From the graph we can see that most (about 1.5 - 2 mbpd) of the projected increase will come pretty soon, 2005 - 2007. 2008 - 2011 increase will be less than 1 mbpd. This means for the overall oil peak may come already 2007 because the yearly increase after that from these projects will be only about 300 000 bpd. That may not offset the depletion at that stage.

All this is just guessing. For me this seems to confirm the view that Russia and Saudi-Arabia will be decisive. They can unexpectedly show such a depeletion rate that those new projects cannot help.

Besides the even most optimistic forecast here doesn't spell much growth (under 2%) in the world production anyway. So we could reasonably expect rather flat production in the next few years.  

I think it's quite hard to conclude much about the global situation from this picture alone. We would need to superimpose what the "class of 02", "class of 03", "class of 04" have been doing, and how the 06, 07, etc projects are shaping up. We also need to get a better sense of whether there's a long tail of small fields that contributes materially or not (Rembrandt Koppelaar has listed some small fields, and maybe Mad Oilman will give us some more). I'm mostly putting the update up now in hope of attracting some corrections and additional pointers, and for the benefit of anyone else who wants to do micro-level tracking of the world's oil supply.

I suppose it's somewhat valid to ask whether we believe the 2-2.5mbpd eventually coming from CERA's class of 05 is enough to offset type II depletion in the rest of the worlds existing fields in 05 - if they are, in aggregate, declining at more than 2 1/2% to 3%, then one could argue we are starting to go backwards. But this is tricky - some recent fields will still be growing, while older ones are declining. And I don't want to conclude that the small fields don't count significantly at present. Also, in a sense it's really the class of 02-04 that will be fully hitting their peaks around now and either offsetting this year's declines or not (it's the difference between accrual accounting and cashflow accounting for those who know some accounting - but I think cashflow - oilflow - is relevant here: we can't power our cars with future oil).

I was somewhat positively surprised by ACG. Looks like Azerbaijan is about to enter the positive column in this picture in a pretty big way:

There are some dry holes in the Caspian. Azerbaijan from EIA.
Besides the ACG project, many of Azerbaijan's offshore prospects have been relatively disappointing in contrast to the high expectations for the Caspian Sea region during the 1990s.

Most recently, the failure of ExxonMobil and Lukoil to discover commercially viable hydrocarbon reserves at the Zafar-Mashal and Yalama blocks, respectively, will lower future production estimates from Azerbaijan's offshore area. The first well at Zafar-Mashal was the deepest in the Caspian Sea, reaching a total depth of over 22,000 feet (6,600 meters) and was the most expensive at around $100 million. The Yalama Block was the last drilling program underway in offshore Azerbaijan. Finally, without an agreement on the maritime borders in the Caspian Sea, entire fields have been left untapped due to the lack of clarity on ownership.
There continue to be large discrepancies in recoverable reserve numbers for this region. I think the overall view is that earlier large numbers were not justified. There's a good summary here if people are interested. This is another good candidate for a Hubbert linearisation plot.
Yeah - I'm just saying the ACG looks pretty solid, and a new 1mbpd is not to be sniffed at right now.
You are correct. Many majors and their partners have let their leases lapse as the risk/reward equation wasn't quite working out in Azerbaijan. BP is doing well with their ACG and Shah Deniz projects, but that's about it.

Khazakstan is perking up quite nicely. I've been involved with a major artificial island project (for environmental reasons) to produce at minimum a billion barrel field.

But Iran is still causing problems. Their claim to Caspian acerage is far beyond reason. And international precedent. And negotiations between the major players are non-existent. It is holding up major production opportunities.

Iran is probably content to see these resources come on line much later, given that only a small share will ultimately go to them, and helpfully increasing their revenues from their current production.