Water is indeed key. Transpiration of water from the soil and out through the leaves delivers the nutrients necessary for plant growth and seed formation. Given that many aquifers worldwide are being depleted for agriculture and that climate models suggest altered rainfall patterns (including more variability) in the future due to climate change, projecting continued crop yield increases decades out without considering where the water will come from is problematic. You need more water for higher yields, not less.
Nevertheless, crop yield growth has slowed in much of the world because of declining investments in agricultural research, irrigation, and rural infrastructure and increasing water scarcity.
Global Food Security: Challenges and Policies
Science 302, 1917 (2003);
Mark W. Rosegrant, et al.
I read your reference. The sentence you quoted is isolated, and is not supported by any data or references. I'm not aware of data which supports the idea that yield growth has slowed in "much" of the world, unless you consider the steady continuation of a linear growth pattern to be a decline in growth rate, in which case both demand and supply growth have been declining at roughly comparable rates.
Water for agriculture is critical for food security. However, water for irrigation may be threatened by rapidly increasing nonagricultural uses in industry, households, and the environment. New investments in irrigation and water supply systems and improved water management can meet part of the demand. But in many arid or semiarid areas-and seasonally in wetter areas-water is no longer abundant. The high economic and environmental costs of developing new water resources limit supply expansion. Therefore, even new supplies may be insufficient. Whether water will be available for irrigation so that agricultural production can provide for national and global food security remains an urgent question for the world.
Next, here are two from an entire issue of Nature which speaks to the broader question of increasing yields:
Past success, however, does not guarantee a food abundant
world in the coming decades. Growth rates of yields have slowed during the period between 1987 and 2001 (Fig. 1). Moreover, the demographic pressures in the twenty-first century will be unprecedented. The world’s population will reach 8 billion by 2025. By 2020, increasingly
wealthy and urbanized consumers and the 2 billion new mouths will demand 40% more food. Rosegrant et al. estimate that food and feed production must continue to rise annually by 1.2% to satisfy the demand of the world’s population by 2020 (ref. 6).
Raising yields on existing farmland is essential for ‘saving land for
nature’, but the prospects for yield increases comparable to those of
the past 40 years (Fig. 2a) are unclear9,10,30. Most of the best quality farmland is already used for agriculture, which means that further area expansion would occur on marginal land that is unlikely to sustain high yields and is vulnerable to degradation6,31. Water, already limiting in many areas, may be diverted to uses that compete with irrigation. In some of the major grain production areas of east and southeast Asia, the rate of increase in rice yields is declining as actual crop yields approach a ceiling for maximal yield potential. Finally, continuous cereal production systems, including systems with two or three crops per year, may become progressively susceptible to diseases and insect pests because of insufficient diversity in the crop rotation.
I don't have convenient access to Nature papers, but the abstract of the paper you cited says:
Solutions to the problem of how the developing world will meet its future food needs are broader than producing more food, although the successes of the 'Green Revolution' demonstrate the importance of technology in generating the growth in food output in the past. Despite these successes, the world still faces continuing vulnerability to food shortages. Given the necessary funding, it seems likely that conventional crop breeding, as well as emerging technologies based on molecular biology, genetic engineering and natural resource management, will continue to improve productivity in the coming decades.
which sounds about right. To repeat myself, my contention is that the only sense in which yields are slowing down, is that the growth has been pretty much a straight line for fifty years. Since food demand is also growing pretty much linearly, this is what has allowed the two to stay in fairly good equilibrium. I see no sign of departure from that straight-line. If you want to dispute that, you need some data. Quoting sentences out of context is not really advancing the discussion.
I will reserve my comments on water issues for a future occasion, as I indicated.
Figure 1 of the first Nature paper shows the following:
Cereal Yields (growth rate %)
1977-1986
1987-2001
Developing Countries
3.2
1.6
Developed Countries
1.75
1.6
World
2.4
1.5
Sown Area (growth rate %)
1977-1986
1987-2001
Developing Countries
0.25
0.3
Developed Countries
-0.4
-1.5
World
0
-0.4
Figure 1 Annual growth rate of cereal yields and sown area in developing and
developed countries, 1977–2001. Data from Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations.
I'm not arguing that yield increases will stop, but you seem to be saying that "if everything keeps getting better like it has it the past", then we should be fine. I definitely question the premise that climate change and peak oil will not seriously challenge your straight line hypothesis.
I believe the point at issue is that I am asserting that it has been a straight line for the last forty years, and that has not changed at present. I believe you have yet to present any evidence to the contrary.
