I caught these two news releases this morning from news.google.com. Don't be confused by the different numbers, as I was at first. The top figures are in barrels per day and the bottom figures are the total for the entire month. At any rate, loading of Brent crude has been cut by almost half.

The Shell-operated Brent crude oil stream was scheduled to load 139,000 barrels per day in January, down nearly half from the previous month's 268,000 bpd.

January Brent crude at London's ICE Futures exchange rose 93 cents to US$63.50 a barrel following a report that the loading program for January was 4.3 million barrels compared to 8.3 million barrels in December.

Ron Patterson

Anybody know why? Maintainence?  Decline?
Traders attributed the decline to poor production and demand for January cargoes.

Poor production and demand? I suppose some traders are saying it poor production and others are saying it is poor demand. But that doesn't make any sense. If demand were down, prices would be falling instead of rising. So I will put my money on poor production.

Ron Patterson

It's not poor demand: dated Brent (physical Brent market) is trading at premium to futures - this means demand is outstripping supply
In round numbers, as of 9/06, the North Sea crude + condensate production (C+C) was about 4 mbpd, versus the 1999 peak of about 6 mbpd.  

Based on my HL plot, the remaining recoverable North Sea C+C reserves are about 18 Gb.

Based on Deffeyes' HL plot, the remaining recoverable World (conventional) C+C reserves are about 1,000 Gb (as of 1/1/06).  

So, based on the HL plots, the North Sea represents 1.8% of remaining world (conventional) URR, while it currently represents about 5.5% of world C+C production.  Notice a disconnect here?  This is why North Sea production is dropping rapidly.  

In round numbers, the four current super giants and the North Sea account, or accounted for about 15 mpbd of production, or about 20% of current world C+C production.  The only question is Ghawar. The other three super giants and the North Sea are in decline or crashing.  IMO, Ghawar is in decline or crashing, given the best case that the production stream is one-third water.

IMO, it is therefore a virtual certainty that 20% of world production is in a long term, and probably rapid, terminal decline.  This doesn't mean that these are the only declining fields/provinces.  It means that these four super giants and the North Sea are critically important to world oil supplies--and they are dying.

The only question is Ghawar.

Sorry WT, but I cannot agree with you here. If the Senior Vice President of ARAMCO says Ghawar is in decline then by God Ghawar is in decline. Nay, Ghawar is crashing.

Ghawar peaked in 1981 at 5,694,000 barrels per day. (Source: Oil & Gas Journal) Two years later Saudi began to dramatically cut back on production because of the Iran-Iraq war and the ensuing tanker wars. Then in 1991 Saudi began to ramp production back up again, but by 1994 could only get Ghawar production back up to 5,000,000 barrels per day. (Source SPE #57322) Now we have reports that Ghawar is producing much less.

The evidence is absolutely overwhelming that Ghawar is crashing. Why do we continue to question that obvious fact?

Ron Patterson

"Why do we continue to question that obvious fact?"

Because some people have Massive Delusions that depend on questioning this obvious fact?

Don't worry Darwinian, be happy.  

There is plenty of time for technologies to be developed, and for changes infrastructure for alternatives to oil, and there are plenty more dollars to be printed and gullible internationals to borrow us more money...

We are in T1.  

I think we just need someone to announce it on Culture Narcissist Networks to make it official.  

The evidence is absolutely overwhelming that Ghawar is crashing. Why do we continue to question that obvious fact?

Ron, I agree with you, but the problem is that the operators of the other three super giants have acknowledged that they are in decline or crashing, and the North Sea decline--precisely as the HL model predicts--is self-evident.

Until the Saudis specifically acknowledge, what is in IMO the decline/crash of Ghawar, I still have to slightly hedge my remarks, because I can't prove that Ghawar is in decline or crashing.  (The Saudis could argue that infill wells in existing fields could offset the declines from existing wellbores.)

But I am still literally astonished that Oil Patch types are predicting rising production given the evidence that production from the Big Four and the North Sea is nose-diving.

But I am still literally astonished that Oil Patch types are predicting rising production given the evidence that production from the Big Four and the North Sea is nose-diving.

WT,

I check in a few times just to see what you're saying due to the respect you've garnered around here.  I've got one answer for you though and it's from your mouth actually.  

