Oil today is down to $107 or about $40 (27%) down from the $147 top reached on July 11th, thus in under 2 months oil prices have basically crashed on a compensation of demand destruction, and higher OPEC production.

I guess the supporters of the speculation thesis are ecstatic by this oil meltdown, which somehow support their believe that our prices were manipulated higher, rather then driven by fundamentals factors.

While, I still believe oil will race higher in the coming months and years, sharp declines as we are seeing today are very detrimental to the security of future supply, as investments in unconventional oil sources will be probably delayed or put on hold until prices stabilize, while the switch to certain alternatives may weaken as people belief in peak oil get shaken.

Furthermore and most importantly OPEC is not likely to inject tens (if not hundreds) of billions of dollars in expanding its production capacity if prices can decline by close to 30% in 2 months based on a slight demand moderation, and slight supply increase.

Meanwhile, the party goes on, as the dollar continue its rally, despite the appalling fundamentals of the US economy.

Regards,
Nawar

The $147 was an important benchmark for traders, but it was pretty much irrelevant to producers and consumers (probably almost no one paid $147 and almost no producers received $147). The monthly average WTI high price was $134 in June, basically flat in July (down 50¢). It looks like August will average about $117, down about 13% from the June/July peak.

Meanwhile, on the export front:

From the Bloomberg article on Russia linked uptop:

Production in Russia's oil heartland of western Siberia is flagging as older fields mature, and companies are investing in harder-to-reach regions in search of growth. . .

It ``is becoming increasingly more expensive and burdensome for the oil companies to maintain output growth,'' Citigroup analysts Alexander Korneev and Ildar Khaziev said in a note to investors, cutting their price estimates for companies including the country's two biggest producers, OAO Rosneft and OAO Lukoil.

I agree west, the average is more relevant, but even if we take the average as our measure, current prices are close to 25% lower, this is a massive decline in revenues for the producers in a very short period of time, I believe such volatility is detrimental to the steady development of unconventional oil.

However, it would be very interesting to see how prices will move during this winter, considering the steady decline in net exports; as you have mentioned in a prior post, there seems to be a race between the decline in net exports, and demand moderation.

Regards,
Nawar

Also, we saw an August decline last year, down 2.4% from July, followed by more than a 10% increase in September. This was in the context of an average monthly increase of 6% per month from 5/07 to 6/08.

In any case, the monthly average price is a far better indicator of what is going on regarding fundamental supply/demand issues, and the August, 2008 average price was down around 13% from June/July. I wouldn't predict the September average price, based on early September trading, but I think that the average September/October prices will tell us a lot about the horse race between the long term overall decline in net oil exports and an overall forced reduction in the demand for oil imports (plus the effect on demand from the slowing economy).

One must ask, "Who does this price deflation hurt the most?". Those selling the oil, of course. Who is the West currently at odds with? That would be Russia, mostly. Could be coincidence?

I find that very doubtful - a year ago, oil was trading at around $70 per barrel, and no one was suggesting that this was in any way painful to major producers.

The pain is being experienced on the consumption side of the equation, and the idea that $100 per barrel oil is a "relief" just demonstrates how many frogs are being slowly boiled with smiles on their faces. Whilst prices above $120 per barrel were a nice windfall whilst they lasted, I doubt that any oil execs in Russia/OPEC will start fretting until oil hits $60 per barrel.

In 2003 the OPEC target price band was $22-28. In 2004 it was $30-35. In 2005 Chavez suggested that $50 was more than acceptable as a guaranteed price. Only $110 per barrel and "oh, noes, we're gonna go bankrupt!" Nah.

A few months ago someone on TOD did a superficial analysis of Saudi Arabia's budget and concluded that, given the size of their social welfare program, they would need about $90/bbl to balance their budget. Yes, the KSA could run a deficit (I think it is less likely they would scale back their welfare program because of concerns about social unrest), but I think it is more likely that they would try to defend $100/bbl.

The problem with easy money is that you get used to spending it, and sometimes it's hard to cut back to previous levels.

However, Saudi's budget requires dollars, not dollars-per-barrel.

I agree that OPEC as well as other oil producers have gotten used to higher prices, and this is exactly why their price target kept moving higher year after year, until they finally abandoned a price target and let the market run to the upside.

I don’t believe that any OPEC member or oil producer expected oil to trade in the $130/$140 range without a major supply shock (such as the Arab embargo or Iranian revolution), the fact that oil climbed to such levels on its own has probably given the producers a lot of confidence that oil may sustain much higher levels on regular market fundamentals then they thought was possible.

It is also worth noting that oil prices have risen by a hundred folds since the $1960s, and they never dipped to such levels after crossing the double digits in first oil shock in the $70s; and I do suspect that they will never trade for any sustainable period under triple digits in the future.

