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259 comments on DrumBeat: October 17, 2008
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259 comments on DrumBeat: October 17, 2008
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After watching the price of oil drop so drastically I have to say I now believe the price was run up by institutional investors IE non industrial users.
The world economy hasn't gotten beaten back so far in 3 months to justify a return to $60 oil. Therefore you can only assume that greed and speculative buying pumped it up to 147 and fear and speculative selling brought it right back down.
If they can unlock the credit markets then we have a good chance of seeing some great economic activity, like the return of the SUV. =-)
--Jack
Two words: Iron Ore. Iron ore exhibited nearly exactly the same price characteristics as oil: it shot up starting in the middle of this decade, topped out in July, and has crashed since.
However, there is no futures market in iron ore. There are no iron ore speculators, nor is there any way for institutional investors to push the price of iron ore up (or down).
So, I think you are incorrect when you say there is no other explanation. There is: supply & demand. And unlike yours, it explains both oil and iron ore.
eyeballing a trend from '02 to present, and eliminating the noise (too low in '06 and early '07 and too high until about oct 1), would put the trend at about $90 -$ 100.
i just dont see how there can be a trend lasting over 6 ys based upon speculation. and granted, the trend may be ready to change.
I would have to agree. If the "speculators" were falsely pushing price trends too high over such a long time, then inventory numbers should have crushed them with the reality. Of course that didn't happen, and over several years there was one reason after another to keep the pressure on price increases.
Gail has commented a few times, including yesterday, that much of the price drop is being caused by forced selling by hedge funds. Well, hedge funds are the epitomy of speculators, and therefore, they owned oil as speculation.
It can't be both ways. The price going up was supply and demand, but the price coming down is hedge funds selling.
Regardless, I still can't understand for the life of me why we even discuss it as an either/or situation. If demand was indeed exceeding supply, speculators would be foolish not to pile in and vice versa. I piled in while it was going up and bailed when it started going back down. And the day I get passed by a brand new Suburban on the way to work, I'll pile back in again. What can I say, I'm a speculator.
Should be a rule against using "I" five times in one paragraph.
It's Inevitable If I'm Invested In It.
Not the letter I the word I-the narcissism is the thing.
To whom should one attribute one's opinions?
Indeed; I interpret ideas individually, indicating intellectual independence.
Iron is the fourth most common element in the earth's crust.
http://www.windows.ucar.edu/tour/link=/earth/geology/crust_elements.html
A building and auto manufacturing recession along with the expansion of mining capacity during the boom cycle are contributing factors to the iron ore bust.
Oil is a bit different inasmuch as it supplies most of the world's transport fuel and was about one third of the total energy consumed in the Unites States. If there were no cartel + Russia then there might be no problem getting oil cheaper. Russian oil companies are so highly taxed they will be hard pressed to produce more as aging fields decline. Higher taxes limit the amount of oil that can be produced in the world.
When I am right, to me, otherwise be my quest.
Shargash -- I don't have the link but a couple of months ago I saw speculation regarding the iron ore price run up: a major mine in Australia was flooded and shut down production. This lost producion was at least a part of the reason.
As far as oil goes I'm still on the fence. Expectation of increasing prices helped run up oil prices to some degree IMO. How much of this expectation was caused by non-oil users I'm not sure. But as long as the crude exporters were expecting higher prices in the short term they were able to pressure the real crude buyers. And the crude buyers felt pressured to make their purchases at the sellers bid before prices rose even higher. Sometimes I just end up with the classic chicken or egg question.
Rockman, I'm confused. How is a supply reduction speculation? I think buyers, knowing a major source of iron ore was shut down, would be willing to pay higher prices almost immediately, but I wouldn't consider that speculation.
Here is my favorite narrative to explain how I see things working. Imagine that freakish weather in South & Central America wiped out 90% of the coffee crop a month before harvest. What should happen to coffee prices?
I would argue that coffee prices should go up immediately, even though there is not yet a coffee shortage. The mechanism by which the prices rise is "speculators" in the futures market performing the role of price discovery. So, lets say coffee prices triple because of that. Note that some people will say "speculators drove up the price of coffee beans". I believe this is an incorrect statement. The bad weather drove up the price of coffee beans. Speculators just realized that and tried to get in ahead of the shortage.
Now, lets say the damage to the crop turns out to be much less severe than predicted. What will happen to coffee prices? They will crash, though they still might be higher than they were before the bad weather. Some people will say, "it was all just a bubble caused by speculators." I believe that this too is incorrect. It is just market forces re-asserting themselves. When the coffee harvest comes in, and it is much better than expected, the specs who were long will get crushed. It is not possible for them to push coffee prices even higher. In other words, speculators lead expectations, but they cannot override fundamentals for any length of time.
All that having been said, I don't think it affects the point I was making in my reply to the original poster: intitutional investors did not drive iron ore prices up. Nor did speculators on the futures market, because there is none. Nor is there any evidence people were filling football stadiums with iron ore in an attempt to manipulate prices.
shargash, your argument seems to be one in favor of the Efficient-Market Hyposthesis, which asserts that at every moment stocks, bonds, commodities, or property price themselves in the market through attracting the input of all information relevant to their value.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Efficient_market_hypothesis
This theory originated in the 1960s with the likes of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School and gained dominance, both in economic and political circles, beginning in the 1980s.
Other economic schools articulate dissident theories that hold that markets are not always informed, rational or efficient. One of those that I find particularly appealing is that of the emotion theorists, which holds that markets have manic mood swings, first cavorting with financial utopianism and later sinking into bouts of despair.
DownSouth,
I think you're overstating my advocacy of efficient market theory. I think markets can get highly out of whack. What I do believe is that it is very difficult (if the market is relatively free) to override fundamentals for long.
Lets say speculators could drive the price of oil to $120/barrel, but there were not enough buyers for all the oil. Furthermore, lets say that the condition of "oversupply" held for weeks or months.
What I say will happen is that producers will either cut production to bring it back in line with demand, or they will lower prices enough to bring in more buyers. What will not happen is for speculators in the futures market to keep on pushing the price up to $130 and then $140 and have the producers sitting on ever-increasing oceans of oil they cannot sell. Even if they did, it would be impossible to hide the oceans of unsold oil.