You've always talked about how the East Texas Oil patch was being drilled like crazy following the RR Commisions decision to remove the quotas.  Everyone drilled like crazy and the information verifying Hubbert was established.  Less oil was produced.  Aggregate world peak is no different, so the views of those in the oil patch should also be similar.  I would expect the same/similar reaction as the one over 30 years ago.  Ive been taking a lot of sociology and psych courses for electives.  I've learned that human action is truly at the center of economics, but it took psych and sociology to connect the dots.

You've always talked about how the East Texas Oil patch was being drilled like crazy following the RR Commission decision to remove the quotas.

A little bit of a clarification.   The East Texas Field was fully developed in 1972--actually way over drilled--but it did show a final (lower secondary) peak at the same time that overall Texas production peaked.  East Texas is to Texas as Ghawar is to Saudi Arabia.

The Texas RRC went to a 100% allowable (with a couple of exceptions, one of them being the East Texas Field) in 1972, which allowed Texas operators to produce at 100% of the maximum efficient recovery rate.  

From 1970 to 1980, oil prices went up by about 1,000%.  Overall Texas drilling surged, increasing the number of producing wells by 14% from 1972 to 1982, while production dropped by about 30% over the same time period.

Do any of the geologists on TOD have any information on the production profile of carbonate resevoirs similar to Ghawar?


My understanding is that the porosity and permiability of Ghawar is relatively unique; but there must be other fieds with similar geologic structures which may have a documented production history that might be used to confirm inferences with regard to Ghawar.

Yibal is similar, in that it is a carbonate reservoir that was redeveloped with horizontal wells, and the field crashed just as Shell was expanding their surface facilities to handle an expected flood of oil.  Instead, they got a flood of water.  This was a primary contributor to Shell's reserves restatement.

I think that Ghawer is at about the same stage of depletion, as a percentage of Original Oil In Place, at which Yibal started crashing.

Sorry WT, but I cannot agree with you here. If the Senior Vice President of ARAMCO says Ghawar is in decline then by God Ghawar is in decline. Nay, Ghawar is crashing.

Ron, such hyperbole does a disservice to your namesake. Is this how Darwin made his case? Did he quote-mine his way to convincing the scientific establishment? No, he built a meticulous case. He was very careful with the evidence he presented, and he wasn't dogmatic.

As has been pointed out already, for those who click on the link, they will find that this is not what he said. That is your version of what he said, and as I argued before, your interpretation is incorrect. Here, let's look at actual statements:

One challenge for the Saudis in achieving this objective is that their existing fields sustain 5 percent-12 percent annual "decline rates," (according to Aramco Senior Vice President Abdullah Saif, as reported in Petroleum Intelligence Weekly and the International Oil Daily) meaning that the country needs around 500,000-1 million bbl/d in new capacity each year just to compensate.

Existing fields. Those decline even in countries whose overall production is increasing, since new fields tend to be brought online. Furthermore, it suggests that they have successfully been bringing on 500,000 to 1 million new bpd year after year (plus some, since production has increased in recent years). Finally, note the other comments:

In June 2005, Saudi Aramco's senior vice president of gas operations, Khalid al-Falih, stated that Saudi Arabia would raise production capacity to more than 12 million bbl/d by 2009, and then possibly to 15 million bbl/d "if the market situation justifies it." Falih added that by 2006, Saudi Arabia would have 90 drilling rigs in the Kingdom, more than double the number of rigs operating in 2004.

So, Ghawar is crashing, yet they are going to increase production? Do you think if Ghawar was crashing, they would actually be talking about increasing production. Now, I know many here don't trust them, but even the notion of increasing production if Ghawar is crashing is a bit much even for them. Don't you think?

Ghawar peaked in 1981 at 5,694,000 barrels per day. (Source: Oil & Gas Journal)

Of course Saudi closed the doors on scrutiny of their oil operations in 1982. So, seriously, we don't have good information on what's gone on since then. Plus, given your above misquote, I would prefer to see the original information in context. We do know that they have increased production in recent years.

Now we have reports that Ghawar is producing much less.

A interesting thing about that. I can't take credit for being the first to notice this, but if Ghawar is down some 2 million bpd as reported, that means they were able to open up the taps on 2 million bpd of additional production. I think you underestimate what they are capable of, given what they have already demonstrated.

The evidence is absolutely overwhelming that Ghawar is crashing. Why do we continue to question that obvious fact?

Because we want people to take us seriously? I mean, if the goal is to convince TOD readers that the end of the world is upon us, that's one thing. Many are here because they already believe this, so you really won't be called upon for much evidence. But that's not my goal. My goal is to convince policy makers that the time is short and we need to quickly implement measures to conserve what oil we still have. The latter requires credibility, which is earned by carefully making a sound case (as your namesake did).