Regards,
Nawar

Come on londanium, we have decided today would be one of national morning in the oil patch. How are we to survive on this mere pittance? I’m sure some of the traders are panicked but at the well head you couldn’t knock the smiles of our faces with a baseball bat. I doubt $100 oil will take much shine off either the unconventional or conventional oils. Even when oil hit $147 most companies were still using $60 - $80 oil in their economics along with some other fudge factors. Based upon the 12 month running average I would expect oil to be bouncing around $110/bbl. As WT pointed out, Aug was the first drop in monthly avg in 7 or 8 months. And it’s easily to write that off to the high July avg. I can’t see any factors down the road that will permanently shift the trend downward but who knows: demand destruction may be sneaking up some out there along with a little bump on the production capacity side. On the other hand, if OPEC is finally on the verge of becoming a functional cartel, even DD might not bring a long term downward price trend with it.

"the switch to certain alternatives may weaken as people belief in peak oil get shaken."

Nawar, I'm not sure if I understand you correctly, but PO is not a belief. If you believe it you must understand the simple basic concept. The price will not shake that understanding.

Paul, indeed PO is not a belief, it is a basic concept, and I do understand it as such, however such severe declines, may push certain believers to consider that PO is not as big of a deal as it may seem, some may start believing that solar and wind are doing their trick, while forgetting that our issue is liquid energy, and not energy per say.

As you know a lot of people and investors have a blind faith in the ability of markets to predict the future (didn’t the CIA wanted to start a terror futures contract after Sept. 11?), if prices continue heading lower, they will rather believe the markets rather then believe the simple fact beyond PO.

Regards,
Nawar

while forgetting that our issue is liquid energy,

And I'll say that this view is wrong. The issue is the economic model built on CHEAP oil. (Cheap VS the other forms)

I would like to refine that to an economic model built on endless growth.

And I'll say that this view is wrong. The issue is the economic model built on CHEAP oil. (Cheap VS the other forms)

Oil just isn't a cheap form of energy. For your dollar you could get ~8 times as many BTUs from coal, 1.5-2 times as many BTUs from natural gas, ~100 times as many BTUs from yellowcake(with ~10 000 as many BTUs potentially extractable); I haven't done the calculations for wind and solar, but they're definetly far cheaper still.

The reason people keep buying so much oil at such a high cost is that it's easy to store, easy to transport, low capital cost of the equipment required to use it, burns relatively cleanly, high energy density.

The cheapest forms of energy are exactly the most costly and cumbersome ones to use; otherwise demand would drive their price up.

You can see for instance how this plays out for a vehicle. Natural gas is hard to store and it costs a lot of energy to compress it for use in a vehicle; but it's still fairly straight forward to power a vehicle with it. Coal would fail the emissions standards of every single country that has one and you'd kill an awful lot of people; you have to build the infrastructure to turn it into something like oil(e.g. see SASOL and the fisher-tropsch process) and you're likely to be required to deal with all that CO2 instead of just venting it to the atmosphere. Nuclear is only practical for powering electric trains, street cars and other grid tied vehicles and renewables can't even do that(not without back-up generation or enormous grid storage capacity).

That is a good summary of the current state of play.
What it omits is that very shortly it will be practical to power most vehicles with electricity and batteries.
It will not be so convenient as oil, but for all personal transport uses works just fine.

Delivery vehicles can also run on electric, but long-distance trucks are impractical, and trains would be needed.
Agricultural equipment etc also will need oil or biofuel for the foreseeable future.

PO is absolutely a belief. Whether something is true or not has nothing to do with how many people believe in it. As the price drops, fewer people will believe in PO, and will put less pressure on TPTB to do anything about it, and will want to continue the party.

The price just balances supply with demand at a particular time, the price says absolutely nothing anout the actual volume of oil being supplied/demanded.

Peak oil is about volumes supplied on a daily basis and has very little to do with reserves.

Peak oil isn't a belief it's a fact, for oil wells, for oil fields, for the USA, for the UK, for lots of countries ... and maybe for the whole world in total ... you need to check the data, moving averaged over a few years, to be sure ... monthly data is too inaccurate to be useful.

If you do check the data I think you will find C+C 'net exports' have actually peaked around 3 years ago - it is the 'net exports' that are important to importers.

Today I expect the demand for oil from refinerys has gone down in the area around NOLA at least, so today I would expect the price of crude to fall if there weren't other effects!

Each country will have it's own peak oil experiences - for some it won't matter much for a few years, for others it will be a rapid catastrophe.

I don't know how someone can make that statement here, but... PO is not a belief, it's a fact.

