In the UK we have gas taxes several times the US level.

Gasoline consumption is lower, but so is GDP per head.

The gain isn't clear (perhaps most prominently, about a 10 mpg difference in the average car fuel economy).  So perhaps 30% of gas consumption v. a doubling of average pump price.  We drive less than you do (I think only about half as many miles pa) but this country is no bigger than New England and is an island.

Gas taxes are great from a fiscal policy point of view:

  • high price inelasticity therefore limited distortion in final behaviour of consumers

  • lots of revenue generation due to the above

But they don't cause people to consume less (or rather: income effects seem to outweigh substitution effects).

This is my concern with most proposed forms of carbon taxation.  We're going to need politically unacceptable levels of taxation to actually have a meaningful impact on consumption

and

income effects will tend to outweigh price effects in the long run (we get richer, we drive more, fly more, burn more carbon).

You can't have it both ways.  If you have a tax that generates meaningful revenue, it doesn't discourage the harmful activity enough.

My conclusion is

-  we'll have to go to a tradeable permits system.  We are actually going to have to physically cap the amount of CO2 we emit.

The result will be some truly amazing permit prices.  And whole industries built around trading those permits, avoiding those permits.

- regulation to induce technology change may be economically inefficient, but it will be important.  A tax on carbon use is one thing, and has one set of costs, a regulation which specifies a higher efficiency fridge, house or car, will be a cost buried in the economic system as a whole.

we'll have to go to a tradeable permits system.  We are actually going to have to physically cap the amount of CO2 we emit.

Absolutely. There will be pain and perverse effects, but it's the only thing I can see that can work.

My brother is an expert in tradeable fish quota systems. They really do work as a tool for managing a common, finite resource (as long as you can keep all the actors honest).

In fishing, the perverse effect that I like the least is that it leads to industrial concentration, and squeezes out the artisan or small-scale fishing operation. At the beginning, you hand out quota entitlements based on historical catch. This gives existing operators a handout of capital, since the quotas are fully tradeable. The bigger operations -- factory ships etc -- can make more money per unit of quota than the small ones. It actually makes better economic sense for the owner of a small boat to sell his quota and invest the proceeds.

Has this sort of effect been analysed for tradeable carbon quotas, I wonder?

I don't know enough.

William Nordhaus (Yale University) who is the guru of carbon taxation and the economic effects thereof (one of), has switched to advocating a 'global Pigovian Carbon Tax'
(with revenue neutrality: ie the entire tax is rebated back through the tax system)

on the grounds that the traded permit system has failed to date (Kyoto implementation) and also the size of financial flows between countries is unrealistic (US will never stump up).

A third (key) factor is that the incentive to cheat is too high-- even in a 'good governance' environment like the US and US, let alone Russia or some other country.

When I read that the second or third largest illegal commodity in the US (after cocaine and marijuana) was CFCs smuggled in from countries still allowed to make them, I have some sympathy with that view.

Fish quotas: glad to know it's working.

The Canadian experience has soured me, though. White man exploited cod in the North Atlantic happily for 700 years, and the natives for thousands of years before that.

The cod is now gone, and shows no sign of ever returning-- the population has dropped below self sustaining

From what I understand this week, if we don't ban cod fishing in British waters, the same is sure to happen here.

When European governments refuse to go with scientific advice on allowable fish catches, I despair.  It's a parallel to the Global Warming situation: politics dampens down the scientific conclusions.  Politics drives science, rather than the other way around.

Iceland has a stable to slightly growing cod population, tradeable quotas and a very "hands on" regulation.  An Icelandic Coast Guard inspector boards a fishing vessel and if the catch has too many immature fish, he closes the grounds to all fishing.

The right to properly manage their cod and other fish stocks is why Iceland went ot war, twice, against a nuclear power. After the herring catch crashed they feared the same would happen with cod and this was key to national survival !  (Fish were 90% of exports then, 2/3rds today).

Best Hopes,

Alan

I should add to my other posts.

My other problem with the Pigovian per unit carbon tax is that it is quite likely that some emissions of carbon will be incredibly price inelastic.

The necessary tax would be so high, and the perceived inequality so great (only the rich can afford to pay the tax) that the system would break down.

Whilst I think right now a sensible price per tonne of carbon is $100 ($28/tonne CO2), I have no doubt by 2050 or earlier, the price will be $1,000 (a combination of world economic growth and the need to keep ratcheting down the total emission level).

The basic right to emit carbon per person in 2050 will be 0.5 tonnes per person pa on a world basis-- 9 billion people, 4.5bn tpa.  Which I cannot see the rich and the powerful in the developed countries (let alone China or India) subscribing to.

It's what makes me pessimistic, because I cannot see the political system producing that kind of (necessary) solution.

The only light I can see at the end of the tunnel is that, in the long run, technological progress surprises.

A Pigovian tax (named after Pigou - not sure where the "v" comes from, other than it's hard to say Pigouian) is set at a level where the tax rates match the negative externalities of the action. It's not a matter of adjusting a tax until we see some desired behavior change. Rather, we set the tax at the level which is numerically equal to the social and environmental cost per unit of activity. In the case of CO2, we calculate the cost of carbon emissions per ton of carbon and set the tax at precisely that level.