I would ask you, Ron, to consider your future influence if the Saudis do increase production. Think about credibility here. You want people to listen to you, but they won't if the Saudis increase production and you keep saying they can't. You know that their oil operations are not transparent, so it would be wise to avoid dogmatic statements.

As has been pointed out already, for those who click on the link, they will find that this is not what he said. That is your version of what he said, and as I argued before, your interpretation is incorrect.

NO Robert, that is exactly what he said! He said existing fields. Ghawar is an existing field. I am astounded that you think it can be interperted in any other way. They need 500,000 to 1,000,000 million barrels per day of new production just to keep even. They recently brought on 300,000 barrels per day of new production in Haradh but that did not stem the decline. Just prior to that, 600,000 barrels per day of new production was brought on line from Shaybah and that bearley kept them even in 2005.

Of course Saudi closed the doors on scrutiny of their oil operations in 1982. So, seriously, we don't have good information on what's gone on since then. Plus, given your above misquote, I would prefer to see the original information in context. We do know that they have increased production in recent years.

But they have never since reached the peak point of 1980 or even the production they reached in 1981, the year Ghawar peaked. After resting Ghawar for over a decade they were not able to get it back to its 1981 peak. And again Robert, there was no misquote on my part.  And as for the original source of the data, Simmons says it comes from The Oil & Gas Journal, various issues 1950--1882. Now you I take Simmons' word for it.

A interesting thing about that. I can't take credit for being the first to notice this, but if Ghawar is down some 2 million bpd as reported, that means they were able to open up the taps on 2 million bpd of additional production. I think you underestimate what they are capable of, given what they have already demonstrated.

I think it entirely possible that Ghawar is down below 4 million barrels per day. And I think it possible that Saudi is also inflating their current production. In fact I also have inside sources that tell me that this is exactly the case. But because that source is still employed in Saudi Arabia, I am not at liberty to comment further on that.

I would ask you, Ron, to consider your future influence if the Saudis do increase production. Think about credibility here. You want people to listen to you, but they won't if the Saudis increase production and you keep saying they can't. You know that their oil operations are not transparent, so it would be wise to avoid dogmatic statements.

Robert, I am saying the same thing that Deffeyes is saying. I am saying the same thing that Simmons is saying. I am saying that we are currently at the peak. I am saying that it is highly likely that December of 2005 was likely the peak month but at any case we are at the peak of world oil production right now.

We have several other people on this list saying the very same thing. But if it is your wish Robert, that everyone on this list preach the same line, that we all pull our punches, then just say so. If this list has an official line, a line of which none of us are allowed to step over, then just say so.

I fully realize that I am putting my reputation on the line. Simmons says he is staking his career on what he wrote in Twilight and on the statements he has made since. Well, I do not have a career to lose but I think I know about as much about Saudi Arabian oil production as anyone on this list, having spent 5 years there myself and have a very close relative there now and has been there since 1991. (He is not an oilfield engineer but many of his Thursday night partying buddies are. And I know what they are telling him.) Yes, I fully realize I am staking my reputation on what I am saying about Saudi Arabia. That is just how strongly I feel about it.

I believe, with every fiber of my being, that Saudi Arabian reserves are grossely over estimated. I believe the same thing about all Middle Eastern reserves. Therein lies the greatest danger of all. Wall Street believes those estimates, the Government believes those estimates, Yergin and CERA believes those estimates and many peak oilers on this list seem to believe those estimates. It is faith in those numbers that is inhibiting governments and markets from taking any action concerning the coming oil crisis. And you wish, Robert, that I should soft-peddle this problem? I say I will not! And if you insist that I take my concerns elsewhere because you and the other editors believe that I am shouting fire in a crowded theater then so be it. Just say so and I will be gone.

Ron Patterson

"It is faith in those numbers that is inhibiting governments and markets from taking any action concerning the coming oil crisis."

I know it is not the first time you've given this signal, but I'm always encouraged to see you holding out hope for the future.

NO Robert, that is exactly what he said! He said existing fields. Ghawar is an existing field. I am astounded that you think it can be interperted in any other way.

