HO,

It was good to meet you and all of the other TOD crowd. It was a very interesting conference.

In regard to the Export Land Model (ELM), strictly speaking my view is that we will see a wide range of responses to declining production in exporting countries, but I think that the UK and Indonesia case histories are very interesting.

The UK has a high per capita income, high energy taxes, minimal increase in consumption. Indonesia has a much lower per capita income, energy subsidies and it showed a fairly high rate of increase in consumption while exports were falling. The result was that the UK went to zero net exports in seven years, while Indonesia went to zero in eight years.

I would think that virtually all net exporters would fall somewhere between the UK and Indonesia in terms of income, energy taxes/subsidies and rate of change in consumption, but as noted, it didn't seem to make much of a difference.

In regard to the "conventional wisdom" model regarding Saudi Arabia (KSA), we used the Economist Magazine's assertion that KSA could produce 11 mbpd (total liquids) for 70 years without finding another drop of oil. If we just plug in the +5.7%/year increase in consumption that KSA showed from 2005 to 2006, KSA would cease exporting oil in 2036, with a flat production rate of 11 mbpd. (In 2075, they would be consuming 108 mbpd, which perhaps even Peter Huber might consider to be unlikely.)

We are working on the full written report on our models, but our middle case for the top five net exporters (half of current world net exports) is that they have remaining cumulative net export capacity of about 100 Gb, after 2005. They exported about 8 Gb in 2005. So, at the 2005 rate, they would deplete their export capacity in about 13 years, which is why, in our opinion, that net exports from the top five fell from 2005 to 2006, and why their net export decline rate appears to be accelerating.

Our middle case forecast is that the top five net hit zero net exports in 2031, which would be 26 years from peak exports (in 2005) to zero.

I would again like to acknowledge Khebab's tremendous work. As I said at the conference, when I referred to "we" in the presentation, it meant that Khebab did at least 90% of the work.

Jeffrey J. Brown

Hello, Mr. Brown. I'm honored to be able to address you directly with a question about your ELM theory. You said in your ASPO address that KSA will cease exports in 2035 and the UAE in 2037, etc. My question is, how soon will the decline in US imports from these producers begin to adversly affect life in these United States? Also, should we expect that, for the US, the effect of ELM will manifest more exponentially considering the growth of China and India? And the bottom line question is this: How long will it be before ELM causes TSTHTF?

Ok, that was three questions but I'm feeling especially nervous lately as I suspect that TS is currently on a trajectory to HTF in a fairly short time frame.

Details, details.

Note that we presented low, middle and high cases for consumption and production that resulted in a range of predicted points at which production = consumption. Our middle case for both production and production resulted in Saudi Arabia going to zero net exports in 2031.

As noted above, if Saudi production stayed flat at its 2005 rate for 70 years, and if consumption increased at +5.7%/year they would cease exporting in 2036. BTW, this would be a net export decline rate of about -5%/year over the net export decline period with a 0% production decline rate.

IMO, October 1, 2007 was an inflection point of sorts, as a bidding war for declining crude oil exports began to heat up.

Given our national debt and high levels of per capita energy consumption, I am somewhat pessimistic about our ability to keep our imports at their current level.

In any case, the key point is that our model and recent case histories suggest that net export declines tend to accelerate with time.

Note that Mexico has a high level of consumption, similar to the UK and Indonesia. Their actual peak was probably in 2004. If the estimate in this article of zero exports is correct, they would have gone from peak net exports to zero net exports in eight years--same time frame as the UK and Indonesia.

Mexico was actually the only top 10 net exporter to show a consumption decline from 2005 to 2006, presumably because of the decline in cash transfers from workers in the US. If their consumption in 2006 had increased at the same rate as 2004 to 2005, they would have seen a double digit net export decline rate from 2005 to 2006.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/14554/
Council on Foreign Relations: Non-OPEC Oil Production
Author: Toni Johnson, Staff Writer
October 19, 2007

. . . D. Barry McKennitt, executive director of the U.S. National Association of Petroleum Investment Analysts, questions Mexico’s ability to continue to export, noting that with domestic consumption going up and production going down, “They may not be able to export to anyone in five years. . . ”

. . . Some experts say that countries, especially the United States, need to work on limiting consumption to help ease world demand instead of focusing on new production. The United States, the top net importer in the world, consumed 21 million barrels of oil per day in 2006 and accounts for a quarter of the world’s oil consumption. The next largest single country consumer was China, one of the fastest-growing energy consumers in the world. It, along with other large emerging economies, has added to the global strain on oil and gas supplies. . . .

