I didn't worry about Y2K one bit.

I have dissassemblers (WDASM, IDA) and a debuggers (SoftIce, HView, etc. ). If my machines did ANYTHING I did not like, I would just open the program and find out why - and patch it.

This was in the era where a lot of kids were out there reversing software to remove registration codes. I figured our computing infrastructure was extremely robust and resilent when you factor in how many people out there knew assembler and exactly how the processor and kernel code works.

Today, though, I am not nearly as confident of the resilence of commercial software, albeit I still have a very high confidence of open-source software.

I have no doubt that breaches of Linux kernels would be highly discussed in tech forums and solutions explained and freely shared. I do not have this confidence for proprietary software, which relies on salesmanship, not technical understanding, for its adoption.

Leanan gave a beautiful distinction a few drumbeats ago when she discussed how resilence differs from efficiency.

IMHO, proprietary software is more efficient due to central control, but - like having all your corn all one strain - - its not very resistant to a blight that could take out the entire crop. Open Source software is more robust, providing one hires/trains/retains the skills to know it.

Its not the Y2K type stuff that I fear - rather its our own ignorance on how our systems work that would enable hostile entities to plant unseen rootkits in the commercial stuff, using botnets and snooping scripts to make google-like databases of everything companies thought was private.

My fear is also based on the suspected cooperation between our supposed antivirus vendors and the government regarding non-reporting of "approved" system intrusions, and the likelihood of hostile entities using this backdoor much like they used the famous Sony rootkit to violate systems that had played a Sony disk.

All these "hold harmless" clauses in the EULAs destroy my confidence of "trusted computing". All this lawmaking concerning the enforcement of ignorance of how our own computing infrastructure works scares the hell out of me.

Basically, I fear we are selling the resilence of our computational infrastructure for a song. Literally. Just so that knowledge can be monopolized.

When I have anything to do with proprietary OS, it seems to me like going to the the car dealership for a car, then immediately trucking it over to the Norton garage to have the wheels welded on so they don't fall off. I feel so stupid allowing the car dealership to force me into their EULA denying any guarantee the car will work, but the businessman who sent me demands that car, and I must fulfill his funded desire, not mine.

If I do not know what my own system is doing, I am wide open for someone else to control it - and I won't know who they are or what they are doing.

Geez, Monsters under the Bed all over again.

Steve

All these "hold harmless" clauses in the EULAs destroy my confidence of "trusted computing".

Software hold harmless clause did you say?
http://gizmodo.com/gadgets/weapons/robot-cannon-goes-berserk-kills-9-312...

. The Oerlikon GDF-005 antiaircraft gun suddenly began uncontrollably shooting as it swung back and forth, spraying hundreds of high-explosive 35mm cannon shells all over the place. The crazed robot's handlers are still trying to figure out what sort of software bug would cause such mayhem.

have dissassemblers (WDASM, IDA) and a debuggers (SoftIce, HView, etc. ). If my machines did ANYTHING I did not like, I would just open the program and find out why - and patch it.

This was in the era where a lot of kids were out there reversing software to remove registration codes. I figured our computing infrastructure was extremely robust and resilent when you factor in how many people out there knew assembler and exactly how the processor and kernel code works.

hardhat, you don't sound like you have worked in a corporate software environment. Typically there are many software systems dependent on each other and it simply is not possible for one geek to patch a piece of software if it fails since the patch might screw up a whole lot of inter-dependencies. Not to mention that much, if not most of the software is under someone else's control and the lone geek doesn't have the authority to fix and replace the main source and object code.

In my own experience, Y2K software work was not at all straightforward and one often had to follow a 'trail' of dependency of different software systems and the data that was dealt with. In these conversations, people seem to ignore that it was not only a software problem but a data problem as well.

There were many situations where things probably would have been ok had nothing been done, but I remain convinced that Y2K would have been a much larger problem than it was. It remains one of those situations where you can't prove that the problem that was avoided would have happened if a lot of people hadn't paid attention to it.