95 comments on The Tragic Consequences of the High Discounting of Oil Extraction
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Price ought to, and on occasion has, reflected scarcity: During the '70s oil shocks and recent price behavior. Another problem is that perfect competition mostly exists in textbooks, along with perfect information, which is requisite for both perfect competition and perfect markets.
Expectation theory also affects price as the so-called war premium shows so well: If Israel had met with success [from its POV] in Lebanon, would oil be under $60 now and the DOW over 12,000?
Lastly, externalities are NOT accurately included in price for any commodity--indeed, almost all products. For example, oil and gas extraction south of New Orleans is responsible for much of Katrina's devastation, yet that future foreseeable cost was NOT factored into the price of the resources extracted; nor does it appear that the massive environmental costs of bitumin mining is included in the pricing of its extraction; nor was the cost of climate chaos included in our past or current fossil fuel pricing.
I think that's enough information for the 18-year-old econ 101 student to argue against econ 101 orthodoxy regarding "infinite" "finite" resources. All that is needed is the courage to confront the "knowledge authority," not an easy task, one much easier for us "non-traditional" students.
The "Here's what I was lying about yesterday/lastyear in my noninteractive lecture" model of teaching is annoying. It's absolutely destroyed the study of history.
Supply has more than one definition:
Which one do you think your Eco professor was referring to when he spoke about "Supply and Demand"?
Was he talking about the population of lazy woodsmen who would be encouraged by higher prices to work harder and cut more trees each day, or was he thinking about the possibility of deforestration on Easter Island?
The reason being: smokers are price inelastic, they pay lots of taxes.
then they tend to die in the early years of retirement.
So you have the almost perfect fiscal mix:
- high (voluntary) taxpayers
- early death, thus saving on long term old age care, pension and medical costs
You can only make smoking a social evil, if you count the pain and suffering individuals (and their families) suffer as a result of it.(another angle might be the additional sickness that smokers undergo during their working life-- I have noticed smokers get sick more, and for longer. A third factor is the cost of unintentional fires especialy at home.)
One of my favourite ways to try to get people to give up smoking, is to point out to them how well the government does out of their habit. Since many are of a more libertarian bent, this usually does get their goat.
If as a smoker I had to pay for and use some form of technology to return the air I used to its composition prior to my lighting a smoke, smoking would become far more expensive and cumbersome than current, and we would all benefit by having a common resource protected. Smokestack scrubbing is the same thing mandated for the same reason.
Externalities are a form of subsidy to whatever is using a commonly shared resource, and they deserve to be heavily regulated and taxed; that they are not is a main reason we face a number of problems. This often gets grouped with market failure.
Gasoline consumption is lower, but so is GDP per head.
The gain isn't clear (perhaps most prominently, about a 10 mpg difference in the average car fuel economy). So perhaps 30% of gas consumption v. a doubling of average pump price. We drive less than you do (I think only about half as many miles pa) but this country is no bigger than New England and is an island.
Gas taxes are great from a fiscal policy point of view:
- high price inelasticity therefore limited distortion in final behaviour of consumers
- lots of revenue generation due to the above
But they don't cause people to consume less (or rather: income effects seem to outweigh substitution effects).This is my concern with most proposed forms of carbon taxation. We're going to need politically unacceptable levels of taxation to actually have a meaningful impact on consumption
and
income effects will tend to outweigh price effects in the long run (we get richer, we drive more, fly more, burn more carbon).
You can't have it both ways. If you have a tax that generates meaningful revenue, it doesn't discourage the harmful activity enough.
My conclusion is
- we'll have to go to a tradeable permits system. We are actually going to have to physically cap the amount of CO2 we emit.
The result will be some truly amazing permit prices. And whole industries built around trading those permits, avoiding those permits.
- regulation to induce technology change may be economically inefficient, but it will be important. A tax on carbon use is one thing, and has one set of costs, a regulation which specifies a higher efficiency fridge, house or car, will be a cost buried in the economic system as a whole.
Absolutely. There will be pain and perverse effects, but it's the only thing I can see that can work.
My brother is an expert in tradeable fish quota systems. They really do work as a tool for managing a common, finite resource (as long as you can keep all the actors honest).
In fishing, the perverse effect that I like the least is that it leads to industrial concentration, and squeezes out the artisan or small-scale fishing operation. At the beginning, you hand out quota entitlements based on historical catch. This gives existing operators a handout of capital, since the quotas are fully tradeable. The bigger operations -- factory ships etc -- can make more money per unit of quota than the small ones. It actually makes better economic sense for the owner of a small boat to sell his quota and invest the proceeds.
Has this sort of effect been analysed for tradeable carbon quotas, I wonder?
William Nordhaus (Yale University) who is the guru of carbon taxation and the economic effects thereof (one of), has switched to advocating a 'global Pigovian Carbon Tax'
(with revenue neutrality: ie the entire tax is rebated back through the tax system)
on the grounds that the traded permit system has failed to date (Kyoto implementation) and also the size of financial flows between countries is unrealistic (US will never stump up).
A third (key) factor is that the incentive to cheat is too high-- even in a 'good governance' environment like the US and US, let alone Russia or some other country.
