34 comments on Late night open thread
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I was thinking about the CERA report vs the one from ODAC which came out with such different results, and I have an idea of what is the problem. CERA came out with considerably higher projected production levels than ODAC. At first people thought there must be some methodological difference, and it was speculated that CERA was ignoring depletion of existing fields. But now that more data is out, the funny thing is that there doesn't seem to be any big difference. There are some differences on a field by field basis, CERA had some that ODAC didn't, but also some differences in the other direction as well.
Here's how I see it. The problem is that it is very hard to accurately predict production levels for dozens or hundreds of oil fields, many of which are yet to begin production, for years to come! No one could realistically be expected to make an accurate prediction, given the uncertainties that lie ahead. It's no wonder that two different analyses came out with somewhat different answers. If they agree to within five or ten percent, that is all we could reasonably expect. And they do.
The further problem is that we aren't really that interested in future production levels. What matters is the difference between potential production and extrapolated demand (based on current price). Even demand levels have considerable uncertainty. The four years from 1990 had consumption growth rates (from the previous year) of 1.2%, 0.7%, 1.0%, and 1.6%. These growth rates jump around quite a bit as well.
The result is that we have two uncertain figures, and we are in effect subtracting them, to see if production levels can meet extrapolated demand. But as anyone knows who has worked with statistics, if you have two data series with considerable uncertainty levels, and you subtract them, your error bars can go through the roof. If we are already uncertain about production levels by several percent, and the differences with consumption levels are less than several percent, then we really can't extract any meaningful predictions at all. The error bars are greater than the information we are interested in.
As I have argued before, the situation is so uncertain that IMO it is premature to say that the case has been made for a near term Peak Oil scenario. When two careful and thorough studies come to such different conclusions, that is further evidence of this truth.
I recently found an amusing academic paper which further emphasizes this reality. Forecasting the limits to the availability and diversity of global conventional oil supply has this to say: "Our results predict that global production of conventional oil will almost certainly begin an irreversible decline somewhere between 2004 and 2037, at 22 to 42 billion barrels per year, depending upon how much oil is available from the earth's crust and the growth rate in its use." How's that for a prediction? Not exactly red meat for Peak Oil true believers, but I believe that any honest evaluation that admits the tremendous uncertainty in the information available will reach a similarly cautious conclusion.
Bingo! This is the issue I keep trying to stress to people online and in person: Anyone making PO predictions is guessing, and if they don't admit they're guessing then they're deceiving you. (Yes, I make PO and energy predictions all the time, but I make a point of saying that I'm guessing.)
This is why I have a problem with people like Pfeiffer saying that gas prices will continue to rise this year (quoted upthread), or Kunstler saying just about anything. Yes, we should look at possibilities and try our best to be prepared for contingencies, but we should also be honest about where the facts end and the extrapolations begin.
I agree completely with Simmons and others who are calling for vastly improved transparency in all aspects of oil reserves and production. Not that I think we'll ever see it; there are just too many incentives for the keepers of said information to maintain secrecy.
But even that general statement, that gasoline prices will continue to rise, is loaded with assumptions and interpretations. Anyone reading this board could easily cook up a perfectly defensible scenario in which the only rational conclusion is that prices will decline between now and YE05.
I'm not saying that Pfeiffer is right or wrong, just that he, like all of us, are guessing. Hell, we can't even decide on whether anyone is gouging oil customers at current prices, let alone predict what prices will do months from now!
I agree entirely with your analysis of the numbers, and the uncertainty of the situation. You're basically taking a falsification approach--if you can poke holes in a theory, then it needs strengthening. But the fact that we can't confirm a problem does not mean that there isn't a problem. It just means our analysis is crude. And it won't get much better anytime soon.
We should then be taking a risk analysis approach. What are the chances of oil peaking? Over the long term, 100%. Over the short term, pick your number, but it's certainly a significant chance.
Then, what are the ramifications of oil peaking, plus continued demand, plus significant depletion rates? This could make for a few bad days.
There are only 4 possibilities: no peak/no preparation; no peak/prep; peak/prep; peak/no prep.
What happens if we prepare now, and oil then peaks? See the Hirsch report. Even under this "best case," we've got trouble.