Obviously, that's an oversimplification of the situation. There is not one oil market. Oil is not perfectly fungible. Information is not transmitted perfectly. However, in general I believe it to be correct. If there is too much oil for the demand, that oil will not be invisible, nor will it find its way back into the ground. There must be a reduction in production, an increase in inventories, or an increase in consumption (likely caused by a price reduction). That is more the first law of thermodynamics than it is efficient market theory.
I don't think you and I are very far apart in our beliefs, for I too believe that fundamentals will inexorably, with time, assert themselves. That said, could we not now be in a period where "emotion" has pushed the price of oil down below fundamentals, or where things are in such a state of caos that the fundamentals have become obscured?
Another big question is what one means when one says "for long." For a trader the important time frame might be a day or a week, maybe up to six months. For an investor, like Warren Buffet, it may be 5 or 10 years. For someone like Nate Hagens, who concerns himself with long-term implications, it might be 20 or 50 or 100 years.
I think a lot of controversy arises due to the fact that different people have different fields of vision.
I don't think we're very far apart either.
Part of the problem of this debate is that the terms are not very well defined (exactly what is a speculator, anyway?), and the argument tends to shift grounds over the course of a single exchange of comments.
I am pretty sure that leverage unwinding, the credit crunch, the effects of the two hurricanes, and speculators' expectations of future economic weakness, have pushed oil prices down farther than is justified by supply and demand. In other words, I think the market is out of whack. I don't think it will stay that way for long, but it might have to wait "for the coffee bean harvest to come in", as it were, before it gets back in whack.
And that belief is not at all inconsistent with the idea that the large majority of the run up in oil prices in recent years. The run down in prices is still too recent to be able to say how much is fundamentals and how much is (temporary) maladjustment caused by other factors.
As far as speculation goes one would think that it works both ways with speculators able to push up prices beyond what a well informed market would agree to and below what a well informed market would agree to pay either by simply leaving the market or actively pushing down the price under false assumptions.
Speculators are often the consumers of the real product Southwest airlines certainly speculated in the oil market and lost big time short term. The entire reason for the speculative futures market by definition is to allow the real consumers to offset price risk. A big part of modern speculative markets is to allow non-consumers to enter via cash transactions. These cash speculators add liquidity to a market. But everyone is speculating and you have winners and losers. And since the market is not well informed it will swing potentially wildly around the informed market price.
What I often find funny is people seldom consider that speculation can also result in lowering the price of something below its true market value. Certainly in housing where the goods are durable speculators not only caused a huge run up in prices but also resulted in the housing market moving to devastatingly low prices overtime as the oversupply causes far more money to be lost than was ever made on the upside.
With oil however its slightly different since oil is consumed and not durable or replaceable.
As speculators that forced the price to high leave the market and prices fall below the informed markets price the net result is that demand that would have been suppressed from the high prices is not suppressed. This is outside the real changes in demand and supply whats happened is more people will delay reducing demand for longer. Thus unlike housing any perceived oversupply can and will be cleared by the market simply via deferment of any demand suppression to a future date. Far worse this condition leads to those who would have differed demand assuming that because prices experienced one large decline next time they increase the same thing will happen further ensuring deferment of future demand suppression.
Back to the real world this can probably explain why VMT does not drop dramatically in regions experiencing recession or depression economics we are all optimists and willing to try to maintain our current lifestyles under the false hope that things will get better. I've certainly fallen into this trap myself. I assure its not fun realizing that my current lifestyle is probably at its peak under common consumption criteria. I may be able to live happier in the future but it won't be via net gains in consumption.
So overall in the case of commodities that are declining in volume the long term trend is relentless and the ability of speculators to lower prices is weaker than the ability of speculators to increase prices. What this means is that periods of significant downward price movements are much shorter than periods of upwards price movements. We have seen a five year bull market in crude prices with practically all averages showing strong increases in prices.
I'd be surprised to see this bear market last one year time will tell of course but I'd not be surprised to see the oil market shape up to be basically five years up six months down.
I've actually figured that we would get effectively consolidation or price stalls at around 200 a barrel then 300 a barrel then 500 a barrel then 800 a barrel with further price increases becoming more and more difficult. I don't know what the total average price will be for 2008 and I did not expect a consolidation point at this price but I'll freely admit I never thought about it basically for whatever the reasons the market has consolidated at 100 a barrel. Once this is done our next reasonable consolidation point is at the next doubling i.e 200 a barrel.
We will see if I'm right but given the way I view how markets work the runnup to 200 a barrel should be very solid given the nature of this early unexpected consolidation and its overswing on the down side. Thus 70 dollar or 60 dollar oil wherever it stops pretty much ensures the run to the next consolidation point is assured. Also I suspect the next downward swing will be lower and more muted then the current one. This time it was about 50% next time say 25% then 12% etc with the volatility dampening each time. Given the long bull run in crude prices this retrenchment is actually not all that large.
I do believe that speculation played a role in the height of the recent oil price run up and I don't believe markets are perfectly efficient. Nevertheless, I offer another view point. Supply and demand was not the mechanism pushing prices to their highest levels. Rather, speculators, using the best information available to them correctly recognized oil is worth a lot more in future value than current value. The increasing likelihood of global recession and the speed with which financial markets collapsed surprised many very smart people. I don't know how to value oil today - recovery, recession or depression would seem to produce different outcomes.
Nor would I shargash. The same point as you: decreased commodity = increased prices.
But they might be flying it around in planes.
If they just piled it up at a quarry somewhere, with no magnetite stabilization field, and it blew, how would we know? Quarries are supposed to be giant holes in the ground.
--- G.R.L. Cowan, author of How fire can be tamed
There are different types of mines. Iron ore mines are large holes in the ground. You can walk away from one, shut it down for a year, no problem.
Other kinds of mines can be ruined by walking away from them for one week. They flood, collapse, catch fire, explode, whatever.
For iron ore mines, the way you stockpile ore is to lay off the third shift and just don't mine ore for a while. Stockpile by leaving it in the ground.
Same with Oil....leave it in the ground.