Any finite resource has to have a peak in production. If there's no peak, it means the resource is in fact infinite, obviously not the case with oil.

PO is not a belief, it's a fact.

I believe it is useful to consider two realities. The first, and familiar one is the actual physical state of the universe (or some portion thereof), the second one is the collective mental landscape of the people (or the people empowered to make decisions). The second reality need not conform to the first. Politics is the realm of the second reality. Physics and geology exist in the first realm. Economics is somewhere in between. At least for a while a collectively held falsehood can control the market.

Needless to say, the farther apart the two realities, the greater the risk of a catastrophic event.

There is but one reality. The first that you mention above.

The collective mental landscape of the people is not a second reality, it is a delusion, and it is not helpful to associate the word "reality" with it in any way. It is a house of mirrors, wishful thinking, evasion.

Words matter.

Whether or not we should refer to the mental landscape as a reality, or some other term, it is a useful mental concept. A large part of human endeavor is involved with the intended manipulation of this second state. Without a favorable perception by enough people, beneficial actions are precluded.

It is a very useful concept! It's just that attaching the word "reality" to it is a bit obfuscatory. At least let's distinguish between actual reality and virtual reality.

E.g., if you jump off a cliff, you die in a big splat at the bottom, no matter what you or anyone else believes. That's actual reality.

The maddening thing is that if you show any real interest in studying actual reality, you will soon be told that you're trying to "escape reality".

That's why I think words matter.

:-)

Sgage, you could have stopped with your first sentence. You reintroduce another duality by talking about "the collective mental landscape". We only have our one "delusion", and it is exactly the one physical reality, permeating all things.

Chris

We only have our one "delusion", and it is exactly the one physical reality, permeating all things.

Perhaps.

I find it useful to distinguish the personal reality, the agreement reality (the reality shared by others) and the final or ultimate reality, which is what you would call "physical reality."

To see ultimate or physical reality clearly, one has to distinguish the personal reality and the agreement reality and then throw them away. What's left is physical reality.

For instance, I can look at the corridor between two walls and think "that's really wide" -- that's the personal reality getting its say.

Then I can say, "the corridor is 3 meters wide." That's the agreement reality (since units of measure are just an agreement).

Take away both realities and what's left is physical reality.

You just wouldn't have any way to talk about it :-).

Meanwhile, the party goes on, as the dollar continue its rally, despite the appalling fundamentals of the US economy.

This isn't so hard to understand. First there has been a coordinated effort by the Fed and other central banks to increase the dollar. Secondly, with 10 trillion dollars in debt, the world is all in on the dollar. It's in few people's interest to have it collapse at this point. Finally, the United States despite all its debt remains far and away the biggest economy and as the global economy slows, the dollar is becoming a safe haven, say what you want about that, but money is very conservative, and as there is nothing near taking the US' place at this point.

Depending on how slow the global economy gets, oil can go down a long way. That said, it will also quickly become a choke on global economic growth above a certain factor in a "recovery" too. Not a situation an economic system run on quarterly results will be able to address.

Secondly, with 10 trillion dollars in debt, the world is all in on the dollar. It's in few people's interest to have it collapse at this point.

Oh yes, no producer of oil or any other goods the US market consumes would take any pleasure in seeing their main customer go bankrupt.

And don't discount the fact that the value of the dollar gets pushed up every time the oil price rises due to increased demand by countries paying for their own oil imports in US currency.

Oil goes up, then there is a time lag of a few weeks, and then the dollar follows suit.
Could this lag be due to international oil customers gradually replenishing their US currency reserve accounts?
I'd be glad if someone could shed some light on this.

Seems to me that we are at least in a phase where, if this were a "speculative bubble", the corpses should be accumulating due to it's "pop". When the tech bubble popped, companies died. As the housing bubble pops, banks are dying and homeowners are defaulting. If the oil bubble just popped, where are the "losers"? No body, no crime.

I think OPEC has a better handle on the supply demand fundamentals than you realize. OPEC wants high prices, but recognizes that high prices create demand destruction and so strives to maintain enough production to keep prices from rising too fast. The worry is that the recent price run-up appeared to be out of OPEC's control and one might surmise that they are reaching production limits.

When supply is constrained changes in demand will drive large price swings. This is especially true when demand is inelastic and exceeding supply. The recent oil price history seems to be a model of what one would expect given my amateur understanding of economics (and reading of others here on TOD).

Peace,
Hacker

I think OPEC has a better handle on the supply demand fundamentals than you realize. OPEC wants high prices, but...

