Do you think the price drop is due to drop in demand or not?

Yes - I don't believe it can be anything else. Supply does not respond to small changes in price, so when demand drops even a little it takes a huge price drop to have any impact on supply.

If so, the blue line seems to be doubling about every three years, from a bit over $20 in 2002, to a bit more over $40 in 2005, to well over $80 in 2008. Should we expect prices then to be averaging $160 around 2011? Or will that curve flatten further as the depression deepens?

I should have stopped the trend line in August 2008. It shows the average price trend over the last few years, showing when the market was ahead or behind the trend (for which there are various explanations). In theory, removing speculators from the market could have smoothed out the day to day, week to week volatility but not changed the average price.

That trend absolutely stopped last year and has no meaning any further in the future.

I have no idea what will happen to prices, except that they can't keep falling (or even stay this low) for very long.

Here is the "real" price curve to supply. I have a slightly updated curve that I have not published yet and it has not changed the nature of the curve.

Price Curve

For a larger image us the following link:

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3186/2968324434_7bd464740b_o.jpg

Nice! Are the data points years? The split in the 55 MM BPD range is interesting.

They are monthly crude plus condensate production values from EIA. The oil cost is the monthly average composite refiner's aquisition cost, also from the EIA for the same corresponding months. The monthly data set runs from January 1974 to October 2008.

The split at the 55 MMBPD level represents the cost increase and subsequent collapse of oil productions in the 1979-1982 time frame. Oil aquisition costs remained high even though oil production had fallen from a high of about 64 MMBPD in November 1979 to a low of under 50 MMBPD in February 1983. Oil prices finally "collapsed" from ~$26/barrel in January 1986 to just over $11/bbl in July 1986.

After that price collapse, production/consumption began to increase again well into 1997, when the Russian/Asian financial crisis caused both oil prices and consumption/production to fall briefly.

Unlike the period in the early 1980's where production fell while oil prices stayed "high", in this case oil prices have collapsed while oil production/consumption has stayed relatively flat. That can be seen in this graphic

IPM (10-2008)

A larger size can be seen at:

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3064/3095002973_600d067fc3_o.jpg

The Starship Trooper
Starship

Great chart. So we are currently on around 73 mmbpd and $35, still close to the curve. With decline eating 3.7 mmbpd / annum, any shortfall between this figure and new capacity will move the curve left.

But where is the evidence for a collapse in consumption? All the public figures (e.g. from the EIA and IEA) seem to suggest that the decline has been small, of the order of 1% or less. So I keep reading about collapsing consumption but I can't find data to support that notion. It seems to be a case of argument from incredulity; it can't be anything else!

Do you think the price drop is due to drop in demand or not?

Yes - I don't believe it can be anything else. Supply does not respond to small changes in price, so when demand drops even a little it takes a huge price drop to have any impact on supply.

All the way to zero ... or five dollars!

There is another factor. I'll keep it brief;

What prices are measuring is production capacity rather than product.

For many years there was a consistent increase in demand - and leaving out inflation - this demand increased prices for crude resulting in more funds being available to further increase production. Consequently production increased, yet it lagged the increase in demand. Production increases never caught up with demand to the point where prices would fall.

Part of this was on account of inflation, but that is not central. Production itself - not the capital cost of it - is what matters.

By 2008 there was a very high level of production. Keep in mind this production is a non- economic activity; unlike banking, drilling wells and pumping oil does not require money (or credit), money facilitates the process but steel, geologists, pipe fitters and other industrial hardware are needed for production. Production takes place on its own account with resources that are inherent to it; out of cash flow. Oil production is basically self- propelled.

By Summer of 2008, the world was pricing a perceived production shortfall. This perception was reinforced by a continuation of the preceding many- years' trend. Also, it was stoked by the media and reflected in parallel bull markets in all other commodities. Yet, perception was false. Even when prices were over $120 dollars a barrel there were other stories in the same media of surplus oil being 'stored' in tankers in the Gulf of Arabia. At the highest price levels, there was sufficient oil available for all users. In other words, there was never a shortage of product, only a perception of a shortage of production.