I was just defending my original comment and quoted sentence, and it seems to me that the data I put in the table does that. But in the event that I am misguided and that past yield trends do portend a similar future, I guess I can start believing in graphs such as this:
I posted these numbers below earlier today, but this thread is touching on this subject;
From the FAO database, selecting global agricultural output, and dropping off minor countries that didn't report until later in the 1990s; http://faostat.fao.org/site/601/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=601
We see that agricultural production is not growing, but actually slightly declining 2000-2006 when compared to 1993-1999. Yield/capita is in a much steeper decline. So any assumption of continuing yield growth, especially per capita, is not supported by the data.
never before in the history of the world has so much food been produced. If all the food produced this year were divided equally among the world’s inhabitants, global food production would provide each person with 2800 calories per day, an increase of 17 percent over levels 30 years ago. And this has been possible despite the fact that over the same period the population has grown by 70 percent.
Even in developing countries, where population has doubled, per capita food production has still increased by 30 percent over the past 30 years.
The units are Production Index Numbers, where the net production quantity of each commodity produced in the current year is weighted by the 1989-91 average per unit international commodity prices and summed for each year. To obtain the index, the aggregate for a given year is divided by the average for the base period 1989-91 where q0 is the net production quantity in the base period. Mathematical fonts don't seem to work here, so if you want a fuller description, see page 6 of http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/123456789/3310/1/wp030002.pdf
Your 2003 quote is out-of-date and has no supporting data for current trends, which is the subject of this thread.
Ah, so when commodity prices go up, the index goes down. So for a decline in the index, we could be talking not about a decline in food production, but a rise in price.
Which everyone knows already - we're producing more food than ever, but it's getting more expensive, price pushed up by demand for livestock and biofuel feeds.
The 2003 quote, rather than being "out of date" is very relevant; 2003 is the year of the lowest index in your given series. So even when food was most scarce and/or most expensive, still the DG of the FAO was saying there was plenty.
Just take a look at the FAO's world food situation page. A glance down the reports and articles tells us that the issues are a shortage of fertiliser, and rising prices. Not a lack of food being produced. There's also a fear that some regions could lose production due to climate change. Could - not will.
[...] the observed long-term decline in real prices could come to halt, signalling a structural change in agricultural commodity markets.[...] However, it is too early to determine whether the observed change is permanent or temporary.[...]
[There were] weather-related production shortfalls [eg drought in Australia leading to lower production...]
Stocks. Another factor on the supply side that has had a significant impact on the markets recently is the gradual reduction in the level of stocks, mainly of cereals, since the mid-1990s. [...] There have been a number of changes in the policy environment after the Uruguay Round Agreements that have been instrumental in reducing stock levels in major exporting countries: the size of reserves held by public institutions; the high cost of storing perishable products; the development of other less costly instruments of risk management; increases in the number of countries able to export; and improvements in information and transportation technologies. [ie, they haven't stored as much grain because it's expensive to do so and they haven't really needed to]
Changing structure of demand. It is widely accepted that economic development and income growth in important emerging countries have been gradually changing the structure of demand for food commodities (especially in China and India) [ie the Chinese and Indians are eating more meat; the article says it takes 7.5-8kg of grain to produce 1kg of beef, with an obvious effect on prices...]
Biofuels and agricultural commodities. The emerging biofuels market is a new and significant source of demand for some agricultural commodities such as sugar, maize, cassava, oilseeds and palm oil. These commodities, which have predominantly been used as food, are now being grown as feedstock for producing biofuels. Significant increases in the price of crude oil allow them to become viable substitutes in certain important countries that have the capacity to use them.
And so on. Nowhere do they mention "lower production" on a global scale. This or that country produces more or less, but the total production of grains, oils, sugar and so on continues to rise.
Nobody is going hungry because there's not enough food. They're going hungry because their area has trouble growing it (eg in the Sahel in West Africa) and because they're too poor to buy it.
> Ah, so when commodity prices go up, the index goes down.
No, let me try it again. Take a look at the reference to the Production Index Numbers I provided above, it's based on Laspeyres formula, which cannot be shown here due to mathematical font limitations.
Easier to understand information sources about how consumption is outstripping supply (even before the biofuels rush) include;
"In the agricultural year that ends with harvest season in 2008, the world will again consume more grain than it harvests. That will be the third year in a row and the seventh year out of the past eight when consumption has outstripped production." http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/JubaksJournal/ProfitFromR...
> Which everyone knows already - we're producing more food than ever
which appears to be in conflict with
>weather-related production shortfalls [eg drought in Australia leading to lower production...]
