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86 comments on Gas crisis: Is Gazprom really expecting Europe to take its side against Ukraine?
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86 comments on Gas crisis: Is Gazprom really expecting Europe to take its side against Ukraine?
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GAIA Host Collective
My point is that Russia cannot force Ukraine to pay for gas, because Ukraine hijacks transit gas. but if Gazprom can get the EU to put pressure on Ukraine not to interfere with transit, then Ukraine would lose the hold it has over Gazprom.
Gazprom does not care about what the EU thinks, only about how it might indirectly help it get any money for the gas it sends to Ukraine. But that can work only if the EU accepts to blame Ukraine for transit issues, and not Russia (irrespective of how fair or correct either position may be).
Russia sure can. If Ukraine does not pay it will not receive any gas. It's as simple as that. Europe is not involved here at all. Gazprom does not expect Europe to make Ukraine goverment to pay anything. It will deal with Ukraine as any other provider of the gas would. Here in US If I do not pay my bill I get my gas shutoff whether I like it or not. I can make up any stories I wont but until bill is payed I will see no gas. I presume the same is true in other countries as well.
Transit is a separate issue. Europe has been blocking any ways to diversify gas supplies lines and now has nobody to blame by itself. There is not enough interest in EU to restore gas supplies. I say it because:
1.) Despite shortages, it still have not provided necessary permissions to build North Stream.
2.) Despite shortages it has not used any legal means (going to the court) to put enough pressure on Ukraine to let the gas pass.
It looks like the clowns running the EU actually believe they will force Russia to export its gas via Nabucco. What a bunch of retards.
You are Vladimir Putin and I claim my five pounds.
I'd suggest the reality goes something like this:
Russia: Wants to regain what it considers as its rightful place as a world superpower. In doing this it wants to regain a measure of control over at least eastern europe. It's therefore flexing its energy weapon and trying to intimidate into getting others to agree with it, or else. It also needs the cash that higher prices would bring and doesn't like the current depressed state of world trade.
Ukraine: Has little in the way of power, but wants to remain independent from its larger neighbour and realises the transit pipelines are a good mechanism. It simply considered any gas going through the pipe as its first, with any excess going to europe. It will pay a little cash for the gas, but as for market rates, forget it.
Europe: Considers both russia and ukraine as squabbling children with gangster pretensions. It wishes both would learn the game of international trade and grow up. It also probably thinks it can get the gas via other sources and is metaphorically tapping its foot and wondering when those communist twits are going to learn the customer is always right.
All are probably mistaken to a degree, about the reality and the beliefs of the others. Next step? Blowing up some pipelines.
Dissident is correct.
Russia is not changing the rules of the game as
it wakes up in the morning as the West has been doing
since Khodorkovsky was arrested for trying to sell
YUKOS to XOM.
At this point (!) Russia became the enemy of the West.
The West and the West alone is authorized to pay what it wants, when it wants, with what it wants for however much it wants for
oil/gas.
Anyone else trying this will be shot out of the saddle.
but now the guy in the saddle has nukes, has paid it's debts from
the czar and WWI and II to the Club of Rome and per Georgia
will defend it's interests.
You want confrontation, step right up and pretend that Russia
is Iraq.
Per Nabucco.
Turkey now wants 15% of the gas that transits.
Too bad the EU has been keeping Turkey at arm's length.
the Goeben Redux:
The British did not immediately realize the importance of the Goeben's actions. The initial reaction to the eastward course of Goeben was relief, as the German ship would no longer threaten French transports. The Royal Navy would have, however, one more chance to stop Goeben before it reached Turkey.
Completed in 1912, Goeben served in the German Navy until 1915, then in the Ottoman until 1918. She survived the collapse of both empires and the scuttling of her brethren at Scapa Flow to serve in the Turkish Navy between 1930 and 1954. This thirty year period of active duty service puts Goeben slighty behind some of her contemporaries (USS Arkansas, the South American dreadnoughts), but she played a more important role in world history than virtually any other battleship of the dreadnought era.
http://lefarkins.blogspot.com/2005/03/tales-of-sea-goeben-part-ii.html