I believe the fact that Bush's proposal refers to alternative fuel rather than renewable fuels has been overlooked in the discussion of his plan. I know I didn't catch the difference and was assuming it meant ethanol and biodiesel until reading the above.

Yeah, there was a bit of discussion about this after Bush's speech. He clearly was throwing some non-renewable options out there.

By the way, Dave Mathews has now infected my blog. Check out the comments following my most recent essay:

http://i-r-squared.blogspot.com/2007/03/why-are-gas-prices-rising.html

I had an anonymous poster post in that weird sort of Dave Mathews style, so I called him out. Sure enough, he admitted it in the next post.

Hi Robert,

I just read your 'D.M. infected' article and came across your statement that: "some argue that Saudi Arabian oil production has peaked (although I disagree)".

If you have explained what your 'disagreement' is in your writing here on TOD or elsewhere would you kindly direct me to it. If not, would you mind taking some time to explain what the basis is for that disagreement is?

I am glad to see an opposing view, they tend to bring out the skeletons and either change one's opinions or firm them up. While I do not mean to put you in the same boat as Freddie H., he does more to convince one of PO than otherwise.

If you have explained what your 'disagreement' is in your writing here on TOD or elsewhere would you kindly direct me to it. If not, would you mind taking some time to explain what the basis is for that disagreement is?

You can read the gist in my debate response to Jeffrey:

http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/12/8/223354/987

Some have also asked what would convince me that peak is upon us. I got that question this morning in my blog comments. Here was the question, and my answer:

Robert, just out of interest, could you list some criteria that would convince you that the peak is nigh? e.g. price point, inventory levels, sustained fall in production while prices are rising etc.

This is a very good question, and one that I should expand upon in an essay. I started to go ahead and write this up as an essay, but I think I will leave the current one up through Monday.

The question is difficult. People have so many different opinions on Saudi, and Stuart Staniford, whose views I respect, is putting forth the argument that Saudi has now peaked. I have detailed what I think is the problem with that argument: Namely, when they started cutting production oil inventories in the U.S. and in every area for which we have information, were high and rising. That lends support to Saudi’s claim. In fact, I just posted the following at The Oil Drum, which represents the dates of the 10 highest levels of U.S. crude stocks this century (listed in chronological order).

Apr 07, 2006
Apr 14, 2006
Apr 21, 2006
Apr 28, 2006
May 05, 2006
May 12, 2006
May 26, 2006
Jun 02, 2006
Jun 09, 2006
Jun 16, 2006

Those dates coincide with when the Saudis were making their cuts. If the inventories had been low, or even in the normal range and falling, it would have called their claim into question. Not long after they began their cuts, prices started to fall and are still well off their highs, while inventory levels are still high. I think this lends further support to the Saudi argument that the world would have been over-supplied had they not made the cuts. So, that is why I don’t agree with Stuart. It doesn’t prove he is wrong, but it would mean that Saudi had peaked at a very convenient time for everyone – just when the world was calling for less oil.

But, that doesn’t answer your question. Forecasting peak is a tough business. I have come to appreciate the difficulty after going back and looking at the case of Texas. Some cite Texas as very representative of Saudi in that they were both swing producers and had similar production profiles. But, I have gone back and modeled the data that were available at the time, and the forecasting methods that are used would have started to call a Texas peak in 1960, and the numbers were so erratic that the 1972 peak would not have been confidently called until 1977 – 5 years after the actual peak. I don’t think many of the forecasters appreciate that these models often only become reliable years after the peak, because currently they are applying them to historical data.

So, using the available modeling techniques, it is going to be difficult to forecast a Saudi (which will probably coincide with a worldwide) production peak. So, how can we do it? The short answer is that we can’t. So, I try to look at what they are doing with respect to what the market is doing. If prices continue to climb, they have an incentive to produce more. But there has to be a place to put it. So, we need inventory levels to come down. If inventory levels come down, that says that the market is being undersupplied, which, combined with higher prices, should give the Saudis ample motive for increasing their production. If they fail to respond by raising production, I would swing to the camp that their current decline is involuntary.

However, as I have pointed out to Stuart, if they are actually holding a number of fields that they haven’t developed because they hadn’t forecast that the world would need the oil yet, they could just start bringing one field after another online. So, while their existing production may decline, the new fields may keep the decline in check. I just wish we could get independent auditors in there to verify their reserves. Then we would know.

Having said that, I do think world oil production will peak around 2012, plus or minus 3 or 4 years. So, I believe we certainly need to be taking action to prepare for a post-peak world. I don’t think the majority of the public appreciates what is going to happen when production actually begins to decline. The higher prices of the past couple of years are probably mild compared to what’s in store. So, I definitely don’t think we can relax. But I do fear that the policy-makers will not take action until peak is obvious. If that’s the case, there is going to be (at a minimum) hardship for a lot of people.

In fact, I just posted the following at The Oil Drum, which represents the dates of the 10 highest levels of U.S. crude stocks this century (listed in chronological order).

Robert,

Could you clarify this? If I am not mistaken, commercial US crude oil stocks were around 20 million barrels higher in the Eighties in some years. Are you including the SPR?

Speaking of the SPR, I have wondered for some time about the drop off in US commercial crude oil stocks after 1987, both in absolute terms and in terms of Days of Supply. From 1983 to 1987, we held an average of 30 Days Supply (first week of April, each year).

From 1988 to 2006, we held an average of 24 Days Consumption. Early April, 2006, at 24 days, was right at the average for the past 20 years.

I wonder if refiners decided to go to a Just In Time crude oil inventory, because they had the SPR as a backup? I think that the SPR crossed the 500 million barrel mark around 1986.

This theory seems reasonable to me. If it is correct, all we are seeing with these inventory fluctuations, relative to five year averages, is minor fluctuations within the Just In Time inventory limits.

In any case, one of the posts that I made the other day described the "Rich Town" and "Poor Town" analogy. I stipulated a food shortfall. Rich Town had plenty of food. Poor Town didn't. The problem arises for "Rich Town" when food supplies continue to contract.

But fundamentally, I think that the approximately two-thirds increase in average world crude oil prices after 5/05, relative to the 20 months prior to 5/05, versus the cumulative shortfall in crude oil production relative to 5/05, is telling us what is going on in world oil markets.

Could you clarify this? If I am not mistaken, commercial US crude oil stocks were around 20 million barrels higher in the Eighties in some years. Are you including the SPR?

Yes.

In fact, I just posted the following at The Oil Drum, which represents the dates of the 10 highest levels of U.S. crude stocks this century (listed in chronological order).

There were some higher levels many years ago, but there were also more refineries years ago. So what the absolute levels were 20 years ago don’t really tell you whether they were higher or lower than normal, and level alone is not the entire story anyway. You need a level and a trend. When the Saudis cut they had a high level and it was trending higher. So while price may have given them a motive to keep production steady (at least until it started to fall), the inventories denied them the opportunity.