IMO there are two types of people dealing on the futures market, large numbers of gamblers who never take delivery and relatively few hedgers who will actually take delivery.
The people who will actually take delivery of the oil and consume it pay the price that the gamblers have agreed at that moment - the final price on settlement day when 'spot price'='futures price' is only relevent to the gamblers.
Our various markets have been deliberately set up to facilitate normal buying/selling and gambling - the gambling 'tail' in many markets is now 'wagging the dog'!
It is possible that speculators/governments that have actually taken delivery and paid for storage are emptying their tanks at the moment. Is there any data available that would tell us how much WTI is stored at Cushing for instance?
I think that we are in the eye of the energy storm. It's a period of deceptive calm.
westexas, you said something yesterday, late in the day, that many may have missed, but I think merits repeating:
Can anyone argue with a straight face that, with non-OPEC production, that hasn't happened in the last five years?
Am I the only person who believes this opens the door for OPEC to establish an effective cartel, at least until the same thing happens to them?
I'm working on 20 minute talk on Peak Oil, Peak Exports and the 'burbs, as an intro to Alan Drake's presentation on 10/24 at SMU: Rail Here, Rail Now, Pay Less (because you are taking electrified mass transit). I'm going to probably lead off with this slide--the Texas & North Sea peaks lined up with each other (two regions developed by private companies, using the best available technology, with virtually no restrictions on drilling):
SMU Conference: http://smu.edu/esp/Lectures/eot%20symposium.htm
Texas today is an oil importer, y'all do not produce enough oil to meet your own demand.
I wonder when Texas went from exporter to importer and if a plot could be created of Texas ELM ?
Best Hopes,
Alan
I'm going to probably lead off with this slide--the Texas & North Sea peaks lined up with each other
Didn't that graphic previously have Texas and Saudi? ;-)
Seriously, though, have you dropped Texas as your model for Saudi?
Why not line up all three?
How about a lineup of geologically diverse regions, for example:
North America (Mexico + USA + Canada) in black
versus WORLD in blue?
Here is a link to my most recent presentation (July), at Sandia Labs, in which I used both the Texas/Saudi production plots, as well as the Texas/North Sea plots (and I will use the Texas/Saudi plots in Dallas):
http://mediasiteson.sandia.gov/Mediasite/Viewer/Viewers/Viewer320TL.aspx...
In the Sandia Labs presentation, I noted the 2006 and 2007 Saudi production declines, as well as the 2008 rebound, to an annual level below their 2005 rate. As you know, Stuart's objection, in March, 2007, to the HL model for Saudi Arabia was that the production decline was sharper than what the HL model suggested that it would be. I replied that was one of the reasons that I expected to see a rebound in production ("albeit to a level well below their 2005 rate.") Granted, I have been surprised by the magnitude of the (apparent) rebound in Saudi production, but the fact remains that the Saudis are going to show three straight years of annual production below their 2005 rate--at about the same stage of depletion at which the prior swing producer, Texas, started declining. We shall see what happens in 2009.
And of course, the really important metric--net oil exports--looks worse. I estimate that Saudi net oil exports in 2008 will be about 700,000 bpd below their 2005 rate. The cumulative shortfall between what the Saudis would have (net) exported at their 2005 rate and what they have actually exported will almost certainly exceed a billion barrels of oil next year.
BTW, the real strength of the HL model is that it gives us a plausible estimate for cumulative production, i.e., the area under the curve (which was my reason for warning, in January, 2006, of a near term resumption in the decline in Russian production).
In any case, Texas produced about 3.5 mbpd in 1972 and Saudi Arabia produced about 9.6 mbpd in 2005 (C+C in both cases). If Texas had maintained its 1972 rate, it would have produced about 3.8 Gb in the three years after 1972. It actually produced about 97% of this amount through 1975. If Saudi Arabia had maintained its 2005 rate, it would have produced about 10.5 Gb in the three years after 2005. It looks like they will have produced about 95% of this amount through 2008 (about 10 Gb).
To give everyone some idea of how much oil 10 Gb is, this is about twice the URR of the East Texas Field, the largest Lower 48 field, and not too far below the URR of the Prudhoe Bay Field, the largest US oil field.
Once the "cheaper" commodity is moved out, it will not be
replaced.
Who would? Ex. farmers wouldn't dream of planting $6 soy
now. Or $3 wheat. None of the inputs, freight rates can come down
fast enough.
Agreed.
Extreme volatility has been totally expected, but most I speak to forget volatility includes up AND down.
What we have is extreme volatility as market participants react to new information. This volatility can create false signals. Hence, the "deceptive calm".
Dispatch
Or, as one gentleman put it, a Head Fake.
I recall seeing a plot of, I believe it was whale oil prices, on this or a related site a while back. As the supply of the commodity peaked, it went through a series of gyrations, eventually settling toward the low end as whale oil was replaced by rock oil.
It is early yet, and a replacement for rock oil is not on the horizon but, doesn't it make sense that there will be a series of wild price swing as the market lurches from crisis to crisis? ... first you have the price runup, then some demand destruction, then a recovery, and another runup ... markets tend to overshoot and undershoot in dynamic circumstances. They are only 'clever' when there is constant supply, or constantly increasing supply.
Eventually we'll be using some other form of power. Electric? Animal? Hydro? Probably some combination of all three.
One thing about whale oil and prices you did not have access to the whalers while they where at see on their long whale voyages. The whale oil market was thus probably experienced more price volatility then we should see today. I'd be careful translating the price volatility from a period of very constrained information to our modern society. Indeed rumor and its effects on prices seem more common place in the past than today. Not that rumors and emotion are not important today but we probably have much better data on our oil stocks then what they had in the 1880's on the whaling fleet and its catch.
I'm not saying it won't be volatile but the current move is probably caused by a number of factors that won't be present going forward. Its a fairly unique set of conditions that allowed it to come to pass. I think todays surprising moves have a lot more to do with incorrect understanding of fairly correct information not outright rumors which probably drove prices around a bit in the 1800's this distinction is in my opinion important.
Not that we won't see steep downward movements and volatility going forward but the down sides will probably not be as deep nor as prolonged.