Now, such calculations are obviously difficult and uncertain, largely because the greater part of the impacts are far in the future. Greenland's not going to melt down tomorrow, but if it does eventually, that's going to be extremely expensive. The future is inherently uncertain so this makes the necessary extrapolations and calculations doubly difficult.

A number of researchers have attempted to put a numerical figure on it anyway, and there has been considerable variation in their results. Here is a paper from 2005 that surveyed over 100 such studies:

http://www.uni-hamburg.de/Wiss/FB/15/Sustainability/enpolmargcost.pdf

The median calculated impact, across all the studies, was $14 per ton of carbon. This is considerably lower than the $100/tC we often see bandied about. The paper also notes: "Interestingly, studies that are peer-reviewed have lower estimates and smaller uncertainties." In other words, the higher-quality studies generally have lower estimates, and the more extravagant estimates come from low-quality studies.

A $14/tC Pigovian tax corresponds to a gasoline tax of about 3 cents per gallon. This is, according to our best estimates and calculations, the correct amount of tax to compensate for the eventual costs of carbon emission, and to cause people to adjust their consumption habits so as to minimize net costs.

Of course, such a low carbon tax would have an almost negligible impact on people's behavior. Maybe some big companies would be willing to make a change in response to a tax of 1% or 2% on energy, but most people won't even notice it. Yet it is the correct level under the Pigou formulation of compensating for negative externalities.

This leads to a paradox, where global warming is a great threat, yet our best estimates of the cost of that threat lead to a policy which will not cause noticeable action to be taken. It is an interesting exercise for the student to try to resolve the paradox. I think the answer should be relatively obvious to anyone who is willing to accept the hard evidence of scientific research without prejudice. But I will refrain from giving my answer here and let others mull over this puzzle.

But isn't the problem the discount factor here? In the end everything in the future, especially the relatively distant future, is made irrelevant by the discount factor. To me, this  is perhaps the single greatest impediment to long-term planning on issues like global warming. Even the 'low cost' estimates in the high-quality studies would become huge if the discount factor didn't use an accounting trick to deflate away the future costs of climate change.

Or am I barking up the wrong tree here?  

You're not barking up the wrong tree. The discount rate is not an accounting trick. It is a mathematical model of human behavior in aggregate. As a species we value things in the present more than things in the future. There is good reason for this. We may not be alive at that future date. This is true as an individual, as a species, and as a planet. What if we were able to somehow abolish the discount rate in our economic transactions? Would this promote longer term thinking? If I had $1,000 today that I could spend on a nicer dwelling or save/invest at no interest (implied by no discounting of future cash flows) what will I do? Live for today. Doing away with discounting future cash flows does not necessarily lead to longer term thinking.
The necessary tax would be so high, and the perceived inequality so great (only the rich can afford to pay the tax) that the system would break down.

If a tax is meant to change behaviour, what is important is the rate at the margin which influences current purchasing decisions.  You can get a high marginal rate without impoverishing the poor in several ways.

For an easily metered product like electricity you can have a low tariff for an amount sufficient for a frugal household and a high tariff for any extra.  For other carbonaceous products you can provide a credit per citizen/household either in kind, with specific "carbon credits", or cash to help buy basic quantities.  With very high prices this turns into a rationing system.

This is a bit like a carbon-trading system where the credits are distributed amoung the population who then sell them to utilities and industries which require them or use them for personal consumption, but is probably less bureaucratic.

it is quite likely that some emissions of carbon will be incredibly price inelastic.
What emissions would those be?

Gasoline consumption is very inelastic over the short term, but quite elastic over the long term.  It appears likely that carbon emissions are not unlike gasoline consumption (they are even strongly related).  If the carbon tax was escalated on a known schedule over a period of years, people and companies would adapt and plan ahead.

If it paid $50/ton or more, American farmers would probably find a way to sequester carbon as charcoal in the soil (terra preta) and pocket the payment.  The USA produces about 1.3 billion tons of waste biomass alone, sufficient to make about 0.5 billion tons of charcoal; burying even half of that would sequester about 0.8 tons/capita/year (the off-gas from charcoal production plus the remaining charcoal could be used for energy or chemical products).  The sequestration potential increases if high-productivity biofuel crops are added to the mix.

We can do this.

I don't know about the effects of tradeable quotas.

I do know in the Southwest of the US (Arizona in particular) farmers have sold their water allocations and retired on the proceeds.  The small farmers go first.

80% of California's water consumption is still for agriculture, apparently.  A truly shocking amount in what amounts to a desert.  Also there is now evidence that California goes through periodic droughts that last for 150 years.  At which point, only mass desalination, or mass migration, is likely to prove to be a solution.

Doesn't the UK have already have a carbon trading system. And didn't they blow it because they put the cost of the credits too low?  If we had this system in the U.S., it would be totally corrupt and ineffective as our congress and President are completely dysfunctional and completely corrupted by the corporate lobbying/donation system. As long as we have our current system of corporate funded elections, we will never impose anything that has a meaningful impact on carbon consumption.