What happens if we spend lots of money on alternative energy, and output never peaks, and we've got rivers of oil? I'd guess that the world becomes economically more efficient (fewer BTU's per dollar of GDP), new industries are developed, climate change is slowed, the world is less hostage to OPEC, trade imbalances are eased.
If we don't prepare, and didn't need to, we luck out, though the outcomes are less attractive to me than the preparation scenario. If we don't prepare, and do need to, we're toast. This is the world's current high-risk strategy: betting that we don't need to prepare.
If we prepare wisely, but didn't need to, I think we're much better off. If we prepare, and did need to, we're still in trouble. Preparing for peak oil is the only prudent course. The potential costs of inaction far outweigh the costs of unnecessary preparation.
I like your analyses, but I'm concerned about how people can take them. You are saying only (I think) that we can't prove there's an imminent peak. I'd agree, even though I believe it will peak soon. However, if people misuse such an argument, and cite it as evidence that there will not be a peak, it can lead us to the worst possible outcome.
The conservative choice is to begin preparing now.
Since the peak is inevitable but projections are uncertain, we must go with peak/X. The Hirsch report is important in this respect as you say.
Stuart Staniford and I went around a bit on this very point earlier this week. Part of his position rests on the assumption that humans are too short-sighted to do "squat" about it until the peak actually occurs and his modeling tries to show hope for us (based on depletion rates) after the peak occurs. I disagreed saying (partially) that although I agreed about the limitations of human nature (cf. New Orleans), we are screwed if the peak occurs and no preparations have been made. I stick with that position. Which is why, in my view, we need to acknowledge that this poorly dated peak production 1) will occur and 2) we need to do something about it starting now (or, better and impossibly, yesterday). Even if it's 2020 or later (CERA) -- which I doubt -- preparation now 15 years in advance would be about right.
I agree with both of you completely. Once the concept of peak oil has been brought to light and proved to be true (i.e. there is not an unlimited amount of oil) then we should start moving on weaning ourselves off of oil ASAP.
However, I am more and more convinced this will not happen because people are not approaching the problem rationally as you both highlight. Lately I am seeing Step Back's position that there are way too many people using the economic system for there own gain to ever start changes before absolutely forced to.
People are doing immediate economic risk analysis. How much money will I get to keep if I do A) vs if I do B). This leads to people buying SUV's after the price of gas has gone up 50% in 6 months. Just because the price is reduced on the SUV by $3000. You could still buy a more fuel efficient car, that seats 5, for less money but people thought they were saving money because they didn't pay list for an Explorer. No thought that since gas already went up by 50% it might just keep going up. They always wanted an SUV and got one cheap.
By this rational doesn't this mean that when oil and NG get scarce that old innefficient technology will get really cheap, but lots of people will buy it because they are on sale? They will rationalize that the money they save on purchase price will more than pay for increased fuel consumption. In aggregate we will use more oil than ever until all the inventory of old stuff is gone. There will be fire sales on everything inefficient, and if some manufacturers make profit on this stuff, they will keep making it.
This violates all the economic theory that has been discussed at TOD over the last couple of weeks; Increased price always reduces demand. I'm not convinced it can work fast enough to make any difference in consumption on a global scale. Individual scale yes, global scale no, and that is the only thing important for peak oil.
"People are doing immediate economic risk analysis." I agree. Saw a clear case in new housing estates outside of Tampa. The developers did careful research on pricing, and found out that a 15 minute longer commute required a price drop of $12-15,000 from memory. When I calculated it out, it seemed that the mortgage interest savings were almost exactly equal to the increased gasoline costs alone. People were not calculating in the true total cost of running a vehicle, or the addition of at least 125 annual hours (3 work-weeks) in the car.
Will old inefficient technology get really cheap? Absolutely. Used SUV's are moving into lower income brackets because they are appealing, and because they depreciate faster than cars.
As for violating economic theory, maybe not. Economist have a great concept called "stickiness." A sticky price is one that stays high, when rationale says it should drop faster. A lot of our infrastructure-related problems are sticky, and will not adapt quickly. Once an SUV is built, someone will probably drive it until the wheels fall off. And an old cheap SUV probably has lower costs of ownership and running than a new Prius, so they'll persist.
I too am very pessimistic about the ability to adapt quickly based on price increase alone.