The head fake link you replied to mentioned that world consumption fell by 13% during the last major oil shock/recession in the 1980's. We have claims the US has fallen by 8% so far this year. Given the changes in oil usage since the 1980's one would readily expect that further falls in US consumption even to 13% will be more difficult. Worldwide its not clear that the rest of the world has experienced as steep of a drop.
Assuming we did decline by 8% and that the rest of the world has probably increased slightly this year the US does not have a lot of room left for further decreases.
Lets say oil prices get back on track and start increasing again the next consolidation point we would have say 4-5% at most we can decrease without getting below the last historical min in consumption. The one after that will be exponentially harder to cause a usage decrease.
Regardless of the reason the US at least has unfortunately blown a good bit of its ability to decrease consumption early in the peak oil game. Even if its closer to a 5% annual decline or less its still a substantial decrease very early in the post peak period. Further decline in consumption in the US will not do a lot to help soften prices going forward.
Given the changes in how oil is used I think we will have a much harder time getting additional decreases. In the 1980's the unemployment rate and decline in production where fairly close numerically i.e a 13% unemployment meant a 13% decline in oil usage. This time around I'd suggest its more like 2:1 not one to one with a 10% unemployment figure needed for a 5% decline in oil usage and a 20% unemployment to get a 10% decline. If you correct our consumption for the outright shortages caused by the hurricane this is probably pretty close to what we will see this year.
20% unemployment is getting well into depression levels of unemployment. Further consumption declines beyond this get even harder as unemployment much higher than 20% probably means outright economic collapse to much lower subsistence living standards as you simply lose the ability to produce regardless of demand.
All my scenarios actually assume that well before we fall into outright unemployment and serious demand destruction we will first default on our personal debts primarly credit card loans, home loans, and car loans. This staves off the point at which the population not involved in the financial, auto or housing industry enter a depression.
Indeed if you look around our depression seems to be exactly following this scenario with consumer debt defaults leading us into this depression. And I've said a zillion times that this first round of demand destruction is primarily driven by the collapse of the housing industry which is a one time event. And additional decreases in demand right now are probably better defined as demand suppression in fact probably almost all concentrated in the regions of the country that have suffered outright shortages.
So overall going forward one would expect that the debt bubble will continue to deflate the housing construction industry is toast and for the most part these are normal folks who will take lower paying jobs to make ends meet. Thus consumption from former construction workers will not drop all that much outside of the one time exodus of illegal aliens back to their home countries. Same of course with the financial and auto industry these workers can and will take lower paying jobs pushing more native American workers into competition with illegal immigrants that stay in the country. Again overall its not a fast destruction in demand at best slow to stagnant. Massive credit destruction but thats not oil demand. Finally only when low wage jobs are no longer available and you have outright unemployment do you start getting into real demand destruction.
We have a long long way to go here and the whole time oil prices can rise much higher as for the rest of the world follows a similar path behind us. Until the credit bubble is well popped which could take several years we really don't enter a real depression.
As long as home loans exist for less than 20% down for example we are still no where near the bottom and in fact in my opinion until 50% is the norm for home and auto loans I won't call the credit bubble dead. It could take five years before we finally give up on loaning money thats not effectively fully secured. And this implies a effectively complete cessation of the use of unsecured credit card debt.
Only at this point is the economy reached the level that further declines in oil consumption have to come from either fairly major lifestyle changes or outright economic destruction.
I strongly believe that as long as credit is extended then people will use it to maintain their lifestyles and this includes oil consumption only once credit is wrung out of the system effectively completely do we finally reach the point that people can no longer easily absorb higher oil prices and we finally start seeing oil prices stagnate as attempts to increase prices in a economy thats effectively all cash and not growing simply results in some true demand destruction forcing prices back down or slowly growing. Until we reach this point overall oil prices will continue to rise and credit will continued to be destroyed as people default on long term debt and unsecured debt.
Problem:
Your scenario started back when Nixon depegged the $ from gold.
We're at the end of your scenario now.
Collpase will be rapid from here on out.
The Baltic dry Index has been in free fall since the Olympics.
Opium is disappearing from world markets.-BBC from latoc
"Ukraine emerged yesterday as the winner of the title “the next Iceland”, with the International Monetary Fund offering the former Soviet republic up to $14bn (£8bn) to shore up its financial system. An IMF delegation landed in the country on Wednesday to try to stabilise the country’s battered banking sector and ailing currency, hit hard by the global financial crisis. The central bank was forced to impose restrictions on deposit withdrawals and lending after panicked savers rushed to empty their accounts, draining the banking system of more than $1.3bn. The authorities also had to rescue two key banks and battle a sharp fall in the currency as the stock market plunged."-cryptogon
I don't disagree but it could easily take 2-5 years to wring out our credit excesses.
The central bank can and will do everything in there power to prevent it.
Consider that in the US most of the home loans made with 3% down in 2008 are already underwater. Credit cards are still being extended to consumers etc etc.
This continued availability of credit will continue for some time. The underlying problem is that the money multiplier effect of fractional banking and inflationary curriencies are not all that useful in a economy thats stagnant or shrinking. The wealth of the banks was based on fractional banking coupled with enough inflation to keep defaults low.
Thus the current corner stones of wealth transfer in our society have become irrelevant they won't go down without a fight.
The financials are in the glow of the footlights.
There is no direction because the consumption picture is framed by the depth of the recession-to-come. The currency/interest rate issues seem to be too frightening for the mainstream economists to face. The "deceptive calm" is in the bond market ... the world is indeed holding its breath.
Long bond Treasury yields are 4.12%; 10 year 3.87%. How high will yields go? 8 - 9% is the danger point. It's not that far away.
Since nobody knows right now (and won't even investigate) how far into recession we will go, nobody can calculate the extent of government borrowing. consequently, nobody knows at what the (low) level of output and taxable receipts will be after next year. What future rates our overseas creditors will demand for repayment are hard to calculate.
Unfortunately, there is no financial equivalent to Matt Simmons.
If anyone could calculate what the future would look like, no one would believe it.
To the extent that the press of peak oil can be expected to get worse and worse over time, we are likely to have more and more inflation (if money supply is constant) and more and more defaults. Interest rates will keep going up.
