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67 comments on Oilwatch Monthly - October 2008
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So much for Peak Oil taking place in 2005. Clearly peak is still a way off.
Or then again, maybe it's tomorrow. Just because it hasn't happened yet doesn't mean it's not going to happen for a while. This month could have the highest production of all time. We just don't know until after it's happened.
Here is one piece of the puzzle:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aRq4OnoWiNx0
Oct. 22 (Bloomberg) -- Petroleo Brasileiro SA, Brazil's state-controlled oil company, may extend investments in the pre- salt oil area over a longer period of time because of the financial crisis, Folha de Sao Paulo reported, citing Chief Executive Officer Jose Sergio Gabrielli.
Investments planned for between 2009 and 2013 may now be extended to a date closer to 2020, Gabrielli said, the Brazilian newspaper reported today.
"Clearly peak is still a way off."
"Or then again, maybe it's tomorrow."
"It may be a way off if you feel the July 2008 records will be surpassed in the future."
Clearly, we know nothing.
Clearly, this shouldn't cheer us.
It may be a way off if you feel the July 2008 records will be surpassed in the future. We now have new records in the rear view mirror. Time will tell if they stand. The global "recession" or whatever you want to call it will likely hold down demand for a while, perhaps allowing the July record to stand for some time to come. How long? Who knows...
I'm betting forever. This decline is not temporary. It is likely to be up to a decade long. Certainly full recovery will take that long. In that ten years we'll use up up to 25% of existing crude reserves. that will put us at 62.5% depletion globally.
New highs at 62% depletion? No way in hell.
Peak is here and gone, friend. Whether '05 or '08 could not be less relevant.
Cheers
This decline is not temporary. It is likely to be up to a decade long. Certainly full recovery will take that long.
Hm -- it's hard for me to believe that the global economy will go for a decade without demand bumping up against production again (and again). You're going by the 30s I presume. But as Nixon said, we're all Keynesians now. I'm inclined to think that there will be repeated collisions between production and demand on the depletion down slope.
Aside from that, the shape of the down slope won't just be geologically driven. I read that rising costs are already removing or are about to remove fields from coming online.
The best way to look at this economy is to try and discern the hardest road to recovery ... that will be the only road.
Like the Great Depression, this crisis began several years before the 'official start date'. That Depression's start date was October 1929; it really began with the Great Panic of 1921. Our current crisis began with the 'Dot Com Bust' of 2001. During the interval in both instances there were historically low interest rates and flat (nominal) or declining wages. In both instances wages were depressed by official policies that favored business owners over labor as well as large scale immigration, both internal and external. Agricultural workers in their millions left for industrial labor in cities in the 1920's. There was an influx of more millions from Eastern Europe. Today, jobs are outsourced to lower wage-rate countries and government policy accepts large- scale immigration from Latin America, both documented or otherwise. In both instances, labor demands are suppressed; the stagnant wage component then and now is vitally important to the unwinding of both economies. The small claim wages made on the GDP expansions both in the 1920's and currently's was and is manifested as reduced purchasing power, masked in both instances by increases in consumer credit. Low central bank money rates substituted debt in place of savings as capital for investment purposes. During both run-up intervals there were historically large asset and credit bubbles. Cheap loans pursued reckless speculation which would have never been financed with more expensive forms of capital. There were spikes in stocks and real estate both in 1920's and the 2000's.
Both recessions were international with markets and trade collapsing. Banks failed world- wide. Unemployment both in the US and abroad exceeded 20%. During the active recession periods governments responded by implememting public spending initiatives, lowering money rates, lending to troubled banks, purchasing stocks and devaluing currencies. None of these steps had any real effect, unfortunately.
There are big differences between the two periods:
-- The world's major currencies in the 1920's were gold- backed hard currencies.
-- The level of indebtedness of the US in the 1920's was much less than today.
-- The US savings rate was +10% in the 1920's, even without government security programs, this was a 'do it yourself' safety net of sorts, plus a pool of investment capital that could be tapped.