I don't see any data that supports the former statement, though I have personally seen information on the latter.
So if more meat is being produced, are you counting the grains that are fed to the livestock as food available for human consumption?
> Nobody is going hungry because there's not enough food.
I don't see any data provided by you to support this assertion. Do you mean that drawing down grainstocks to make up for insufficient production is a sustainable trend?
More grain is produced each year than the last, on average. Grain is "food".
Now, we choose to give some of that grain to livestock, and some to biofuels. That given to biofuels no longer counts as "food." But the meat and milk does. The meat and milk have been rising from year to year.
If you take the total grain consumed directly by humans, add in all the meat and milk products, and the beans and oils, and the fruit and vegetables, then divide that by the population of the day, what you get more and more nutrition available year by year.
However, the food is not divided equally. There are 1,000 million overweight people in the West, and 800 million hungry people in the Third World. These numbers are probably not a coincidence.
The facts of ever-increasing grain, meat, milk product, beans and oils, and fruit and vegetable production are public information at the FAO site. However, they're separated into several different reports, especially "World Food Outlook". Go look.
That there's lower production of grain in this or that country does not mean there's lower production in the whole world. Don't be deliberately obtuse.
The issue of world grain stocks being lowered was already addressed in the paper I linked to. Look again, the word "stocks" is even bolded for you. It's too expensive to store them, and they don't really need to store as much, so they don't bother, they just sell them off. I don't see why I should go through that whole fucking site pulling out all the numbers when you don't even fully read a post here.
> If you take the total grain consumed directly by humans, add in all the meat and milk products, and the beans and oils, and the fruit and vegetables, then divide that by the population of the day, what you get more and more nutrition available year by year.
This is an assertion without data; how do you calculate the "total grain consumed directly by humans"? What total ag production figures are you referencing (be specific, please)? What population numbers are you using since 1990? With those answers, what trends do you see in this (21st) century?
I will reserve my comments on water issues for a future occasion, as I indicated.
As someone who has tried to make a profit (or recover costs) with irrigated farming I have some thoughts. In the arid west, you do not purchase land for farming, you purchase water rights that happen to have some land attached. All food production is dependent on water, the soil is merely a structure to support the roots and plant structure and allow absorption of water and nutrients. No water = no food.
The production of food in the future should utilize a Hubbert analysis to determine the impact of peak irrigation water on food production. Much of the increased production is due to the mining of fossil water that is in decline. There is also the impact of the Export Land Model where irrigation water is diverted to other uses, power production, city consumption, recreation. The availability of water is probably a production limit reached before fertilizer or oil.
The earliest impact on food production may still be climate change. You have addressed the potential impact of global warming. There are also arguments that support global cooling. Global cooling may have larger impacts on food production than global warming, see the mini ice age approximately 1400 AD.
The number that struck me was one by one of China's leading glaciologists who said that the glaciers on the Qinhai plateau are melting at 7% a year. That's a rather staggering figure when you think about what it means for the flow of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, as both of them rely on the glaciers for their flow to be sustained during the dry seasons. The Ganges is also experiencing this now, which some scientists believe will become a seasonal one once the Gangotri glacier is gone. They think it will eventually flow only during the rainy season. I mention these things because they are so enormously disrupting. The irony of all this is the two country's whose food security will be most affected by these melting glaciers are the same two countries that are building most of the world's coal-fired power plants today. There's an irony in that situation and I think that Beijing and New Delhi are the same as Washington D.C. in that the political leaders have not been able to absorb the meaning of these scientific studies and make policy.
You have the same problem in the US southwest with snow pack. I'm trying to get my family to move out of that area. These are things I think Stuart should have included with this first version. No water, no food. Anything after than is just a mental exercise.
I do not find Staniford's essays enlightening. He is the Oil Drum's own Dr Pangloss. His work is interesting only insofar as it is useful to keep up on the spin used by incorrigible Micawbers as the planet's crises deepen.
Stuart draws together multiple disciplines and threads into a single coherent view. It may not be your view - but at least it sparks thought. This is a valuable contribution, and one that I appreciate, as it certainly helps me with my own attempts to construct a single coherent picture.
Yeah, I mean it's not like anyone should appreciate an intelligent person using actual data and reasoned argument to contradict our quasi-religious faith-based doomer beliefs, is it? Jeez.
Yep, by 2050 the oil needed to plant, harvest, and transport will be in such short supply, that the power grid will have failed long ago and much of the U.S. will have frozen and starved to death. Solar power and electric gadgets will not do the trick. I am always amazed at the power of denial and self delusion, even among those who have some formal education.
