Khebab, thanks for this compilation.

Here's the forecast I produced last year which I believe is using similar methodology to that used by J. Burn this year - i.e. the forecast is built upon the historic production stack, some assumption is made about decline (I'll return to that later) with new projects built upon that to produce the forecast. I think JB's forecast looks pretty similar to mine though I note he is modeling crude oil and mine is for crude + condensate + NGL (C+C+NGL).

Forecast numbers are production capacity. Actual production may be lower depending upon demand. Click all charts to enlarge

This forecast is built upon the significant body of work done modeling reserves and decline in Ghawar last year by Stuart Staniford and myself aided and abetted by a gang of TODers. At the end of it all Stuart and I reached very similar conclusions.

This is the revised base case Ghawar forecast upon which the Saudi forecast is built:
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/2507

The weaknesses with this Saudi forecast that I would identify myslef are as follows:

• The 500,000 kbd estimates for discovered undeveloped and yet to find are pure guess work.
• I have applied 5% decline to the heritage assets and this may be far too high. As JB points out here there are still large undrilled areas on certain supergiants that can be drilled to compensate for decline. This may be particularly true in the northern sour heavy fields of Safaniyah, Marjan and Zaluf.
• No allowance is made for secondary recovery from the now wet areas of Ghawar. With the right investment these may produce vast amounts of oil with high water cut forward to 2100.

Each of these points are likely to add to the forecast shown and this will likely help bridge the gap between the reserves held in this forecast and those reported by the likes of Colin Campbell.

A note for Khebab: is it possible to remove the Euan 2007 Ghawar base case and high case lines from the compilation - which I think were your own guess work and which are superceded by the forecast shown above. They appear in any case to be wrongly labelled? And is it possible to add the C+C+NGL forecast as shown above? You should already have the XL file.

Nicely written and reasoned summary. Thank you Joules and some nice replies by Khebab and Euan. The Matt Simmons quote leading off the article sets the tone of the article but then posting the data from various sources gives a scattergram of data points leading me to conclude "what data!?". It's everywhere. Until we get verified data from KSA, articles like these are useful talking points but trying to use the current data for policy decisions is fraught with risk. My one significant question is what techniques are being used in the new additions? Are they drilling wells and waiting for the oil to run directly into pipelines or are they starting new production hot and heavy with enhanced techniques right from the get go a la North Sea? If so can be expect sharp fall offs in production going forward? The graph showing new refineries coming chiefly from overseas and not in the North American hemisphere suggests several conclusions:(1)we will not need new refineries built domestically(2) we will be buying refined products going forward instead of crude so this will probably increase price for distillates, gasoline and petroleum based feedstocks at a greater rate than crude(3) if you are using domestic refineries as I have for investment vehicles, fuhget it, sell them, suck up your losses and look elsewhere for ways to lose money. Generally, not a pretty picture.

Thanks Joules and Khebab!

My assumption for total economic URR crude/condensate for Saudi Arabia (including half of Neutral Zone) remains a pessimistic 185 Gb based upon the creaming curve, recovery factors and monthly/annual HL plots.
http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/4299/387218

Saudi Arabia's forecast crude and condensate production rate to 2020 is updated below for the recent EIA data release. It is worth noting that the EIA says that Saudi Arabia's production for May 2008 was 9.40 mbd while the OPEC July 2008 OMR says a much less 9.18 mbd. Which number is closer to the true production?
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/t11c.xls
http://www.opec.org/home/Monthly%20Oil%20Market%20Reports/2008/mr072008.htm

An important feature of the chart below is the recent increase in the depletion rate of remaining reserves. WebHubbleTelescope uses a similar statistic which he calls extraction rates in proportion to the current reserve value.
http://canada.theoildrum.com/node/3958/373313

From Jan 2005 to Dec 2007, the average depletion rate of remaining reserves was 4.4%/year as shown by the dashed green line. The depletion rate has now risen to 5.0%/yr or in other words, Saudi Arabia is extracting their oil at a higher rate. There is a chance, probably after the US presidential election in November, that Saudi Arabia will reduce their depletion rate back to about 4.5%/yr. If this is done then the production rate would have to fall by a one off 10% or about 0.9 mbd, in addition to normal decline. Furthermore, this would also imply that Saudi Arabia's average crude/condensate production rate for 2009 would be about 8.0 mbd, rather than the 8.9 mbd shown below.

Saudi Arabia Crude & Condensate Production to 2020 - click to enlarge

The next chart has also been updated but hasn't changed significantly from the last update.

Saudi Arabia Crude & Condensate Production to 2080 - click to enlarge

World crude/condensate production to 2012 has been updated for the recent EIA data release and also for the Aug 12 EIA STEO.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/contents.html

The chart indicates that crude/condensate production has stayed at about a high 74.5 mbd from May to July. The drop for August is due mainly to the Russia Georgia conflict interrupting oil supplies from Azerbaijan through the Georgian part of the oil pipeline and summer maintenance.

Weak demand and recent high production rates of crude/condensate have contributed to the recent fall in the oil price. However, as crude/condensate production rates are forecast to decline, this will place further upward pressure on oil prices.
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/4397/392132

World Crude & Condensate Production to 2012 - click to enlarge

Are we ignoring, then, the comments from al Husseini and the recent seeming confirmation from BusinessWeek, or are we considering those not to be useful as they are not data sets? Even if not data sets, do they not help frame the discussion, particularly since the claimed info from both comes from insiders? Are our models more reliable than info from those who worked/work there (assuming reliability)?

Cheers