93 comments on World Oil Exports [01] Angola
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93 comments on World Oil Exports [01] Angola
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I would doubt that 30% growth in GDP annually is going to be a good thing for this country.
Where did you got that figure? Why would it be bad?
Very top of the article:
In my opinion, this growth rate is just plain reckless, and it is doubtful the Angolans, as history has exhibited in many other African countries, will spend that newfound oil money on sustainable economic policies. This new oil money will just fuel internal consumption for food exports and modern goods ect, and result in more and more modern lives that will be born dependent upon fossil fuels for their livelihoods. It is akin to yeast in a jar getting a boost in their growth medium, which will result in an intensification of the overshoot/die-off cycle. In my opinion we should be questioning growth as being something universally good for societies, and seeing it as something that will make us more dependent upon a system relying on increasing complexity and depleting fossil fuels to solve its problems. Increasing complexity, like the transition from horses to cars for transportations requires exponentially more infrastructure to implement and as will some green fantasy to ultra high tech hybrid cars which requires even more infrastructure. Few people seem to think of this background issue which is exponentially increasing dependencies on infrastructure to accomplish our the same simple task which requires exponentially more energy. The net energy cliff is on us in my opinion and a technological fix will further exacerbate our decent, a fundamental change in socialization is what we need similar to what Jeff Vail speaks of. That's why I don't see a 30% growth in GDP based on it's people making it a golden part of Africa, long term, but setting it up for a tremendous amount of difficulties.
Read Joseph Tainter's, The Collapse of Complex Societies, It explains this issue in greater detail
-Crews
That was a good one. Check the GDP growth rate here. I don't know how the 30% figure ended there.
haha yes, that would mean angolas GDP would double every 2 years, looked kinda funny too me. Thanks
They should get Norwegian advisors. (No, not the oil fund, the intersting part is that they did not let the oil incomes ruin the rest of their economy and invests in long lasting infrastrucure and knowledge. )
They should get non-corrupt politicians and civil servants + working judiciary and police system. Besides, Norwegian Oil & Energy Company Norsk-Hydro of Norway has already been accused of corruption in Angola, so I doubt that advice from would help a lot.
Advice doesn't help, when politicians and oil company figures can get away with corruption routinely. Those guys already have the best advise: embezzle the money, put it in an account of a money laundering bank on Jersey and with the leftovers fund expansions in oil production, so you can steal more the next year.
Angola was at rank 147 out of 179 countries in the Transparency international 2007 Corruption Index rankings. If you think corruption in China is bad, it ranks at 70.
Global Witness wrote a whole report on corruption in Oil & Gas industry (both NOC and IOC) and it's a sad read (2004). CorpWatch also details how Angola oil deals are opaque and often involve shady arms deals that break various laws and regulations.
And as has been written in another thread, it is really difficult to fight corruption, when western banks work in collusion with the corrupt politicians. Banks in Switzerland and Jersey have been guilty of this and the practice continues.
On top of this, western investors are fighting over the rights to pour money into oil investments in Angola, usually caring very little for laws or ethics. The practice is easy, because World Bank has rated Angola as one of the most difficult places to do business, due to rampant cronyism and corruption.
What about the people? 70% of them live in abject absolute poverty (less than $1/day) and the rest who are not corrupt, mostly in very poor conditions. Oil sector is responsible for destroying much of the livelihood of fishermen in Cabinda, one of the poorest provinces.
It has been said many times and tons has been written about it, but let's say it again:
African oil producing nations are very unlikely to get out of poverty, until IOCs clean up their act, foreign banks stop laundering embezzled money, US/Switzerland/China/etc stop selling them arms and everybody imposes strict requirements on the government from the outside (trade/development/etc). It would probably take another 10 years to flush the system even semi-clean, but the lure of black gold is impossible to resist.
Random Wiki tidbits:
The current government has announced an intention to hold elections in 2009. These elections would be the first since 1992 and would serve to elect both a new president and a new National Assembly.
The country is the second-largest petroleum and diamond producer in sub-Saharan Africa, yet its people are among the continent's poorest.
Many African states have developed this tendency post-colonialism:
The concept of a gatekeeper state was introduced by the African historian Frederick Cooper in his book Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present.
According to Cooper, African governments suffer from a peculiar politico-economic dysfunction that derives from a particular historical sequence. Specifically, he contends "Africa was systematically conquered but not so systematically ruled" (2002: 196-197) and hence "colonial states had been gate-keeper states" (ibid.: 5) which had "trouble extending their power and their command of people’s respect... inward" (ibid.: 156) but could control "the interface of national and world economies" (ibid.: 141). The colonial powers wanted specific things from Africa (e.g. natural resources) and hence had only a limited transformational agenda since extraction could occur in the absence of a strong state. Ultimately, the authority of colonial regimes depended on the superior military forces of the metropole, which could easily defeat organised resistance but could neither routinise authority nor gain legitimacy (ibid.: 157). The survival of each colony therefore depended on external resources and support, not on internal factors like in established states. As a result, colonial governments had weak roots in the African countries nominally under their control and therefore could not really govern the social or cultural realms of their subjects. In turn, this external dependence produced an outward orientation focused on ‘guarding the gate’: colonies collected most of their revenues from taxes on imports and exports, controlled entry and exit visas, distributed foreign aid, decided who could move currency in or out, and issued licenses that determined who could engage in business activities (ibid.: 5, 97, 157).