-- Today, the primary source of capital in the entire world is debt.
-- Our US safety net is either unfunded or supported by debt.
-- The US debt is largely in the hands of overseas ministries that are - in general - far less robust than the US's financial system.
-- Developing nations in the 1920's and 30's made a much smaller claim on resources than they do today.
-- There were no nuclear weapons in 1920- 1944.
In order for the economy to 'right itself', wages will have to catch up relative to higher income earners. In the earlier period, this took place over 9 years and required legislation recognizing and supporting organized labor. The Keynesian doctrines as applied during the New Deal were not particularly relevant to this effort. The war mobiliztion of industry beginning in 1938 raised the wages of many workers in industries that were notorious for low pay. After 1945, wages remained high and the difference between high income earners and the low income earners was compressed.
This compression must be done in our period. Higher wages increase spending power and allow a fraction to be set aside as savings which in turn bcomes capital for new investments. Regardless of whatever eco-economic context exists over the next decade, there must be increased spending power and aggregated savings from which investments can be capitalized.
Catching up wages is almost impossible when companies are laying off large percentages of workers. Nevertheless it must be done.
Encouraging savings requires a return on money. The depressed rates of return on money - discount rates close to zero percent - are designed to stimulate demand, particularly consumer spending. This first assumes all participants in the economy are borrowers. This leaves out the needs of lenders and thwarts the ability of the market to direct capital most effectively and to do so by price rather than by (government) fiat. Because any demand for new credit requires its substitution for existing debt the stimulus effect is small or non-existant.
Consumers must first pay off or liquidate existing debts, then accumulate some savings; only THEN they will able to consume. This is again almost impossible, nevertheless it must also be done.
Currencies today are credit based, they require trust to function as means of exchange. Governments must answer the trust issue FOREMOST before the attempt is made to use monetary policy tools. The instinct of government is to borrow first then deal with consequences later, however default hangs like a guillotine over all the major currencies. A run on any of them - Euro, Pound Sterling, Yen, Won, Dollar - would quickly become a chaotic run on all of them, one and then another. Such a run is an article in Bloomberg away.
Unfortunately, reining in borrowed 'liquiodity' is almost impossible to do when the begger-of-the-moment has national prestige or is a campaign contributor ... nevertheless it must be done.
Until all these are done, there will be no recovery, just a sickening slide into greater and greater calamity, until the currencies are repudiated and governments declare emergencies and institute ration cards and command economies.
More parallels: command economies were installed world-wide in 1939-1945, so that road will also likely be followed.
In my opinion, the oil crunch will hit when Mexican production drops another 20%. That is ... if the country doesn't default, first.
Steve, that is the most cogent exposition of our current situation that I have seen. Many thanks.
I wonder if you would share any thoughts on how some of the 'impossibilities' you mention in your post can be attempted?
Got to agree with you, Dave. Excellent post, Steve, enjoyed it very much. Spot on as well, IMO.
I know what a run on the bank is, but you got me with this concept of a run on a currency. What is it?
If you said there would be a run on one currency, I would have assumed it meant people massively selling the currency and converting cash assets into some other currency. But you talk about a run on all currencies at once. Where would the cash go?
This is a good, hard question to answer! Such a phenomenon hasn't happened before! In this instance, the cash - the paper - would remain, values would sharply diminish. Post-modern credit- based 'Money' only exists insofar as it is useful in credit transactions. If it is useless there, it's utility elsewhere is negligible.
I can only honestly answer that any sovereign default by any of the major industrialized nations would not leave 'survivor' currencies, that is any currencies having much 'wealth value' at all. Since all the major currencies are more or less identical and are all debt based and all require acceptance of value as a matter of faith, the collapse of one could hardly fail to cast fatal doubt upon the rest. This is not so much a matter of disavowing one particular creed in favor of another, it is more a matter of dismissing all creeds together, then dismissing the entire creed concept.
