179 comments on Net Oil Exports and the "Iron Triangle"
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179 comments on Net Oil Exports and the "Iron Triangle"
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GAIA Host Collective
Jeffry, Thanks. I really appreciate your hard work and the work of Khebab on this problem.I'm with you on the cascading effects of depletion.
First question: Many exporters have very small internal economies and no surplus for export except oil. Will they therefore export all their remaining oil? I feel this is more likely in countries where a small elite controls the country and has massive overseas investments-like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the kleptocats of Nigeria.
Second question: Many countries that export production are building or have built refineries and petrochemical complexes, as they want the refining markup as well as the production markup. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are both in this category. Does your decline in exports include net products, or is it crude plus condensate only?
Bob Ebersole
The EIA tracks production and consumption in terms of Total Liquids. Let's assume that we have production land and refinery land. Let's ignore refinery gains, transportation costs, energy used in energy production, etc.
Production Land produces 2 mbpd, and ships all of it to Refinery Land. Production Land consumes one mbpd of product, and Refinery Land consumes one mbpd of product.
So Refinery Land ships one mbpd of product to Production Land, and consumes one mbpd domestically.
On a net basis, Production Land shows a net total liquids export rate of one mbpd, and Refinery Land shows a net total liquids import rate of one mbpd.
Following is a slightly edited copy of a post I made on the 7/12 Drumbeat, regarding the ELM:
If I recall correctly, at the beginning of 2007 the EIA was going to track net production with regard to other liquids (notably biofuels).
I think they already have enough data for inputs and outputs, and publish them so that we can see how the inputs and outputs "net."
Would you re-post the diagram from yesterday showing the actual production, consumption, and export figures for Mexico against the ELM shown above? I think it makes a stronger case for a theory when current date fits the model.
Flavius Aetius
Khebab,
Could you post your graph on Mexico's production, consumption and exports?
I'm not sure it's a completely accurate picture because Mexico is also importing petroleum products (and growing) but I don't have time to redo this chart right now. Also, only consumption numbers for total products are available from which I roughly deducted a crude oil equivalent (by dividing volumes by 1.1). Consequently, this chart has to be taken with a grain of salt.
I'm just eyeballing it, but it's interesting to note that although the predicted exports go from 2mbpd to 1 mbpd from 2004 to ~2011, the rise in the price of oil to date keeps the export income relativity healthy.
I wonder what the 'income' lines would look like. Pretty ugly as you go from an exporter to an importer (If you can afford to import at all.)
It'd be interesting to see a few predictions of oil income, based on a range of price targets for 2020 (Say $75 to $300)
Production peaked in 2004 but profit may have peaked in 2006 because so far prices in 2007 are not higher than in 2006. Problem is that Mexico's importation of oil products is growing rapidly so they reach a negative trade balance sooner than we think (2010?).
This is the important graph. I think if you did this with KSA you will see that their investment in Petrochemicals is going to pay off even as crude oil exports decrease. Iran I don't think so. Norway I don't know. Some of the other Persian gulf countries are also investing heavily in petrochemicals.
The ones without significant petrochemical investments and significant imports are going to be the ones having problems.
Venezuela ??
Where did you find this info btw ?
Take quarterly data for Mexican oil consumption (all products) from here: http://omrpublic.iea.org/omrarchive/12june07tab.pdf page 3 Here's the data):
1Q05 2.04
2Q05 2.11
3Q05 2.06
4Q05 2.10
1Q06 2.08
2Q06 2.02
3Q06 1.99
4Q06 2.03
1Q07 2.08
2Q07 2.05
and do a linear regression. The result: a decline of 4,000 barrels per quarter, with an r squared of .104 (which is pretty low).
So, we don't see rising consumption. Are the IEA's projections wrong again?
As I noted down the way, the top 10 net oil exporters, inclusive of Mexico, showed an annual rate of increase in consumption, in aggregate, of 3.3% per year, from 2000 to 2006. Just the increase in consumption by the top 10 from 2000 to 2006 is equal to all of Nigeria's net exports in 2006.
Ok. Does my data and analysis look ok to you?
Bob,
In regard to your first question, in post-peak exporting countries, I think that we will see Phase One and Phase Two.
