Nice summary, a few comments:

10. Will alternative energy sources be able to make up for the shortfall in petroleum production?

Alternatives will help but there is a lot of oil to be save with simple conservation measures (60-70% of oil consumption is for personal transportation).

4... Because of this "stalled out" condition, there is a growing gap between what the world would like for petroleum production, and what is actually being produced.

some are arguing that this "stalled out" condition is due to lower demand and not an actual supply problem. Note also that inventory levels are not near an historical low. Your summary should address this important fact.

Khebab,

Thanks for your comments.

Regarding conservation, I agree that this will help, but not until Peak Oil starts making the front pages and people start realizing that there is a real need. Also, While it should help in the US, I am less certain that there are big gains to be made in the parts of the world where autos are rare and usage is growing rapidly.

Regarding the inventory situation, this is one I really wanted to put in, but didn't have fully sorted out in my own mind.

As I see it, inventory levels when the price for the "front month" is lower than the next two or three months are likely to reflect buying ahead, and thus are not directly comparable to inventory levels when the front month is lower than the price for the next few months.

The analogy I think of is deciding what gasoline inventories are by doing a survey of automobile drivers as to how full their tanks are. If gasoline stations posted not only what their price was this week, but also their expected price in future weeks, auto owners would tend to keep topping off their tanks as long as prices appeared to be rising. If prices looked like they were falling, they would wait until their tanks were close to empty.

I know this theory is not the standard one, and I didn't have a history of how long the front month has been lower than the next few months. There are also some carrying costs for buying oil ahead, and these would need to be considered too for a proper analysis. Right now, the front month seems to be lower than the next several months. See this site.

Gail:

Good Work!!!

On the NYMEX futures market and inventories:

The NYMEX futures have been in contango now for ost of the time since the end of 2004 when oil prices ran beyond $40/barrel and and seemed unable to fall below that price point in a time of rapid expansion in demand. This constant increase from the front-month to the 3rd/4th month contracts has been unprecedented since the beginning of the NYMEX futures trading back in 1983.

In the post Katrina/Rita era where concerns about JIT approaches to inventory were raised, along with the contango position of the market, the inventory build of oil is not surprising. Unless we run out of storage capacity (creating a sudden decrease in demand) or there is sudden jump in supply that makes the market go back into the more traditional role of backwardation.

While there are people who attempt to gain leverage in the market, it seems the market has largely bought the idea that cheap, easy oil IS NOT the wave of the future (this is what I tell them that the market sees). This is consistent with PO... the idea that as oil becomes progressively more scarce with no easy substitutes areound, the oil prices will continue to climb. At some point, the climbing oil prices eventually "break the bank" but economic theory does not do a very good job of predicting where that occurs.

On EIA assessment of Peak Oil:
the latest one from 2005 is shown here

http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/speeches/Caruso061305.pdf

The methodology used by the EIA is one disputed by a number of people (including me) where the growth curve is constrained by the amount of recoverable reserves AND a decline rate governed by a R/P ratio of 10. That's too technical for nontechnical types. But I do tell people, to answer their question, that our own government and energy department predicts two things...one, the peak is a long way out and two, when it comes our Energy Department is predicting a global collapse in production. If the ability to support population is tied to the amount of oil available, then the US Government is making some pretty stark predictions. Most people get the happy talk on the left side of the curves not the dire consequences on the right-side.

I point out that these are collapse curves no matter which one you choose. On the otherhand, if PO is now and the decline is rather modest and we get some serious awareness about PO, we might actually have some chance to adapt to a gradual decline (it won't be pretty but which would you prefer?)

Once again, great job.

• Faith in OPEC oil reserves. The Saudi oil company Aramco was taken over by Saudi Arabia in 1980. Shortly thereafter, the amount of oil reserves was doubled, without finding any more oil. Other OPEC countries soon followed suit, since higher reserves meant higher oil production targets under OPEC rules. Current OPEC reserves appear to be seriously overstated, but they are repeated endlessly as fact, in news media and textbooks.

Just to avoid confusion. Saudi Arabia was not the first to raise its reserves estimates. Iraq was first and Saudi Arabia was last, completing its reserves increase in 1990.

It was OPEC which decided to implement the production quota based on reserves system, no doubt with SA's strong influence. I know this may seem to be nitpicking, but on a site that promotes accuracy, I would suggest you clarify your statement.

Thanks for the clarification. I had not gone back and checked who was first.

