What one must believe in order to include Saudi oil production as a key element in long-term national or international energy policy? The optimists who support the common wisdom about the kingdom's oil must hold one or several of the following assumptions:

  • The secretiveness of the Saudi oil establishment as well as other Middle Eastern and OPEC producers for the last 25 years has not been part of an effort to conceal troubling realities or enhance political interest.

  • Aramco and its contractors have developed proprietary technology for wringing oil from mature fields and sustaining production that is far superior to that applied by the world's best known publicly held oil companies in other major oil provinces.

  • The phenomena that have signaled the onset of decline at oilfields elsewhere in the world, and that have been observed in Saudi Arabia's mainstay fields for many years, somehow do not mean coming decline for Saudi oil production.

  • The Saudis have chosen to concentrate production in their aging super-giant fields, even if this risks hastening depletion by overproducing, rather than spread the burden by developing additional discovered fields. But many other fields have been kept in reserve and could make a significant contribution once they are brought onto production.

  • Saudi Aramco's exploration program has missed additional giant or super-giant  oilfields lying beneath the desert sands, but future exploration efforts will surely find them in time to head off a supply crisis.

  • The reserves in Ghawar field really do greatly exceed the estimates made by Aramco in the 1970s.

  • Ghawar, by virtue of its unprecedented size, is simply an exception to all the truths and principles that have governed production and depletion of oil in all of the world's other super-giant fields.

  • Aramco could have grown its oil output at any time in wanted during the last 20 years, but the world markets never had need for more oil.

Evidence already presented in earlier chapters casts serious doubt on several of these assumptions. Others may simply strike more disciplined minds as prima facie absurd.

Matt Simmons, Twilight in the Desert, pages 283-284, posted here by Ron Patterson

Excellent passage and highlights the HUGE unknown that is KSA petroleum-related information.  We absolutely have no way of knowing from downstream information just what KSA really has in reserve.  Unfortunately, this makes planning for the future nearly impossible.

We could be smacked into a brick wall tomorrow or in 50 years.  This gives KSA and those that know the "real" reserve figures a large advantage over the rest of the world.

If KSA, has enough reserves to cover things in the foreseeable future, then they can play the game however they want to.  They can fake a shortage and pressure prices higher, they can just keep the buffer just above demand, or they can ruin Iran by flooding.

Anyone who wishes to understand the mentality of ordinary people under pressure in the Middle East should look at what happened in the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The Egyptians had a line of anti-aircraft rockets along the west of the canal that covered one another and that neutralized the Israeli Force in that area. The Israeli's slowly built a bridge/crossing across the canal and then started rolling their tanks across (Sharon was in charge). A great number of Egyptians could see what was happening and did not pass the bad news on - no one wanted to get blamed for it. Eventually, the Israelis rushed across and eliminated the anti-aircraft emplacements one after another. The Egyptian High Command only heard about the crossing when it was much too late. I guess that something like that is happening with Ghawar and Burgan