More than classical supply/demand I think OPEC was concerned with at what (oil) price would the world economy on which they depend start to tank. The experiment in high prices, showed that at least in the very short term (a few weeks) the economy was robust enough to withstand pretty high priced oil (say $140). Now they are seeing that on a somewhat longer time scale (six months to a year), that the world economy may not be quite as resilient as they had hoped. So they are still struggling to determine what price maximizes their profits. This of course doesn't mean that they can maintain control indefinitely, i.e. they may not be able to maintain enough production to keep the price within a range that the world economy can happily live with for much longer.

It also didn't help at all that the islamic nations' governments kept blaming it on "speculators".

Everybody with their eyes open trivially sees their deceit, but what is Joe Average supposed to think ? Here we have Tom, from New York saying it's the fundamentals and on the other hand we have the oil minister of Saudi Arabia saying it's "speculators".

It would help a lot if they'd drop their "it's a conspiracy !" yelling everytime something happens.

islamic? Maybe. I thought it was the US Congress.

It would help a lot if you'd drop the "islamic" everything something happens.

Last year I was creating price projections for WTI. It said:

2008: USD 120
2009: USD 180

I'll revise these numbers, but it is somewhat besides the point I'd like to make.

On January 12th I made predictions for this year. Basically the following:

  • USD 130 by midsummer
  • A minimal price crash late summer, I mentioned 100-105 as a short minimum
  • steady increase in Q4, starting in mid-September
  • A price maximum aroud USD 150 late this year (say mid-Dec)
  • Events have been following my predictions so far. As for proof of all this: I do have proof but it is in Hungarian. However, should anyone doubt it I can give you the address.

    All in all I think oil is trading at a minimum these weeks, and in two weeks' time it is going to start strengthening. By two weeks I mean: not later than that, maybe sooner.

    Regards
    eastender

    I'm about the same as you although a bit higher understand that in my opinion 2008 is the year we have fallen off the plateau and started into decline so its a bit of a split year.

    I had us up to about 130-135 this summer and we should have stopped seeing price increases their and stayed basically level with a drop about now down to say 120 then headed toward 150 towards December.

    This is what should have happened however it seems that the oil markets have been played with this year in my opinion in preparation for a war with Iran.

    On that note as near as I can tell what actually happened is that Ghawar production is in decline which is not unexpected but in addition to this a significant amount of light sweet crude was withheld from the market something like 30-70 million barrels or so. This also includes probably a resting of wells that may have seen water breakthrough. Problems in Nigeria production mae the light/sweet situation worse. Balancing this KSA has always claimed to have excess heavy sour production and I believe them I don't believe its 2mbd but 500k-1mbd is highly probably to some extent selling this masked the problem. But this lead to Iran seemingly having some problems finding buyers for its own heavy sour oil recall the reports of tankers sitting loaded.

    However this gave us and early glimpse of what life will be like once Ghawar is really in serious decline and it will not be pleasant since it looks like the heavy sour/NG issue is huge and was triggered by the above.

    Eventually of course after price rose well above everyones expectations including mine KSA belatedly hit the market with a surge of light sweet this was coupled with what looks like a extensive set of financial maneuvering. Publicly this showed as a campaign agianst speculators you have to imagine that in private the people with large long position received a lot of pressure. Needless to say the combination of real increases in short term oil production esp light sweet coupled with financial moves burst the bit of bubble we had.

    As far as demand destruction goes well its certainly a factor but demand does not change dramatically over a few months demand destruction has been going on for years and is absolutely required to match flat supply with a growing population. Needless to say this supposed demand destruction argument happened during the months we supposedly had the highest world oil production ever. Of course this is just one of the blindingly obvious paradoxes ignored by people who wish to believe the current price is real. I could write forever on this and the bottom line is that concerted financial pressure along with the help of real increase oil exports will cause a price drop.

    Finally following the last surge we have seen a sharp drop in oil exports out of the ME this indicates that a second mini surge if you will is possible over the next month or two and this can be coupled with political talk of opening the SPR. I believe the goal is to try and get the market price down to 70-80 dollars a barrel in anticipation of a strike on Iran.

    On the Iran side the situation is fairly strait forward. Once Iran has stockpiled sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium they no longer have to have the large enrichment facilities. They can build a bomb now or later if the political climate changes or never and blend it down for nuclear fuel. And they can build the bombs almost anywhere potentially in a number of small facilities that would be impossible to track.

    Later they could readily build more enrichment facilities that need not be large to ensure a growing stockpile of enriched uranium. Once they have enough to build a few bombs they basically have a lot of options and would be practically impossible to stop. Their bomb program would effectively be successful.
    Once nuclear reactors are in operation plutonium would then be viable which is much easier to separate.

    This is important since even if Mcain wins he would have a tough time getting and attack together on Iran before they reach the point that they are basically immune from attack and could use the attack itself as justification for suddenly deciding to develop a bomb.