This kind of fratricide - the war of all against all - is happening right now in the other markets, where different services - stocks, bonds, commodities, swaps, interbank lending, options, real estate - are subject to runs in turn with the markets all declining in chaotic fachion. The complexity and volatility of the unwinding transactions transmits the instability of the markets themselves against the values of all participants.
In a default scenario, a creditor nation would race to recover as much currency (of their choice) as they could for what bonds they hold, however denominated ... for any reason at all. This could be a Korean government trying to obtain local currency for Yen bonds or Saudi government 'dumping' Treasuries for Euros. At this, government creditors would then hesitate to make any more loans or accept any more of a particular currency as repayment for outstanding debt - as is happening in the interbank lending sector. With the commingling of currencies, if one is unacceptable, all would eventually be unacceptable as well. The 'laundering process' of trading one currency for another and another and so forth ... would be the visible run. The actual damage would be don by the freeze in lending, amplified by the 'noise' in the currency and related swaps markets. In a short time the damage would be done. Without the flow of funds and credit the actual value of the money so engaged in the credit transactions would soon be zero.
Thanks for your answer. It seems that my intuition about what a run on the currency is was right.
Call me dense if you want but I still don't get this idea of a run on all currencies at once. Here are a few areas that don't add up in my mind.
If paper remains and credit disappears, isn't this the very definition of deflation? In such a scenario money gains value and a hoarding mentality installs. This would be the opposite of a run on a currency.
This dismissing of the creed concept is beyond my ability to imagine. Every economic actor depends on having a monetary system to execute transactions. They all need a monetary system to assign a value to assets and pay taxes. There is no substitute to money to perform any of these functions. This is obvious to everyone. If people stop believing in the creed of fiat money, they may as well slit their own throat. Things have to be extremely dire for a long time before the creed in fiat money goes away.
Belief systems are very sturdy. We have seen in the case of peak oil how people can deny the existence of problems in spite of mountains of evidence. Wont' this same psychological mechanism support the creed of fiat money? I can see how the collapse of one currency may cast doubts on others, but I don't see how the doubts can be fatal. People will just do a risk analysis and put their trust in what they perceive to be the less bad option.
Isn't the credit market already frozen?
Timing is everything; just as our conversation got underway, aeldric's topic appeared on TOD Australia! "The Failure of Networked Systems: The Repercussions of Systematic Risk"
You are far from being dense, this is a very valid discussion. The currency issues have not been resolved by economists including the central bank chairmen as well as many other thinkers and traders I personally admire. It is part of the big 'Inflation vs. Deflation' argument. The inflationists suggest there is no danger to running large deficits denominated in dollars bacause the resulting overseas fraction of our debts can be paid for with printing press money; inflated out of existance. The deflationists suggest that the shrinkage of money generally available would make a default less and less likely, as the dollar would maintain inherent value. This would be true even with the large increases in money at the institutional level resulting from the various stimulus and rescue attempts by central banks. This is an ongoing mental puzzle for many thinkers, this includes you, me, and a lot of others here on TOD. I certainly don't have all the answers; the biggest issue to to figure a way out of this mess.
I personally don't think the inflation scenario is possible. In order for this to work, our creditors would have to accspt the printing press dollars knowing full well these dollars are being devalued by the process of their acceptance. In other words, the only way the dollar can maintain value in an inflationary context is for dollar buyers not to accept them. So far, our creditors are accepting dollars, and lending them back to us as well, so the level of inflation-of-the- moment is considered acceptably small.
Meanwhile, the credit swap and bond markets are reflecting concern about the worthiness of the US as a debtor; this is despite or because of the ongoing deflation.
We have a multi- polar situation with many contradictions.
Partly because of deflation the default scenario seems structurally unlikely to most economists that I follow. Unfortunately, in our ironic universe, the least- likely appearing event is what actually most likely to happen.