I think that the approximately two-thirds increase in average world crude oil prices after 5/05, relative to the 20 months prior to 5/05, versus the cumulative shortfall in crude oil production relative to 5/05, is telling us what is going on in world oil markets.

But does the fact that oil prices have fallen well off their highs, despite the Saudi cuts, tell you anything? It tells me that the world would have been oversupplied had they not made the cuts. Which is precisely why I believe they made them.

Think about this. Had the Saudis not made the cuts, where would all of the oil have gone? It would have plummeted the price. I don't see any other option.

While I was at lunch, I realized what you meant when you said "This Century."

As best that I can tell, the all time record high US commercial crude oil inventory was 372 million barrels, for the week ending 2/25/83, when the crude oil throughput was 10.9 mbpd, a Days Supply of 34 days.

For 6/16/06, we had 347 million barrels (7% less than 2/25/83), versus crude oil throughput of 16 mbpd, for a Days Supply of 22 days (a 35% reduction relative to Days Supply for the week ending 2/25/83).

But in neither case does it tell us what was going on in areas like Africa.

Also, what about the theory of refiners going to a Just In Time inventory plan, because of the SPR?

Think about this. Had the Saudis not made the cuts, where would all of the oil have gone? It would have plummeted the price. I don't see any other option.

The question really is, what would have happened if world oil production kept increasing in 6/05, instead of declining. The price spiked followed the production decline, starting in 6/05.

If oil production had kept increasing, I think that Yergin would have been correct, oil prices probably would have stayed at about $38 per barrel, which was the average monthly Brent spot crude oil price in the 20 months preceding 5/05.

Instead, as Deffeyes predicted, world crude oil production has fallen, relative to 5/05, and the approximately two-thirds average increase in oil prices following 5/05 was necessary in order to balance reduced supply against reduced demand--much in the same way that my example of "Rich Town" would be well supplied with food while "Poor Town" had to get by on reduced rations.

The problem is that the post-Peak Oil environment is dynamic--not static.

We will see a period of equilibrium, and then production--and especially exports--drop again, leading to another round of bidding, and a new definition of "rich" and "poor."

In any event, note that you are forced to ask a question which is contrary to fact, to-wit, "What if Saudi production had increased," when in fact it declined--as predicted by the HL model.

In any event, note that you are forced to ask a question which is contrary to fact, to-wit, "What if Saudi production had increased," when in fact it declined--as predicted by the HL model.

Well, I didn't ask if they had increased, I asked what if they hadn't decreased. Given that price fell even though they cut production, I think the answer to the question is obvious. Then the question becomes: Was the world just fortunate enough to have Saudi peak just as the market was becoming oversupplied, or did KSA see that the market was oversupplied and make a preemptive move?

But you keep saying "as predicted by the HL model." Yet the HL model didn't predict that it would decline in 2006, did it? 2004 would have been consistent with the HL, 2003 years ago would have been consistent, 2008 would have been consistent with the HL model. So let's put last year's "prediction" in perspective. You could have a span of many years that would work. It just happened to decline last year - and whether it is voluntary or not you have latched onto that as "HL predicted it."

But at least be honest enough with yourself to look at the HL and admit that if production had started declining in 2010, it would have been consistent with the HL and you could still say "as predicted by the HL."

To be clear, I want the readers to understand that the HL did not predict that KSA would decline in 2006. It predicted, according to what you have said, sometime between 50 and 60% Qt. And given that the % Qt has been moving backward for a couple of years, we don't really know how long the prediction was good for. As I have indicated, I looked at Texas and a Texas decline at any point between 1960 and 1977 was consistent with the HL prediction.

In fact - and I think this is a very important point - I bet the last Saudi decline - which was voluntary - was within the range of the HL prediction. I need to check this out, but I bet I am right.

Based on Saudi production data through the end of 2005:

http://static.flickr.com/55/145186318_27a012448e_o.png

http://www.energybulletin.net/16459.html
Published on 24 May 2006 by GraphOilogy. Archived on 25 May 2006.
Texas and US Lower 48 oil production as a model for Saudi Arabia and the world
by Jeffrey J. Brown & "Khebab"

In summary, based on the HL method and based on our historical models, we believe that Saudi Arabia and the world are now on the verge of irreversible declines in conventional oil production. While there will be massive efforts directed toward unconventional sources of oil, we predict that unconventional sources of oil will only serve to slow and not reverse the decline in total world oil production.

That was a complete dodge.

True or false: A Saudi peak in 2003 would have been consistent with the HL?

True or false: A Saudi peak in 2008 would be consistent with the HL?

Both cases are true, and you have inspired me to make this the topic of my next essay: HL's Throughout History. The fact is that your parameters are such that you have a very, very broad range of years in which you could claim a "hit." Why is this so difficult for you to acknowledge? You are really overstating your case every time you say "as predicted by the HL", because "as predicted by the HL" doesn't define a precise time."

This is about like me predicting in 2000 that based on his age, Ronald Reagan was on the verge of dying. Four years later, I say "Just as I predicted." Or, had he died in 2001, "Just as I predicted."

I was typing an edit when you blocked me out, with your response.

What we had in 2005 in Saudi Arabia was a high level of production at a fairly advanced stage of depletion, so I knew that the decline would be past 58% of Qt.

Of the HL plots of large producing regions that I have looked at, Texas showed the latest peak, as a percentage of Qt (57%).

Since Texas was also the prior swing producer and since I could find no examples of large producing regions showing sustained steady increases in production past the 55% to 60% of Qt range (and given Matt Simmons' book), I thought that 2006 was the most likely year for a decline, but I agree that it had to be by 2008.

So, the Lower 48, North Sea, Russia, Mexico and the world fit the 50% of Qt model.

Texas and Saudi Arabia fit the 55% to 60% model. What Saudi Arabia has demonstrated is that we still have no examples of large producing regions showing sustained, steady increases in production past the 60% of Qt mark.

What Saudi Arabia has demonstrated is that we still have no examples of large producing regions showing sustained, steady increases in production past the 60% of Qt mark.

What you will soon be surprised to learn - as I was - is that this claim is not remotely true. Stay tuned. :-)

OK Jeffrey, I am going to do something I should have done a long time ago. I am going to do something that every fan of the HL method should have done a long time ago. I am going to investigate the precision in my next post.

Here is what I would request from you. Define for me the parameters in which you would say "That region has peaked." I presume this is not a problem. I am thinking 50-60% Qt with some defined intercept. But I am going to let you define the parameters, and your reasoning. Then I will proceed with the analysis. Texas and Saudi will be my test cases. My hypothesis is that the precision is going to be very poor.

I think it's quite stupid to hope for the best and do nothing because the precision is bad and the peak could be later. It's like driving a little bit to fast in fog and hope for the best because everything has gone well before.

Although I personally believe we are at or past peak, Robert has stated many times that even if peak is further down the road as he believes, that it is critical that we start preparing now. He has never said, "Relax, be happy, go for a drive."