    So this is basically it its pretty much now or never for and attack on Iran which would reasonably ensure they don't or can't develop a bomb. If this window is passed then their may well be and attack but it probably will simply ensure that Iran will develop nuclear weapons. Right now my opinion is that they are telling the truth in the sense that they have no short term plans to build a bomb but they will maintain needed enriched uranium and later plutonium supplies along with the expertise to rapidly assemble a bomb.

    Finally even with the mini-surge that is highly probable I just cannot come up with a way for price to remain low through Nov esp with the recent Hurricanes SPR release cannot keep us from having a crunch by at least that point in time. But assuming they can successfully keep the price down over the next few weeks and this mini-surge does show up then I believe its possible to see oil prices pushed down into the 70-80 dollar range.

    The reason for all this is pretty simple and attack on Iran would lead to a price doubling if they get it down to 70-80 then this means 140-160 not a lot higher than at the beginning of the year. The assumption is that disruption of supplies from other countries in the gulf would be temporary but Iranian oil production would be shut-in for the foreseeable future. By aggressively pushing the price down now although temporary then the response from and Iranian attack would have to work from and artificially low price point. And certainly the pressure would stay on to try and suppress the price as much as possible. From this standpoint and attack later with oil say at 150-200 a barrel would be far far more damaging. I think and attack was planned for last year but to many Generals objected and we have seen a serious house cleaning on this side.
    Also the US is officially winding down operations in Iraq and it does seem to have settled down quite a bit this itself may be temporary but for the moment at least the US seems positioned to be able to reduce its presence in Iraq.

    Finally even if for some reason and attack does not actually happen you have the secondary goal of taking Americans minds off of the Middle East and keeping the campaign from falling into a lot of promises to force OPEC to ship more oil. Overall the financial moves have not only been in oil but a broad spectrum full court press to temporarily shore up the financial system for a few months.

    But a Mcain win in the election is in my opinion secondary to either attacking Iran before the election or losing whats probably the last chance that can reasonably ensure they cannot develop nuclear weapons.

    Sorry for the long post :)

    Not really but we are in a unique geopolitical year this year its really the first post peak decline year if you look at tanker traffic, price and oil quality. The high probability of and attack on Iran during the very first year we probably had significant declines at least in exports does not bode well for the future geopolitical climate. Coupled with this of course is the situation in Russia. Russian moves in Georgia indicate that they have every intention of trying to ensure they have their way if a resource war does develop.

    Whats even more interesting is that Pakistan is on the brink of collapse yet the papers are not even really covering the meltdown of the only nuclear armed Islamic state.

    And last but not least the current year has been marked by underlying geologic decline but on top has been some significant manipulation of the oil markets as near as I can tell the outcome is twofold. If and attack on Iran actually takes place then our short term situation will be entirely driven by above ground factors.
    For the next several years geologic peak will be secondary and probably effectively masked by the attack it could well be years before the situation stabalizes to the point that real production levels could be determined. More likely is that further entanglements with Russia, Venezula, Collapse of Mexico etc etc will result in people thinking that if only all this ended the oil will flow.

    If and attack does not happen then prices should increase on their own accord I expect a spike to 160+ by December simply because the current situation is unstable. But as the supply and supply quality change and probably more important NG production changes the price will go up until the spreads stabilize then plateau for a bit then up some more. As near as I can tell the first round of serious demand destruction is actually at the 200 dollar a barrel level. The current round is simply the collapse of the housing industry and the start of a mild recession. 200 a barrel will eliminate the most outrageous use in the US with large SUV's etc really off the road except for the wealthiest people. From here on out the oil prices should creep higher approaching 300 a barrel and the next stage of demand destruction contraction where very fuel efficient cars are widely adopted. In the interm the continued collapse of the housing and consumer debt defaults in general will ensure people retain cash flow for food, gas, rent. Eventually as we pass 300 a barrel and into 500 a barrel collapse of a significant portion of the middle class will be the next stage of demand destruction. Starting back at 200 a barrel we will see collapse of poor nations such as Eygpt but they don't use a lot of oil so demand collapse if you will probably won't free up significant supplies.

    On a time scale you have
    2008 at 140 -160
    2009 160-200
    2010 200-300
    2011 300->500+ ( first serious collapse year )

    Depending on how low they can get oil prices before and attack on Iran we would see post attack 160-200 etc
    basically about a 30-40 dollar long term premium from the attack. But at least for the short term if they pull it off they practically get it for free.

    Although I don't have Eastenders data I suspect the reason I'm higher is I've got a very strong suspicion that Ghawar started into decline and I think that prices will be driven by the light sweet supply and that NG production problems will prevent the heavy sour oils from being all that useful.

