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Hi Rob,
I guess I have two issues:
1. Is that both Deffeyes and Staniford have shown a very tight correlation between the US oil production and the logistic curve, which leaves no unexplained variation for price. Essentially what determines how much oil will be produced tomorrow is about 98% how much oil was produced last year, last decade, etc (where you are on the curve). This may not be intuitive, but there it is. I don't believe that WHT's model has price as a variable either (unless he changed it recently).
2. All the substitutes that are being proposed are conversions of other energy sources. Meaning if we try to switch to biofuel, we need more natural gas (or coal). But NG in much of the world is also in decline. And coal is nearing peak and will be just as difficult to ramp up. You mention the tar sands, but where will the NG come from to power the process?
Energy and GDP are tightly correlated. 98% in a study I am reading right now. We could easily see a drop of 50% in energy supply over the next 20 years. That would be a 50% drop in GDP. Is that Armageddon? No, it does not have to be. But the political and economic stress is going to push people. Imagine every single person getting a 50% pay cut. We are seeing poor choices from politicians (turn the food into fuel) and poor choices from those impacted (truck drivers blockading refineries). I have to say I am quite worried.
Overall decline in the US did not follow a smooth graph or even a cliff scenario that most refer to here. Yes, we found oil elsewhere (Alaska, offshore) but that oil did contribute to the economy and round out the shocks so they were not as severe. I don't think it's likely we'll find zero significant new oil or even fail to use oil we already know is in place (for example North Slope). Now I know this cannot stop an inevitable peak. But it can buy time and soften the decline.
In a real sense, Hubbert was correct. But the details did not dance perfectly to his prediction. US production slid down a rather gentle slope on the downside.
Not all substitutes are complete conversions of fossil fuel. And though there is a natural gas input into synthetic fertilizer and insecticide feedstocks not all biofuel crops must rely on synthetic fertilizer and insecticides. So, yes, there is an input. But the solar input, for example, is far greater. Ethanol is a net gain and though not as good as oil it is still a net gain.
Canada will have to import LNG for tar sands. No way around it if they use gas plants to heat the bitumen. If there's no NG, they'll build nuke plants in the production basin. Yes, coal and NG will probably peak too. But the timeframes are not quite as close as oil so we have a little wiggle room.
So, yes, world conventional oil will probably go into decline. But I think there are factors both in conventional, unconventional, new tech, and efficiencies that will help slow the fall rate and squeeze more productivity out of each barrel while shifting to other energy sources. I also think it's possible with new projects, Iraq, and others that overall liquids can still grow a bit. As I said before, I don't think it will be much more than 88-90 mbpd.