Since you seem to know quite a bit about this, can I ask for a bit more clarification on the reserves to production quota? How exactly does it work? Is the quota directly proportional to reserves, ie if a country doubles its reserves it basically doubles it's quota? And is that an upper limit or a mean production value?

Thanks.

The quota system was never to my knowledge actually predicated on reserves. They talked about it, everyone inflated their reserves, then they quietly dropped the idea when they saw each other cheating like mad.

Stuart Staniford's excellent graphic from his article What would we have predicted for Kuwait? is referenced below and clearly shows the odd shape of the OPEC reserves increases, all coming within a span of a few years and not accompanied by any one single discovery anywhere in the Middle East!

Ghawar Is Dying
The greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function. - Dr. Albert Bartlett

When prices in the front month are lower than outgoing months this is a signal to buy now and hold instead of later since your dollars get more now. (This has to be offset against inflation, of course, but if the later months are higher than current plus inflation then buying now makes sense.)

In turn, buying now also makes sense in a resource constrained environment, even if the buyers don't know it is resource constrained. It becomes cheaper to "hoard now" than buy later.

This point is often dismissed by those who argue that the inventory surplus must be "explained" by peak oilers. The explanation is in the futures price itself and there is nothing further for a peak oiler to explain. Our problem would be explaining current inventories if futures prices were lower while inventories were building.

In other words, the market itself is arguing for a constrained supply system and if you want to be certain of having yours, you need to get it while you can.

Ghawar Is Dying
The greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function. - Dr. Albert Bartlett

Also, the graph in section four is misleading. Projecting 2% demand growth from a date 2 years in the past doesn't make sense to me on its face. What is the basis for implying a level of demand other than the quantity supplied at a given price?

If projected 2% demand growth in 2006 did not materialize, then a peak-oil themed discussion might suggest that stagnating production "pushed the supply curve backwards", leading to a higher equilibrum price caused by less oil on the market. In a global market, there should not be supply shortages because price mediates between the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded.

If there are people clamoring for more oil, higher prices will shut them up. My apologies that this doesn't properly convey the toll on the people who are potentially being priced out of the market for modern energy.

13. If the peak oil story is really this important, why haven't we been reading about it in the newspapers for years? Are you claiming there has been some sort of conspiracy?

These extended explanations for why peak oil enthusiasts are the only ones who are angst-ridden about peak oil make us look very defensive.

I opt for a simpler explanation: "Governments, businesses and individuals don't respond to a crisis until it subjectively feels like they're in a crisis."

Actually there is I would suggest a better number than 2% to use as a historical demand predictor....

If you look at global per capita oil consumption since about 1971 to current vs global population you will see it is as close as you get in the real world to a perfect fit:

4.1 bbls /person/ year +/- 0.25 bbls/year with R^2 > 0.91
(consumption from BP review, world population from US Census dept.)

BUT world population is growing at about 1.275% per year exponential, not 2%, so I'd suggest that as a benchmark, unless there is a better explanation for where 2% is being drawn from....

P.S. I can't find an equation that describes the price-production relationship at the level of yearly summary figures in this time period that is anything like a good fit, if someone knows of such a thing do tell...

In the US, there are 1000 cars for every 1000 adults. In China, there are 8 cars for every 1000 adults. In India, the number is 4 cars per thousand adults.

They want what we have.

And are working hard to get it.

I'd guess the number low, were it not for the fact that there won't be oil enough to support the demand. The reality is growth can't exceed the supply.

I did inhale.

Hi Kenny, and thanks (as always) for your work, Gail,

re: "My apologies that this doesn't properly convey the toll on the people who are potentially being priced out of the market for modern energy."

1) Yes, well - it does seem like an important concept, i.e., "people who are potentially being priced out of the market for modern energy."

How would you describe this?

How would you quantify it? (Or otherwise bring it in to the discussion.)

These "people" may well be the US middle class, as memmel (I believe) has mentioned.

It seems like such a crucial concept - "being priced out of the market". Because the lives of real people are affected.

So, we have an entire phenomenon with no words to describe it? And it doesn't fit in with the theory?

2) "should not be supply shortages"

Actually, memmel has addressed this point. And made the argument there actually "should be" supply shortages. (I'll try to look it up and edit back in.)

3) I like the idea in your last sentence. I just wonder if it might be re-worded some.

