Mexico has never had a foreign war except the French invasion and the US invasions in 1845, 1915 (Pershing chasing Pancho Villa) and 1920? when the Marines occupied Vera Cruz to help steal oil. Its a fairly peaceable place with pretty girls and great beaches and mountains.

Mb: Hate to be redundant, but in 1957 the USA had an "us" mentality. Those days are long gone-you are on your own (just like in Mexico)-sink or swim.

France?

However, the Nazis rode to power on deflation - an interesting overview at http://www.sehepunkte.de/2004/03/2066

Basically, an overproud proud nation, having lost a war and having its economic institutions decimated by payments to external sources with nothing but short-term interests in transferring wealth to themselves, started to see a light at the end of the tunnel - which turned out to be the headlight of the Great Depression.

From the article -
'If Germany was to honour its obligations under the existing gold standard system, Germany simply had no option but to engage in a brutal programme of deflation to turn around its balance of payments. To describe the deflation policy as Bruening's is to underestimate the external pressures acting on any German government after 1929. At the same time it provides a highly misleading characterization of the economic policy preferences of Bruening, who, as Ritschl makes clear, began his period in office in the summer of 1930 struggling to mobilize foreign funds with which to combat unemployment and ended his period in office, preparing for a work-creation programme much like that actually put in place at the end of 1932. The common view of Bruening's policy as a trade-off between the domestic economy and the objective of eliminating reparations is reductive. Bruening's real problem was a three-way trade-off between the desire to throw off reparations, the desire to prevent a domestic economic disaster and the desire to preserve Germany's long-term economic relations with the United States, the world's largest economic power. The desire to preserve creditworthiness in the largest capital market in the world was what prevented Bruening from adopting the ultra-nationalist programme of a unilateral default on Germany's foreign obligations. Interestingly, Ritschl also highlights American pressure as the chief reason why Germany did not follow Britain in devaluing the Reichsmark in the autumn of 1931. The Federal Reserve and the Hoover administration had expressed a strong preference that Germany should not devalue and should instead continue to honour its long-term foreign debt, whilst using capital controls to protect its balance of payments. Given the outstanding size of debts to the United States and the importance of US pressure to a final resolution of the reparations question, Germany could not afford to go against this American "advice".'