Right, I can see that big combine that has a 400 hp engine being powered by batteries, for a kilometer or 2, and we can use cow pies to power the steam tractors. The power grid will fail when coal is not mined and transported, and as natural gas and oil are depleted. Sorry, John, but your solar toys will not be manufactured when oil goes so high that all oil will be used for survival. And the capital for implementation of the solar dream is just not there. So dream on, but it won't happen. Illusion is what we want to happen, reality is what actually happens, as Colin Campbell wrote -- about those who could not face the reality of Peak Oil.
What do you mean that the capital is not there? Are viable projects going unfunded now? It doesn't seem like it. The world appears to be awash in capital. The current economic problems could impact some of that temporarily. But, it does seem safe to say that availability of capital is not now, and does not seem likley to be, a barrier to overhauling our energy infrastructure.
Doomers? Please don't just toss about silly comments. We aren't talkin about Peak Oil activists. Perhaps if you watched some videos and visited their website?
http://www.eurotrib.com/comments/2008/1/1/202944/4797/11
As to Depression, here's another possible bit of the picture from shadowgovernmentstatistics:
"In publishing its six-month and triennial survey of global outstanding derivatives, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) showed the June 2007 balance at $516.4 trillion, up by 39.8% from June 2006. With the total notional amount of derivatives outstanding in the global markets now at $0.5 quadrillion, the risks of systemic liquidity implosion are well beyond anything ever seen before. Of course, these estimates are from before the onset of the financial-system solvency crisis."
First face reality, it was your comment that was lacking in fact or analysis. I said that there does not appear to be any lack of capital for NPV positive energy projects. You seem to have gotten quite upset and have called me silly, but haven't even tried to refute my point. I suggest a few deep breathes.
Shadow statistics may or not be doomers. They may or may not have a point. However just claiming that they say things are going to be bad (which I am sure they always say)is not a coherent counterpoint to my statement that there is ample capital for profitable projects.
I know that at any given time there are a huge amounts of people predicting that some form of bad thing is looming (see, I avoided using the word doom). I also know how easy it is to google up a whole pile of them. There are also an enorous number of people saying everything will be fine. For example, the Anderson Forecast at UCLA just said that they do not even expect a recession. I happen to be a bit more pessimistic. I do think there will be a pretty tough US recession, but we will see some recovery in 2009 and be back to normal by 2010. That puts me pretty much in line with consensus. I haven't heard anyone forecasting that global growth will slow down yoy or fall below 5% or so.
I know that you inflation guys and goldbugs treat this stuff like a religion. I didn't mean to insult you or set you off on your little fervor.
However, we are just months past a renewable energy boom market with capital pouring in from a wide range of sources. Massive funds from Asia and the Middle East are currently scouring the globe for investment opportunities. As I noted below, the investment that Robert Rapier estimates is required adds up to about 2% of US GDP for the next 20 years.
I find that when people get hysterical and then link to everything they can find to try to answer a simple question, it means they have a high level of conviction and a low level of knowledge. If you actually have an argument for why there will not be capital for future energy projects, see if you can walk me through it all by yourself.
There is a spiral cost problem where projects that looked cost effective keep rising in price as cost of energy drives up the cost of all materials. Although there may be a lot of money for many kinds of projects, most will not go, if people think that they will not be profitable after all.
.
Besides a few other factors, a major part of the problems on these examples below were costs.
Petronet LNG expects 50 per cent cost escalation
The need for a deeper pile work because of unstable soil and rising price of nickel to be used inside the storage tanks will push up the project cost by Rs 1000 crore to Rs 3000 crore,
.
Chevron, Shell Delay LNG Projects, Sending Gas Higher
None of the world's biggest energy companies approved developments last year to increase production of liquefied natural gas,
The main reason is the cost to build LNG plants has tripled in six years
The reluctance of companies to commit to building new capacity appears to stem from two prime influences. The first is the rapid inflation in construction costs, which is reported to have reversed all unit costs reductions in the last 20 years.
I don't disagree with any of this. It is clear that almost all large projects have overun budgets and failed to meet planning timelines.
It does seem that in certain sectors, these factors can permanently slow or stop development. The refining sector was always the best example, although huge new capacity in India and China have changed that somewhat. LNG also has its own issues.
It may well be that there are no solutions, or that the ones that exist can not be done profitably. I am not claiming that everything looks rosy.
However, if there is a pathway to a future energy system that could be developed at a profit, I have seen no evidence that availability of capital would be a barrier.
