Stuart, I know this has been discussed before, but with CERA again saying no peak till at least 2020:

http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story.asp?guid={6D4DFEB4-0DE5-480D-9AE2-3676BF4E7F98}&siteid=google

We are thinking it may have already passed or may come next year. I still struggle with how people can persistently reach such different conclusions (although I'm used to it). I know it's about estimates for decline rates more than about new production. You have seen more of the the CERA report than I have. Is it possible to identify & quantify specifically the discrepancies between our assumptions and CERA's in a way that they can be more systematically compared and challenged?  What exactly do they say about decline rates? Do you know? Thanks. I understand if you don't have time to address this.

I don't know with full confidence. I do not have the full report, and people who I've talked to who do say it doesn't give full detail (eg doesn't give the full list of fields). So I have no way to assess it. The 16mb they talk about by 2010 is consistent with Chris Sebrowski's number, which Rembrandt and I think is a little on the low side. However, it all depends on what one assumes about the FIP decline rate. CERA appears to account for FIP decline, but there's something extremely fishy about their specific graphs. Eg this one, were fields under assessment (FUA) start contributing to production in 2005.

Thanks for the response. Very interesting graphic. Suggests an additional 500,000 barrels per day by 2007 from fields uncharacterized and not even yet under development? Seems quite impossible given lengthy time lines for developing fields, even if the oil is there (which is apparently uncertain).

With enough of this fudge spread around, I can see how they claim no problem. I just wish people in the public debates had time to actually discuss and challenge these assumptions, and that the journals would be more critical in their reporting rather then parroting their favorite pundits.

Thanks again.