The Texas/Lower 48 article has the HL data and production data.

Just a suggestion though. Before going to great lengths to continue to attack the HL method (even as recent data support the HL models), you might want to wait for some evidence of rising crude oil production in Saudi Arabia and the world.

I could be wrong, but I am willing to bet that many people on the website--at this point--would be willing to pay us to not further debate this topic, at least until we have data contradicting the HL models.

hey robert & westexas,

i'd be quite happy for you to continue this debate (although i might not go as far as paying you to do it :-)

even it doesn't help with Saudi Arabia, it might teach us something about the Russian HL plot for instance.

i'm starting my own HL work to try and get my head around how good it is (or isn't) as a predictive tool. we have some good production and reserves data for several sufficiently large basins here in Oz. i expect that the data will show that HL isn't very useful once you have large new basins coming onstream within a country that already has declining production from other regions. HL could not have anticipated the very recent rise in Australian production, and similarly in Russia now. HL would have predicted Russia to go back into decline for several years already (after post-Soviet recovery). not sure what i'll find as i dig into it..

cheers
phil.

Westexas, all you have to do is STOP.

I just scroll by now anyway.

As I have been saying, IMO it's a question of whether the Titanic sinks in two hours or four hours.

Exactly!

If I recall correctly, RR said his belief in peak is 2012 +/- 3-4 years putting next year within his guesstimate zone, so why all the bickering... is it just to score debating points or is it to score bragging rights as to who correctly called Peak first?

It seems to be a tad pointless to obsess on pedantic details when all agree the ship is sinking!

Thats $0.02 from a dedicated fan of the Oil Drum.

(even as recent data support the HL models)

This is exactly the reason that I need to evaluate the precision. I think this is what you are failing to grasp. Do the data "support the HL models" because the error bands are so wide that any data over the course of 20 years would have supported the models? That is a key question, especially when you are using these models to tell the world "Saudi has peaked."

From my perspective WT & RR are actually very close in their respective positions. RR doesn't refute HL methology, only the precision of the results.

It's like one person saying that that fish is 12.4 inches long and the other person saying it's about a foot, plus or minus an inch or two.

In the end it's still a fish about one foot long.

B.W.

I am writing up my results now. They are pretty shocking. All I can say is: HL, RIP. The precision is horrible beyond belief. I will have the essay up ASAP.

Stuart did a bunch of analyses last year about how well curve-fitting techniques such as HL work, when applied to different data sets. I think he used the US as an example. For example, fitting a curve based on 1930-1960, when would you have predicted a peak? How about 1920-1970? Etc.

He came up with all these graphs showing when the peak would be as a function of the two years that defined the beginning and ending of the curve-fitting, and then compared different types of curves to see which produced the most stable peak predictions. I think his preferred method, a quadratic based curve, came out better than Hubble's linear method, which corresponds to the logistic curve.

Unfortunately it would be hard to find the posts right now, but there was plenty of information for someone who wants to look at how accurate Hubble-style predictions of the peak tend to be.

The issue of methodology, predictability and resolution were also evident in FH's skepticism of the Texas and Bakhtiari studies several weeks ago (which have vanished).

This does not apply to RR's KSA upcoming effort, due to its current nature, but the essence wrt to Texas would be that using today's corrected EIA database would not be entirely indicative of what analysts would have deducted in 1969. I have addressed this very recently.

The corrected data of past years has discrepancies of as much as 0.5 mb/d in some provinces and 4 mb/d globally. Using the 2007 database will be an interesting exercise, but only by performing the same task with the *then* available 1970 or so database will it be shown what MK Hubbert and others were viewing at that time.

This will become apparent with RR's test if it (Texas) does not show Hubbert's curve apex if one exists. In 1956, Hubbert's data revealed that the Texas Peak would be 1.15 GB/d (3.15 mb/d) in 1962 assuming a URR of 60 GB. I do not recall if he attempted further calls. Westexas posted in January that the actual Texas peak was 3.5 mb/d in '72.

Okay, here are some of Stuart's posts on the issue. It appears that Khebab was actually the first to use the method of varying the start and end year in looking at HL stability, but I can't find his posts on that right now. Khebab produced this graph, which is very informative if you take the time to study it:

Stuart's final and most informative post:

Projecting US Oil Production

Earlier posts:

Four US Linearizations
Predicting US Production with Gaussians
Linearizing a Gaussian

Turns out that contrary to my memory, the HL method is the most stable in terms of predicting things pre-peak. However as you can see in the plot above, the URR estimate varies from about 160 to 240 depending on what years you pick.

There are a few posts on PeakOil.com:

How Reliable is the Hubbert Linearization Method?
How Reliable is the Hubbert Lin. Method? the world case

I've started an article on wikipedia in order to try to clarify what is an HL and its properties:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubbert_Linearization

RR, great if you do this.

I'm not sure exactly what you were planning, but this may come in handy:

Uncertainty in Peak Oil Timing (Marcel Schoppers)
http://www.cge.uevora.pt/aspo2005/abscom/ASPO2005_Schoppers.ppt

As you, I believe that we should stick to the stuff that matters (risk assessment, mitigation) and talk about things we can have a reasonably certainty of.

Thanks for the link. I am working on it now, but I keep getting distracted. I need to stay away from TOD for a while. It takes a lot of data-mining to come up with this information, and when I have to address someone's misconceptions every half hour it doesn't help matters.

I think the time and effort you spend on this site is a fantastic service to all. Please, don't burn out on it though! Let the minor stuff slide...

I'm sticking my oar in here because I wasn't convinced by Stuart's explanation of the SA production curve. I'm backing RR in this debate. It's too early for the SA peak.

First, demand. The global economy is slowing - witness Alan Greenspan's comments last week on the risk of a US recession in Q4. It takes up to 2 years for rising interest rates to effect the economy according to the Swiss central bank.

Then supply. Not only is oil demand slowing but a number of large projects came on stream last year. I think we are seeing SA cutting production because the demand isn't there, just as they say.

Why try too hard? The Saudi's don't need the money right now. They have seen the world economies cope with $60/bbl so that is likely to be their preferred price. If the futures price is in contango you make more money by deferring production.

IMHO Stuart is reading too much into his SA chart. There are two variables at work - capacity and demand. I don't see how you can tell them apart. Surely, prior to global peak, the oil production curve is a demand curve. There has been spare capacity for most of the last century. If demand had had a different shape (World War III, bird 'flu, asteroid strike, anything) then production would have looked different. And that would blow HL out of the water.

Bottom line - we are looking through SA's swing producer role. We don't know what we are seeing. Moreover, my bet is that SA will produce as little oil as possible from now on.

Does anyone know how I can change my username to DemandSide? ;-)

Hi Robert,

Thanks for the quicker than expected reply I quickly scanned your two references and will read all three of the postings(Westexas has added more) tonight, but at a quick glance these two things struck me.

