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111 comments on Saudi Aramco on 60 Minutes
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111 comments on Saudi Aramco on 60 Minutes
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As I previously noted, every Peak Oiler I know talked about production first, and then discussed price. Matt's mistake was that he was spent too much time talking about price, instead of production.
Regarding voluntary production cutbacks, it's a good point. In fact, the Texas Railroad Commission just released the following:
You got it right. I only talk about price as it relates tangentially.
Greed is constant, price fluctuates.
I hear a lot more of that now that prices have collapsed. :) In the past they were almost invariably linked... because assumptions about production informed their predictions of price movement and price movement validated their beliefs re: production.
Clever... but not informative. Simple question... the last time oil peaked like this, production copllapsed and took years to recover. Was it because capacity to produce had peaked?
This video discusses new projects that will begin production shortly that account for over 2million bpd. Do you really think that declines from the rest of their fields will be that intense over the next couple years? If not, you know that their capacity will be higher than it was in 2005.
the last time oil peaked like this, production copllapsed and took years to recover. Was it because capacity to produce had peaked?
Price spikes induced temporary demand destruction. Capacity to produce was not an issue then; what does that have to do with the current R/P (depending on whose numbers you use)? Yeast at point 4 on the graph might think "We can party forever!". Yeast at point 10 on the graph may think "Just like at point 4, we can party forever!".
you know that their capacity will be higher than it was in 2005.
For how many years? 2? 5? 10?
Some people thought it was... and we haven't gotten to the point where we know it is now.
Possibly even longer.
The problem with that is that almost every such graph (including coal and NatGas etc.) shows the ranmping up all the way to "today" and then beginning a decline. You could draw such a graph at any point along the climb.
Some people thought it was...
Who? References, please.
and we haven't gotten to the point where we know it is now.
Sure, but in order to be smarter than yeast, we have to make intelligent assessments of remaining supplies, and intelligent decisions about how to transition away from non-renewable sources.
Possibly even longer.
Possibly? Aren't you sure? On the other hand, possibly less, right?
You could draw such a graph at any point along the climb.
But we've hit an undulating plateau, and at a time when oil prices are high.
Sure, but in order to be smarter than yeast, we have to make intelligent assessments of remaining supplies, and intelligent decisions about how to transition away from non-renewable sources.
So your position is "let's assume I'm right" ?
Only if you believe that they don't understand anything about oil or are lying through their teeth (in a way that does them no benefit).
Which is just what happened the last time.
The point is that production can be either supply or demand-limited. You can't look at a decline in production and assume that it's because they can't pump more. In the case of the Saudis, they have decades of history of intentionally pumping less than they can.
What time was that? I hope you are not talking about the early 80's. There was never a doubt what caused that very short plateau and then a retreat of 15% of production. We had the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraqi war and the subsequent "Tanker Wars". All this reduced OPEC production to about half and world production by 15%.
I get tired of people pointing to this period and saying, "Yeah, we thought oil had peaked then also." No we did not! We all knew exactly what caused that fall in production. But because non-OPEC nations could not take up the slack, some speculated that the world may be facing production restrictions. Which was also the truth.
And by the way, in 2008 non-OPEC oil production fell off it's five year plateau that began in July of 2003 and ended in July of 2008.
Ron Patterson
LoL!
So "we know", do we? You just saw the same thing happen again and interpreted it as different because you wanted to.
In the 80s, production declined because there was no demand as economies contracted. Now you see a five year plateau that just coincidentally ends just as demand is falling off the table and you somehow see it as different?
I never had any doubt about how the 80s went down (though yes, there were people who thought we were close to using up cheap energy)... you're the one stuck having to demonstrate that "this time is different".
Yes we knew! I take it you are too young to remember those days. I am not and remember very well what was going on.
That is the most absurd thing I have read on TOD in weeks. High oil prices, brought on by the decline in OPEC production, caused the recession. If what you say is true, then why did only OPEC production decline. In 1979 OPEC C+C production averaged 30.942 mb/d, according to the EIA. in 1985 their production was 16.693 mb/d, a decline of 46.05%. Over the same period non-OPEC production went from 31.732 mb/d in 1979 to 37.273 mb/d in 1985, an increase of 17.46%. So why did economic contraction cause only OPEC to cut production by almost half while non-OPEC production kept right on increasing as usual?