There could also be other explanations. Perhaps people simply don't know what to do.

I think this is right. The middle class of the western industrialized world might well be one group that is priced out of oil consumption. I was thinking more of the developing world and the misery already being caused by high global oil prices.

I agree that population growth and global per capita energy consumption is a useful way to look at future demand, with the caveat that global per capita energy consumption would change significantly if for example 300 million Americans suddenly became 50% more energy efficient. One consequence of sustained high oil prices will almost certainly be greater energy conservation and investment in energy efficient technologies among the richer nations.

Anyway, it's important to understand that the drive to energy efficiency and conservation caused by high prices will obscure peak oil for years, even if those high prices are caused by peak oil. Most of the potential/foreseeable effects of peak oil will obscure it in the short term, including a global recession, a massive effort to improve the energy efficiency of the industrialized world, continued trend toward nationalization of oil resources and "resource nationalism" among the major producers, etc.

I also recognize that there are other potential mechanisms besides price for the allocation of scarce resources. Thinking outside the box, an extreme form of future resource nationalism might be an oil producer suddenly deciding not to export any more oil. It doesn't seem likely, but you can imagine a revolution based on the idea that oil is too important a strategic resource to export.

I think this is right. The middle class of the western industrialized world might well be one group that is priced out of oil consumption.

They have to compete VS the rich, the military, the farmers and the subsidized poor.

Once they become the poor, then they can be helped!

I agree with Kenny about the graph in section four.

"a rough estimate of future demand for oil (red line), assuming world oil desired usage continues to grow at 2% per year."

I think there is some hand-waving going on here. You need to tighten this somewhat, without going all economist-technical on the reader. How about something like this:

"a rough estimate (red line) of what future demand for oil would be assuming oil prices hold steady and supplies are adequate."

Seems to me you can't talk about demand for a product without saying what the price is.

What's lurking behind this are the classic price-demand and price-supply curves from economics 101... where the curves meet is what sets the price and the amount produced. Seems like TheOilDrum could use a bit more econ 101 type of information to balance all the great geology info. I still have the impression that the economists are right in the following sense: there are so many ways for people to adapt, conserve, substitute that the emergency will indeed be long. The book "1000 barrels a second" by Peter Tertzakian helped turn my personal doom-o-meter down from defcon 4 to defcon 2 (but Westexas' Export Land Model may push me back up to defcon 3).

P.S. Gail, do you want some help with typos and such? I spotted about a half dozen in your excellent piece.

Regarding the demand, I am really assuming prices at early 2005 levels, rather than at today's level. I know the economic theory about demand varying with price, and that as the price goes up the quantity demanded goes down.

My problem with this is that most readers have a very different view of what demand really is. When I read about riots because of load shedding and about hospitals in Africa going without electric power because the price is too high, in my mind there truly is current unmet demand. That is why I used a trend based more on the pre-2005 period, and a left a gap between supply and demand. I tried to tip the reader off that I was not using the standard economic definition by talking about the "the countries that are suffering a shortfall because the current price is too expensive are mostly third world countries from Africa and Asia." I probably need clarify my demand sentence somewhat further, in the direction you are talking about.

Regarding typos, please send me an e-mail at gailtverberg at comcast dot net. That way I will also have your e-mail, if I have a new version that it would be helpful for someone to look at.

Gail,
Your postings are some of the best on TOD; I do enjoy them.

But when it comes to "demand" and "quantity demanded," please stick with standard usage in economics.

IMO any other usage is fatally flawed by ambiguity.

Terms such as the inherently ambiguous "demand destruction" should be avoided entirely.

Clarity, clarity, clarity.

"Seems like TheOilDrum could use a bit more econ 101 type of information to balance all the great geology info."

Ummm... I would suggest thats sort of like the preacher saying that more info about the book of Genesis is needed to balance all the great geology info from the fossil record. (with regard to evolution vs creation).

[bold claim]
I'm not saying that oil consumption is unrelated to price, but I am suggesting that in the real world such relations are so far removed from the simple "supply demand curves" graph of economics 101 as to make it fairly meaningless.
[/bold claim]

But, of course, if such a curve pair could be constructed from actual real world data it would be great to see....

John Milton wrote,

I'm not saying that oil consumption is unrelated to price, but I am suggesting that in the real world such relations are so far removed from the simple "supply demand curves" graph of economics 101 as to make it fairly meaningless.