From your discussion with Stewart,

Those questions are difficult to answer definitively. Hurricane Katrina really shook up the oil markets by exposing just how little excess capacity presently exists in both oil production and refining capacity. A few short years ago, several million barrels of spare capacity were available. But by the time demand reached 85 million bpd, there was little excess capacity. This makes the markets nervous, and so geopolitical events have a disproportionate impact on oil prices.

About the "85 million bpd with little excess capacity", where was Saudi Arabia as a 'swing producer' at this time?

And in this current article,

Having said that, I do think world oil production will peak around 2012, plus or minus 3 or 4 years.

I am no more competent to say this is any more correct than to say that PO has already occurred, but would you consider qualifying that statement by saying that this small difference in dates is immaterial in considering the necessity to 'get on with the job'. (Not much point worrying who is in front with a cement truck bearing down).

Actually, I do believe Robert has said that it makes no difference whether he is right or WesTexas is right regarding the year of actual PO-- that we need to prepare now as the time difference is essentially meaningless. Robert, correct me if I am wrong.
Cheryl

Robert, correct me if I am wrong.

No, you are absolutely correct. And I am doing my best to prepare as if peak is upon us; I am making changes in my life and trying to set an example for those around me. My main concern - explained above - is that if peak is still 4 years away we are going to completely lose our voice because we called peak now, and the 4 years are going to be lost time.

Hi Robert,

Yes in your debate you do state that response should be immediate. Sorry about that bad oversight of mine.

But I do not see why, if on this point you and Westexas are in close agreement, a statement to this effect shouldn't be broadcast, with force, while explaining the limits of the PO forecast.

It seems to me that a stumbling block to this forecast is the inability to access the Saudi figures necessary to a quite definite prediction? The Saudis must hold accurate knowledge of their reserves and I would think this information would be available to the US government as well. Oil reserve figures for SA are a US security matter that would be of foremost concern and given the political relationship between the SA and the USA this information would be common knowledge between them.

If the US Government holds this information would it not be an idea to request it directly if only for public relations value for TOD in MSM .

Further,

SamuM (above, I think) gives the following link,which I will repeat here:

http://www.cge.uevora.pt/aspo2005/abscom/ASPO2005_Schoppers.ppt

I couldn't copy and paste the bit that interested me so will quote it as follows: from the article by Dr. Marcel Shoppers and DR. Neil Murphy. Pleasantly for us lay guys they end with afterthought #!:

2.5% chance the peak occurred by 2003

15% chance the peak will occur by 2006

50% chance the peak will occur by 2009

85% chance the peak will occur by 2012

95% chance the peak will occur by 2015

2.5% chance the peak will occur after 2015

This sort of approach if validated, I think,would stifle the 'wot year is this supozed to hapen?' sort of criticism, while limiting 'Cry Wolf' concerns.

BTW Robert, Still beavering away at all the material you loaded on my plate...thanks a bunch..I think. And if you have anything on how you are preparing for APO I would appreciate hearing about it, but only at your leisure.

Hi Black B.

re: "But I do not see why, if on this point you and Westexas are in close agreement, a statement to this effect shouldn't be broadcast, with force, while explaining the limits of the PO forecast."

Thank you. I second this (as I've been making similar comments for a while).

I very much like the Shoppers/Murphy way of presenting it. Add what you say above, (summarize the analyses that give rise to one or more predictions) - and this should do it. Something rational and scientific (yes?) upon which to base positive action.

If it is 4 years away, and don't get me wrong, I wish it was 20 yrs away, I believe they will not care if it was called early. They will be saying, "oh sh*t, what do we do now?", and turn to anyone who seemed to know something about it. They certainly won't be listening to CERA.

Hi Cid,

I just wanted to respond (though no one may be reading by now) - To me, the issue, as I've said above, is to lay out, with care, the parameters and methods of any and all predictions - for all to see.

It should be doable to come up with a statement that summarizes the range of methods and outcomes.

The reason this matters, as I see it, have to do with the following:

1) There's been much discussion about how things might unfold once peak is upon us (or even if it has already begun). The evidence of "peak" per se - ie., "peak"-as-the cause-of-the-outcomes-of-peak, might not be at all evident. We need a clear statement about what we are saying re: world supply of oil, in order to be able to draw connections between events and what we view as the cause (major cause) of those events.

2) Most people (in my experience) have very little of the relevant knowledge that might enable them to grasp the significance of peak. So, in other words, they might not have anything at all resembling the response you imagine. They may not know; they may not be able to know. They may draw the wrong conclusions, for example, the recession is temporary. The Depression is temporary. Things will return to "normal"...just as an example. Hence, it's important to be able to make extremely well-reasoned, well-evidenced "predictions" - or even background statements.

3) Even people with relevant background may not understand how oil functions (or energy for that matter) in the economy. and finally...

4) My experience is that the ability to grasp (let alone respond in a constructive fashion to) the idea of "peak" has almost nothing to do with anything at all - education, etc. There is something quite uniquely difficult on the emotional side about this topic, in other words.

This is why I believe the statement Black B makes (I have made, also) is important. It does matter. To be able to give a coherent summary matters.

Hirsch et al did this (in a way) in the first Hirsch report, by simply listing the various "calls". We need to take this further.

About the "85 million bpd with little excess capacity", where was Saudi Arabia as a 'swing producer' at this time?

Oh, I think up until they started making the cuts, they were producing all the could. In other words, I do believe they lost their ability as swing producers during the time of high demand. Now, is that because they were peaking, or was it because they failed to properly anticipate demand? Given that they still have lots of projects in the pipeline that will bring new oil online, I would say they failed to properly anticipate demand (and supply, for that matter) and have these projects coming on later than they should have.

this small difference in dates is immaterial in considering the necessity to 'get on with the job'.

I think you are kind of new here, so I will repeat my position. In no way do I think we should relax. We need to get on with the job. If we peak in 2012, we are still going to be in dire straits, because we won't be prepared.

Here is my concern. Many people have gone on record now and said "Saudi has peaked." Some of them are using the HL model to back them up. Some very influential people are picking up on this and repeating it. Therefore, it is important to understand the precision of that model.

Here is the worst case scenario in my mind, and the whole reason I argue these points with Jeffrey. What if production starts to rise next year? He, and others who have been calling peak last year or in 2005 are going to be finished prognosticating. The influential people who repeated these claims won't be taken seriously on this subject.

Yet we may still have 4 or 5 years in which to convince the policy-makers that we have a serious problem, and it is nearly on top of us. But they aren't going to listen, and those 4 or 5 years will be wasted as well. Folks like CERA are going to point to yet another failed prediction of peak, and credibility will slide. But I feel we will need our credibility more than ever in the next few years, and I am determined to fight anything that may chip away at it. If the methodology for calling peak in 2006 is sound, so be it. If not, I want to make sure that is understood.