And between 1978 and 1980, oil prices increased by 150%. And oil prices stayed extremely high through 1985. That is really strange behavior for prices if the decline in production during that period was caused by falling demand! Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table)
As I said above, we all knew very well what was happening because it was on the frigging news daily! I would suggest PP, that you get your facts straight next time before you go spouting off stuff about which you are obviously totally ignorant of.
Ron Patterson
And I take it you didn't read what you responded to. And yes, I remember reasonably well... I lived in the ME around that time.
Yes... artificial tightening of supply caused economic weakness which in turn clobbered demand... that reduced demand (combined with new sources of energy) caused oil prices to collapse. Even with OPEC (again intentionally) curtailing production, prices continued to fall.
Pretty much just as is happening today.
For the same reason it's falling today. They're desperate to prop up prices but have trouble enforcing discipline on their wn producers, let alone the rest of the world.
You're kidding, right? Other nations don't allow price-fixing and cartel behavior. Nations who had discovered new supplies while prices were out-of-whack kept pumping. Then OPEC not only had to cut a bbl to prop up prices but had to cut another one for every bbl produced outside of OPEC.
This is why the Saudis (and a few others) fought against Iran/Venezuela/etc to raise quotas several months back. They were terrified that the high prices would cause another worldwide slide which would end up hurting far more than letting prices go back down.
It would be... if your characterization was accurate. It isn't. You accepted annual averages and ignored inflation (if you do remember the 80s...)
From 1975 (no idea why you selected 78) to 1980, prices were up (inflation adjusted) more like 500% and fell fairly consistently (and significantly) for over five years.
I would suggest RP, that you get your facts straight next time before you go spouting off stuff about which you are obviously totally ignorant of.
PP, you are engaging in double talk, trying to get out of the really stupid thing you said:
NO, that is dead wrong! In the 80's production declined because of the Iranian Revolution, because of the Iran-Iraqi War and because of the Tanker War that started in 1984. Prices skyrocketed. There were long lines at service stations. In some places you could only get gas on alternate days, based on whether your tag number was even or odd.
PP, to say, as you did, that "In the 80s, production declined because there was no demand as economies contracted," is just down in the dirt stupid!
Ron Patterson
PP, you are engaging in double talk, trying to get out of the really stupid thing you said:
Nope. Just pointing out that your strawman is a strawman.
NO, that is dead wrong! In the 80's production declined because of the Iranian Revolution, because of the Iran-Iraqi War and because of the Tanker War that started in 1984.
Production did decline for those reasons. It also (and primarily) declined due to economic contraction. There was the ability to export more oil... but no demand for it.
PP, to say, as you did, that "In the 80s, production declined because there was no demand as economies contracted," is just down in the dirt stupid!
"Stupid" perhaps to try to pound the truth through a thickened head... but not wrong. Sorry. What would be "stupid" would be to pretend that you remember skyrocketing prices and economic contraction but that it didn't impact demand for oil.
Note, BTW, that the embargo was in '74 and supply continued to climb. Iran was 78-79 and supply only dropped 4%. Economic weakness was well in place by that point.
A simple exercise for you. Google "oil glut" and see what you get. If prices were falling because there was too much oil on the market even though less was being produced than before... you have to know it was a demand-side problem. Right?
The price did not collapse until 1986, the year that production began to increase. Production jumped by over 2.2 million barrels per day in 1986, then prices collapsed! The proceeding seven years, 1979 thru 1985 saw deep cuts by OPEC causing prices to skyrocket. Then in 1986 they opened the spigot again and prices collapsed.
You are putting the cart before the horse. The very high oil prices, and very low oil production, caused the recession. Demand did not collapse until 1986, (or late 85) the exact same year that prices collapsed. How could you possibly have excessive production, a glut of oil, and still have extremely high prices? And remember there was no NYMEX speculators in those years to drive prices up.
Obviously there was much less oil sold during the early 80's, because there was much less oil produced. That is why prices stayed high! Then when OPEC opeaned the spigot prices collapsed. What else would one expect?
However as Will Stewart said:
Ron Patterson
You're absolutely immune to facts, aren't you? Did you not even look at the graph I provided? I can give you another one from the site you linked.
How can you expect anyone to look at that and then read you saying "price did not collapse until 1986" without laughing?
The CEO of Exxon was talking about an oil glut in 1981 (saying that the main cause was declining consumption).