This is of course true, but there are two things happening because of stratification of the money system. Goods are declining in value relative to currency to most of us in the real world - and credit is shrinking - which is deflation. Meanwhile, back at the ranch, there are trillions of loose fiat dollars floating around the banking system worldwide looking for something to destroy. The supply and demend situation at this level makes dollars tremendously cheap relative to goods, which is inflationary. For good or ill, all these dollars are held as if by gravity within the circle of high finance, taking the place of monies that have vanished into bad loan rat-holes.
In my opinion, what matters most to creditors is not so much the goods/dollar relationship of the moment, rather the absolute ability of the US to pay its debts. Relative value here is an indicator of ability to pay, or willingness. If inflation appeared to start leaking out of the tight circle of high finance it would instantly signal our creditors the US is trying to inflate its debts out of existance.
At that point, our creditors would refuse to accept our dollars, or would demand higher interest rates for loans. These rates would become onerous for the US to pay due to the size of our borrowings. Either would precipitate a race to unload the unwanted dollars or dollar- denominated securities for whatever else of value could be had; gold, commodities or polyester leisure suits from the 1970's.
This run would be by central banks or international finance companies. Unfortunately, the run would not likely be limited to one or two currencies, since international finance is a complex, interconnected and overloaded system. The end would be a general breakdown similar to the network malfunction described by aeldric. You can insert your own scenario, but a likely one would have the other fiat currencies considered as proxies for the now- unloved and unwanted dollar ... currencies bought and paid for in dollars for the sole purpose of being traded in its place. These currencies would soon enough be unmasked and dumped in their turn ...
Eventually, the US would run out of currencies to buy; since we borrow so much and consume so much overseas goods, any secondary currency - even yen - would have to be massively printed ... a 'run on all currencies'.
Ultimately ... the idea of fiat money itself could be judged along with floating exchange rates, computerized over the counter capital flows, hedging with swaps, having no centralized money disciple or treaty structure and having no 'lender of last resort' to answer demands for some, any or all currency in times of stress.
What would happen afterward, besides throat- cutting and window sill jumping is anyone's guess.
The credit markets are frozen to the degree that most transactions require a (much) higher rate of return. It is unlikely that more expensive money will remain confined to the banking and credit markets. Higher rates by themselves could precipitate a run on the dollar as higher rates could be interpreted as a pricing of increased repayment risk ... even if repayment was not an issue.
Great post.
The only thing I think thats missing is time. There is a huge difference between loaning the US x amount for 1 month and thirty years.
They way out of this dilemma is to loan money over ever shorter periods for ever higher interest rates. Its the loan shark approach and it works regardless of how depressed or messed up the economy or in this case the borrower is.
If your loaning money at 300% annual rates then its all good.
Seriously though when things get this messed up you simply fall back to traditional loan shark approaches. You don't really car what they do if your loan duration is short enough and your interest rate high enough you can extract money from the most worthless of borrowers.
I concur that this is a great post.
It is funny that you point out aeldric's article. I have two decades of professional experience with computer networks and cascading failures. I did troubleshoot them, I fixed them, analyzed them after the fact and designed networks to make sure the impacts of failures were mitigated or contained and critical functions kept working. To someone with my background, aeldric's article is amusingly simplistic. But this article fulfills the purpose if was written for and I saw no point in raining on the parade. I didn't replied to aeldric's article.
But for purpose of this discussion, there is an important detail that needs to be fleshed out. When cascading failures occur, it is normal and usual to have to identical devices such as routers or switches that are connected next to each other in the network and one of them is part of the cascade of failure where the other keeps running just fine. The reasons are that although the devices are identical to the point of being of the same make and brand, their interconnections with the rest of the world are totally different.
Lessons to be learned: it is not because two components of a network are connected and identical that they will behave the same. The specifics of the interconnections are of paramount importance.
I think this applies to this discussion of the currencies. They are structured the same and are connected. But they have different relationships with the various national economies and national governmental debt. My expectation is they will behave differently unless there is something in the specifics of their interconnections that will cause them to behave the same.