It is better to have 2 or 3 years to prepare than no years. Maybe only marginally better, but for some people this may be the difference between life and death. I fear that if Jeffrey is wrong because he overstated his case, we are going to end up with no years to prepare because people are going to start viewing these predictions as "end of the world" religious beliefs that continue to be wrong.

I think you are kind of new here

Yes, just a bouncing baby meathead who finally has figured out how subthreads work...I think.

What if production starts to rise next year? He, and others who have been calling peak last year or in 2005 are going to be finished prognosticating. The influential people who repeated these claims won't be taken seriously on this subject.

By that logic he is out in right field and and you in left, while the ball is somewhere in the middle. Westtexas takes a risk in loosing credibility while you with caution hold back and risk losing a lot of important years. Each of you strike me as intelligent people but, in your individual rigors, perhaps both going to miss the ball. I would suggest a large net that the two of you hold up for a possibly, maybe, sure 'out' on.P.O. (of course nets don't always succeed...I've been out and about for a mighty long time).

and now to tackle a greased piggy-wigg...the Parent subthread...whatever that ferocious looking creature is.

Westtexas takes a risk in loosing credibility while you with caution hold back and risk losing a lot of important years.

That's just the thing, though. I am not saying we should hold back with respect to preparations. I think we should prepare as if a meteor is bearing down on the planet. But I think the message is going to lose a lot of its urgency if those who forecast peak last year turn out to be wrong as production starts to rise. We may have 4 or 5 years to keep beating the drum: Start preparing for event.

I do like that approach that you copied above where they give probabilities. Those probabilities are not too far from what I would suggest. That approach really emphasizes the urgency without the risk of credibility loss.

how much of saudi's oil does the us consume directly?
i wonder if the saudi's are all that interested in us inventory.

good point

how much of saudi's oil does the us consume directly?

We get about half of our oil from OPEC, and between 10 and 15% directly from KSA.

http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a...

i wonder if the saudi's are all that interested in us inventory.

That is a complete misunderstanding of the argument. It isn't that Saudi is interested in our inventory. We are a major customer of theirs, and our tanks were high and rising. What does that tell you? What if your bathtub is filling up with water? What if you don't stop the rising water? That is exactly the situation in the U.S. when the Saudi cuts began. The U.S. was purchasing more oil than we needed prior to the Saudi cuts. We could only do that so long because our storage levels were already high.

I can't believe so many people struggle with this. It is not rocket science. It was physically what was taking place when the Saudi cuts began: If your tanks are high and rising, you slow down your purchases. Given that the timing also coincided with refinery turnaround season - as I showed in my debate with Jeffrey - and you also don't buy crude when your refineries are down, their story checks out. That doesn't make it true, but it does make it consistent with the demand picture of the world's largest oil consumer.

"What if you don't stop the rising water?"

You open the drain.

"how much of saudi's oil does the us consume directly?"

Does anyone actually have the data, current and past, indicating Saudi Arabia's customers and their share of Saudi crude oil exports?

A point I tried to make to Robert in a thread below Stuart Staniford's brilliant analysis the other day, was that he, Robert, didn't really have much to go on when making his assertion that inventory levels were driving production decisions in Saudi Arabia. I used poor wording by saying that he didn't have any real data, when what I meant was that he doesn't have enough data to support his interpretation of Saudi Arabia's recent production profile.

A National Petroleum Council Report of 2004 makes an interesting point:

"Since crude oil quality varies significantly from one supply point to another and refineries are designed to operate using crude oil of given qualities, sudden changes in crude oil supply could cause a reduction in refinery throughput even though there appears to be ample volumes of crude oil available."

Michele Markey, an experienced analyst at Apache, reports:

"There currently is no way to quantify what types of crude are in commercial U.S. storage."

There is also no information on the mix of crude oil in commercial storage in the other OECD countries. And there is no information, that I can find, or Robert appears able to offer, at all about commercial crude inventories in the non-OECD countries. These latter countries have accounted for 3/4 of the growth in oil consumption since the turn of the century and now account for more than 41% of total consumption.

Robert refers to remarks made by Saudi and Iranian officials about growing inventories in south-east Asia. But this hardly amounts to information. In fact, it could easily be disinformation. In either case, it doesn't amount to useful evidence. (Nonetheless, if anyone has links to these statements, I would appreciate them, as I am slowly accumulating a dossier on some aspects of the spin surrounding the Peak Oil issue.)

Not only is there an absence of a clear picture of crude oil inventories, there are also other factors at play in the time frame we are dealing with. Contango in the futures market is referred to in numerous IEA monthly stock reports as factor encouraging increases in inventories. The above mentioned (and below linked) NPC report of 2004 described markets concerned "about
increased geopolitical risk in a number of oil-producing
countries." The potential impact on inventories of storms was made unforgettably clear in the wake of Hurricane Ivan in 2004. All these factors create a reason to hold more crude in inventory. Surely, the Saudi's read the reports of the NPC and the IEA.

http://www.npc.org/reports/R-I_121704.pdf
http://www.apachecorp.com/Explore/Explore_Features/20060828/Topic_Report...
http://omrpublic.iea.org/

You open the drain.

Excellent answer, and one that I was hoping someone would come back with. So, what do you do if the drain is plugged? In the case under discussion, refineries were being taken offline for maintenance. The reason for refinery maintenance in the spring and fall is that it provides a combination of good weather and lower demand. So, this is probably a universal happening (nobody plans maintenance in the heat of summer or dead of winter). All refineries have to be maintained. And we do know why and when U.S. refineries undergo peak maintenance (refinery utilization is one of those tracked statistics). So, in this case the drain was plugging up. Then the only other option is to close off the supply.

Does anyone actually have the data, current and past, indicating Saudi Arabia's customers and their share of Saudi crude oil exports?

I linked to it above.

Robert, didn't really have much to go on when making his assertion that inventory levels were driving production decisions in Saudi Arabia.

I have a lot to go on. I know the inventory picture for about half the world, and I know when peak refinery maintenance season is. Some of you people seem to believe that if you just choose to ignore these things, then they aren’t really true.

"There currently is no way to quantify what types of crude are in commercial U.S. storage."

When we turn in crude inventories from a refinery, we also provide information on gravity and sulfur. So, there is certainly a way. The government has this information. And I could have sworn I have seen it made available, but maybe that was just the SPR.

There is also no information on the mix of crude oil in commercial storage in the other OECD countries.

So now we are back to appealing to the unknown for support? Please. I have provided actual data, and what I have provided supports me. I have provided a logical basis for my argument. In return, I get “We don’t know everything.” Well, Stuart doesn’t know everything either. That is why this is a debate. Stuart is making some assumptions about the timing of Haradh III that may not be accurate. But some of you lose your objectivity in this debate and pick and choose which assumptions you like based on which scenario you support. Why don’t you just throw Stuart’s argument out since he can’t prove that the bump is Haradh III? After all, you realize that he doesn’t know that, right?

Robert refers to remarks made by Saudi and Iranian officials about growing inventories in south-east Asia. But this hardly amounts to information. In fact, it could easily be disinformation.