Since I've now said that more than once... one must wonder what point you think you're making.
Simply (and ridiculously) wrong. So you position is that supply collapsed but people kept consuming the same amount? Was it magic pixie oil?
You can't... which is why prices declined by more than half in real terms during the period you claim there was no decline. You've entitled to your own opinion, not your own facts.
PP, The only thing that happened in the 70's and early 80's was a huge effort to make processes more energy efficient. Before that time, oil flowed like water. Afterward, it didn't. This could look like a reduction in demand, as people realized they shouldn't treat it like a sieve anymore. From this resetting of the baseline, productivity kept on increasing and demand once again started to creep upwards again.
It's happened again and we have immediate reductions in energy use, unfortunately the gains in reduction are not what we saw back then since that was an "awakening" kind of event that will never be duplicated.
The Oil Shock model is designed to handled these changes in production rates.
"the gains in reduction are not what we saw back then since that was an "awakening" kind of event that will never be duplicated."
One of the largest events was substitution of Nat Gas and nuclear for oil electrical generation. We can do the same thing, on a larger scale, with the electrification of ground (and, surprisingly, water) transportation.
This kind of large-scale substitution isn't unique to the 21st or even the 20th century - it happened in the late 19th century with the substitution of electricity for kerosene illumination. If gasoline powered ICE vehicles hadn't come along in the early 20th century, oil would have had no large markets at all.
Still waiting...
Only if you believe that they don't understand anything about oil or are lying through their teeth
You must know about the sudden OPEC reserve hikes in the 1980s, and how reserves never seem to drop. Only the naive would take something like that at face value.
Which is just what happened the last time.
Nope. On top of what was mentioned upthread, the North Sea and Alaska came online, dropping the price. More fuel efficient cars became available and common, people shifted their home heat from oil over to electric, etc. And note that demand destruction did not occur in 2005 (or 2006 or most of 2007), so this situation is clearly dissimilar from the late 70s/early 80s.
are lying. Got it.
What? You mean that non-opec energy supplies were being ramped up while energy-efficiency and conservation efforts combined with weaker economic growth to curtail demand?
Um... how is that different from today again? :)
And note that demand destruction did not occur in 2005 (or 2006 or most of 2007
It took a few years the last time as well. Living habits don't change until a pain threshold is reached... not as soon as prices rise. And new production takes years to ramp up (as does transitions to alternate fuel sources).
Again... how is that different?
What? You mean that non-opec energy supplies were being ramped up while energy-efficiency and conservation efforts combined with weaker economic growth to curtail demand?
Um... how is that different from today again? :)
A number of reasons; One, there are no major sources of new oil like there was with the North Sea and Alaska. Two, there are little in the way of massive home energy conservation efforts that have an effect on oil prices. Three, the plateau previously experienced was a direct result of demand destruction; the current plateau was not.
A number of reasons; One, there are no major sources of new oil like there was with the North Sea and Alaska.
Sorry... that begs the question, doesn't it?
Two, there are little in the way of massive home energy conservation efforts that have an effect on oil prices.
Nonsense. Never heard of hybrids? Shifting to natGas? High-efficiency washers/dryers/furnaces/AC... tankless water heaters (just got one of those) etc etc etc ???
And LOTS of the savings came well after prices spiked. Two or three years is hardly enouogh time to say nobody is making significant efforts.
Three, the plateau previously experienced was a direct result of demand destruction; the current plateau was not.
See #1. Assumes the conclusion of your argument as evidence to prove your argument.
The recent "plateau" is just noise until a substantial production decline is evident and now that we see a clear decline, it also clearly demand destruction.
You are obviously not interested in rational debate; good day...
There's the sign of a "true believer".
"If they don't accept my word as Gospel within five posts... they're just not interested in rational debate".
Put another way "Don't confuse me with the facts, I've already made up my mind".
More likely... you just read the Jimmy Carter quote and realized that the early 80s were far more like the current situation than you're comfortable with.
Oh well... far be it from be to hurt any sacred cows. Have a good day.
Sorry for the delay... I remembered something that works and can be cited.
Remember Jimmy Carter?
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7372
"But early in the 1980's, even foreign oil will become increasingly scarce." - "we could use up all the proven reserves in the entire world by the end of the next decade"
That was 1977.