Ron, it is simple why it must be interpreted differently. If he meant it the way you think he did, we would have been seeing their production fall for quite some time now. When he says "existing fields", nobody else is interpreting that to mean "Ghawar has peaked." They did acknowledge that it was close to half depleted. They said in the same article that they estimate they have extracted 48% of recoverable reserves. But the bottom line is that he did not say "Ghawar has peaked", and he certainly didn't say that it is crashing. Those are your words and your interpretation. To spin it any other way is hyperbole.

They recently brought on 300,000 barrels per day of new production in Haradh but that did not stem the decline. Just prior to that, 600,000 barrels per day of new production was brought on line from Shaybah and that bearley kept them even in 2005.

Isn't Shaybah an existing field? Do you think every existing field is in decline? How can you bring on new production in an existing field if existing fields are crashing? That's my whole point.

After resting Ghawar for over a decade they were not able to get it back to its 1981 peak.

How do you know? You don't. You make assertions, and call that evidence.

Robert, I am saying the same thing that Deffeyes is saying.

Believe me, I know. Deffeyes of "we are going to be back in the stone age" hyperbole. Those sorts of comments set us up for ridicule. Even if you have a case, people aren't going to take you seriously with that kind of sensationalism.

It is not only what you have to say, but how you say it and what evidence you have to back you up.

I am saying the same thing that Simmons is saying.

Simmons has said that Saudi has peaked? He has said that Ghawar has peaked? Source please. Otherwise, you are not saying the same thing. He has built a pretty good case with data. But to my knowledge, his case is still that Saudi is close to peaking.

But if it is your wish Robert, that everyone on this list preach the same line, that we all pull our punches, then just say so.

My wish is that when you punch, there is substance behind that punch. Putting your own spin on quotes and calling it fact is not the way to put substance behind your punches.

It is faith in those numbers that is inhibiting governments and markets from taking any action concerning the coming oil crisis. And you wish, Robert, that I should soft-peddle this problem?

Your approach, though, will get you nowhere. You can hard-peddle all you want, but you aren't making the case that Simmons did. You certainly aren't making the kind of case that Darwin did. You aren't making the kind of case that Barry Marshall and Robin Warren made. Study those case histories, and learn from them if you want your hard-peddling to get you to your destination.

And if you insist that I take my concerns elsewhere because you and the other editors believe that I am shouting fire in a crowded theater then so be it. Just say so and I will be gone.

Could I run you off that easily? You are saying very extraordinary things. This is OK, but extra claims require extraordinary evidence. So far, your "evidence" is very ordinary. Nobody is trying to run you off. I am trying to get you to make sure your claims are well-supported.

Ask yourself: What's my objective? Then, How can I best achieve that objective? I personally disagree that the Deffeyes approach is the way to achieve it.

OK, guys. I've followed your arguments for some time. Please desist.

The quote can be interpreted either way. Robert, you say "this suggests" that they're bringing on the amount necessary for decline. Suggests, maybe. But it's ambiguous.

As such Saudi announcements tend to be.

You're both reading tea leaves, it seems to me.

No disrespect intended!

Robert, you say "this suggests" that they're bringing on the amount necessary for decline.

Well, then change suggest to "this means". After all, their production is not falling by a million barrels per year, which it would be if their existing fields were crashing at that rate.

My objection is that Ron is making claims like "that is exactly what he said" and "Ghawar is crashing." It was not exactly what he said, so this is hyperbole. That is just one example. I am just asking him to be careful with his claims, as hyperbole can get us stereotyped as crackpots. If we are stereotyped, we lose our ability to influence.

While I can't evaluate this dispute (keep it civil!), the lesson I take away from it is this:

Isn't it TRAGIC that we can't know more with more certainty what the state of OUR MOST IMPORTANT ENERGY "SOURCE" IS? Not that the Saudi's in particular are "our" most important supplier, but that, overall, our information is so flawed.

Simmons has said that Saudi has peaked? He has said that Ghawar has peaked? Source please. Otherwise, you are not saying the same thing. He has built a pretty good case with data. But to my knowledge, his case is still that Saudi is close to peaking.

My God man, have you read "Twilight in the Desert"? That was the main theme behind the whole book. All my figures came from that book. The 1981 figures and the 1994 figures came from that book. I quoted his sources. Simmons wrote the book in 1984 but every page in the book points to the imminent decline in Saudi oil production. And if you follow his speeches and postings since then you know he thinks that December 05 was probably the peak.

My approach is simply mine. I do not claim that Darwin would have presented his case in the same way.  But if he was alive today and was looking at the evidence of Saudi and Middle East oil reserves, I really believe he would make a very similar case as I.