Again with the appeals to the unknown. Do you think the refiners in SE Asia don’t know what their inventory picture was? If their inventory picture is not what the Saudis and Iranians said, what kind of reaction might they have? Might they lose a bit of trust for their supplier? Personally, if I was a refiner in SE Asia and my supplier misrepresented my inventory situation, you would read the contradictory reports in the news.

Contango in the futures market…

When you start talking about contango it is clear that you are not understanding the argument I am making. Contango is irrelevant to what was happening when the Saudis began their cuts. Look to the physical data we have at that time, and you will see support for their statements.

I said I wasn’t going to keep doing this, and I won’t. There is my argument. I believe the Saudi cuts were consistent with what the market was calling for, and the fact that the price fell despite their cuts seems to validate that. If it was involuntary, gosh it was convenient timing for us all.

I think I starting to understand why you are having some difficulty here. You appear to be gazing at the US navel exclusively.

I, following Edelmore, ask for information on Saudi exports and you propose a link to US imports.

I propose that the way to deal with rising inventory is the usual way to clear markets (within your metaphor - drain), by lowering prices. And you start discussing US refinery practices. Well, subtracting US consumption as shown in the aforesaid link of Saudi Arabia oil from EIA reported Saudi production levels, does suggest that there are other customers for that production elsewhere in the world, and that this lot is buying most of the stuff.

I note, for example, that while crude oil stocks in the OECD Pacific countries grew by 5.4 mb in the first quarter of 2006, they were at the end of 2005 almost 14 mb below 2004 year end levels (down 2.5 days of forward demand) and nearly 23 mb below 2003 year end levels. Was their bathtub overflowing?

I cite Michele Markey, an experienced analyst at Apache, as saying:

"There currently is no way to quantify what types of crude are in commercial U.S. storage."

And you respond: "When we turn in crude inventories from a refinery, we also provide information on gravity and sulfur. So, there is certainly a way. The government has this information. And I could have sworn I have seen it made available, but maybe that was just the SPR."

You could be right that there is a way, but, no, you did not see any report containing aggregated data for the types of crude in commercial US storage. And so, no, you do not have much more than a fuzzy picture for the half of the world. And even then it is a half that represents less than one quarter of recent growth in oil consumption.

"If their inventory picture is not what the Saudis and Iranians said, what kind of reaction might they have?(...) Personally, if I was a refiner in SE Asia and my supplier misrepresented my inventory situation, you would read the contradictory reports in the news."

Honestly, Robert, I've been googling and yahooing and haven't come up with any reports from anyone. I suppose you might swear to having seen them, but, frankly, I'm starting to wonder if your imagination isn't playing a whole bunch of tricks on you.

I'm not surprised that you refuse to deal with the Contango argument, or the implications for inventory practices of geo-political and weather events. I however don't think that the Saudi's are as immune to the import of these implications as you.

"I believe the Saudi cuts were consistent with what the market was calling for, and the fact that the price fell despite their cuts seems to validate that."

I'll just leave you this comment from the NPC report to contemplate:

"However, statistical analysis of the simple relationship between inventories and prices or inventory changes and price changes finds only a modest correlation. This conclusion is indicative of the fact that the interaction of inventories and prices is complex. Inventories are an imperfect measure of the supply/demand balance, and prices for crude oil and petroleum products are influenced by many factors in addition to inventories."

edit:

I've been assuming that the KSA started their contraction at the beginning of the 4th quarter 2005, when according to the EIA production dropped from 9.6 mb/d to 9.5 mb/d. Is this correct?

I think I starting to understand why you are having some difficulty here. You appear to be gazing at the US navel exclusively.

I am not the one having difficulty here. You see, I actually understand what takes place when crude tanks start to fill up. I understand a bit more about the physical constraints than you seem to believe. I have been there and done that. I also understand that some factors that affect U.S. refineries affect other refineries in the same way.

But you seem to have a selective attention span. Again, we know more about the U.S. than any other region, and we do have good information for the U.S. The U.S. is a big customer of the Saudis. We have OECD data. We know when and why refineries do maintenance. But you want to ignore all of this, so Presto!, in your mind there’s nothing there to see. No relevance, no significance.

I, following Edelmore, ask for information on Saudi exports and you propose a link to US imports.

There’s that attention span again. He asked “how much of saudi's oil does the us consume directly?” I cited the information and gave him the link. We don’t have data on all of their customers, so we try to interpret what we have, and we try to fill in the blanks based on other factors. You know, like Jeffrey’s “export model.” He doesn’t know the sum total of Saudi’s exports either, but that hasn’t stopped him from sounding an alarm bell that exports are down. What he really means is “some imports are down.”

I propose that the way to deal with rising inventory is the usual way to clear markets (within your metaphor - drain), by lowering prices.

So you propose, when tanks are filling up, that we lower the price on the crude? The U.S. was already buying more than they need; how is lowering prices going to help the crude tanks go down? I think you are very confused here about crude, products from crude, the refinery constraint between the two, and where the significance lies.

Well, subtracting US consumption as shown in the aforesaid link of Saudi Arabia oil from EIA reported Saudi production levels, does suggest that there are other customers for that production elsewhere in the world, and that this lot is buying most of the stuff.

Of course they do their refinery maintenance at the same time as everyone else. Again, review my debate response to Jeffrey. None of this is new. All of this has been covered.

I note, for example, that while crude oil stocks in the OECD Pacific countries grew by 5.4 mb in the first quarter of 2006, they were at the end of 2005 almost 14 mb below 2004 year end levels (down 2.5 days of forward demand) and nearly 23 mb below 2003 year end levels. Was their bathtub overflowing?

I honestly have no idea what you are talking about. Here are the data on total OECD – which includes Pacific countries – and it shows inventories growing during the time in question.

http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/surveys/oil_web.xls

My guess is that you are looking at total inventories – which includes refined products (irrelevant for obvious reasons) but you are going to have to start citing some sources if you want me to address the claims.

You could be right that there is a way, but, no, you did not see any report containing aggregated data for the types of crude in commercial US storage. And so, no, you do not have much more than a fuzzy picture for the half of the world. And even then it is a half that represents less than one quarter of recent growth in oil consumption.

If you wish to argue that perhaps inventories were filling up because the crude suddenly heavied up, then it is up to you to demonstrate that. I have shown actual data demonstrating that refineries were down. Do you think refineries that are down continue to buy crude at the same rate? Do you think the rest of the world doesn’t do maintenance at the same time as the U.S.? If you don’t, please explain why.

Honestly, Robert, I've been googling and yahooing and haven't come up with any reports from anyone. I suppose you might swear to having seen them, but, frankly, I'm starting to wonder if your imagination isn't playing a whole bunch of tricks on you.

OK, I think we’re done here. Believe what you wish. You have yet to address any of my arguments with anything but “unknown factors might refute you.” When you dig up some of these unknown factors, let me know.

