As Mattias says, electricity feed laws (also called advanced renewable tariffs) have made an enormous difference in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Feed laws allow renewables to compete by offering a 20 year supply contract, with term varying depending on the type of renewable generation. The price is set politically, but the quantity is up to the market. More is paid for expensive technology such as solar and less for technologies cheaper to implement, in order to level the playing field and bring complementary technologies online simultaneously and quickly. Doing so is recognized as a public good that the market cannot be expected to provide.

This is the reverse of the approach in Britain and Ontario, for instance, where renewables are encouraged through a formal bidding process for a set amount of capacity. The quantity is politically (and arbitrarily) determined and the price emerges through competitive bidding. Cheaper technologies would dominate and others may not be exploited at all.

The problems with the latter approach are significant. A cumbersome and bureaucratic bidding process restricts participation to the larger players with deep pockets. Those players can only participate if they have access to the highest quality renewable resources as these are the only projects which will be able to compete on price. The mindset behind this approach is one which attempts to force renewable energy into a form compatible with a traditional power system - large-scale generation at a distance from demand.

Unfortunately, this is model is not a good fit with the potential contribution of renewable energy, which is naturally small-scale and distributed. A competitive bidding process tends to set a ceiling on the penetration of renewable energy technology rather than a floor beneath it. The emphasis on low price is counterproductive - the problem is that power prices are too low for alternatives to be viable. Even winning bids often do not lead to construction of new projects as commercial financing can be difficult to find when spot-market prices are very volatile, there is no long-term visibility and a history of political interference makes potential backers nervous. Ontario has begun to recognize this and is planning to introduce feed laws as Standard Offer Contracts shortly.

Feed laws give investors the long-term visibility they are looking for. They are simple enough that the cost of entry is not prohibitive. They encourage small-scale distributed projects by paying enough to make it cost effective to build renewable capacity, even where the renewable resource available to be exploited is not ideal (Bavarian sunshine for instance).

Germany, and others, have made a political decision to use what renewable potential they possess to best effect, even if it is nowhere near competitive on cost grounds with traditional alternatives. This is a recognition of the fact that the traditional model is faltering, partly as a result of looming fossil fuel shortages. Continental Europe is taking the long-term view and planning for the future in advance of a crisis, unlike most of the anglo-saxon world where a short-term market-based view is thoroughly entrenched. Unfortunately, by the time market prices adjust sufficiently for price signals to drive renewable energy, we will probably be pitched into a state of short-term crisis managment which is incompatible with a rational programme of infrastructure replacement. We need to take action while we still have the luxury of taking the long-term view if we choose.

The anglo-saxon approach described above is based on Ricardo's comparative advantage, in other words a person or a country should concentrate on what they do best and use the money they get for doing it to purchase the rest of what they need or want from others who are doing what they do best. It is an argument for specialization based on the most efficient use of capital. The assumption is that necessities from elsewhere will always be available, readily transportable and affordable.

Applied to electricity, pursuing comparative advantage would mean one should generate in the cheapest possible way, or perhaps rely substantially on imports. If one must encourage more expensive renewables for political reasons, then one should limit their penetration and should exploit only the best resources. This approach focuses on short-term cost comparisons, even when pertinent information about the long-term is available, and leaves its practitioners potentially vulnerable to supply disruptions.

A web of interdependency works for as long as the system is stable, or at least does not change too drastically or too abruptly for the specialists to adapt. However, when it is possible to predict very significant change with some degree of confidence, then I would argue that it is advisable to develop and make best use of all one's own resources rather than rely on others, even if it is not cost-effective in the short-term. This is what Germany, and others, have done in  building distributed renewable energy capacity through feed laws. During periods of upheaval, specialists often suffer disproportionately while generalists may thrive.