Once our creditors catch on to peak oil, they will realize we will never pay them back. In fact, any country with even a moderate amount of debt will have trouble paying debt back.
It is hard to see how this will end well. The system looks like it will break down.
Gail I'm saying the same thing. Peak oil induced price increases end when debt is not longer extended without being fully secured. Between now and then all thats going to happen is endless defaults and devaluation of anything that takes a significant amount of debt to either purchase or peruse. And as long as this debt keeps getting extended some of the credit will make its way into paying for oil whatever the price. Thus oil prices stop increasing only when debt is removed from the system. Effectively this means only when the economy accepts that it is stagnant to declining and can no longer grow.
A perfect example of debt being converted to purchasing gasoline is the person who defaults on his mortgage then lives rent free for six months or more. This entire time he is using the cover of defaulted debt to purchase gasoline. A better example is someone running up their credit cards using them in part to finance gasoline purchases then defaulting. A whole lot of gasoline has and will be bought in the US using credit with no intention of paying back the loans. On a bigger scale you get companies exhausting their credit lines and using this money in part to pay for goods and pay employees a precentage of this debt goes into purchasing gasoline and other oil based products and energy and once its defaulted on the energy has been used and not paid for.
I wonder how much energy and esp oil is being used today via credit purchases that will be defaulted on in the near future or via cash flow thats been freed up by earlier defaults. I suspect a LOT. Until we get down to the point that only real cash customers are available for oil prices can and will increase. Once its true cash transactions then people can finally decide if they want to spend real money on oil or invest in a longer term alternative.
I made a small addition (only about 1% of my cash) into an income mutual fund yesterday, the yield over 9%! I think for anything that isn't absolutely government guaranteed, the markets are already pricing debt/credit at those sorts of rates. Thirty year fixed rate mortages, if you can get them are something like 6 and three quarters. I heard of a Puerto-Rican tax free issue (govt backed) offered at six and a half. Unless the risk perception drops dramatically, I'd say we are near your danger point already.
China has 500 years of revenge bottled up. The Chinese will allow the Rothschilds to make them richer and in return, the Rothschilds will get some of this SWF in the form of fees. But the end will be the Chinese taking over.-Elaine Supkis
Immanuel Wallerstein argues there hasn't been a significant revolution in 500 years.
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/10/where-are-food-prices...
And Mish misses it as well, me thinks.
deflation is grabbing hold while everyone is addressing the old status quo of inflation meaning oil, et al is cheaper.
Farmers will be crushed next year trying to duplicate this year's efforts.
http://www.investmenttools.com/futures/bdi_baltic_dry_index.htm
The BDI is STILL falling. If ships aren't moving bulk commodities
are not moving. Globalization has fractured. According to technicians, the odds are now 100% that BDI rises at least 100% from here.
How? Why would shipping rates double? With this systemic crisis
still unfolding? Gold tells the story. The price keeps falling,
but it's getting harder to find the physical commodity.
In the US, at some point, we will reach the corporation that will be told that there's no "unlimited dollars" for you. That point will be like Sodium hitting water.
The gold thing is scary: Coins are expensive and hard to locate in quantity, but it's not reflected in GLD.
It's not about a deflation of the economy, it's a deflation in the faith we have in the economy, as reflected in our declining willingness to accept paper proxies for wealth.
Agreed:
I call my supplier every week and very little is available. 80% silver dimes, Mexican 1oz silver..... He didn't even bother going today. If the real stuff is hard to get, are certificates worth anything?
One of the talking heads on CNBC said paper gold is as useful as a picture of a life raft.
That's actually a brilliant metaphor!
But it's nothing more than a paper life raft. Best thing is to have the real thing where you can put you hands on it. John
The Rothschilds will get Shockwave Flash from China?
shargash -
I think one can take the comparsion between the market for oil and the market for iron ore only so far. While there are of course similarlities, there are also major differences.
First: Oil is used mainly for transportation, heating, and some electrical generation - the production of petrochemicals being a relatively small fraction of the whole. However, iron ore is almost totally used for the production of iron and steel and is therefore almost totally tied to heavy manufacturing. Oil functions more as a utility.
Second: Iron ore is nowhere nearly as fungible as oil. Crude oil is far more of a high-value product, having a dollars-per-ton selling price typically 5 or more times that of iron ore pellets. Therefore, transportation costs are a far more important factor for iron ore in comparison to crude oil. As a result, the links between supplier and user are usually closer together geographically for iron ore compared to crude oil due to this transportation factor.
Third: I am a bit shaky on this one, but I strongly suspect that most of the large iron ore producers use a higher percentage of their output for domestic production or iron and steel (though the a large percentage of the downstream products might be exported).
Fourth: The production and distribution of iron ore doesn't have a fraction of the geopolitical problems associated with it as oil. (When was the last time you heard someone talking about going to war for iron ore?)
Fifth: Oil refiners appear to be operating more and more in a just-in-time inventory mode. Given the size of iron ore stockpiles at major integrated steel mills, I don't think that is the case for iron ore. (Though in the US part of the reason for the large stockpiles is that shipping on the Great Lakes is sharply curtailed during the winter.)
All of the above work to make iron ore a much 'quieter' commodity than oil and one not quite subject to the same forces or in the same way. This make me suspect that the market for iron ore works more along the lines of Economics 101 type of supply and demand than does oil.
Some of what you say about iron ore is true. However, there is a big international iron ore market. Because of the lack of a futures market, it is not that easy to discover what recent iron ore prices actually have been. Most of what I've been able to discover about recent prices comes from news stories about big deals between, say, Rio Tinto and China.
However, I think what you have posted reinforces my point. If iron ore is a much "quieter" commodity than oil, then why did it run up so much? And if it ran up so much, why couldn't the same cause be behind oil's (the more volatile commodity) run up?
Every industrial commodity shot up in price: oil, molebdynum, copper, natural gas, coal, iron ore, you name it, EVERYTHING. When that happens it is highly likely that the run up has a common cause, rather than a separate cause for each case. The pro-speculator people have argued that speculators are the common cause. This is clearly not the case for iron ore, and I think it pretty much kills that argument.