Ovis Suburbanus:

This is a complicated question about when export cutbacks from Saudi Arabia and the UAE begin to affect the US. In at least one area,price, the cutbacks are already affecting the US. The cutback of exports of light, sweet crude to Asian importers this year have raised the price of crude in Asian markets and helped it remain high, plus the Saudi's not raising their production of Arab Light to satisfy the growing world demand at a lower price has had an effect on the world.
The Saudi's are unlikely to specificially target the US unless they fell they have no choice, although individual members of the royal family may be against US interests. The US administration is unpredictable and out of control, and the Saudi's are likely to view any new conflict with any Moslem nation as proof that the administration's US policy is a crusade against Islam. I'm an American and hold the same view, it seems our foreign policy is being shaped by fundementalist Christians who have that view and its truly scary. So, in spite of having over 300,000 troops and mercenaries in Iraq, the US can't attack any country in the region without risking WW III.
The Saudi's have very substantial US refining interests. When Texaco lost its lawsuit to Pennzoil over Getty, they sold 1/2 of their US refining interests to the Saudi Arabians for cash to help pay off that judgement. That interest is at least part of a big joint venture with Royal Dutch Shell called Motiva, they have a couple of giant refineries. Texaco is now part of Chevron, and I'd guess that Saudi Refining also has some joint ventures with Chevron in petrochemicals, although I have no exact knowledge. Another reason the Saudi's won't target the US is the personal investments of members of the Saudi Royal Family. They own much of the Carlysle Group that, together with the Bush famiy, owns Haliburton and many other US investments.Until about a year ago these investments were managed by Prince Bandar, AKA Bandar Bush.
But, this tangled web is further complicated by the Saudi's own fanaticism. The Wahabi sect controls the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, and run the country through Islamic law. They are the basis of Jihadist cults like al Quaida, who want to destroy Israel and the western Materialist culture. Many members also want to destroy the Saudi family too because they have defiled the holy sites of Islam by allowing US troops in the region.

So, in summary, its a hell of a mess. All the regional powers, except Turkey, are run by fanatics. I haven't mentioned the Zionist crazies that control Israel or the Shia mystics with control of Iran, but they are all motivated by a fanatical view of the situation. And, we've barely begun to look at the situation, but the US policies are being formulated by our own crusaders. Eric Prince, the owner of Blackwater, is a non-denominational fundementalist, and looks to become the Praetorian Guard of the American Empire. Our professional military officer corps is run by non-denominational cultists, IMHO. We've abandoned the constitutional seperation of church and state that was the basis of the US success in the first 90% of US history. And its terrifying and gloomy unless we get some balance again in the world and go back to reason and tolerance, the gift of the 18th century to the west. Bob Ebersole

Bob, hope you are doing better today.

Yes, a fine mess the world is in. I have to keep reminding myself that some good minds are working on these problems in the administration along with what is probably the most concentrated nexus of computing power on the planet.

Scary that they are making the moves that they are. Obviously this is the best that they can come up with from the data available. I rather doubt that they are missing much.

It makes one wonder just how bad the alternatives are that they see.

Hi Jeffrey,

re: "It was good to meet you and all of the other TOD crowd."
Wish I had been there (sigh).

I wonder if there's any chance you could keep us posted if/when you accept future speaking engagements? (Even if I'm not able to be there, I might know others who would be.)

Alan Drake and I are kicking around the idea of some joint presentations--ELM + EOT.

WT,
That sounds like a great idea. We need to start mitigation These are geological problems that are going evryone in the world working together on solutions..
Bob Ebersole