether technology changes the recovery rate (=% of OOIP ultimately recovered). In order for your reasoning to work, I believe you are committed to  the position that technology does not change the recovery rate. That seems a little extreme. What scientific evidence do you have to support that view?

I don't want to speak for HO but I don't believe he is talking about original oil in place (OOIP), he think he is talking about URR from the fields in question. In my story here I referred to a paper Technology and Petroleum Exhaustion: Evidence from Two Mega-Oilfields. You might look at that. Do you read what we write here?

I've looked at the nonsense on your Peak Oil Debunked website. I made an assertion and both HO and me have now provided some evidence to back it up. In science--you are perhaps unfamiliar with the nature of this subject--a hypothesis is stated and as new evidence comes to light, this hypothesis is either contradicted (falsified in the language of Popper) or the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis. So why don't you provide us with some evidence that shows that we're wrong? Then we can talk about it. In some cases I've seen, it appears EOR does perhaps seem to increase the URR. My original assertion may not apply in all cases but does seem to apply in those cases where we have the best production history. What's gained on the front end from EOR is lost on the backend from very large decline rates. Unfortunately, there is uncertainty because the URR is not actually known beforehand with an unshakeable degree of confidence. However, that is why Stuart and others use the Hubbert Linearization--to predict the URR after a field is mature. The URR seems to be known to a good degree of confidence after approximately 50% of its predicted production has occurred but may be inferred before that in its production history using a statistical line fit. The method seems to work pretty well in the best test cases we have. Stuart has been working this out for months now with more precision than anyone else, IMHO, working in this field.

I am not writing this just to address a jerk like you--it's also general information for readers of TOD. Does the word "troll" have any particular meaning to you in this context? Please, contribute some useful information if you have any. TOD is reality-based. If you're looking for anecdotal evidence, go visit Mike Ruppert's website or some other appropriate place (like the EIA forecasts, the IEA forecasts--these are especially recommended--, CERA, Lynch or Mr. Abiotic Oil himself, Jerome Corsi. Otherwise, get lost.
Dave, I'm not trying to be antagonistic. The point you raised is a core issue, and deserves to be looked at very closely, not glossed over. It's the main difference between the later peakers (Lynch, Yergin) and the early peakers (Campbell, Simmons etc.) Lynch says URR keeps increasing due to improved technology, and Colin Campbell says no -- but keeps increasing his URR. To me that suggests Lynch is onto something.

I think there is a different URR associated with each successive level of technology. For example, suppose you went back to the day of Colonel Drake, and froze technology at that level. How much total oil could you recover if you deployed Colonel Drake technology to its maximal capability? That would be the URR with Colonel Drake level technology. It's clear that deepwater oil is not included in that URR. Which leads me to believe that the technological advances since Colonel Drake's time are associated with a larger URR. You can recover more oil with better technology.

That doesn't mean that peak oil is infinitely far into the future. It means that it might be farther into the future (or less serious) than you expect if you don't analyze technological gains very carefully.

Anyway, it's a complicated but important subject. I hope we can talk about in more detail sometime on The Oil Drum. Thanks for the link. I'll read it.

It's a time function.  If you are patiently willing to wait (and I think Matt Simmons quotes a family in Houston that has been) you can continue to draw oil at a slow rate from a field for a very long time.  Most of the time folk are a little more impatient.  I did a post on this some time ago, trying to explain the problems of rapid draw down.  They relate to the development of flow channels in the rock, and the fact that the faster flow goes through a channel the more it wears and the wider it gets, and the greater the amount of relative flow that goes through it in contrast with the situation where a lower relative pressure will draw more evenly over the surface of the deposit, but will pull oil out at a much slower rate. With the creation of flow channels, the oil that is in the rock around them can often get stranded, and is not recovered.  Thus while the instantaeous rate of recovery goes up, the long-term absolute recovery goes down.  One of the intents of MRC is to reduce this by spreading the well coverage more intensely through the reservoir.  However while it reduces the distance that some of the oil has to travel, it does not overcome the problems of that higher differential pressures create with  flow channel development.
I see that HO has already answered your question.

If you need any other anecdotal evidence, let me know. It's the only kind of ever use.
I have to say, with all due respect to my fellow OD'ers, I'm rather with JD here. While it's certainly true that decline rates have increased a great deal, the industry also believes recovery rates have increased somewhat. I've not seen any good evidence for Matt Simmons' position that there's zero improvement in recovery rates, and it seems implausible - how can visualizing left behind pockets of oil with 4d seismic not improve recovery?

Here's a discussion of Valhall in the North Sea.

In Simmons' book, he states that recovery has been increased but only in certain cases. I'll have to dig through it again to provide his specific instances.  I suppose I should do that when I have more energy. My recollection is that he doesn't feel that the technology will make a significant difference in the overall picture, that in some cases it may result in reduced total recovery, and that the temporary boost in production has led to complacency in the past, which was shattered when the fields hit sudden sharp declines.
On the one hand:

I agree with you. It is a little bit odd how people classify conventional/unconventional.

On the other hand:

Who cares? The point is that we consume 85 mbpd. So we need to supply that much. This rate increases by anywhere from 1% to 2.5% in any given year(with exceptions, of course). But as long as supply keeps up with demand-rate there is no problem.

Peak-oil is not a new idea, but the fervant debate surrounding it is. As proof, this website and all its popularity has only been happening for less than 6 months(please correct me if I'm wrong).

The key is to document predictions and who they are coming from. With a database of these predictions, we can very quickly identify who is full of it and who has a grasp on the truth.

When I track my data, I have 3-4 lines for every producing country. The first is BP's, then I have two separate lines for the EIA's different tables, and then a fourth for maybe another EIA table or a 3rd source. It doesn't matter that EIA doesn't match BP. Know that they don't and WHY.

The big mystery to me is how we are going to match record forecast demand in 2006 with supply. Will it be Saudi? Will it be Angola? It's not going to be Canada, not this year, at least.

These numbers are fairly simple. It will be pretty hard to dupe the oil community. Price will be a pretty good indicator to what is going on in 2006. So far, no crisis.

Oil CEO,

I think you put your finger on the bottom line.  There may be all this conventional (land and deep sea) and unconventional oil sources but can those reserves be brought to market?  At some point we get into splitting hairs in our discussions.  

Is field development or refining restricting supply?  Are prices or difficulty in maintaining platforms the choke point?    Are unconventional not producing because conventional hasn't been limiting enough to make tar sands attractive economically?  There is so much complexity in the overall, world supply of liquids that one can't point to a single issue as the major area of concern.  

The converse of this is that to maintain (and grow) worldwide supply, all these diverse areas must increase simultaneously to offset conventional oil declines.  Declines defined as shrinking daily output not field size.  This is the part I have trouble with.  Going forward it will be ever more difficult to remain on schedule on all the difficult projects.  The oil supply is getting exponentially more complex than a decade ago.  Complex things can be very efficient but they are also much easier to break or disrupt.  I think the cornucopians discount the effect of the added complexity.  As you say, 2006 should tell us what we can do and what we can't.