This is part of why I have such a hard time imagining a run on all currencies at once. I look for a specific cause and find only general principles that I think are unconvincing.
The data here is all total liquids. When people talk about a peak in 2005, the data they're usually using is conventional crude oil plus condensate. That said, even that peak was busted slightly this year.
Remember the graphs above don't have vertical axes starting at zero. There's not a lot of difference between 74 and 75, especially in the context of increasing producer nation demand. Maybe peak globally traded crude was 2005?
You may want to check again figures 5, 6 and 7. They are crude oil data, not total liquids. Figure 5 is relevant to the peak and shows clearly the 2005 levels were exceeded. But IIRC there is an history of downward revisions of such numbers. We need to wait a little to form a definitive opinion.
Oops, thanks for that! Yeah, as someone pointed out below, these might be revised downward.
It remains to be seen whether the "peak" of July 2008 remains standing from the perspective of C+C production. There were other "peaks" that came and fell after May 2005. The following chart is from the latest Monthly Energy Review (EIA) which, like the IPM product, periodically gets readjusted with new data. Some of the earlier months that beat May 2005 have subsequently been reigned back, so we will just have to wait and see what the future holds and whether the values for May and July 2008 remain higher than the peak of 2005.
It's possible that, in the grand scheme of things, July 2008 is just a final spike in the struggle for ever increasing production (notice the average oil aquisition cost for the month also spiked) before the prices brought the struggle to an end with the ensuing cascade of issues.
It is also worth noting that the US $ has gained dramatically in the past several months compared to the €. On the basis of the €, the cost rise has not been as dramatic, though the same type of trend is visible.
Link to the larger version of this image: http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3275/2966690637_67a86ec0e4_o_d.jpg
Just remember, it's not over, 'til it's over (and then it may go on for several years beyond that).
The Starship Trooper

Beechcraft (Raytheon) Starship 2000
That graph is rather interesting. From quickly scanning it, several things jump out at me overall:
1) From '79 to '87 production and price appear to be negatively correlated. This implies to me that a shortage of supply is causing the price increase. And yes, this was during the Oil shocks of the 70s and 80s, so this makes sense.
2) However, from '87 onwards, production and price appear to be positively correlated. I could be wrong here, but this implies to me that cost was driving production. If oil production had peaked, then you would expect 1) to occur. As this is primarily from the '80s to the present day, this makes sense.
3) As you get closer to the present day, the gradient of the price curve increases relative to the gradient of the production curve. This implies to me that, as oil becomes more scarce, the gradients of these lines (note that I am using the averages here, not the actual data) will become more and more perpendicular to each other, and once we pass peak oil, then the angle between them will pass 90 degrees, as no amount of money will increase oil production.
This leads me to conclude the following:
1) Price and production are positively correlated before the peak.
2) Price and production are negatively correlated after the peak (or when the oil supply is constrained for other reasons)
3) The angle between the line for production and the line for price will steadily increase, and once it passes 90 degrees (for a great enough averaged line), we have passed peak oil.
I apologise if this appears to be stating the obvious to some of you.
Here is a curve I love as it approximates the relationship of oil cost (composite aquisition cost) to global production. As the scatter curve suggests: it gets harder and more expensive to push beyond the 75 million barrels per day mark.
The Starship Trooper

Beechcraft Starship 2000
Production elasticity in action. The graph tells evrything. Lets see how he will behave in the next few months.
@starship trooper
Were did you get the composite acquisition cost data from, and what does it represent?
The data is from the EIA.
The data can be found here: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_rac2_dcu_nus_m.htm
Just to clarify the definitions,
Composite : The weighted average of domestic and imported crude oil costs. ( EIA definitions )
The cost of crude oil includes transportation and other fees paid by the refiner but the refiner acquisition cost does not include the cost of crude oil purchased for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). ( EIA definitions )
Very revealing plot, by the way.
Thanks