Robert, I believe the evidence is as plain as the nose on your face. I simply do not understand how anyone, who has examined the evidence, can believe those God-awful reserves Saudi Arabia is claiming.

Also I must point out that what one ARAMCO Vice President says about decline rates, and what another believes Saudi future production might be are two different things. They are not contradictory. Even if the first Vice President truly believed that they had 264 billion barrels of reserves, just waiting to be discovered, then they could easily ramp up to 15 billion barrels per day. Current declining fields and other untapped reserves, real or imaginary, are two different things and are not necessarily contradictory.

I am still at a loss as to how anyone can possibly disregard a senior Vice President when he says all existing fields are in decline. And worst of all, not to believe him simply because he, or someone else, thinks there are vast other fields to be found. And after all, it was the EIA who stated that 500,000 to 1,000,000 million barrels per day of new production must be found each year just to stay even. I know a lot of people at the EIA are idiots but when was the last time you saw them err on that side of the fence?

Ron Patterson

My God man, have you read "Twilight in the Desert"? That was the main theme behind the whole book.

Of course I have. He is saying Saudi will peak soon. You are saying that Saudi has peaked. I am unaware that Simmons has now come out and acknowledged that Saudi has peaked. Unless you can show that he has, then no, you are not saying the same thing he is. If you think you are, show me some quotes.

I am still at a loss as to how anyone can possibly disregard a senior Vice President when he says all existing fields are in decline.

Ron, I will ask you again, since you chose not to answer. If all existing fields are in decline, how can they raise production in a existing field like Shaybah?

Okay, I am saying that Saudi has peaked. And if you have a problem with that, so be it. And I will continue to say that Saudi has peaked until Saudi produces more than 9,9000,000 barrels per day for one year. And I would bet my last dollar that that will never happen.

And you are really reaching about Shaybah. Shaybah is a new field. Though discovered in 1968, it was not put into production until 1999. But if you wish to nitpick, and obviously you do, then I will acknowledge that it is not likely that Shaybah is declining, though it might be. But the data furnished in "Twilight in the Desert" and Simmons' souces given in the book, Ghawar is clearly in decline. 5,694,000 barrels per day in 1981, which Simmons clearly labels as peak output and year and 5,000,000 in 1994 is decline by any stretch of the imigination.

Though almost 700,000 barrels per day decline in 13 years may not seem much to you, let me remind you that Saudi had cut production due to the tanker wars for over 10 years of that period. If they had continued to produce flat out, the decline would likely have been much greater during that period of time. That data is on pages 89 and 120 of the book in case you wish to check it out.

Ron Patterson

But if you wish to nitpick, and obviously you do, then I will acknowledge that it is not likely that Shaybah is declining, though it might be.

Ron, it isn't nitpicking when you make it such an emphatic point as you did:

I am still at a loss as to how anyone can possibly disregard a senior Vice President when he says all existing fields are in decline.

This is the problem with sensationalistic claims. People take them seriously, when in fact the claim wasn't even correct as you now acknowledge. So, as I said, the Senior VP obviously didn't mean all existing fields. This is my point about Ghawar.

Well hell Robert, do you think there is a chance he was not talking about Ghawar, or Safaniya, or Abqaiq, or Berri, all of which has been in production for well over half a century and from which over 80 percent of Saudi prouction comes?

Yes you are nitpicking Robert. You should take this occasion to get real!

Ron Patterson

imo, the strongest evidence that sa wants to increase production capacity is their 3x increase in the number of rigs drilling for oil.

THe strongest evidence that sa has peaked is that production declined throughout the year even as the number of rigs has increased.

This combination of events does remind one of what happened in texas when the rrc allowed full production... as wt often reminds us.  Everything is quite consistent with texan history... sa announces confidently their program to increase production, more rigs begin to drill, production declines.

Maybe sa has not peaked, nevertheless the evidence to date indicates they may well have done so.  TOday they are cutting production to shore up prices... given this, how long should we give them to demonstrate that they can, indeed, increase production past 10M/d? Two years? 10?

Looking at this another way, at what price would you say the absence of sa production above 10M/d strongly suggests sa cannot produce at such a level? $80/b? $100/b? $200/b?

BTW, based on Deffeyes' HL plot, at our current rate of production, we are burning through our remaining conventional C+C reserves at the rate of 1% about every 4.5 months.   So, through the first nine months of 2006, we burned through about 2% of all remaining conventional C+C reserves.