In Phase One, their cash flow from export sales will increase, even as their net exports decline--because of higher oil prices.
In Phase Two, their cash flow from export sales will decline, as their net exports continue to decline--because rising oil prices are not sufficient to offset declining net exports.
It will be extremely difficult--if not all but impossible--for exporting countries to curtail domestic consumption in Phase One.
And even in Phase Two, I expect to see massive resistance against efforts to curtail domestic consumption, probably leading to varying amounts of violence.
Also understand that as time goes forward the demands for investment in the oil industry to maintain production only increase. Look at Mexico and Venezuela and now Russia as example where needed investment is not forthcoming. As a country moves from phase 1 to phase 2 pressure to lower investment in the oil industry to continue to support internal projects only increases. Here Venezuela is the poster child.
So its reasonable to expect that as time goes on these countries will not reinvest in their oil infrastructure at anything like the rate investments where made in the western nations at the same time that the amount of needed investment is doubling or tripling in price because of the intrinsic nature of oil in our economy.
We have already seen the costs for investments in oil infrastructure spiral out of control as high oil prices and demand cause more general inflation.
I'd like to see some projections on when a country moves from phase one to phase two.
Finally I think the market will remain fairly clueless about ELM for some time and thus we can expect oil to remain under priced vs the real price needed to prevent exporting countries from going from phase one to phase two with the potential for major cutbacks in investment.
So in my opinion the market by underpricing oil will force most oil producing countries into a phase two situation far sooner than most people realize. I actually think we are already in phase two since we have every indication that all the major oil producing nations are pulling back rapidly on re-investment in the oil industry. At that point ELM becomes a optimistic model probably highly optimistic as producers continue to cut so they can get back into phase one growth.
We have every indication that we have already entered this war between and unrealistic under priced market and producers steadily cutting to get the large profits they need for internal use at phase one growth rates. At this point only a rapid repricing of oil above that needed to get back too phase one along with continued strong demand at the higher price point will spur a reversal of this game of chicken.
See Iran for early Phase 2.
Indonesia, deep into Phase 2 (and importer of oil by quantity, but still a SMALL exporter by value due to high quality oil produced) endured blackouts rather than buy heavy bunker oil while waiting for new coal fired power plants to be completed.
A worthwhile point of discussion is when will the Phase 1 to Phase 2 transition take place.
My guesses:
Mexico within 2 or 3 years.
Venezuela just after the next Presidential election in about 5 years.
Russia within eight years, but more than three years.
Oddly, Norway, with the HIGHEST gas taxes in the world, could be said to be in Phase 2 and never in Phase 1.
I expect 70% or so of Norway's remaining URR to be exported, the highest in the world.
Best Hopes for doing SOMETHING now,
Alan
Norway is rather a special case. Due to their low (c 5m) population the percentage of total prod'n available for export remains high well into their decline phase. Their population is relatively stable and living standard already among the world's highest. It's also one of the last places you'd expect to see unrest, quite unlike many ME states.
Phase One could last a very long time. My guess is that we are likely to see price spikes to high levels that will be sustained ($100-200) and this will generate tremendous income and raise living standards significantly in exporting countries everywhere but Norway. The difference between $40 oil and $150 oil offsets a lot of years of 5% production declines as far as net income goes.
Prius / Suburban = 4.6
Ken
Westaxas,
I'm wondering what the real shape of the production curve will look like. As countries get past peak production, and especially then they get to Phase Two, it seems like we will be seeing more "above ground" disruption. Thus, at some point production is likely to drop more than normal decline rates would suggest.
It also seems like there will be other changes that make the model more complex. Exports will more likely to go to favored countries - ones that can provide things the country needs, like military protection, medicine, and food. Other non-favored countries may see their imports drop much more rapidly that the model would suggest.
I agree, and as I suggested down below, I suspect that the US is basically making "an offer that they can't refuse" to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, since oil prices and inventories would suggest that oil exports to Asia should be going up, while Saudi Arabia and Iraq are cutting exports to Asia.
The Neocons might argue that things are going according to plan regarding Iraq and oil exports to the US. As I have previously discussed, the flaw in their plan may be the willingness of the American military to continue to put themselves in harm's way to keep H2 Hummers well supplied.