    An Appeal For More Economics in Peak Oil Theory

Doubtless Mr. Milton's statement is correct... the real world is complex, messy. However, we view the world through our mental models. And the more powerful mental models are often the simplest ones.

While the supply and demand curves for gasoline, for instance, are doubtless not the simple curves of my econ 101 text, they are still curves that are monotonically increasing or decreasing. Meaning that the demand curve only goes down with increasing price, never up (at a given moment in time of course... the curves themselves change shape and shift up or down over time).

We use simple models like this to reason about the future. For example, we can reason that a recession would lower demand for gasoline, and reduce the price from where it would have otherwise been without recession.

Another example: gas prices having jumped from $30/bbl to $60/bbl over the last 3 years has generated large business investments in all sorts of energy fields. This is the supply curve at work: as price increases, we move up the supply curve and more is produced. This is an effect that is too little appreciated by what I've seen of peak oil literature.

The cornucopian viewpoint (hilariously well expressed in a recent Drum Beat story: Arthur Foulkes: We will never run out of oil) believes that these effects (substitution, better oil extraction technology, unconventional liquids, etc.) will win over the gradual loss of petroleum supply. I think it is in the interest of peak oil researchers to take on these issues as directly as possible, and provide a point-by-point rebuttal of Arthur Foulkes or Huber/Mills of The Bottomless Well. (Such rebuttal's probably already exist... I'm grateful for any links). The excellent work by Gail The Actuary on the Peak Oil Summary is a good start.

The most reasonable cornucopian I've read is Peter Tertzakian, his book "A Thousand Barrels A Second". I highly recommend this book to TOD readers; he presents history of the various energy transitions that have occurred so far (whale oil to kerosene; coal to oil; etc.) and argues that what is coming is just another transition to a different energy source(s) plus some conservation.

I don't know who to believe: the doomers or a reasonable cornucopian like Tertzakian. Seems to me, a key issue is the speed at which the transition is forced on us. Too fast and the doomers might be right. But if it's slow enough, then people and economies can adapt.

I don't see TOD as a doomer website. I find great information here, and reasonable informed people discussing the articles with vigor and intelligence. TOD seeks the truth, and let's the chips fall where they may.

That said, how can you not be a doomer with the info that TOD presents? Part of the answer has to be these economic issues, of how precisely the energy transition will be handled, and its speed. (Another big part of being or not being a doomer has to do with how cynical you are in general about human nature.)

kenny made a recent comment along these lines:

Anyway, it's important to understand that the drive to energy efficiency and conservation caused by high prices will obscure peak oil for years, even if those high prices are caused by peak oil. Most of the potential/foreseeable effects of peak oil will obscure it in the short term, including a global recession, a massive effort to improve the energy efficiency of the industrialized world, continued trend toward nationalization of oil resources and "resource nationalism" among the major producers, etc.

It would be great for TOD to have articles on economics that is of the caliber of the geology and oil industry research. (Now, I'm a bit of a newbie, so there may well be lots of great info here that I haven't seen yet... This is based on about a year's worth of reading, but much of it books and not internet sources). It strikes me that the "future resource estimates" are improving (see for example The Coal Question from a couple days ago) to the point where economists might be able to help with models of possible economic responses and scenarios.

BTW, these supply and demand curves are by and large theoretical constructs anyway; you can't easily do the tests of offering gas at different prices to see how much is supplied or demanded. At least you can't do repeatable, controlled tests in the real world. You can look at time series, and try to factor in the zillion other things that were going on in the world over that time period. Governments that control the price of gas can supply messy uncontrolled real-world experiments: like the current riots in Iran over gas being rationed, where the subsidized price is $0.30/gal.

Speed is probably the key issue but there are others.

A transition in energy form will most likely lead to different living arrangements than we have now. In other words, we're likely to see Kunstler's end of suburbia one way or another. This leads to a second issue - the psychological, sociological, and political commitment to successfully transition regardless of where it takes us in our living arrangements. Right now the US is engaged in a hard defense of suburbia. If we gave up that defense and adopted a new way of living, would that make the transition easier? I think it would. And contrarily, the longer we cling to outmoded ways of living, the faster we must transition when the time comes, which puts more pressure on the adoption of technologies to make the transition.

If we had started to transition back under Carter as he had argued, we would be laughing at peak oil today. Instead we face the very real possibility that we may delay to the very last second and then not have enough time to transition before things fall apart.

