My guess is that the production drop due to reduced demand will be from October forward, but in any case if we take the 2008 EIA data (subject to revision, frequently downward) at face value, the 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 annualized production volumes are as follows (C+C, using 365 days for 2008):

2005: 26.9 Gb
2006: 26.8
2007: 26.6
2008: 27.0*

*Based on preliminary data through August

If we round off to the nearest billion barrels, it's four years at 27 Gb per year. Alternatively, the cumulative shortfall between what we would have produced at the 2005 rate and what we actually produced would be 300 mb, using 27 Gb for 2008.

Of course, different crude oils trade at different prices, but if we use Brent as an index price for comparison purposes, the total dollars paid for crude would like like this (assuming $100 for 2008):

2005: $1.48 Trillion ($55 per barrel)
2006: 1.74 ($65)
2007: 1.92 ($72)
2008; 2.7 ($100)

This pattern of flat to declining production versus rising oil prices is exactly what we saw in the initial Texas and North Sea declines, two regions developed by private companies, using the best available technology, with virtually no restrictions on drilling:

http://www.theoildrum.com/files/TexasAndNorthSea.png

If we use 27 Gb for 2008, we would have increased annual production by 100 mb (per year) relative to 2005, so we paid (for comparison purposes) $1.2 trillion more for an incremental increase of 100 mb, or about $12,000 per barrel of incremental production.

However, the reason for using cumulative production is because that directly relates to the area under the production rate versus time curve, which is the argument that Hubbert made back in 1956. The bottom line is that the crude data show a cumulative shortfall relative to 2005, even with the contribution from unconventional production.

I find it fascinating too the focus on pricing we see. Analytically, everything revolves around supply and availability. Monetary worth is purely a side effect and not very important in the greater scheme of things. Economists show their stupidity by always referring to "fundamentals" when in reality they have yet to come up with any kind of model for oil depletion. It could be the case that no one field of study uniquely covers constrained resource exploitation. Economics definitely doesn't cover this.

This is the sort of empirical analysis that puts the lie to all the current chatter in the media that the days of high oil prices are over. The plateau cannot be explained by demand being flat as clearly reflected in the exponentially increasing price. Therefore the plateau was maintained by the development of marginal and unconventional oil fields, which of course was expensive and solidly in the realm of diminishing returns. I expect the plateau to turn into a decline now that the price does not justify expensive field development (exhibit A: the Canadian tar sands). The plateau is a transient feature regardless of oil price but the current financial meltdown will shorten its life.

Good points, Westexas.

I wonder what's happening to spare capacity. When the public works are in full swing from Peoria to Paris to Peking (or is that Boston to Berlin to Bejing?)how long will it be until the oil industry is back to the high cost barrel?

Apart from the availability of financing, it seems to me that the industry will not be well served by too much spare capacity, as this would keep the price of oil down, at a time when higher prices are required to overcome the cost of the marginal barrel.