I am bothered by this circular doom assumption that takes as a starting point that the world is ending, then uses that to prove that no solutions are possible.
If there were to be a depression in the US, which to my knowledge no major economic forecaster is calling for, things would obviously change. Firstly energy use would plummet making a large-scale transition to another system far less urgent and probably less profitable. In this regard, I would expect it to delay both the need and the ability to finance energy projects.
I do expect the next year is going to be very painful for the US. I think financial institutions could fail, people will lose their homes and jobs, etc. I would not be surprised to see three quarters of GDP shrinkage and/or a full year of negative growth. This is a pretty serious recession (meaning not a "small recession") and worse than most forecasters with a significant track record are expecting. However, I would not be surprised if it were milder.
However, I do view this as cyclical and consistent with the historical record of credit getting too loose, then blowing up. But this is the nature of market economies. I feel sorry for the individuals involved, but don't think the US should have immunity from economic downturns. I was in Thailand during the 1997 crisis and know how bad it can be. I also know that it is temporary and unless policies prevent it, economies will recover.
It is possible that the problem spreads to Europe or even Asia. Anything can happen and it is very hard to assign probabilities to specific good or bad scenarios. Note credit markets in most of Asia do not seem to have been infected by the sub-prime crisis at all. At this point the global economy looks pretty sound and seems likely to grow at or near trend rates.
Unless there is a paradigm shifting crisis in the US, the economy will come back and energy projects will again become necessary. At the end of the day, capital is essentially infinite. As long as there are profitable projects (on a risk adjusted basis), there will be capital to fund them.
Thank you Stuart. Enlightening and encouraging - though I'm very interested to know what you make of the water situation.
Water is indeed key. Transpiration of water from the soil and out through the leaves delivers the nutrients necessary for plant growth and seed formation. Given that many aquifers worldwide are being depleted for agriculture and that climate models suggest altered rainfall patterns (including more variability) in the future due to climate change, projecting continued crop yield increases decades out without considering where the water will come from is problematic. You need more water for higher yields, not less.
Global Food Security: Challenges and Policies
Science 302, 1917 (2003);
Mark W. Rosegrant, et al.
I read your reference. The sentence you quoted is isolated, and is not supported by any data or references. I'm not aware of data which supports the idea that yield growth has slowed in "much" of the world, unless you consider the steady continuation of a linear growth pattern to be a decline in growth rate, in which case both demand and supply growth have been declining at roughly comparable rates.
First, here's something for everybody:
http://www.ifpri.org/2020/focus/focus09/focus09_02.asp
Next, here are two from an entire issue of Nature which speaks to the broader question of increasing yields:
doi:10.1038/nature01015
Enhancing the crops to feed the poor
Jikun Huang*, Carl Pray† & Scott Rozelle‡
NATURE | VOL 418 | 8 AUGUST 2002
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v418/n6898/abs/nature01015.html
Specifically addressing the water problem:
Agricultural sustainability and intensive production practices
David Tilman*, Kenneth G. Cassman‡, Pamela A. Matson§ ||, Rosamond Naylor|| & Stephen Polasky†
NATURE | VOL 418 | 8 AUGUST 2002
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v418/n6898/abs/nature01014.html
I don't have convenient access to Nature papers, but the abstract of the paper you cited says:
which sounds about right. To repeat myself, my contention is that the only sense in which yields are slowing down, is that the growth has been pretty much a straight line for fifty years. Since food demand is also growing pretty much linearly, this is what has allowed the two to stay in fairly good equilibrium. I see no sign of departure from that straight-line. If you want to dispute that, you need some data. Quoting sentences out of context is not really advancing the discussion.
I will reserve my comments on water issues for a future occasion, as I indicated.
Figure 1 of the first Nature paper shows the following:
Cereal Yields (growth rate %)
Sown Area (growth rate %)
Figure 1 Annual growth rate of cereal yields and sown area in developing and
developed countries, 1977–2001. Data from Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations.
I'm not arguing that yield increases will stop, but you seem to be saying that "if everything keeps getting better like it has it the past", then we should be fine. I definitely question the premise that climate change and peak oil will not seriously challenge your straight line hypothesis.
I believe the point at issue is that I am asserting that it has been a straight line for the last forty years, and that has not changed at present. I believe you have yet to present any evidence to the contrary.