    Whats really interesting is that Iranian crudes are generally of low quality
    http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL142487620080730
    http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/geopolitical_diary_iranian_oi...

    Given I expect US NG production to collapse worldwide we probably will simply not have enough NG to process the heavy oils such as Iran produces. In short peak light sweet plus rapidly declining NG production puts us into the paradoxical situation of incredibly high prices for light sweet but a surplus of heavy sour oils that are not that useful. Basically we will have all the heavy oil we can refine without sending NG prices skyrocketing. As T Boon Pickens has realized we are better off just burning the NG directly its no longer economical to refine the heavy sour crudes.

    The reason this is important is because from the big picture Iranian oil is of limited utility without opening up Iranian Natural Gas supplies and in fact heavy oil in general is of little use without a significant new source of NG. Iran has the largest natural gas resources and they are located close to a lot of the worlds heavy sour production so the choice is politically bleak. We would have to help the Iranians develop their NG resources and back off on attacking them on the political side.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_Natural_Gas_Reserves

    So on the energy front we have no use for the Iranian oil without Iranian NG and to get both will require a significant investment from the western nations or china. So its pretty much gotten to and all or non situation. The US would have to eat a LOT of crow on this one.

    Needless to say given all the above which is pretty reasonable outside of my suspicions about Ghawar the big picture seems to indicate that a concerted effort to push down oil prices before and attack on Iran before the last and best window of opportunity passes is sensible. You don' have to agree with everything I'm saying just the key points about NG and heavy sour and at least strained light sweet supplies coupled with the nuclear situation. The rest is details.

    if iranian crude is uneconomical to refine, what chance is there for bitumen ?

    Given I expect US NG production to collapse worldwide we probably will simply not have enough NG to process the heavy oils such as Iran produces.

    Not true.

    Refining bitumen requires about 5kg of natural gas per barrel. Natural gas is about 0.05lb/cf, meaning 5kg is about 220cf of natural gas. Refining 1Mb/d of bitumen, then, would require about 80Bcf of natural gas over the course of a year. This represents 0.08% of worldwide natural gas production of 104,000Bcf.

    Even 10Mb/d of bitumen would require less than 1% of world natural gas production to refine, and other heavy oils would require even less. A lack of natural gas for refining heavy oil is not a credible bottleneck.

    (This, incidentally, is exactly why it's so important to run the numbers before making claims: intuition is very often wrong about quantitative situations.)

    You don' have to agree with everything I'm saying just the key points about NG and heavy sour

    Unfortunately, you're simply wrong on those points. Anyone can check my calculations above and see that for themselves. Upgrading heavy oil requires only a tiny fraction of world natural gas supply.

    At a price of $8/Mcf, natural gas adds only about $1.60 to the price of a barrel of bitumen-derived syncrude, or less than 2% of the total input price. Natural gas supplies will have to fall very, very far before heavy oil upgraders are priced out of the market.

    Hi Pitt,

    bitumen requires about 5kg of natural gas per barrel. Natural gas is about 0.05lb/cf, meaning 5kg is about 220cf of natural gas.

    Nope.

    At a price of $8/Mcf, natural gas adds only about $1.60 to the price of a barrel of bitumen-derived syncrude

    Not even close.

    According to Petro-Canada,

    Operating costs are approximately $6 per barrel at a gas price of $4 per thousand cubic feet.

    Petro-Canada

    I could duplicate these numbers from a myriad of sources.

    Don

    Ron I seriously doubt this is all the NG input before you get final refined gasoline and oil.

    I'd love for a real ChemE to get involved in this but you can look outside the oil industry at plants that render animal waste for there NG input to get a handle on how much is used in the overall process. On a boe basis for rendered animal waste its about 1:1.

    Reading the article this seems to just be the NG needed for the steam/electrical inputs. I've tried to back calculate the NG usage from various public sources but they simply don't break it out in a easy manner.

    Steam is of course one of the big ones and the heavier the oil the more steam thats used. The pipes have to be heated to flow the heavy tars and in complex refining you have a lot of pipes. Next NG is used as the source for hydrogen in sulfur removal and upgrading and finally its used in the coker. As far as oils lighter than bitumen that are on average about 40% bitumen and generally the bitumen is processed after the lighter fractions are boiled off so they are not a lot different from the tar sands for rough calculations I just assume the barrel is 50% tar.

    I've posted my attempts and results several times on this issue and not gotten others to take a look but I've come up with about 1/3 of a boe of NG per barrel of heavy oil 40% bitumen as the entire NG input before you get your final products of Gasoline and Diesel. This includes primarily coking and steam usage. With the coker as the main energy culprit vs refining lighter grades. The plants can and do burn the lighter fractions internally i.e butane and higher but these are marketable products and burning them in the refinery operations simply shifts the demand for NG to the petrochemical/plastic industry.

