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65 comments on UK Industry Taskforce Sounds Alarm on Peak Oil
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65 comments on UK Industry Taskforce Sounds Alarm on Peak Oil
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I suspect that the way the Financial Times wrote what you cited here (as did many other media) is rather misleading or even a hoax. A worldwide annual rate of output decline of 6.4 per cent would even outstrip the Energy Watch Group's decline outlook (3%) and it is contradictory to the IEA's forecast that worldwide production will rise to 106.4 mbpd by 2030.
As far as I understand (and as explained by Rem Koppelaar of ASPO NL) this decline rate only applies to the most important the oil fields examined by the IEA. So possibly the IEA only examined the fields they got hold of reliable data (mainly OECD countries, which are all in decline?) and now has high hopes for the fields where they couldn't get information from (mainly OPEC countries). At least this sounds more logical to me.
Well, in a week we'll probably know more.
I expect you're right. 6.4% does seem too high. Could it be the IEA wrote that fields in decline, decline at 9.1-6.4%? So weren't referring to all production, just the fraction already in decline? Indeed, we'll know more next week.
Actually, reading Google's translation of Rembrandt's post, he seems to imply things could be even worse, given the impact on production from financial turmoil:
I've been tallying Credit crunch impacts on production. Someone will read the roll call soon enough. This latest from Reuters is a doozy: FACTBOX-Financi al crisis hits global oil investment. Whole page of cancelled tar sands operations. And many say the credit unwind has just started!
...given the impact on production from financial turmoil:...
Hm, this is where I get a little confused. How does one distinguish "natural" (geological) decline from economically induced decline? It's probably hard to do, but it seems to me to be a distinction worth keeping (and making). I guess the most vivid example was the SU when an economically induced peak and decline preceded a later geological peak that is only occurring about now (do I have that right?)
Exactly this is what I thought of.
So the financial termoil is pulling back the curtain on ERoEI?
Right now there are many instances where obtaining credit is holding smaller companies back, which I'd say on the face of it operates independently of the geologic decline, or the current price of crude. Inability to obtain credit will impact supply, possibly eventually manifesting itself in a positive feedback loop; or the smaller companies and service outfits will find another avenue of doing business. Or the minor players will go under and be bought for fire sale prices - but will XOM want to tender a bunch of stripper wells?
There is no distinction. The economics have always been part of the picture. Less obvious, perhaps at high EROI and for the low hanging fruit - the easy oil.
cfm in Gray, ME
Over the past few weeks I've been seeing references here on TOD to decline rates significantly higher than the 2 or 3 percent I'd somehow come to expect - and why did I come to expect that??? It strikes me that a 5 or 6 percent rate - or something close to 10 percent - would make for very rough sledding. Perhaps the lower rates implied a full-bore effort at replacement, but with energy depletion taking out the financial system and destroying the ability to replace energy sources, the decline rate only gets steeper with every misfortune.
Has anyone else been noticing the stories about higher than expected depletion rates or is it my eyes only?
cfm in Gray, ME
Dryki, I've posted a few times recently: Colin Campbell is still talking of an all liquids average decline rate of less than 1.7% (ie 1.35 Mbpd) from 82 Mbpd in 2010 to 55 Mbpd in 2030. Is Colin wrong?
not if he terms it an 'all liquids decline rate', but for a geologist that is kind of odd terminology because it mixes geologic natural depletion (on oil) and economic growth of something else (unconventional and biofuels)
When will some agency do cost tranches for all these fuels? How much can we bring to market at X price and with Y non-energy input costs (land, water, etc.)
1.7% on all liquids seems too low.
We do need a pseudo decline term for syncrude and ethanol based on the nat gas energy inputs. This would in a sense capture the ERoEI at the same time.
The official WEO 2008 Executive Summary is out today and is quoted here: http://news.moneycentral.msn.com/provider/providerarticle.aspx?feed=OBR&...
800 wells sounds like a familiar number.
Chris