I was just defending my original comment and quoted sentence, and it seems to me that the data I put in the table does that. But in the event that I am misguided and that past yield trends do portend a similar future, I guess I can start believing in graphs such as this:
I posted these numbers below earlier today, but this thread is touching on this subject;
From the FAO database, selecting global agricultural output, and dropping off minor countries that didn't report until later in the 1990s;
http://faostat.fao.org/site/601/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=601
1992 4022.14
1993 4200.31
1994 3998.06
1995 4027.96
1996 4072.65
1997 4109.69
1998 4056.5
1999 4025.72
2000 3980.68
2001 3993.63
2002 3981.28
2003 3857.04
2004 4139.75
2005 4057.07
2006 3957.06
We see that agricultural production is not growing, but actually slightly declining 2000-2006 when compared to 1993-1999. Yield/capita is in a much steeper decline. So any assumption of continuing yield growth, especially per capita, is not supported by the data.
Again you give no units. What do the numbers mean?
In 2003 the DG of the FAO said,
The units are Production Index Numbers, where the net production quantity of each commodity produced in the current year is weighted by the 1989-91 average per unit international commodity prices and summed for each year. To obtain the index, the aggregate for a given year is divided by the average for the base period 1989-91 where q0 is the net production quantity in the base period. Mathematical fonts don't seem to work here, so if you want a fuller description, see page 6 of http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/123456789/3310/1/wp030002.pdf
Your 2003 quote is out-of-date and has no supporting data for current trends, which is the subject of this thread.
Ah, so when commodity prices go up, the index goes down. So for a decline in the index, we could be talking not about a decline in food production, but a rise in price.
Which everyone knows already - we're producing more food than ever, but it's getting more expensive, price pushed up by demand for livestock and biofuel feeds.
The 2003 quote, rather than being "out of date" is very relevant; 2003 is the year of the lowest index in your given series. So even when food was most scarce and/or most expensive, still the DG of the FAO was saying there was plenty.
Just take a look at the FAO's world food situation page. A glance down the reports and articles tells us that the issues are a shortage of fertiliser, and rising prices. Not a lack of food being produced. There's also a fear that some regions could lose production due to climate change. Could - not will.
A closer look at one of the articles gives us a few key quotes.
And so on. Nowhere do they mention "lower production" on a global scale. This or that country produces more or less, but the total production of grains, oils, sugar and so on continues to rise.
Nobody is going hungry because there's not enough food. They're going hungry because their area has trouble growing it (eg in the Sahel in West Africa) and because they're too poor to buy it.
> Ah, so when commodity prices go up, the index goes down.
No, let me try it again. Take a look at the reference to the Production Index Numbers I provided above, it's based on Laspeyres formula, which cannot be shown here due to mathematical font limitations.
Easier to understand information sources about how consumption is outstripping supply (even before the biofuels rush) include;
"In the agricultural year that ends with harvest season in 2008, the world will again consume more grain than it harvests. That will be the third year in a row and the seventh year out of the past eight when consumption has outstripped production." http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/JubaksJournal/ProfitFromR...
> Which everyone knows already - we're producing more food than ever
which appears to be in conflict with
>weather-related production shortfalls [eg drought in Australia leading to lower production...]
I don't see any data that supports the former statement, though I have personally seen information on the latter.
So if more meat is being produced, are you counting the grains that are fed to the livestock as food available for human consumption?
> Nobody is going hungry because there's not enough food.
I don't see any data provided by you to support this assertion. Do you mean that drawing down grainstocks to make up for insufficient production is a sustainable trend?
More grain is produced each year than the last, on average. Grain is "food".
Now, we choose to give some of that grain to livestock, and some to biofuels. That given to biofuels no longer counts as "food." But the meat and milk does. The meat and milk have been rising from year to year.
If you take the total grain consumed directly by humans, add in all the meat and milk products, and the beans and oils, and the fruit and vegetables, then divide that by the population of the day, what you get more and more nutrition available year by year.
However, the food is not divided equally. There are 1,000 million overweight people in the West, and 800 million hungry people in the Third World. These numbers are probably not a coincidence.
The facts of ever-increasing grain, meat, milk product, beans and oils, and fruit and vegetable production are public information at the FAO site. However, they're separated into several different reports, especially "World Food Outlook". Go look.
That there's lower production of grain in this or that country does not mean there's lower production in the whole world. Don't be deliberately obtuse.
The issue of world grain stocks being lowered was already addressed in the paper I linked to. Look again, the word "stocks" is even bolded for you. It's too expensive to store them, and they don't really need to store as much, so they don't bother, they just sell them off. I don't see why I should go through that whole fucking site pulling out all the numbers when you don't even fully read a post here.
> If you take the total grain consumed directly by humans, add in all the meat and milk products, and the beans and oils, and the fruit and vegetables, then divide that by the population of the day, what you get more and more nutrition available year by year.
