The Iranian wild card is just scary. Iraq may get so bad this year that it may almost zero out.

I agree with these points.

IEA data which is the basis of Stuart's analysis reflects several different situations at the same time.
i) Physical limitations of oil exploitation (This is a physical oil peak).
ii) Demand destruction derived from high oil price.
iii) Demand destruction derived from the policy of energy conservation (Oil demand doesn't increase much in many European countries and Japan recently. China reduced the oil demand increase without hurting economic development last year).
iv) Oil production sabotage (Iraq, Nigeria, hurricanes, and so on).
v) Existence of borders (Oil must be exported from oil exporters to oil importers. Some countries might limit oil productions from strategic reasons, most notably Russia and Venezuela).

On the contrary, Chris' analysis reflects mainly on physical limitations of oil exploitation. He summarized the maximum oil production which should be physically possible without considering other factors. In fact he himself did not draw any graphs suggesting rosy pictures. Khebab did. Chris's own conclusion is that only if new capacity flows into the system rather more rapidly than of late, will there be any chance of rebuilding spare capacity and softening prices. I don't think that he believe this scenario.

I think that these two pictures merely depict one thing only from different perspectives. The reality does not happen in a manner depicted by Chris' analysis because all the factors described above work together. However, we can't know how flat and how long the plateau will be either.