But one more thing:

I'm not surprised that you refuse to deal with the Contango argument…

Other arguments I refuse to deal with: What phase the moon was in, who won the Superbowl that year, and what Nostradamus predicted.

I will explain again. Very slowly. Contango has no relevance when crude tanks are physically filling up and we have data that tell us why (refinery utilization is down). I don’t know how to make that any clearer. I am not going to deal with an irrelevant argument.

It's sort of like the theoretician and the research scientist. The theoretician may have it in his head how things should be, but the scientist working in lab knows how it really is because he has conducted the experiments.

Now, unless you have some new data (or some data at all, I should say) then I think we are done. I honestly can’t continue to waste this much time on this fruitless discussion.

"My guess is that you are looking at total inventories – which includes refined products (irrelevant for obvious reasons) but you are going to have to start citing some sources if you want me to address the claims."

Here is the link to the IEA site. I did post it upthread I believe. Year over year data up to 2005 for regions is available in the annual statistical report. Data for 2006 is in monthly reports. I did post this link farther upthread, but thinking that you actually did some research before posing, I didn't think to necessary it repeat the link.
http://omrpublic.iea.org/

The rest of your argument speaks for itself. While I have been impressed with your work on ethanol, especially after you adjusted your position on brazilean sugar-based ethanol, I will be taking anything you post with a large grain of salt henceforth.

That's it? I hit you with facts, the logic behind my argument, a link to OECD inventories, and an explanation that lower refinery utilization means lower crude purchases, and that's your rebuttal?

I will be taking anything you post with a large grain of salt henceforth.

You do that. Meanwhile, I will continue to go to work and actually get paid for knowing this stuff.

Tell you what. I have an essay setting in the queue. It is an expose of the HL as a predictive model, and it is pretty shocking. Take your best shot. Of course one of your heroes read it in the queue and already e-mailed me a hearty endorsement, so you may want to be careful before you overdose on the salt.

You really are quite full of yourself.

I can see that proposing that you contemplate the observation of the NPC on the relationship between inventories and supply/demand was wasted.

A week ago, I didn't know much about oil inventories. Working my way through the discussion on Saudi production, I observed your comments about how inventory levels belied the notion that SA oil production declines were involuntary. Interesting, I thought. So I asked for links to data on inventory levels and set about finding my own.

It didn't take long to conclude that the available facts were limited to OECD countries, and that even that data was of limited value, in that it didn't provide any information on the mix of types of crude oil, information which seasoned analysts such as Michele Markey and the authors of the 2004 NPC report identified as significant in the context of inventories. I also learned that the rate of oil consumption growth was 3 times higher in the non-OECD countries, a fact that could not possibly elude the Saudis, and a fact which further diminishes the value of the available OECD stock information.

On my own, recognizing that you are a busy and ambitious young man (politics?), conducting interviews and so on, I tried to follow up your reference to Saudi and Iranian comments expressing concern about high stock levels in south-east Asia. I found nought. I said as much, but you have chosen to keep your links secret. Still statements aren't worth much in the age of spin, so I don't really mind.

But I did find evidence that within the OECD the inventory trends varied from region to region and that, at the time that Saudi production began dropping, in the fall of 2005 according to the EIA, the Pacific region possessed commercial stocks below the levels of the two previous years. And furthermore, the increase in stocks in the OECD-Pacific during the first quarter of 2006 didn't close the gap.

It was really quite revealing that you were ignorant of this data, especially given your haughty pronouncements regarding the role of inventories in the matter of Saudi Arabia's recent production profile. It is also revealing how you choose to ignore the presence of incentives, noted by the IEA in numerous monthly reports during this period, to increase discretionary stocks. Incentives that logically were as present in the OECD Pacific and the non-OECD countries as they were in the US and Europe.

In the time I've paid attention to TOD, I have witnessed you on your soapbox lecturing others about the necessity of arguing from evidence. I sadly conclude that it turns out to have been a show.

A week ago, I didn't know much about oil inventories.

Believe me, it was not necessary that you tell me that. It showed then, as it does now. Your comments have reminded me of the Creationist, who, after having learned all there is to know about evolution in a week of reading Creationist websites, ventures out into the world with misplaced confidence and starts telling the evolutionists they don’t know what they are talking about. Same attitude from you, just a different topic.

It didn't take long to conclude that the available facts were limited to OECD countries, and that even that data was of limited value

Of limited value to YOU. But you don’t even know what you don’t know.

On my own, recognizing that you are a busy and ambitious young man (politics?), conducting interviews and so on

Politics? Whatever are you on? Have you listened to nothing I have ever said? You have one of the most selective attention spans I have ever seen. I am a chemical engineer. I am in the oil business. I have much direct experience with inventories. Right now, I am in charge of a 12-person team carrying out projects in the North Sea. Like your Michele Markey, I am seasoned. I have been doing this for close to 20 years. People call and write to me for information because they recognize that I have a long track record of knowing what I am talking about. When I tell you that rising inventory levels affect purchases, or explain why refineries will all tend to come down in the same season for maintenance, it is because I know. I am not reading a couple of web pages and constructing a hypothesis. But, bravo for you that you have chosen to ignore all of this in favor of your week’s worth of earned knowledge.

I tried to follow up your reference to Saudi and Iranian comments expressing concern about high stock levels in south-east Asia. I found nought. I said as much, but you have chosen to keep your links secret.

You are asking me to take time to look up something for you that you have already indicated that you reject. You already discount the statements, but still want me to take time to look them up for you, personally. I posted them and linked to them the first time around. They may in fact be in the comments following that essay response to Jeffrey. Whether I saved them, I don’t know. But believe me, I have better things to do than go digging up statements for someone who has already indicated that he rejects them regardless.

But I did find evidence that within the OECD the inventory trends varied from region to region and that, at the time that Saudi production began dropping, in the fall of 2005 according to the EIA, the Pacific region possessed commercial stocks below the levels of the two previous years.

That’s not when the Saudis began their cuts. In 2005, they stepped production up by 100,000 bpd and then back down by 100,000 bpd. The trend was very flat. Starting in the Feb-March 2006 time frame, they started to make some real cuts that continued through refinery maintenance season. The U.S., the largest oil consumer in the world and a major customer of the Saudis, had high and rising inventories during this time - which tends to support the Saudi explanation for the cuts. I know that my refinery was reducing purchases during this time. I am glad that you feel you can so easily ignore this information. Again, all the data is provided in my response to Jeffrey. Feel free to have a look.

It was really quite revealing that you were ignorant of this data, especially given your haughty pronouncements regarding the role of inventories…

Again, you don’t even know what you don’t know. I don’t even know where to begin. You are confused about even the “role of inventories”, which has been clear by your insistence that contango matters here. The inventories by themselves are not the significant factor, as I have explained a dozen times or so. So it isn’t that I am ignorant about any of the data. In fact I have linked to all of this data numerous times. The problem is that you don’t understand what is significant and why, and so you crib quotes that you think might have some bearing, when in reality they don’t.