This is an assertion without data; how do you calculate the "total grain consumed directly by humans"? What total ag production figures are you referencing (be specific, please)? What population numbers are you using since 1990? With those answers, what trends do you see in this (21st) century?
The data's there at the FAO world food outlook. Go look it up. If you want a research assistant, I take paypal.
I've looked and seen nothing that substantiates your assertion. If you support your assertion, we can consider the data you present.
I will reserve my comments on water issues for a future occasion, as I indicated.
As someone who has tried to make a profit (or recover costs) with irrigated farming I have some thoughts. In the arid west, you do not purchase land for farming, you purchase water rights that happen to have some land attached. All food production is dependent on water, the soil is merely a structure to support the roots and plant structure and allow absorption of water and nutrients. No water = no food.
The production of food in the future should utilize a Hubbert analysis to determine the impact of peak irrigation water on food production. Much of the increased production is due to the mining of fossil water that is in decline. There is also the impact of the Export Land Model where irrigation water is diverted to other uses, power production, city consumption, recreation. The availability of water is probably a production limit reached before fertilizer or oil.
The earliest impact on food production may still be climate change. You have addressed the potential impact of global warming. There are also arguments that support global cooling. Global cooling may have larger impacts on food production than global warming, see the mini ice age approximately 1400 AD.
Here is a very good article (freely available) addressing the additional impact of climate change:
Implications of Atmospheric and Climatic Change for Crop Yield and Water Use Efficiency
Crop Science 42:131-140 (2002)
http://crop.scijournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/42/1/131
(click the PDF link at right)
Impact of climate change on food production:
The Day China Runs Dry
http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/Observer/2008/02/29/92990.html
You have the same problem in the US southwest with snow pack. I'm trying to get my family to move out of that area. These are things I think Stuart should have included with this first version. No water, no food. Anything after than is just a mental exercise.
Cheers
I do not find Staniford's essays enlightening. He is the Oil Drum's own Dr Pangloss. His work is interesting only insofar as it is useful to keep up on the spin used by incorrigible Micawbers as the planet's crises deepen.
Stuart draws together multiple disciplines and threads into a single coherent view. It may not be your view - but at least it sparks thought. This is a valuable contribution, and one that I appreciate, as it certainly helps me with my own attempts to construct a single coherent picture.
Yeah, I mean it's not like anyone should appreciate an intelligent person using actual data and reasoned argument to contradict our quasi-religious faith-based doomer beliefs, is it? Jeez.
Exactly. Abandon all hope ye who enter here...
Yep, by 2050 the oil needed to plant, harvest, and transport will be in such short supply, that the power grid will have failed long ago and much of the U.S. will have frozen and starved to death. Solar power and electric gadgets will not do the trick. I am always amazed at the power of denial and self delusion, even among those who have some formal education.
cj- say we don't need oil to grow crops? suppose we use electric tractors or steam tractors?
what if we use hydroponics.
please tell us why the grid will fail?
Right, I can see that big combine that has a 400 hp engine being powered by batteries, for a kilometer or 2, and we can use cow pies to power the steam tractors. The power grid will fail when coal is not mined and transported, and as natural gas and oil are depleted. Sorry, John, but your solar toys will not be manufactured when oil goes so high that all oil will be used for survival. And the capital for implementation of the solar dream is just not there. So dream on, but it won't happen. Illusion is what we want to happen, reality is what actually happens, as Colin Campbell wrote -- about those who could not face the reality of Peak Oil.
What do you mean that the capital is not there? Are viable projects going unfunded now? It doesn't seem like it. The world appears to be awash in capital. The current economic problems could impact some of that temporarily. But, it does seem safe to say that availability of capital is not now, and does not seem likley to be, a barrier to overhauling our energy infrastructure.
With people like the folks behind shadowgovernmentstats saying an inflationary depression within two years, I think the question of capital is legit.
Cheers
Doomers saying there will be doom proves there will be doom?
That's pretty weak.
Doomers? Please don't just toss about silly comments. We aren't talkin about Peak Oil activists. Perhaps if you watched some videos and visited their website?
http://www.eurotrib.com/comments/2008/1/1/202944/4797/11
As to Depression, here's another possible bit of the picture from shadowgovernmentstatistics:
"In publishing its six-month and triennial survey of global outstanding derivatives, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) showed the June 2007 balance at $516.4 trillion, up by 39.8% from June 2006. With the total notional amount of derivatives outstanding in the global markets now at $0.5 quadrillion, the risks of systemic liquidity implosion are well beyond anything ever seen before. Of course, these estimates are from before the onset of the financial-system solvency crisis."