I argue that the common cause was supply and demand: in particular, stunningly rapid growth in asia coupled with a general "diminishing returns" on resource production from late-stage industrial society. That hypothesis fits all the known facts (which "blame the speculators" does not), and it has solid supporting evidence (which "blame the speculators" does not).
shargash -
Much of what you say is true.
However, the thing that makes a lot of people suspicious about the purely supply & demand argument is the fact that the run-up and the subsequent run-down happened so incredibly fast. How did the global supply/demand dynamics worsen so incredibly rapidly on the eve of the price run-up, and how did it relax so incredibly rapidly on the down side?
In other words, what physically changed so drastically and so uniformly in such a short period of time? I can see prices gradually building up to high levels, plateauing there for a while, and then gradually sinking as demand started to weaken. But this whole erratic price behavior seems to have been at least partially decoupled from the actually phsyical facts on the ground. It's as if a super-tanker made a complete U-turn in the space of 10 seconds.
That is the thing that keeps nags at me.
Joule, one of the things that shifts the demand curve around is a change in expectations. Expectations can turn on a dime--and the expectations for change in the demand for oil can be amplified far beyond what they would be if everyone were rational and perfectly informed.
Don,
You hit the nail on the head with respect Helicopter Ben's background and determination to avoid a deflationary collapse last year. Any more recent thoughts? Do you think we're heading for deflationary or inflationary times?
Arbitrarily, I now put the odds of increasing inflation (anything from seventies style stagflation up to and including eventual hyperinflation) at 50% and a severe deflationary depression at 50%. I see no chance of stable prices in the next twenty years.
Helicopter Ben has not yet brought out his Big Helicoptor Fleet--the outright monetizing of the debt by having the Fed buy greater and greater amounts of Treasury securities to finance rapidly increasing deficits. But if U.S. government deficits get into the multitrillion dollar range I expect the Fed to buy up U.S. bills, notes, and bonds--because nobody else will want them due to inflation fears. Don't worry about China selling U.S. securities; the Fed can always buy what China (or anybody) wants to sell.
Much depends on political factors. If Obama is elected with a strong Democratic Congress I think the response to rising unemployment will be a typically Keynesian one--cut income taxes and raise government spending to stimulate aggregate demand. We might be hugely lucky and have huge public works to build streetcar lines and do the rest of Alan Drake's proposals plus spending a trillion dollars or so per year on wind turbines and solar panels and beefing up the electrical grid. Actually, a trillion dollars a year isn't enough--either for expansionary fiscal policy or to respond to peak oil, but it would be a start.
One argument against a deflationary depression is that the amount of bad debt in the whole world is limited--very large but finite. With expansionary fiscal policy the ability of the Fed to create money and the government to spend it is unlimited. The Fed is the lender of last resort, and the U.S. Treasury is the borrower and spender of last resort.
Elected governments tend to cut taxes and raise spending, because nobody likes taxes and everybody likes to get money from the government. Thus the long term tendency--even while real GDP declines year after year due to declining net oil exports--is toward more inflation.
True but we this little problem of oil imports. One thing I've noticed is that extreme inflation only happens after a economy has become economically isolated. You can look at countless examples show me one where international trade remained brisk while the country inflated like mad. I don't know of a single case.
Thus to play the final inflation end game oil imports would have to be sharply curtailed or outright cease otherwise increasing oil prices effectively suck the money right out of the country as spiraling import prices.
Its a checkmate situation that seems to prevent attempts to finally inflate away a fiat currency. To some extent you could look at Japan which imports all of its oil as and example of a country that failed to inflate despite every attempt to do so. Every attempt to inflate simply resulted in the cash draining out as higher import costs.
Certainly this is a bit simplistic but it does raise the issue that any country that imports vital raw materials or food probably cannot play the inflation game with abandon.
Smaller countries can isolate themselves and do it but not ones that form the backbone of the global economy regardless of their desire. I'm not saying they won't try but they will simply stoke the fires of commodity prices at every attempt.
However inflation via public expenditure that reduces imports esp oil seems quite feasible.
It effectively keeps the money at home strengthening wages and reducing the amount that leaves the country for imports. Devalued money that leaves the country to pay off past debts does not matter since in the end it would generally be spent on exports.
Theoretically the drill baby drill campaign can do the same thing and I think all sides recognize the need for "energy independence" people that look at the problem a bit deeper hopefully realize that its needed to allow one last inflationary blow out of the fiat currencies without it we are stuck in a endless deflationary cycle.
Going back to WWII it should be noted that inflation only finally took hold once the War itself isolated the worlds economy. Germany of course was the exception as it never really reintegrated after WWI.
Now for the even more devious minded soul like our esteemed leaders who understand this.
They realize the other trick is to adopt a world wide currency then spread the final fiat inflationary collapse over the entire world.
But its best not to encourage these megalomaniacs even though I fear they already have it figured out.
I don't think we will go to hyperinflation either intentionally or soon. But when oil exporting countries go to zero net exports (pretty soon according to westexas), we won't have to worry about paying for oil that cannot be produced or that will not be exported.
From a political point of view, the beauty of increasing inflation (especially if this is done without people anticipating it) is that it erases debt and makes bad debts (e.g. my mortgage) into good ones by raising asset prices. Also inflation wipes out most savings held in the form of money or bonds or anything else tied to money. Thus creditors (lenders and savers) get the shaft while debtors get relief. There are way more debtors than there are creditors--that's what John Maynard Keynes meant by his phrase "the political superiority of the debtor class."
To a large extent, the history of money is the history of inflations interrupted by a few periods (e.g. 1814-1913) of stable prices (though there was great inflation during the Civil War; the English pound [the dominant trading currency] was more stable). Even the Great Depression lasted only eleven or twelve years.
If the fed were to calibrate its stimulatory use of the printing press to exactly compensate for the money going down the deleveraging black hole, wouldn't that be inflation neutral? Of course that may not leave enough scope to fully stimulate the economy. But, at least an argument can be made that a certain very substantial amount of stimulus can be used before inflation kicks in.
Ah,
Don Sailorman you are back.
I trust you and yours are well and that you enjoyed your anabasis.