When the surplus of oil became obvious, and could not be rationalized away the high price for product became unsupportable. The idea followed that high prices were causing 'demand destruction'. However, what was happening was a secular supply/demand imbalance. There was structural overproduction relative to demand. Demand was indeed declining because of the recession, but neither the decline in demand nor the accelerating shortage of credit affected the level of production capacity. That level is an outcome of the process; the large investment in it having already been made. Even with the depletion of the world's oil fields, there is still a great amount of production capacity, and there is an accompanying perception of a high level of capacity.

Consequently, any 'surplus' no matter how small is an indicator of excess capacity; of the continuing secular supply/demand imbalance. OPEC can announce cuts, they can actually shut some valves on pipes and reduce the flow, and some big fields can deplete dramatically, but geopolitics and the need for a constant revenue stream leaves the producers able to put a large fraction of available production onto the market - at any time. In other words, the oil available to produce is both absolutely and relatively very great, even if it is temporarily suspended there is no 'production destruction'.

As Phil indicated, the industry is very large with a large investment base. This capacity functions even at low product prices. Product can even be made available even at an economic 'loss' if only for a producer to maintain market share.

Against this background, any surplus on the market has the effect of continually forcing sales; product is sold at whatever price ... in order to clear the market. The perception is that tomorrow will bring increased supply OR that reduction in demand will have the same relative effect. As demand falls, the structural imbalance between capacity and demand increses; less oil sold and burned is oil that remains on the 'supply' side of the balance. It becomes reserve - or excess - capacity. Going forward, the less consumption the greater the imbalance.

Until there is an actual structural reduction of oil production capacity, not temporary cuts ... prices will drop. As demand continues to fall, the forcing mechanism of marginal oil surpluses - real or perceived - will become more and more powerful ultimagely pressing prices downward ... all the way to zero.

New ... there are other non- energy feedback mechanisms that come into play, but the short version has all these loops amplifying declines in price - making the forcing mechanism stronger still! Higher prices, to paraphrase Ronald Reagan lift all boats. Falling prices eventually leave all the boats aground. After this grounding point is reached, there is little that can raise the prices as only small amounts of money will be risked (or be available to risk) for higher, but still very small returns. Even if there are actual shortages, the price will only rise a little as higher prices will deter consumption. There might be long term $8 dollar oil.

The same mechanism is at play in other sectors of the world's economy. Deflation is a bitch ... I will leave to others the amount of economic activity which $8 oil reflects. It may be substantial or may be very reduced, but it will certainly be much less than in 2008.

Excellent Steve. I’ve worked in the oil patch 33 years and yours is the most concise explanation of pricing I’ve seen. So many folks want to ignore the psychology behind pricing trends and just want to view the process as some sort of a plot. It is horse trading. Sophisticated horse trading but none the less a negotiation. I think your most pertinent point deals with production capability vs. pricing. I’ve mentioned this before: at least with US oil produces (with whom I’m very familiar) low price periods do not drive them to lower production levels. Just the opposite: they do whatever they can to maximize production = maximize cash flow. I’ve seen many actually spend capital to even increase production capabilities to whatever extent possible during these low periods.

While OPEC production cuts don’t change production capabilities they are significant IMO. The price collapse in the mid 80’s was a direct result of the KSA cranking their valves open. They had constantly cut their production (as other OPEC members produced even more in the face of lower prices) to support pricing. Eventually they would have had to shut in 100% of their production by 1988 had they kept to their cut rate. Obviously that was not an option for them. But this is not 1986 and the KSA has much greater control as many OPEC members are probably at PO and know it. Additionally OPEC is not spending the $’s it had once budgeted for production expansion. It will take a good 6 to 12 months IMO for these efforts to be felt but it is coming. And the market expectation of tightening supplies may precede that time. And, as you point out, expectations can drive pricing more then some economist’s cross plot.