I just finished listening to the CERA presentation and the Q & A section afterwards.

I enjoyed the entire presentation.  It's great to have this kind of detailed analysis from experts in the field.  I think this raises the debate to a higher level, with informed experts on both sides, debating the complicated issues involved.

However, now it is time for us to poke holes in CERA's analysis if we can find any.  They were very detailed in their research and I liked the Q & A section, because the listeners asked about "Peak Oil".  Also note the fact that CERA did not discount, "Peak Oil" as a possibility, just that they didn't see it before 2020.  This tells me the experts are no longer, "uncomfortable" talking about the subject.  That is, at least a first step toward open debate.

The main potential pit falls to their analysis are:

#1.  Over estimation of Supply from OPEC
#2.  Underestimation of Demand from China

First Supply from OPEC;  The OPEC nations are, as we all know, the hardest to predict.  With our very limited knowledge of their total reserves and their refusal to allow any third party oil field analysis, we know, only as much as they tell us.  From CERA's presentation it seems they just gloss over this fact and assume OPEC is as good as their word.  I will not go any further on this subject because with out the raw field numbers, that only OPEC members have access to, it is just my guess vs. CERA's guess.  

Second Demand from China;  In the CERA Q & A, the experts down play 2004 demand of an additional 2 MBD, as a fluke.  I think this is a major flaw in their analysis.  China has for the last twenty years grown at an annual rate of 9 to 10%.  China's 2004 economy has grown to a size of, 7.2 trillion dollars a year.  To give that number some context, both the US and EU economies are each 11 trillion dollar economies.  With China's continued growth over the next 6 years, their economy will require ever increasing amounts of petroleum.  While China continues to grow at a 9-10 % rate, by 2010 their economy will be valued at 13.8 trillion dollars, larger than the current US economy.  China currently consumes, 1 MBD per trillion dollars of economic activity.  So, as China's economy grows 6.6 trillion dollars from 2004 to 2010, it is safe to calculate that China's petroleum consumption will also grow 6.6 MBD from 2004 to 2010.  
    CERA's statement that "reduced gasoline firing electrical generation", as China switches to coal fired electrical generation, will slow China's petroleum demand growth, is completely unfounded.  Even though, the U.S. is very heavily dependent on coal for our own electrical generation, we still use 21 MBD of petroleum mostly for our transportation infrastructure.  So even as China switches to coal for electricity generation, their 19 % annual growth in car sales, will more than over whelm this effect.  All in all, 2004's 2 MBD demand growth was not a fluke, but instead the new reality of China becoming one of the world's three largest economies, US, EU, China.  

So why is the "world demand" so important when we are talking about a peak in, "world supply"?

Just this; if demand remains high, supply will remain tight for years to come.  If supply remains tight for years to come, crude oil prices will remain in the $50 to $60 range.  If crude oil remains in the $50 to $60 range, big oil companies will continue to; push mature fields harder, rush new fields into production, begin coal liquidation, ramp up tar sand processing, and increase NGL imports.  All of which, leads to steeper decline rates in mature fields, and reduced return activities such as tar sand processing, which in turn, hasten the day of "peak oil" dramatically.

In the end, CERA is right, production will rise for a couple years.  But at what price?

Reduced returns, steep field declines, and depletion of coal and natural gas.

Sources:
CIA World Fact Book:  China 2004, 7.2 trillion dollar Purchasing Power Parity
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html

China's stated goal is doubling of economic size by either 2020 or 2025 - restated in the past year by its president. At the of the statement I calculated the avg annual growth needed and it was indeed right on the 9% line which its been following.

Higher oil prices no doubt will cause some slowing but how much remains to be seen.

Years to double and percent growth are related by the "rule of 70". Divide one into 70 and get the other. To double in 20 years is about 70/20 or 3.5% growth per year. To double in 15 years is 70/15 or about 4.7% growth per year.

9% growth per year would double in 70/9 or 7.8 years! That would be quite a feat.

Can't remember where my brain was at when I did that calculation but likely did not factor in compounding.

So many details, so little time.

Econbrowser has had several articles on China's growth rate and petroleum demand, http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/china/index.html .

This one, http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2005/07/the_week_in_oil.html , reports on a surprising recent drop-off in Chinese demand:


The New York Times reported that after growing 11% in 2003 and 15.4% in 2004, Chinese petroleum use fell 1% in 2005:II compared to 2004:II. Andy Xie, the chief Asian economist for Morgan Stanley, reported that for the first half of 2005, China's crude oil imports rose by 3.9 percent compared to a 34.8 percent increase in 2004, and refined product imports dropped by 21.1 percent compared to a 34.1 percent increase in 2004.

These figures are really astonishing. A 34.8% increase in crude imports in 2004 decreasing to only a 3.9% increase in 1H 2005? Gasoline dropping to a 21.1% decrease compared to a 34.8% increase the year before? Clearly Chinese oil demand is slowing. We all saw the pictures over the summer of gas lines. Their state controlled economy does not seem to be doing a good job of allocating this scarce resource or handling the high international prices. Without a market to adapt in a flexible and dynamic fashion, centralized control systems tend to be brittle in their responses to challenges like this. That will probably further hurt Chinese growth as long as oil prices stay high.

I'd say Yergin has an excellent case for Chinese growth slowing from its hyper-rapid pace.

I agree with your CERA weaknesses #1 and (the well argued) #2. I would only add this, which you discuss briefly

#3 Uncertainty about depletion rates

CERA on decline rates:
We don't actually look at depletion in terms of an average number across different countries and basins.... we look at it in enough detail that we're trying build up our analysis on a bottom up basis and we're trying, when we can, to get information about specific fields, or, in other cases, where we know about particular reservoirs and different types of reservoirs and particular basins, we make assumptions about decline rates. And so, there's a whole range that we use, from certain Middle Eastern fields where we see depletion rates of lets say 3 or 5%... which can range up to 20% or so for some of the heavy oil fields in Venezuela, where we see depletion rates that, without intervention, are actually pretty high...
Cera on "peak oil":
[what will drive the peak?] ... in the medium term, we don't think these will be subsurface issues. It's mostly going to be subsurface factors that will control the timing and nature of the peak.... [UK past its peak and on an undulating plateau, gradually declining]... [ultimately oil production will peak but we see an undulating plateau out to 2020]... if we consider the behaviour of oil fields and basins and countries and regions to be fractal, we can look at what's happening in particular countries and extrapolate that on a world-wide basis, so we see the undulating plateau existing for a number of decades. And if you look at historical US production, you can see some elements of this shining through.
One final comment. You can not have your cake and eat it too. They seem to make the following 3 incompatible assumptions:
  1. Yearly demand will decline from recent years until 2010
  2. Supply will increase until 2010
  3. Prices will be lower (2007 to 2010) than current levels
Sorry, you can not increase supply, decrease prices and also decrease demand in a world built around economic growth. I'm not an economist but I know an impossibility when I see it.
The "undulating plateau out to 2020" is effectively the same as a peak, and what Colin Campbell was saying a few years ago: The peak has been flattened out by technological/economic factors (lack of drilling rigs on the upslope, "unconventional" oil on the downslope), and we're bumping along the top now. So we won't see a significant decline in supply until 2020.

The main disagreement seems to be that Campbell thinks we're already at the plateaua, whereas Yergin thinks supply can increase for another five years. That's not really much difference, especially considering that Campbell was until recently considered very pessimistic.

Of course, Campbell assumed that Saudi Arabia would peak much later than the rest of the world. If Simmons is right, the decline is already starting.