    Some links.

    http://www.energymanagertraining.com/petrochemical/pdf/RefiningIndustry-...

    http://gcep.stanford.edu/pdfs/2RK4ZjKBF2f71uM4uriP9g/Theresa_Hochhalter_...

    The second link has additional NG inputs as 26% of the overall input and internal gas as 53% obviously the heavier oils have less volatiles so the need for more external NG increases.

    Slide 9 is important since its C02 output this means you burned stuff to generate the C02
    a light refinery produces 12 ktonnes/kbd of C02 vs a heavy refinery at 48ktonnes/kbd about 4 times as much C02. Guessing that the internal volatile gas sources are 50% lower for the heavy crudes not only is it 4 times as much but your getting half as much from internal light fraction sources.

    On slide 8 they claim that the energy usage in refining based on C02 emissions is less that 10% of that emitted when the gasoline is burned since C02 is a almost perfect proxy for Btu's and assuming that this slide is using the less energy intensive results of light refining we can assume heavy refining is 4 times higher or 40% of the total vs 10% for light refining.

    I've come up with heavy crude refining consuming about 1:3 i.e one boe of NG per 3 barrels of oil.
    Going of of the C02 emissions it seems to imply 1:2.5 Btu or 0.16:2.5 BOE or 1:15 BOE of NG to Gasoline
    Take the gasoline fraction as 40% of a barrel and you get about 1:7 BOE NG to Oil barrel.

    Finally a barrel of oil is a volume concept not density heavy oil can be 40% more dense than the lighter oils
    once you try to work with weights not volumes it becomes clear that the uncertainty can readily be attributed to where and how they converted. Given the higher real density of the heavy crudes vs light you get different results and refinery gains using volume is completely wrong but its all we have.

    This is a really rough way to figure it out but and order of magnitude agreement is not that bad given these are completely different approaches. A 50% error term is not horrible :)

    The ballpark figure of 4 to 10 times as much NG usage for complex refining vs simple seems reasonable.

    You can also work backwards from the discounts for the heavy sour crudes plus price of NG to figure out the profitability of refining a heavy sour vs light sweet crude. Going that way you also get numbers similar to this approach.

    On a BTU basis in my opinion from everything I've read your probably not getting any real gain in net energy for when you process the residual oil via thermal coking. But what is clear is complex refining uses significantly more NG or produces significantly less gaseous products vs simple refining either way the net demand for NG is a lot higher.

    Hi memmel,

    I seriously doubt this is all the NG input before you get final refined gasoline and oil.

    I agree completely. That amount of NG is just required to to get the bitumen out of the ground and is not even close to the amount required to refine said bitumen into light sweet crude. Since Pitt's numbers were so far just the minimum amount of NG made it clear he was not seeing the picture correctly so I only posted those. I should have gone further so thanks for the detail.

    Don

    I seriously doubt this is all the NG input before you get final refined gasoline and oil.

    Of course; I was simply pointing out that the amount of natural gas needed to upgrade heavy oil (even bitumen) is very small.

    The amount of natural gas required to upgrade bitumen to API 31 is 220cf, and that puts it right on the borderline between light and medium crude (link) and not far below "generic light sweet". Accordingly, it should take neither more nor less natural gas to refine than any other medium-light crude oil, meaning that 220cf/bbl is the net additional natural gas requirement to obtain refined products from bitumen vs. a naturally-light oil.

    In other words, finding natural gas for upgrading heavy oil simply isn't going to be a problem. Either there's a reasonable amount of natural gas available - and, remember, the amount needed to upgrade heavy oil is under 0.1% of world supply - or there's barely any natural gas, which means upgrading heavy oil is likely to be the least of our concerns.

    we can assume heavy refining is 4 times higher or 40% of the total vs 10% for light refining.

    As a reminder, this doesn't apply to syncrude, as that's an API 31 oil, and so not heavy.

    You also can't assume this because you're basing it on other faulty assumptions; in particular, you're assuming that the 4x higher CO2 emissions of Refinery B represent 4x higher energy consumption, which of course is false. Refinery A is fuelled by natural gas and refinery B by fuel oil, and those two have a very different level of CO2 production per btu. (Slide 12 also points this out.)

    Not to mention that you're assuming "refinery A" and "refinery B" on slide 9 are giving you real numbers, rather than made-up numbers for explanatory purposes. No evidence that's true.

    I've come up with heavy crude refining consuming about 1:3 i.e one boe of NG per 3 barrels of oil.

