Outstanding post! Many thanks Rembrandt.

In the latest ASPO NL Newsletter I have come to an approximate net decline rate of 4% by means of method C.

  • I noticed that your decline rate (4%) is a little bit more optimistic than Chris Skrebowski's Mega Projects (5%). What is  your confidence interval on this fundamental variable?

  • It you take the total production profile from the 20 countries that have already peaked, is 4% a resonnable value to model the observed decline?

From your last peakoil report, you were predicting between 85.781 and 86.456 mbpd for 2006 (All liquids). The last 7 months EIA estimate is  84.33 mbpd. Have you tried to analyze what went wrong in your last forecast?

@ Khebab

  1. 4% is a slightly conservative figure, the net decline rate is probably somewhere between 4% and 5%.

  2. Average decline of all 22 peaked countries is approximately 4.6% or 4.7% depending on which year you take as a starting point (1996 or 2003). 4% post peak would therefore be an optimistic setting, especially when including deep sea decline rates. A few years after peak something like between 5% and 6% seems like a more likely decline rate then 4%. Before peak it is ofcourse different and then 4% seems more reasonable

  3. Far less understanding and data on decline rates and oil projects. Since then I have learned many things.
Thanks for your answer.

Average decline of all 22 peaked countries is approximately 4.6% or 4.7% depending on which year you take as a starting point (1996 or 2003). 4% post peak would therefore be an optimistic setting, especially when including deep sea decline rates. A few years after peak something like between 5% and 6% seems like a more likely decline rate then 4%. Before peak it is ofcourse different and then 4% seems more reasonable
This suggests that the decline rate is not constant but increases with time. Have you ever tried to model the decline from the 22 declining countries using a logistic model instead of an exponential decline? the use of a logistic model will give you a decline rate that will slowly increase after the peak.
No, If i had the time I would have dug into that. A friend of mine is working on an open source program that automatically models production in various settings such as logistic modelling.
Interesting, Is this project online? is it open to any participants?
Not yet, hopefully the base case will be finished somewhere next year. He is very busy and is doing this in his spare time.
Hey RK,

I just wanted to say, excellent work, I really like the ASPO newsletter, as well. I like the mega-projects section at the end. It is something I have been working on, and am glad to see you've beat me to the punch. You certainly lit a fire under my ass.

Skrebrowskis and CERA's layouts are frustrating to say the least. I like how you have grouped things.

I do have one serious question, though.

You say 22 have peaked out of top 50. I have reviewed the top fifty and have come to a different conclusion.

I can only verify 12 peaking. I have 24 that have not peaked. I add to this the other 14 as "unclear"(is what I call it). I will submit that "unclear" amounts in essence to "not peaking." To me this says, 12 and 38 - or if you want to slpit the difference, 19 and 31. Not 22 and 28. I'm not intested in arguing. I'm fascinated by where we disagree.

I realize that these definitions, how they are calculated, and what they mean are highly problematic and subject to much debate.

I can submit a list here and we can talk about it(an idea I like since it would subject us to peer review), or we can continue this privately. I have no inherent interest in conducting any discussion publicly. You tell me. But for the hell of it, can you just name the 22?

I have detailed numbers and analysis regarding each of these 50 producers. I can email you information presently, but within a few days, I should have produced a comprehensive PDF, and hopefully will be able to direct you to a private website archiving this data.

I would seriously appreciate your input and analysis.

Sincerely,
Oil CEO

Most of the Depletion Models compiled at TrendLines have maintained their integrity with IEA's indication this month of a new quarterly global production record with 85.7-mbd in 2006Q3.  This compares with 84.4-mbd in 2005Q3.  While in the big picture we have seen nine years with annual setbacks since 1975, the last annual drop in global supply was in 2002.

Rembrandt, Chris & Colin all engage in bottom up analysis.  Their methodology lends itself to inherent upward revisions due to the lack of medium and long term production announcements by the oilco's.  Most announcements are 3-7 yr timelines.  As these companies see refinery enhancements in the 2012-2017 year time frame, imenent announcement of new and/or expanded projects will be forthcoming and with those, the annuan revisions to the above three models.

This has been the background to the merging of our twelve models over the past seasons.  There is no evidence that a seachange is ahead in the next decade.  The merging will continue and continued revisions in URR imply a Peak in the 2020-2030 era at earliest (subj to refinery capacity expansion) based on the history and magnitude of upward revisions by our conservative Models in the past three years ...  

The same old arguments on reserves growth.

Conventional Oil reserves peaked in 1979 and have been falling ever since.

And the impact of burning that much oil is considered where in your hopeful assessment?

Peak oil has a number of factors, including an increasing recognition that burning oil at such massive volumes is a problem, in itself. This potential restraint to production is never considered by people who argue that oil production will increase, possibly because the entwining of the two subjects is just not clean enough - it is possible to accept the geology of peak oil, and its engineering aspects, but the entire framework of human society, including recognition that the short term must be balanced by a longer term? Too complex - and besides, people who think burning fossil fuels idiotic need to prove their position, while we all accept that economic progress through increased economic activity is in and of itself a public good beyond dispute. I have read there is some real cheap land available in West Virginia and Alberta - I wonder why people keep moving away from coal and tar sand mining operations, since cheaper land would seem to be the sort of economic benefit which would attract people, not repel them.

Simply saying that it will be possible to pump that much is not enough. Which I don't quite imagine will happen anyways - both the Gulf and the Russians have been throwing some real wrenches into scheduling over the past few years, while the Nigerians are just being typically unstable, over the last few years - and as for Iraq, well, you can decide whether production is likely to go up or down in a society which seems to be increasingly violent and riven. But decline is real, and neverending in places like the U.S.A., Great Britain, Norway, and well, at some point, that list will include every oil field on the entire planet.

I am not sure that such heroic measures of oil recovery will be as acceptable in five years as they are among the brave pioneers at the frontiers of human technology making us all observers in a world wide, real time lab experiment to empirically see what happens when CO2 is re-introduced to the atmosphere on a geologic scale in a timeframe which has nothing much to do with geology, but an awful lot to do with our and our children's lives.

Spot on expat.  This piece by Dale Allen Pfieffer on the Energy Bulletin is the best work I've seen on the confluence of PO & climate change.  Parts II and III are here and here (PDF warning on #3)  Comprehensive and well worth the time IMHO.
All projections should be viewed as best case scenarios, because political, military and natural events will certainly subtract from production, but will rarely add to it.

Consider how much production has been lost in the past 5 years due to non-geological, non economic forces. Imagine if you could graph that, and model it into the future.  

My guess would be that, because of the impending defeat in Iraq, unrest in Nigeria, and Putin's actions, etc., there will be greater losses in the future than there have been in the past.

Thus, "peak 2010" might become "peak 2007" because of forces which would be difficult to anticipate, let alone graph.

'...political, military and natural events will certainly subtract from production, but will rarely add to it.'

Actually, that is pretty insightful, as long there is some recognition that some production can be quickly restored (freezing in winter) while other production is gone (sunk in the Gulf).

I wonder if -50 C in the winter and clouds of black flies and mosquitos in the summer have anything to do with land prices around the oil sands projects?

Not likely?

Well, that doesn't apply to West Virginia, God's own country or some such, if I remember that correctly - I grew up in Northern Virginia.

The reference to Alberta was to an article detailing how a family farm is shutting down due.

Your case for peak in the 2020-2030 era would be possible depending on

  • the amount of new discoveries in the deepsea
  • Timing of new/expanding projects comin-onstream in the 2012/2017 timeframe