Please tell me the model that either you (now) or Jimmy Carter (then) was working from. If either of these is anything more than a heuristic based on empirical data, I distrust it as well. So please tell me the model that you are using now to criticize current predictions.
So, your position is that the Texas production decline is involuntary, but the Saudi production decline is voluntary?
In neither Texas nor Saudi Arabia do we stop finding oil fields post-peak. Our problem in both cases is that we can't offset the declines from the older, larger oil fields. Based on the Hubbert Linearization (HL) models, Saudi Arabia, in 2005, was at about the same stage of depletion at which Texas peaked in 1972. BTW, the semi-cornucopian speaker (Peter Wells) at ASPO-USA, who was using the IHS data base, opined that North Ghawar would be effectively watered out within two years.
In any case, when Stuart, in March, 2007, discussed the ongoing sharp decline in Saudi production, he said that the problem with the HL model was that the observed decline was exceeding what the HL model predicted. I replied that was one reason that I expected to see a future rebound in Saudi production "Albeit to a level well below their 2005 rate." In any case, the observed decline in cumulative production, relative to what they would have produced at the 2005 rate, is consistent with what the HL model suggests.
Peaks happen, even in the best of circumstances, in regions developed by private companies, using the best available technology, with virtually no restrictions on drilling:
The facts fit that, yes. When they are no longer a "swing" producer, you'll know it has ended. As long as they can say "sure, we'll pump some more" when prices get too high... you know they aren't capacity constrained.
So now finding oil fields is evidence of the peak?
Of course not.
You can't make such a model without first knowing how much oil was there to begin with. Short of that it's just stacking one curve on top of another. If they increase production by 1.5 mbpd, people will just shift the curve over until that figure lines up with the TX peak.
As noted down the thread, the Texas State Geologist, in 2005, basically claimed that Texas might be able to match its 1972 production rate. So, denial is a powerful force.
I also addressed the disclosure issue in the following article.
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/2767
Net Oil Exports and the "Iron Triangle"
July 13, 2007
The HL method is discussed in the following article (which used production data through the end of 2005). The strength of the method is that it allows us to develop a plausible estimate of URR for a region using the two numbers we have the most confidence in, annual production and cumulative to date. So, it is incorrect to say that it requires us to know URR. It is used to develop an estimate. Of course, the estimate may be wrong, but it is a relatively objective way to develop an estimate for the area under a production rate versus time curve.
http://www.energybulletin.net/16459.html
Texas and the Lower 48 as a Model for Saudi Arabia and the World (May, 2006)
That "basically" relies on emphasis that you added to "may". His actual position appears to be that TX isn't necessarily in a permanent decline.
But what about when they say "we are able to increase production and are currently doing so"? All that does is rip a hole in their back pocket.
And the weakness of it is that it is nothing more than a great big "begging the question" falacy. It assumes that you're on a curve that you've predetermined. Hardly different from assuming you know how much oil is there in the first place (which is why the assumptions behind the gives you how much is in the ground).
Let's use Alaska as an example. We know that there is oil there that we choose not to develop. You can take the historical production and come up with your estimate, but it's based on faulty assumptions.
Again, factually incorrect. The P/Q intercept and the derived estimate for URR give you the predicted shape of the curve.
Alaska helped, but it was really just a blip on the long term US decline, and I think that the same thing--new and mothballed fields-- is true of Saudi Arabia. For example, Hubbert found, in 1956, that a one-third increase in projected Lower 48 URR--from 150 Gb to 200 Gb--only postponed the projected peak by five years. 50 Gb is roughly four times the estimated reserves for ANWR.
In January, 2006, I warned, using the HL model, that Saudi Arabia was on the verge of a long term decline. In March, 2007, I suggested, based on the HL model, that we would see a future rebound in Saudi production. Also in January, 2006, I predicted that Russia would resume its production decline within one to two years and I predicted that Norway would continue to decline--again based on the HL models. I also predicted a long term decline in net oil exports, starting in 2006. The data table that Datamunger compiled showed two years of accelerating annual net export decline rates in 2006 and 2007--primarily as a result of the declines by top net oil exporters.
Regarding Texas, we have used the best available technology, and the best that we have done is periods of close to flat production, with one year of increase. So, the Texas State Geologist was argued for something that we have not yet seen, which is not to say that we are not finding new oil fields. I am developing new oil fields right now. Peak Oil means that we can't offset the declines from the older, larger fields.