In the time I've paid attention to TOD, I have witnessed you on your soapbox lecturing others about the necessity of arguing from evidence. I sadly conclude that it turns out to have been a show.

Ah, the hubris of the amateur analyst. Good stuff. When people start paying you for what you know in the energy business, let me know. I will take your criticisms more seriously then.

Picture this. There are a bunch of debunkers making $7.00 hr. sitting at computers in little cubicles. They have a printout telling them what to try next if the previous post was challenged. It has things like "Demand links to obscure data, as the longer you keep them occupied searching, the longer it keeps them from posting." "Challenge them emotionally, the longer you can keep them defending themselves, the longer you keep them from posting something meaningful." "Lie, they will have to waste time proving what you said was wrong." I believe that is what we have had to deal with here since Stuart's 8% decline article.

Mixed in with the rhetoric, and the ad hominem attack, something else, which when practised by others, gets you on your soapbox, there is this :

"That’s not when the Saudis began their cuts. In 2005, they stepped production up by 100,000 bpd and then back down by 100,000 bpd. The trend was very flat. Starting in the Feb-March 2006 time frame, they started to make some real cuts that continued through refinery maintenance season. The U.S., the largest oil consumer in the world and a major customer of the Saudis, had high and rising inventories during this time - which tends to support the Saudi explanation for the cuts."

Let's see, the first 100,000 barrel cut in production from the peak of 9.6 mb/d, which lasted six months, doesn't count. Well, I guess that's one way of trying to make the facts fit an argument. Cuts and 'real' cuts. That ought to stand up in court.

Then, of course, you're back to the US.

Because you never did post a link to information showing Saudi Arabia's exports by destination, confusing a request for this information with US imports by source, I searched away until I found it. I'll put the link at the bottom (OPEC).

What I find is that in 2001, the US took just under 25% of SA's exports and that by 2005, the US share of Saudi's exports had dropped to a little more than 18%, and had dropped in absolute volume.

Meantime, 'Asia and Pacific' customers increased their share from 48.9% to 54.6%. The share of Saudi Arabia's exports to other Middle East countries increased from 2.6% to 4.3%, and more notably, nearly doubled in absolute terms. Effectively all of Saudi Arabia's increased exports in this century have gone to Middle Eastern and Asia and Pacific countries, in and out of the OECD.

At the same, the OECD-Pacific region ends 2005 with the lowest commercial crude oil inventory of any year since at least 1986. Inventory continued, according to OECD monthly reports, to decline during January in these countries, before beginning to climb in February. At the point at which you think fit to place Saudi Arabia in 'real' cut mode, the OECD member countries in the most important regional market for the Saudi's, have stocks well below the average level of previous years.

And to repeat a concern I’ve had from the time I first investigated your claims regarding inventory, there is no reliable data on the stock situation in the ensemble of countries which represent 75% of the growth this century in consumption.

We do know that the Chinese have undertaken to build a strategic reserve. Of course they have, since they are as aware as anyone else that production is generally constrained and subject to frequent interruptions from geo-political and natural disturbances. It is in the interest of all consuming countries, because of these factors, to increase discretionary stocks. It is not surprising to find this trend noted frequently in industry reports. In this context, the historically low stocks during the time that Saudi Arabia began and continued its production decline appear even smaller.

On March 8, in a response to Suyog you said:

"We have OECD inventories, but then the Saudis have also cited high inventories across SE Asia as a reason for the OPEC cuts. Iran has also stated concern about high inventories. So, the evidence we do have indicates high inventories. The only rebuttal I ever hear is "we don't know about the rest of the world." Well, we know about a lot of it, and the part we do know about supports my point. I am waiting for someone to show me the part that doesn't."

The reality turns out that OECD-Pacific had had historically low inventories when Saudi cuts (100,000 b/d) began in the fall of 2005, and that when the Robert Rapier "real" cuts (150,000 b/d) began inventory levels had reversed a declining trend, but still remained well below the average levels of each of the twenty previous years.

In sum, Saudi Arabian production held at peak levels this century for six months before beginning a long-term decline at the beginning of the 4th quarter in 2005, according to the EIA. During this time stocks in the OECD Pacific countries, very significant customers in the most important market for Saudi crude, were at historically low levels and declining.

http://www.opec.org/home/ See Annual Statistical Report and Monthly Reports

Robert,

The debunkers are wearing you out and trying to take you away from what you should be doing. Let the rest of us handle them while you get us your new "shocking" post.
(You notice they jumped all over you as soon as you said that.)

Is it your opinion that Robert should get a pass on those of his assertions, which are backed only by other assertions, vague references and credentialism?

No. I just wanted him to make his new post first. Then, if so inclined, he would be free to saly forth and do battle.

So we really are just going to have to wait it out? Has there ever been another attempt by anyone else to model oil production curves? Just curious, as important as this is it would seem to me that someone would model it. If not Hubert then who and how? This is not meant as an
attack in the slightest just a question.

Hi Robert,

Thanks so much for the offer to submit questions.

re: "Having said that, I do think world oil production will peak around 2012, plus or minus 3 or 4 years."

What are you basing this on?

There are a lot of pieces that go into that, and the picture obviously evolves. But basically I am looking at the projects that are in the pipeline, discounting somewhat for delays, problems, etc. and then trying to estimate whether that will stay ahead of depletion. You can read some background on Chris Skrebowski's mega projects list - discussed here from time to time at this link:

http://www.globalpublicmedia.com/articles/539

That's not the most recent version, as he has updated the list. I am also aware of various projects in the pipeline that haven't shown up on the list because they have not been announced yet (Note: I am not arguing from propietary sources here; in fact I never use this as the basis of my arguments).

There is obviously a lot of art to go along with the science, but my best guess is that new supply is going to stay ahead of depletion for a few more years. However, I don't know that new supply is going to stay ahead of increasing demand - my Peak Lite scenario.

In my opinion, the best case scenario we can hope for is for Peak Lite to occur for 3 or 4 years before true peak. This would force us to begin to come to grips with the oil situation before the production curve turns downward.

Thanks, Robert, I'll look into this further. I'm wondering how you analyze the depletion side of it. (But I suppose I'll learn when I look in more detail at the "megaprojects" approach - ?).

I sure hope we do get the best scenario.

So, how about this? What if sa production continues to fall throughout this year, say 100kb/month, to around 7.6Mb/d end year. Then, assume further that oecd stocks (now down 80Mb from the oct peak) continue to decline, as predicted by eia, another 80Mb by end year. And, further assume that price at year end is at or above last year's peak, so 80/b. Would this combination of events move you to the other camp, or would you still be waiting for more data?

IMO ghawar is going down 18%/y. If true, and assuming all of their new projects come on line as scheduled, I see production over the next five years at 7-8Mb/d.

Hi j,

I find this interesting, and wonder if anyone has seen it. Perhaps you might repost today?