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hwH7NHU_KkM An interview with Glenn Beck.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dR7h8NBQU3E&feature=related CNN interview.
http://www.shadowstats.com/
Yeah. Real nutbags over there at shadowstats. Do yourself a favor: if you've nothing to say, don't post.
Cheers
First face reality, it was your comment that was lacking in fact or analysis. I said that there does not appear to be any lack of capital for NPV positive energy projects. You seem to have gotten quite upset and have called me silly, but haven't even tried to refute my point. I suggest a few deep breathes.
Shadow statistics may or not be doomers. They may or may not have a point. However just claiming that they say things are going to be bad (which I am sure they always say)is not a coherent counterpoint to my statement that there is ample capital for profitable projects.
I know that at any given time there are a huge amounts of people predicting that some form of bad thing is looming (see, I avoided using the word doom). I also know how easy it is to google up a whole pile of them. There are also an enorous number of people saying everything will be fine. For example, the Anderson Forecast at UCLA just said that they do not even expect a recession. I happen to be a bit more pessimistic. I do think there will be a pretty tough US recession, but we will see some recovery in 2009 and be back to normal by 2010. That puts me pretty much in line with consensus. I haven't heard anyone forecasting that global growth will slow down yoy or fall below 5% or so.
I know that you inflation guys and goldbugs treat this stuff like a religion. I didn't mean to insult you or set you off on your little fervor.
However, we are just months past a renewable energy boom market with capital pouring in from a wide range of sources. Massive funds from Asia and the Middle East are currently scouring the globe for investment opportunities. As I noted below, the investment that Robert Rapier estimates is required adds up to about 2% of US GDP for the next 20 years.
I find that when people get hysterical and then link to everything they can find to try to answer a simple question, it means they have a high level of conviction and a low level of knowledge. If you actually have an argument for why there will not be capital for future energy projects, see if you can walk me through it all by yourself.
There is a spiral cost problem where projects that looked cost effective keep rising in price as cost of energy drives up the cost of all materials. Although there may be a lot of money for many kinds of projects, most will not go, if people think that they will not be profitable after all.
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Besides a few other factors, a major part of the problems on these examples below were costs.
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DocScience
http://www.angelfire.com/in/Gilbert1/tt.html
I don't disagree with any of this. It is clear that almost all large projects have overun budgets and failed to meet planning timelines.
It does seem that in certain sectors, these factors can permanently slow or stop development. The refining sector was always the best example, although huge new capacity in India and China have changed that somewhat. LNG also has its own issues.
It may well be that there are no solutions, or that the ones that exist can not be done profitably. I am not claiming that everything looks rosy.
However, if there is a pathway to a future energy system that could be developed at a profit, I have seen no evidence that availability of capital would be a barrier.
I am bothered by this circular doom assumption that takes as a starting point that the world is ending, then uses that to prove that no solutions are possible.
"I have seen no evidence that availability of capital would be a barrier."
Upthread you dismissed the possibility of a depression and predicted a small US recession.
If such a depression/deep recession did come to fruition, how would that effect capital availability?
If there were to be a depression in the US, which to my knowledge no major economic forecaster is calling for, things would obviously change. Firstly energy use would plummet making a large-scale transition to another system far less urgent and probably less profitable. In this regard, I would expect it to delay both the need and the ability to finance energy projects.
I do expect the next year is going to be very painful for the US. I think financial institutions could fail, people will lose their homes and jobs, etc. I would not be surprised to see three quarters of GDP shrinkage and/or a full year of negative growth. This is a pretty serious recession (meaning not a "small recession") and worse than most forecasters with a significant track record are expecting. However, I would not be surprised if it were milder.
However, I do view this as cyclical and consistent with the historical record of credit getting too loose, then blowing up. But this is the nature of market economies. I feel sorry for the individuals involved, but don't think the US should have immunity from economic downturns. I was in Thailand during the 1997 crisis and know how bad it can be. I also know that it is temporary and unless policies prevent it, economies will recover.
It is possible that the problem spreads to Europe or even Asia. Anything can happen and it is very hard to assign probabilities to specific good or bad scenarios. Note credit markets in most of Asia do not seem to have been infected by the sub-prime crisis at all. At this point the global economy looks pretty sound and seems likely to grow at or near trend rates.
Unless there is a paradigm shifting crisis in the US, the economy will come back and energy projects will again become necessary. At the end of the day, capital is essentially infinite. As long as there are profitable projects (on a risk adjusted basis), there will be capital to fund them.