Yes, we (both Stuart and I) are trying to (and are pretty skeptical of) figure out the Russia case...ergo, if anyone has some data to debunk the Russia case, we welcome it.  I did a cursory search over the last couple of days and couldn't find anything, hence the decision to go ahead and put this up.  If someone in this braintrust can't tear it apart...
Well, for what its worth...

The most trustworthy source I have found for Russia is Ray Leonard, former VP Exploration and New Ventures for Yukos. He is now Sr. Vice President for MOL Plc. He is a regular ASPO attendee. In this abstract of the text of his 2002 Uppsala presentation RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS: A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT, he states

Russian Reserves: In the Soviet Union (and now Russia) after discovery and delineation, each oilfield was analyzed by the State Reserves Committee to calculate geological and recoverable reserves. The Categories A, B and C1 represented proven reserves. This was based on a proposed and approved development plan. The plan was based on existing technology, but with no economic "filter." In recent years, Russian oil firms offering market shares have used internationally recognized auditing firms to estimate their reserves. In the case of the four largest oil firms, the audited amount averaged about 80% of the State Reserves Committee approved number. Including Russian majors, independents, condensate from Gasprom, state reserves and reserves of foreign companies operating in Russia, proven reserves are 100-110 billion barrels, or 80-90 billion if the 80% factor is taken into account. International convention usually takes a 50% reduction factor in counting probable (C2) reserves. Therefore, the Russian total of 30-40 Billion probable would add an additional 10-15 billion. More detailed calculations are being made to refine the number, but 90-105 billion barrels is a reasonable estimate of Russian reserves
This conclusion is repeated in a presentation Russian Oil And Gas Reserves (ppt).

He also presented in 2003 (ASPO newsletter #164) at the Paris Second International Workshop on Oil Depletion giving a talk entitled Can Russia make up the Difference and for how long?". I can't find the full text.

He also participated in the 2005 Lisbon meeting in another talk entitled The Reality of Russia (ppt). From Slide 3

Two sets of calculations: Russian C1(proven) accurately measures reserves without economic filter while SPE and SEC measure economically recoverable reserves and actual developed reserves

C1 Russian reserves are 119 billion barrels

As development of past five years has taken place, gap between SPE and SEC numbers and C1 is narrowing

Proven reserves are concentrated in West Siberia with about 70% in difficult to produce reservoirs

So, he's an expert on Russia and an ASPO regular. I think some information you may be seeking on Russia can be found in these sources.

As far as the Russia continental shelf/Artic goes (eg. the Kara, Barents Seas) go, I have a pending post on the shelf that I've been meaning to finish. I think I'll get right on it.

Hope this helps.

However, the recent trends have shown that major oil companies (e.g. Shell) and major producers (e.g, Kuwait) have been overestimating their reserves.  

Most recently, as Matt Simmons pointed out, all of the majors were dead wrong regarding the North Sea.  Hubbert Linearization was dead on right regarding the North Sea.  

Except for some "noise" around the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been following the "glidepath" down.  Why should we not expect it to continue?  However, the key point that a lot of people seem to be evading is that Russia--exactly as predicted by the model--peaked in a broad plateau centered on about 53% of Qt.  

Let me repeat.  Hubbert Linearization accurately picked the peak of Russian oil production.

The key challenge is the following.  Name me one region/country with decades of serious production (at 2 mbpd or so or more), with a Qt of at least 50 Gb that has shown increasing production beyond 55% of Qt.  

Personally, I think Ray Leonard is probably a good source. I doubt this "dramatic collapse" will happen in the next five years or so. I see nothing in his ASPO presentations that indicate such radical declines soon. IMHO, it will depend on their internal politics more than on how much recoverable oil they have. Sakhalin looks pretty good for the time being and although West Siberia is looking more and more challenging to produce, EOR should allow production there to stay at least flat in the shorter term with a highly probable steep drop-off after 2010 or so. 70% of their proven reserves are there. But they have other significant oil provinces as well. If that's the timeframe for your collapse assumption, then we agree about it.

Hubbert linearizations are a good thing but in Russia we have the infamous "double peak" because of what happened in the 1990's. In the (P/Q)/Q calculation, where are we getting reliable information about cumulative production to date? The Soviets were pretty secretive about their production history. What's our data source?

Dave,

Khebab addresses the data issue down the way.