When I read that the second or third largest illegal commodity in the US (after cocaine and marijuana) was CFCs smuggled in from countries still allowed to make them, I have some sympathy with that view.
Fish quotas: glad to know it's working.
The Canadian experience has soured me, though. White man exploited cod in the North Atlantic happily for 700 years, and the natives for thousands of years before that.
The cod is now gone, and shows no sign of ever returning-- the population has dropped below self sustaining
From what I understand this week, if we don't ban cod fishing in British waters, the same is sure to happen here.
When European governments refuse to go with scientific advice on allowable fish catches, I despair. It's a parallel to the Global Warming situation: politics dampens down the scientific conclusions. Politics drives science, rather than the other way around.
The right to properly manage their cod and other fish stocks is why Iceland went ot war, twice, against a nuclear power. After the herring catch crashed they feared the same would happen with cod and this was key to national survival ! (Fish were 90% of exports then, 2/3rds today).
Best Hopes,
Alan
My other problem with the Pigovian per unit carbon tax is that it is quite likely that some emissions of carbon will be incredibly price inelastic.
The necessary tax would be so high, and the perceived inequality so great (only the rich can afford to pay the tax) that the system would break down.
Whilst I think right now a sensible price per tonne of carbon is $100 ($28/tonne CO2), I have no doubt by 2050 or earlier, the price will be $1,000 (a combination of world economic growth and the need to keep ratcheting down the total emission level).
The basic right to emit carbon per person in 2050 will be 0.5 tonnes per person pa on a world basis-- 9 billion people, 4.5bn tpa. Which I cannot see the rich and the powerful in the developed countries (let alone China or India) subscribing to.
It's what makes me pessimistic, because I cannot see the political system producing that kind of (necessary) solution.
The only light I can see at the end of the tunnel is that, in the long run, technological progress surprises.
Now, such calculations are obviously difficult and uncertain, largely because the greater part of the impacts are far in the future. Greenland's not going to melt down tomorrow, but if it does eventually, that's going to be extremely expensive. The future is inherently uncertain so this makes the necessary extrapolations and calculations doubly difficult.
A number of researchers have attempted to put a numerical figure on it anyway, and there has been considerable variation in their results. Here is a paper from 2005 that surveyed over 100 such studies:
http://www.uni-hamburg.de/Wiss/FB/15/Sustainability/enpolmargcost.pdf
The median calculated impact, across all the studies, was $14 per ton of carbon. This is considerably lower than the $100/tC we often see bandied about. The paper also notes: "Interestingly, studies that are peer-reviewed have lower estimates and smaller uncertainties." In other words, the higher-quality studies generally have lower estimates, and the more extravagant estimates come from low-quality studies.
A $14/tC Pigovian tax corresponds to a gasoline tax of about 3 cents per gallon. This is, according to our best estimates and calculations, the correct amount of tax to compensate for the eventual costs of carbon emission, and to cause people to adjust their consumption habits so as to minimize net costs.
Of course, such a low carbon tax would have an almost negligible impact on people's behavior. Maybe some big companies would be willing to make a change in response to a tax of 1% or 2% on energy, but most people won't even notice it. Yet it is the correct level under the Pigou formulation of compensating for negative externalities.
This leads to a paradox, where global warming is a great threat, yet our best estimates of the cost of that threat lead to a policy which will not cause noticeable action to be taken. It is an interesting exercise for the student to try to resolve the paradox. I think the answer should be relatively obvious to anyone who is willing to accept the hard evidence of scientific research without prejudice. But I will refrain from giving my answer here and let others mull over this puzzle.
Or am I barking up the wrong tree here?
If a tax is meant to change behaviour, what is important is the rate at the margin which influences current purchasing decisions. You can get a high marginal rate without impoverishing the poor in several ways.
For an easily metered product like electricity you can have a low tariff for an amount sufficient for a frugal household and a high tariff for any extra. For other carbonaceous products you can provide a credit per citizen/household either in kind, with specific "carbon credits", or cash to help buy basic quantities. With very high prices this turns into a rationing system.
This is a bit like a carbon-trading system where the credits are distributed amoung the population who then sell them to utilities and industries which require them or use them for personal consumption, but is probably less bureaucratic.
Gasoline consumption is very inelastic over the short term, but quite elastic over the long term. It appears likely that carbon emissions are not unlike gasoline consumption (they are even strongly related). If the carbon tax was escalated on a known schedule over a period of years, people and companies would adapt and plan ahead.
If it paid $50/ton or more, American farmers would probably find a way to sequester carbon as charcoal in the soil (terra preta) and pocket the payment. The USA produces about 1.3 billion tons of waste biomass alone, sufficient to make about 0.5 billion tons of charcoal; burying even half of that would sequester about 0.8 tons/capita/year (the off-gas from charcoal production plus the remaining charcoal could be used for energy or chemical products). The sequestration potential increases if high-productivity biofuel crops are added to the mix.
We can do this.
I do know in the Southwest of the US (Arizona in particular) farmers have sold their water allocations and retired on the proceeds. The small farmers go first.
80% of California's water consumption is still for agriculture, apparently. A truly shocking amount in what amounts to a desert. Also there is now evidence that California goes through periodic droughts that last for 150 years. At which point, only mass desalination, or mass migration, is likely to prove to be a solution.