As I have said before, the problem has never been the technology. We have the technology. The problem was and remains us. We are the problem, not the technology. Our lack of psychological, sociological, and political willpower is the problem. And that is a far harder nut to crack than technology.

Ghawar Is Dying
The greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function. - Dr. Albert Bartlett

I really liked what RelocalizeNow said. It fits my psychological take on the issue. Key point is definitely speed, though I suspect that if USA keeps having presidents as intelligent as Bush, speed factors nil.

If we had started to transition back under Carter as he had argued, we would be laughing at peak oil today. Instead we face the very real possibility that we may delay to the very last second and then not have enough time to transition before things fall apart.

I agree. But there was also another problem. With high energy prices, the USA could not have maintained the GDP growth (and with it its productive capacity) it has been having for twenty years. Americans always laughed at the Euro"tards" that kept having slow GDP growth and high centralized energy taxes and all. It seems like a slippery slope: if you save too much, you will grow nothing, and if you grow too much you might have nothing saved at the end to back up. But again, if you save too much, you might miss technological breakthroughs that only come with sustained economical growth (compare for instance Sillicon Valley with Russia), and those breakthroughs could (eventually) save the day.

Take solar power, for instance. I really doubt that the amazing sustained progress for decades that this technology has been through could have been possible in a stagnating economical world. This is the danger of slowing down "too soon".

Either way, the world is climbing blindly. We simply don't know what to count on. But the world has faith that all is well. So, it is obvious it requires a big slap in the face to wake up.

I agree with what GreyZone, that

...the problem has never been the technology. We have the technology. The problem was and remains us. We are the problem, not the technology. Our lack of psychological, sociological, and political willpower is the problem. And that is a far harder nut to crack than technology.

I guess I'm searching for persuasive information to motivate people. This Peak Oil Summary by Gail The Actuary is a good start. But it doesn't address some of the cornucopian arguments, some of which I personally still find compelling and hard to argue with. In particular, question 10 above falls short I think.

10. Will alternative energy sources be able to make up for the shortfall in petroleum production?

I still feel that if/when the true picture emerges (when PO is obvious to all), that people will be motivated to "make different arrangements". Whether there will be enough time and political will and leadership is a very open question.

It's up to us (the PO-aware) to shorten the time until the rest of the world is PO-aware. Otherwise all we can do is try to make our little armed farms more obscure and secure.

The Mayans didn't make different arrangements. They kept doing what they thought would work. The Romans didn't make different arrangements. They too kept doing what they thought would work. Only in neither case did their approach to their particular problems work.

There is a large body of history that says there is a high probability that humans will not respond as you think. That instead, humans will look for scapegoats and keep trying to do what they think is right even when it is not. Of course everyone says we are different. Somehow we are special and not like the Romans, the Mayans, the Babylonians, etc. The truth is that societies that actually do change in response to a changing set of problems facing that society are fairly rare.

Let's hope that we really are different and special. I'm not going to assume that though in my planning.

Ghawar Is Dying
The greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function. - Dr. Albert Bartlett

Agreed. I wonder, if we were going to be different what would be different about us?

  • The Internet. Freedom of communication occurring on the internet (forums like TheOilDrum) are a difference from the past
  • Current industry and technology. We have fantastic powers to reshape the world. We could use them for good instead of for evil.
  • Future technologies from research. We've proven we are clever. If there are any more clever tricks out there we have a good chance of finding them. (Note this includes low-technologies like permaculture also.)

That's enough of a list right there to make a difference. It all depends on whether enough of the right things are done, and few enough of the wrong things.

This is why I want to see more of a debate between some peak-oil writers and well-meaning cornucopians who are not peak-oil deniers.

The future has not yet been determined. It is possible we can make a difference. (At least the opposite has not yet been proven to me).

BTW, if you are at all concerned about Freedom Of Communication on the internet, you might want to see the #1 story at this webpage:
Top 25 Censored Stories of 2007
The number one story?
#1 Future of Internet Debate Ignored by Media

Hi Relocal and Grey,

I really appreciate your comments, relocal.

re: "Whether there will be enough time and political will and leadership is a very open question."

We also need available energy, i.e., material and physical means to make such transitions.

We need both.

re: "Let's hope that we really are different and special."

Grey, are "some" of "us" in this category? And/or, "some" of "us" under "special" circumstances?

My guess is, yes. Then, as re-l says, what does this look like and/or consist of?