Thank you. It is good to be back. All is well with me; for one thing I have nothing invested in stocks, bonds, or commodities. Actually, not everything is well; I've been trying to sell my house and find no buyers at a price substantially less than I paid five years ago. I plan to move in with my daughter and granddaughter, thus "walking the walk" in addition to "talking the talk."
Don -
I realize that expectations can change quite rapidly and that expectations can affect price. This is what speculation and hedging are all about.
However, the argument I frequently hear at TOD is that short-term speculation, hedging, or whatever you want to call it does not and cannot have much effect on the price of oil. This argument goes on to maintain that it is 'the fundamentals' of supply and demand of real oil produced and real oil consumed that ultimately controls the price of oil. (The term 'real oil' here refers to oil that comes out of a well and is then actually used by someone - as opposed to 'paper oil' in the form of future contracts traded by people never intending to ever take delivery).
And this is where I have a problem. Unless I am mistaken, the amount of oil produced and the amount of oil consumed were not all that radically different shortly before the sharp run-up in oil prices as compared to after the sharp drop-off in oil prices. There was neither a sudden major drop off in production nor a sudden major increase in oil usage in the time period leading up to the sharp run-up in oil prices. The reverse is also true for the time period following the sharp drop-off in oil prices. Thus, I think it is hard to explain the wild price swings solely by 'the fundamentals' of physical production and physical consumption.
If 'expectations' are the culprit, then as I see it, those sorts of expectations would appear to be decoupled more than just a bit from the physical reality of production and consumption. Dare we call this speculation?
Anyway, when this subject comes up, I sometimes feel like someone just told a joke but I'm the only one in the room who doesn't get it.
In the long run, fundamentals rule and expectations will converge toward reality. Of course, as Keynes said, in the long run we're all dead.
Hedge funds speculate; that's all they do. They have been involved with recent volatility in oil prices for sure. Thus, to some extent speculation has affected oil prices, and of course hedge funds are not the only speculators around. However, even without speculation (e.g. the iron ore market) there can be tremendous volatility as expectations shift rapidly and far.
Thanks Don -
So, then would I be correct in saying that you DO believe that hedge funds and other speculators have had a not insignificant effect on the recent large oil price swings?
I wish you would tell that to the many people here at TOD who have automatically pooh-poohed any conjecture whatsoever that something other than real oil consumption in relation to real oil production has been at work here. While I found some of their arguments persuasive, I've always had a gut feeling that something about those arguments was leaving something very important out of the picture.
Of course, I suppose we can then all argue about what time frame constitutes the short-term versus the long run.
For some reason I have no idea everyone seems to assume that speculation and real oil levels are two different issues and cannot occur simultaneously. Everything I see about the market this year indicates prices rose because of demand for oil and supply problems earlier in the year this surge enticed more people in to speculate on oil driving the price up by about 20 dollars.
Next the price went down because Saudi Arabia unleashed a large short burst of oil right when seasonal demand was waning and prices where at their highest. Demand was dropping naturally prices where somewhat inflated and the global oil supply situation changed dramatically leading to a price drop. Notice I said global here because its been a pretty strange year this oil surge did not head to the US. The US which was buying oil like crazy at the high prices and had built up a large excess of gasoline then proceeded to not but all the way down as prices fell the US allowed both oil and gasoline to drop down to MOL.
Why I have no idea in any case we then got wacked by hurricanes and only recently received a decent surge of oil.
This was posted on PeakOil.com
http://www.peakoil.com/post794428.html#794428
Real oil played a huge role in both the price run up and decline.
Speculation near sent prices slightly higher then the should have gone as the US kept on buying oil even as it built up a large surplus of gasoline.
The only point at which it seems and sort of serious price manipulation happened started in Sept when the US did not have enough oil or gasoline and we had the hurricanes but at this point all hell was breaking out in the financial world forcing hedge funds to dump their oil positions and this is still going on.
You can look at distillate and propane data to get a better feel for markets that did not have such interesting dynamics. This was not a good year for either. Distillates are esp worrisome. The biggest point however is Distillates and propane did not follow the wild gyrations of gasoline and oil inventories which moved exactly opposite to price.
I don't know of another year where gasoline stocks built while oil was the most expensive then both gasoline and oil stocks where allowed to decline as oil prices fell.
I have my own opinions but its clear that real oil and real gasoline played a large role in the price movements. Speculation at best played a role for a few weeks and certainly forced selling has played a large role over the last few months.
For oil you always have to look at both factors in a sense generally from what I've seen I've felt that speculative pressure can add a ten or at most a twenty dollar premium on the high side. I believe this year for various reasons we have seen downward speculative pressure during the second half of the year. Give it the same ability say lower prices by 10-20 dollars then the absolute extremes you could get from speculative pressure would be 40 dollars. Indeed we saw oil go to 140 and it tried very hard to find a floor price around 100. Then we finally got things running after the hurricanes and received a healthy does of imports for the first time since May. This coupled with extreme negative speculation going on as people are forced to sell oil futures for cash at the moment did the final push downwards.
Can it go lower maybe more oil seems to be headed our way 60 is now not a impossibility. However everything I've read indicates that the flow of oil to the US will decline quite rapidly over the next few weeks and it seems certain that imports will be unseasonably low for sure after the first week in November ( how convenient ).
And last but not least I have my own theories about heavy sour and NG and they indicate that the first half of 2008 light sweet crude was in distinctly short supply and became readily available at the same time Saudi surged supply. Not only was it a surge in barrels but it was a surge of light sweet crude on a strained market. And most of it did not go to the US but out to the world market. Given that NG prices have remained low I think the recent build up is also light sweet. The fairly high recent gasoline builds coupled with low NG prices makes me believe this is the case.
Going forward we probably will see strong price increases up towards 200 as KSA cuts back to rest its fields I have to thing they gave 110% to move the oil market this year. And they will be able to blame speculative forces throughout most of the year.
So at the end of the day KSA has managed to turn six months of with holding light sweet of the market followed by a 60 day surge then a month later a smaller 30 day surge for a total of 90 days of excessive light sweet crude on the market into a huge political win for them long term. Its been a impressive series of moves.