The North Sea is a far more compact province than Russia that should have been far easier model.  According to Matt Simmons, the best engineers in the world at all the major oil companies working the North Sea thought that it wouldn't peak until 2010.  

The simple Hubbert Linearization method was far more accurate.  North Sea production is down almost 25% from its 1999 peak (using the crude + condensate number).  I assume that you would concur that this verges on a collapse--one that the best engineers in the world missed.  

If the engineers can be that wrong about a province that--compared to Russia--is a piece of cake, don't you think that they might be wrong about Russia too?  In my opinion, the "double peak" was simply cumulative production catching up to where it should have been at this point in time.  

Backward induction
Backward induction is a technique to solve a game of perfect information. It first consid-
ers the moves that are the last in the game, and determines the best move for the player
in each case. Then, taking these as given future actions, it proceeds backwards in time,
again determining the best move for the respective player, until the beginning of the game

How much does it take to push people away from their natural strategies? 

I have a suggestion for the geologists and petroleum engineers. Figure out what the heck your measurements and estimates mean, and then perfect the formula to eliminate the magical guess work. The more I look at it, the more I seriously think that no one has figured out how to do estimates of oil reservoir volume correctly
It almost sounds as if no one wants to admit that a parabolic growth law has any kind of importance.

And FSU Oil Shock Model here

However, if you discount OPEC reserves by 50%, it becomes clear that we are WELL past that half-way point. So production should have already begun to decline. This suggests that, as widely feared, only the use of water injection and water flood tecniques to keep reservoir pressure artificially high have kept production rates up for the past several years. The problem with this is that when a field who's production rate has been artificially sustained beyond the half-way point finally does begin to decline, its rate of decline tends to be very, very high. 10-18% has been suggested (by Simmons and others) as the decline rate for fields that have been pressed to the limits with injection technologies. This is critical, because while Peak Oil may be a quite manageable problem at 2% depletion, 10%+ depletion means that world production will fall by half in less than 7 years. That would be absolutely catastrophic. No wonder this story isn't available on CNN.

Mobjectivist has the Parabolic Growth Law and Fractional Yearly "Reserve Growth #'s and Jeff Vaill has the Implications.

Game Theory states that we now must assume the worst.  Catastrophic oil depletion this year.

Thank you mcgowanjm for bringing this up. I've been trying for three days, but maybe some numbers will get people involved.

We've used 1000 Gb. If we have past 50% some time ago, that means we could be well into the 60s.

1000 /.60 = 1,666.67

1000 /.65 = 1,538.46

1000 /.70 = 1,428.57143

Overall, if we have used 60% of URR, the average decline rate will be much higher than if we were at 50%.

Which is why I asked if most countries use techonology that has delayed their peak...

Also, how much will the countries that are ramping up production offset the decline rate?

I should have said, "will get more people involved"
mcgowanjm, thanks for the post.  

I certainly wouldn't compare myself to Hubbert, but I have gotten a small taste of what it must have been like for him to challenge conventional wisdom,

I was at an oil industry meeting last year where a geologist employed by the State of Texas gave a talk debunking Hubbert.  Of course I challenged him on it during the Q&A.  In response to one my points, he said "Texas may not be able to equal its peak production, but we can certainly get close with better use of technology."  

In 33 years, Texas has never shown year over year increases in production, and we are down close to 75% from our peak.  It shows how deep the denial is that an allegedly competent scientist can ignore data in front of his face and talk about production increases.  Our problem is fields like the East Texas Field, which is now producing 1.2 mbpd of water, with a 1% oil cut.  How does high tech help you revive a field that has watered out?

Westtexas,

I saw the Enron documentary yesterday.  It's a Ten
by the way.  See it if you can.

Anyway the movie flashes the book Selfish Genes as a book Skilling runs his life by.

From the book or like minded authors-

We humans are blissfully unaware that we are driven to behave in ways that maximize inclusive fitness. Because of the advantages of unawareness of our own deceptive tactics and of our suspicion, I suggest that innate tendencies made us "embarrassingly stupid" as far as conscious awareness of these facts is concerned.

Evolutionary theory predicts the inherent selfishness of the individual. Therefore, we would not expect communication to develop as a means of informing others of the truth, if such truth gives the recipient an advantage at the expense of the sender. Cronk (1991) suggests to "follow the example of animal behavior studies in seeing communication more as a means to manipulate others than as a means to inform them". In other words, most communication serves for the purpose of social influence, defined as "change in one person's beliefs, attitudes, behavior, or emotions brought about by some other person or persons" (Raven, 1983, p. 8).

