Ah, so when commodity prices go up, the index goes down. So for a decline in the index, we could be talking not about a decline in food production, but a rise in price.

Which everyone knows already - we're producing more food than ever, but it's getting more expensive, price pushed up by demand for livestock and biofuel feeds.

The 2003 quote, rather than being "out of date" is very relevant; 2003 is the year of the lowest index in your given series. So even when food was most scarce and/or most expensive, still the DG of the FAO was saying there was plenty.

Just take a look at the FAO's world food situation page. A glance down the reports and articles tells us that the issues are a shortage of fertiliser, and rising prices. Not a lack of food being produced. There's also a fear that some regions could lose production due to climate change. Could - not will.

A closer look at one of the articles gives us a few key quotes.

[...] the observed long-term decline in real prices could come to halt, signalling a structural change in agricultural commodity markets.[...] However, it is too early to determine whether the observed change is permanent or temporary.[...]

[There were] weather-related production shortfalls [eg drought in Australia leading to lower production...]

Stocks. Another factor on the supply side that has had a significant impact on the markets recently is the gradual reduction in the level of stocks, mainly of cereals, since the mid-1990s. [...] There have been a number of changes in the policy environment after the Uruguay Round Agreements that have been instrumental in reducing stock levels in major exporting countries: the size of reserves held by public institutions; the high cost of storing perishable products; the development of other less costly instruments of risk management; increases in the number of countries able to export; and improvements in information and transportation technologies. [ie, they haven't stored as much grain because it's expensive to do so and they haven't really needed to]

Changing structure of demand. It is widely accepted that economic development and income growth in important emerging countries have been gradually changing the structure of demand for food commodities (especially in China and India) [ie the Chinese and Indians are eating more meat; the article says it takes 7.5-8kg of grain to produce 1kg of beef, with an obvious effect on prices...]

Biofuels and agricultural commodities. The emerging biofuels market is a new and significant source of demand for some agricultural commodities such as sugar, maize, cassava, oilseeds and palm oil. These commodities, which have predominantly been used as food, are now being grown as feedstock for producing biofuels. Significant increases in the price of crude oil allow them to become viable substitutes in certain important countries that have the capacity to use them.

And so on. Nowhere do they mention "lower production" on a global scale. This or that country produces more or less, but the total production of grains, oils, sugar and so on continues to rise.

Nobody is going hungry because there's not enough food. They're going hungry because their area has trouble growing it (eg in the Sahel in West Africa) and because they're too poor to buy it.

I don't disagree with any of this. It is clear that almost all large projects have overun budgets and failed to meet planning timelines.

It does seem that in certain sectors, these factors can permanently slow or stop development. The refining sector was always the best example, although huge new capacity in India and China have changed that somewhat. LNG also has its own issues.

It may well be that there are no solutions, or that the ones that exist can not be done profitably. I am not claiming that everything looks rosy.

However, if there is a pathway to a future energy system that could be developed at a profit, I have seen no evidence that availability of capital would be a barrier.

I am bothered by this circular doom assumption that takes as a starting point that the world is ending, then uses that to prove that no solutions are possible.

This has become pointless. I said that your argument was weak. Here at TOD it is considered acceptable to counter other people's arguments, but not to insult them by calling them silly or saying they are acting like a fool. Disagreement is not condescension.

It is also customary to actually present an argument if you have one. I do not have to chase down a bunch of links and watch videos to try to figure out what you would have said if you could have made a coherent statement.

I asked you to make an argument because I don't think you have one. Sending me to follow a bunch of links confirms it. It seems fairly obvious that you want to believe something in absence of an ability to provide an argument in support of it. That is faith and I can’t reason with it.

Given the scenario you depict, then hyperinflation would occur, I would have thought.

However, your argument does not take into account that a less extreme outcome is still possible, with some devaluation of the dollar, and some move to other currencies, but without the dollar being totally dropped.

For instance, most times in the past when this sort of problem has happened then most other places have also taken a blow, and on reflection the US often seems not so bad a place to put some of your money.

In present circumstances with energy getting tight and food very expensive, the massive resources relative to everyone else of the US in these factors make it perhaps difficult to totally short the US economy.

Although oil sands may not be an ideal energy source the massive reserves of this in the US are something other nations just do not have, and wind resources in the States are enormously better than in Europe, as are the solar resources.

Even in security, whilst the US is indeed over extended, it is fundamentally more secure than Europe, with an irritable bear to the East and militant Islam to the south, and in the inner cities of Europe itself.

More fundamentally, not surprisingly in a continental economy like the US, many here confound to some degree US difficulties with world problems.

China, and to a degree India, show considerable strengths, and their input is in many ways more fundamental than that of the US.

None of this should be taken as minimising the severity of present problems, and it is clear that in many respects US concerns are greater than at any time since the Second World War, but it is relatively unclear at the moment what the outcomes will be - certainly recession, but perhaps not depression.