It presumes that you're on a curve... which presupposes that oil is being produced at the maximum economical rate. It breaks down when there is oil that could be pumped but isn't.
Take just Gwahar. What and when was the peak for that monster? Over 25 years ago, right? Try plotting the data up until that point and ignore everything since. See what you get. I think you'll be surprised.
I'm not saying "Alaska will save us" (and Hubbert obviously didn't take it in to account). I'm saying that if you plotted historical production, your output would be wrong for Alaska because it cannot account for oil that they choose not to pump (but could economically). It also can't account for technology - which it looks like we'll address in a moment.
And since you know that they aren't producting every drop they could, you have no way of judging whether or not you were correct. Obviously if they are correct that they will be capable of 12 mbpd in the next few years, you will know that you were wrong.
Do you assume that the "best available technology" is a permanent "best"?
Shouldn't we assume that similar assumptions informed Simmons' claim just a few years ago that the US had already reached "peak natural gas"? We now know he was sadly mistaken. We weren't on the curve.
The HL method is obviously not perfect, especially for swing producers, but not perfect does not mean useless. The approach I used was to take the prior swing producer, Texas, and use it as a model for the successor swing producer, Saudi Arabia. And as we have discussed, the successor swing producer is going to show three years of lower production at about the same stage of depletion at which prior swing producer started declining. Does it prove that 2005 was the final peak for Saudi Arabia? No, but IMO it probably was.
And BTW, regarding Russia, we are principally modeling the mature basins, but I suspect that the frontier basins are to Russia as Alaska is to the US.
Two articles:
http://graphoilogy.blogspot.com/2007/06/in-defense-of-hubbert-linearizat...
In Defense of the Hubbert Linearization Method (June, 2007)
http://graphoilogy.blogspot.com/2008/01/quantitative-assessment-of-futur...
A quantitative assessment of future net oil exports by the top five net oil exporters (January, 2008)
Jeffrey J. Brown and "Khebab"
In the second paper, Khebab put in some 95% confidence intervals for (HL based) production, consumption and net exports.
Regarding shale gas versus shale oil (as in thermally mature oil in shale formations), I suggest that you look at the recovery factors in the Bakken Shale (oil) Formation versus the Barnett Shale (Gas) Formation.
Will I find something that says Simmons wasn't badly mistaken in thinking that natural gas production peaked in the US years ago?
"Not perfect" is an understatement. It can't take revolutionary technology advances into account... it assumes that whatever has been produced is the most that can be produced given existing tech... and it assumes that new discovery will always be insignificant by comparison to existing total known supply.
Basically... it presupposes what it intends to prove. It isn't hard to get what you want out of data in that case. It's the third category of dishonesty (lies, d@mn lies, statistics).
Obviously Hubbert was way off in using it to estimate total world supply. If the peak was in 2005, it was still at a far higher point then he thought could occur.
Thank you. Now allow me to translate. You took a prior example where you knew the producer had long-ago peaked and assumed that you could use the model on a producer that may have peaked. Should we be surprised that the results point in a given direction? Is it really fair to tie them together by simply saying both were "swing producers"?
Again... wasn't the peak in gwahar over 25 years ago? How did TX production compare to peak 25 years later?
Better yet... take Iraq. You can look up or reasonably guess at their historical production figures. They clearly produce far less then their most recent peak. Can you rely on those numbers? Or is it possible that they could be producing 2-3 times as much ten years down the road?
BTW... I hope I don't come across as too strident. I enjoy the debate but don't mean to be insulting. Thanks!
BTW... I hope I don't come across as too strident.
Other than implying "Everything I say is right, and I'll repeat it until everyone agrees with me", I'd say no. Having a rough day, or too much coffee?
Positive_Phototaxis, I suggest you look at the derivation of the Logistic model as it forms the basis of HL.
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/4171
Please criticize in the context of a real model not in terms of a heuristic.
Again, factually incorrect. The estimate for the area under the curve, i.e, estimated URR, is derived from the plot. The estimate may be wrong, but it's just a tool, and as I have outlined above, many producing areas are showing a reasonable approximation to what the HL models predicted. Regarding Saudi Arabia specifically, we will have to wait and see if they ever again exceed their annual 2005 production rate, but we do know that it appears that they will show three straight years of annual production below their 2005 annual rate, which is what the HL based historical analogue model suggested we would see.