The post-colonial "successor states," Cooper goes on to argue, inherited the mantle of gate-keeper from their former rulers. Independence, however, greatly exacerbated the negative consequences of gate-keeping because whereas before it was taken for granted who would control the gate (along with the power and wealth derived therefrom), in the post-colonial period there was no external military force to impose order. Furthermore, unlike the colonial powers (at least before the "development era" after about 1940) African rulers wanted to impose their authority internally in order to affect a far-reaching transformation of the economy and society. And given, moreover, that control of the gate was an "either/or phenomenon" (ibid.: 159) or a zero-sum game, the stakes of control were extremely high because the winners gained control of resources they could use to entrench their rule. Consequently fierce competition for control of the gate arose soon after independence, and this resulted in the collectively irrational political instablitity that occurred in Africa after independence as evidenced by, among other things, cycles of coups and counter coups.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gatekeeper_state
Hate to be critical, but the future-prospects part at the end was wanting. I would suggest for TOD to get someone versed in political-economy to maybe contribute a little bit to relevant articles. I could be available (if wanted) maybe the mods could help facilitate the connection with the relevant parties. (provide them with my email, if its not on display--IDK).
I’m not quite sure what you mean by ‘versed in political economy’. I hope you don’t mean to include the pundits who write for ‘The Economist’ and who, some 30 years ago, predicted that Mugabe would bring peace and prosperity to Zimbabwe, or who ten years ago predicted that South Africa would become an ‘African success story’, or who can’t write an essay on any African country without including the expression ‘sliver of hope’.
My hunch is that the more ‘versed’ people are in political economy the more bullshit they are likely to spatter about. If you want to know more about Africa, ask somebody who has lived there.
From ‘The Economist’, 8 May 1980:
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&s...
No, someone 'versed' would have thought the opposite; I thought that was rather clear.
I am also doubtful of Angola's future prospects. Nigeria demonstrates just how bad things can get when a state becomes highly dependent on natural resource revenue. From a political economy perspective, government dependence on oil revenue can lead to a lot of negative structural impacts, especially in the context of Africa, its history, and current state. Rising oil production engendered much hope and expectation for positive change in Nigeria. None of it panned out.
See also the "resource curse" thesis. In a nutshell: Resource rich countries exhibit a startling trend toward economic underdevelopment. Countries whose economies are largely dependant on the extraction and production of primary resources suffer from domestic strife and conflict, poverty, authoritarian rule, and flaccid economic growth. Resource dependence leads to the "rentier state," in which those in power come to depend on rents from resource extraction rather than taxation, making them less accountable to their people.
Ross, Michael. "The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor." Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Ed. Ian Bannon and Paul Collier. Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2003. 17-42.
Collier, Paul. "Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation and Policy Interventions." Oxford University and the World Bank (2003).
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth." Center for International Development and Harvard Institute for International Development (1997).
One again, no comments on why any of these theories apply differently to Africa, than say post-colonial Asia. Isn't the Daqing oil field in China, at 16 gigabarrels, larger than any found in sub-saharan africa? Am I the only person that sees a contradiction in statements like: "America was able to dominate the world in the early 20th century because of its ample natural resources, especially oil, of which it had one of the world's largest endowments.", and "Africa is poor because of its ample natural resource, especially oil."
The explanation for that disconnect lies in historical context. The statement that "America was able to dominate the world in the early 20th century because of its ample natural resources, especially oil, of which it had one of the world's largest endowments," isn't incorrect, but its only one piece of the puzzle, there are a lot of other reasons why the US became so dominant in the 20th century. The United States has a very different post-colonial history than say, Nigeria. The US gained independence, and went through massive stages of industrialization, migration, and expansion, all the while being free to exploit the people and natural resources of an nearly an entire continent. American history, especially westward expansion, is characterized by the kind of conflict, strife, and instability that the resource curse thesis attempts to explain. One could frame it as the resource-poor original 13 colonies dominating the resource rich interior. History is full of examples like this, such as 19th - early 20th century Japan, and the Netherlands in the 17th century. The United States never suffered from a resource curse, however Native Americans did. Africa's colonial and post-colonial history is a completely different story, as is Asia's. The resource curse thesis doesn't apply differently to America, Africa or Asia. It's really an observable phenomenon, you just need to go a little deeper to see how it plays out in the real world.
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Ed. Ian Bannon and Paul Collier. Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2003.
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/05/24...
Thanks for posting the link, I'd used a few articles from that for a research paper awhile ago. Some good stuff in there.