I doubt that this wild ride will be repeated any time soon it I suspect at least four years :)
Note the main reducing agent for iron ore is low sulphur coking coal which has its own supply issues. India for example has its own iron ore but not enough coking coal. I believe export spot prices for coking coal near doubled in the past two years and are still holding up somewhat.
I'd still say supply and demand. OPEC finally stopped talking and actually did (at least temporarily) surge production to the highest level in 3 years. There may be some debate about the actual figures but there's no doubt that world oil production (and exports) jumped considerably in 2008 until, coupled with the Olympics and recession, supply exceeded demand for the first time since the price run up began.
Can you guess what will happen to the oil price soon if the recent downward production trend continues - especially as the US has to rebuild stocks into the winter with over 1/3 GOM production still offline after Hurricane Ike?
I think that is a deceptive chart, comparing crude to all liquids - try comparing opec crude to world crude.
Not sure why it's particularly deceptive. It just doesn't show the comparison you want. OPEC don't break down non-OPEC "oil" production in their report although they do give figures for OPEC non-conventional oil and NGLs. Have to wait for the IEA and (bringing up the rear) EIA September figures to catch up with OPEC.
I wanted to post a graph with figures for September even if it is preliminary and OPEC provides the only data currently available. For clarification it's OPEC's graph from their latest monthly report - not mine.
Exactly, deliberately opec not comparing 'eggs' with 'eggs' - trying to show opec in a good light maybe?
xeriod, I'm pretty sure you are not reading the graph correctly.
Nothing personal, just try reading it again. If you think the two lines are meant to draw a comparison, you are misreading the graph.
It tells me all liquids and opec crude have actually peaked and world all liquids has dropped close to 2 mbpd in just 3 months or so, an annual rate of maybe 7 or 8%. What am I missing?
Much of the GOM was shut in for September. Refineries were down in the U.S. thus some oil was not shipped from Mexico, etc. It was published in The Oil Drum. OPEC shut in production after the Sept. meeting. Russian taxes on oil companies allowed them to profit at $147. a barrel oil, not much profit at $70. a barrel. If that country has 60 billion barrels of oil, three times what Cuba is claiming, and as much as was stated in a recent report about Syrian BOE reserves/in place, yet it would have difficulty expanding production in consideration of low oil prices.
There have been many peaks in oil production since I was born, sometimes worldwide oil production peaked several times a day.
I agree with all you are saying but your extra information is not in that chart, I was just commenting on the chart.
I would add things like - one, two or three months figures are meaningless in isolation, the USA isn't the world, we don't know how many surface stores of crude have been used in the last three months, the past is no predictor of the future etc etc.
IMO the chart has two lines to compare/correlate. OPEC is a political organisation in the crude oil business, so IMO comparisons with all liquids instead of crude makes them look much less important than they really are. The chart shows them having ~37% of the all liquids market whereas they actually have something like 43% of the crude market and ~50% of C+C net exports.
The left hand scale and the right hand scale are different, why? - (1 mbpd on the LH is ~1.5 bigger than 1 mbpd on the RH), the correlation between the two lines is actually not as tight as it might seem.
IMO the chart is a type of executive summary and deliberately sets out to deceive people like politicians who don't know (or want to know?) the full story.
Overshoot on the upside, now overshoot on the downside. The overshoot up didn't last long, and the overshoot down won't either.
Well I did not expect a consolidation at this price point it was a surprise. But now that its behind up give we had one earlier than I expected.
I see absolutely nothing preventing oil prices from going practically strait to 200 once they start rising again within the next few weeks.
Potentially we could even miss our 200 dollar consolidation point and instead not hit it till 250 I really think this early consolidation was forced on the market looking at all the data.
This the next one will be in the 200-250 range as apposed to the 150-200 range.
BAU should have resulted in prices going on into the 150-200 range towards the end of this year then we would have consolidated and had a bit of a breather before heading on upwards.
I've not expected these consolidations to result in significant price drops and again I suspect this one was forced we will see what happens next time but if its natural then we can expect a much shallower price pull back if any. However since the natural consolidation point should have been 200 and we are probably going to overshoot on the high side say 250 a drop back to 200 would be possible or about 20-25%.
So overall we should see a spectacular runup in oil prices next year that makes 2008 look like a cakewalk. The 50 dollars we knocked off prices this year by forcing a early consolidation will be added back with interest.
You could be right.
Personally I'm expecting prices to tend downwards until around 2011. It wouldn't be surprising to have a rally up to 80-100 now, but I don't think we will see 150 within 12 months.
This is more based on my experience with markets rather than with anything else.
I'd just like to have this view included here view because i do believe in peak oil. I don't want to be in a situation in 2011+/-1, where prices have been falling for years and everyone thinks peak oil believers were wrong because they predicted higher prices than actually occurred. After 2011 prices could escalate rapidly.
Again I would just like to include my point of view in the conversation that's all.
Hey, Jack saying greed drove up the price of petroleum is like saying gravity causes plane crashes. Accurate, but not very useful. On the long trip down to today's prices for every sale there is a buyer, no? So, all those buyers from $147 to today are altruistic idiots? Somewhere in there I believe you might still find a tiny weenie bit of greed Jack.
Gday Jack,
The reasons why the run up could not have been speculation are still valid, and apply equally to the price fall. Whether or not the world economy has been 'beaten back' or not is irrelevant - expectations about the future economy certainly have (together with a repricing of risk) - and that is what has driven the oil price to the extreme oversold position.
If the real economy has not much damage as you believe, then undoubtedly oil price will rise as expectations are corrected by reality...
Personally, I believe the expectations are correct, and thus the oil price at these levels is not altogether surprising... However, I was very surprised that the price got as high as it did... That surprise notwithstanding, it is simply impossible that speculation can drive the price of oil to extremes for periods longer than several weeks...
Good luck...
"The world economy hasn't gotten beaten back so far in 3 months to justify a return to $60 oil."
What you overlook is that the current oil price also includes an expectation of future supply/demand. The future demand picture has changed from economic boom to bust.
Also, where the supply is tight and the demand largely inelastic, expect a very non-linear response as you move away from a supply/demand balance.
I do believe that speculative money was also a factor in oil, as most commodities, which exaggerates price swings.