This demonstrates that deceit as an influence strategy is neither new nor a human invention. Second, it is likely that humans employ strategies as low as level two (body language signals of strength or submission) or maybe even level one (immature and baby-like facial features in an adult).

In summary, we should expect a good strategists to strive to maintain an image of being a truthful person. He or she should be prepared to deceive whenever it confers a sizable advantage versus a much smaller risk.

It's now obvious that the powers that be got away with the Enron model.  Lay and Skilling are big, but they ain't
Chase Morgan or CSFB.

The US has absolutely no intention of slowing "growth"
(the same def as Enron's-whatever we say it is).

We will continue until stopped.  By PO, Climate Change,  or nuking Iran.

Excellent post!  If we are going to get this data out to the point where something is done about it, we will have to address the social psychological aspects of it.  The "Abundant Oil" people know this and are doing it right now.

For example: I recently listened to a debate between a Peak Oiler and an Abundant Oiler from an Art Bell radio show from about a month ago.  My wife said that she thought the Abundant Oiler won the debate, and I have to say that most unknowledgeable people would probably feel the same.  The Abundant Oiler was lying up a storm, but it was obvious that he was used to this and he had practiced staying calm and beating his message to death.  Also, his message induced a very warm, feel-good emotional state of long-term economic stability.

The Peak Oiler had the real data, but I could see how he could easily confuse the average non-technical person.  Also, his voice got very shrill as he slowly freaked out at how many lies the Abundant Oiler was making.  The tone of his voice and his message induced a state of confusion, insecurity, and irritation.

It was an interesting case of how easily a person ruthless enough to lie like a dog, can beat an honest technical person for the hearts of the average person.  In my Neuro Linguistic Programming classes, they used to say that people aren't swayed by reasons, but by their emotional state.

On the other hand, maybe this is a lost cause, and we destined for the hard landing later, instead of the softer landing now.  But, I would like to hope that we could do something...like convincing the average person of the reality of PO.

Many thanks for your thoughts on this, westexas, mcgowanjm, zach. I need to preface my comments by saying: I expect decline rates to be significantly higher for many fields in future due to EOR use, I think that many reserves are a bit overstated, I think things are going to get worse and faster than many here seem to think. However...

I can believe that some large fields in mid east, like Ghawar, may reach perhaps 70% URR / OOIP so there could be more recoverable oil than you expect.

Though the water cut from Ghawar is about 35% now its rate of increase has been slow, steady and seemingly well managed, it was over 20% 25 years ago.

Russia is just weird, I don't think any relatively simple model will work for it. There could be anything from 50 to 100 billion barrels of URR remaining (80% probability range).

One thing we really need to know more about is how EOR has impacted production rates and decline rates for large fields. I think this will be absolutely critical in attempting to project forward, I too expect some seriously nasty decline rates.

More philosophically, I almost never lie, often manage to go several years without telling even the smallest white lie, one lie a year is a bad record for me. When I do choose to lie it usually causes me considerable trauma both before and after, I almost never lie by mistake since being untrue is now so alien to me. Yet I am very aware of people around me lying continuously, often without being aware they are doing so. Is it me that is sick or them?

I never liked "The Selfish Gene" book or thesis, it is well argued but doesn't ring true. I generally consider the 'common good' above personal benefit, if I could gain 15 at the cost of 10 each losing 2 then I would not do it. But I am very rarely ripped off and can be a very good bargainer and negotiator when needed. Maybe I am a communist who believes in personal freedom, lol.

Come on, westexas, you are claiming that Russia has ultimately recoverable reserves of only 18 Gb, according to your chart? Yet Dave's expert, who is working with ASPO and sounds very credible, says it has proven reserves of over 80 Gb, with considerably more probable reserves. These figures don't add up.

Besides, it's clear at a glance that the Hubbert linearization is no good for Russia:

Production has moved well above the logistic fit and continues to climb. If I fit a line to this last portion I get that Russia has, let's see... looks like an infinite quantity of oil to me. Boy, you sure can learn a lot by fitting lines to charts, can't you?

As Prof. Goose said, the curve fitting for Russia is a nasty fit and a mixture of logistic curves should be used instead.