    Roughly speaking, 1 boe = 6Mcf = 6Mbtu. 1Mbtu is currently about $8, meaning that you're claiming refining a barrel of heavy crude costs $16 in natural gas, above and beyond all the other costs of a refinery (in particular, capital costs). Crack spreads simply aren't that high.

    US refineries consumed 670Bcf in 2007, for all uses, while processing 5.5Bbbl of oil. That's an average of 120cf/bbl, so any estimate you come up with that's on average higher than that is known to be wrong.

    Moreover, most of that natural gas is used as fuel to heat the various processes - your own links make it clear that it's used for fuel. Accordingly, the amount that's used in refining to supply hydrogen is necessarily quite a bit less than 120cf/bbl. 120cf/bbl for 30Bbbl is 3.5% of world natural gas production, meaning that at most a couple percent of world natural gas production is used to supply hydrogen to oil refineries.

    You can also work backwards from the discounts for the heavy sour crudes plus price of NG to figure out the profitability of refining a heavy sour vs light sweet crude.

    You're falsely assuming that that price difference is due to the price of natural gas, rather than due to paying for (among other things) capital costs on cokers and other machinery needed to refine heavy crude. You really need to read RR's essay on assays and refining, and some of the links he gives. The need for hydrogen depends strongly on the refining method, and some (such as coking) require relatively little, even for heavy oils (see his response to the first comment). See also here, which points out that not only does coking not require hydrogen, catalytic reforming actually produces hydrogen.

    Plus, if you actually try looking at price differences in terms of natural gas prices, you find it doesn't work.

    I randomly picked a very heavy and a very light oil from here - API 40 Canadian Par and API 22 Canadian Lloyd - and compared the average annual price difference with the price of natural gas in that year. If your theory is correct - that most of that price difference is due to natural gas requirements - then that difference should be some constant number of Mcf of gas (since the quantity required for refining won't change).

    It wasn't - it varied from a low of 1.6x to a high of 3.2x, meaning that your estimation method doesn't work. Looking at monthly figures, it's even less valid - it varies from 1x to over 4x.

    Of course, months where the price difference was 1Mcf means that at most 1Mcf more gas is required to refine that heavy oil; since that price difference also needs to take into account the capital cost of the coker and other machinery, it's clear evidence that much, much less than 1Mcf of additional gas is used in the refining process. As 1Mcf is roughly 0.17boe, then, it's clear that your other methods of estimating are also wild over-estimates.

    Look, your ideas are interesting, but they'd be a lot more useful if you checked them for accuracy before running with them.

    Operating costs are approximately $6 per barrel at a gas price of $4 per thousand cubic feet.

    You're talking about process heat for SAGD production of bitumen; I'm talking about hydrogen inputs for upgrading bitumen. Those are completely different steps in the process!

    Step 1: use SAGD to produce bitumen. Uses $6 of gas.
    Step 2: upgrade bitumen to syncrude. Uses $1.60 of gas.
    Step 3: refine syncrude much like you'd refine WTI.

    When we're talking about the amount of natural gas required for refining heavy oil, it's totally irrelevant how much SAGD uses for heat. Two totally different things.

    I could duplicate these numbers from a myriad of sources.

    I'd rather you found numbers relevant to refining; that is what the discussion's about, after all.

    A real plant processes a sour medium weight crude and low sulfure resids.

    http://www.valero.com/AboutUs/Refineries/Houston.htm

    Its processing capabilities consist primarily of medium sour crudes and low-sulfur resids

    http://www.valero.com/AboutUs/Refineries/Houston.htm

    http://www.aspentech.com/publication_files/HydrocarbonEngineeringJan2005...

    Uses 17 MMSCFD of NG and used 135,000 bpd of oil.
    17000000/135000 = 125 cf per barrel.

    So one medium weight refinery used more NG then your 120 estimate.

    This refinery does not have a coker unit from what I could tell although the flow graph was unreadable for me.

    Nor did I include the Sweet Gas usage in the numbers.

    Thats at 28.6 MMSCFD.

    Next another refinery with a coker unit.

    http://www.co.contra-costa.ca.us/depart/cd/current/ConocoPhillipsDEIR/4....

    75,000 bpd

    Coker unit energy usage.

    449 mbtu/hr -> 10776 mbtu/day

    Assume:
    1516 Btu/scf -> 7MMSCFD

    Or 93 scf/barrel for the cocking unit alone if it was fired with natural gas.

    If it uses internal refinery gas then the effect is felt by former customers that don't get the refinery gas.

    Yeah ditto for gas. How many of the shale gas projects in North are even profitable at these prices? Where will the financing come from in the future if capital believes the extra gas will drive prices down?