61 comments on The Anatomy of a Natural Gas Price Spike - Past and Future
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61 comments on The Anatomy of a Natural Gas Price Spike - Past and Future
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Excellent presentation Jon. The best graphic representation of the realities of NG production I’ve ever seen. Not much to add other then some fine details on the dynamics you’ve described.
First, every drilling decision is based upon a pricing forecast of 10 years or so. Initial pricing is obviously based on present day well head prices. Escalation of the price over the course of the model is driven by pure optimism/pessimism. As you show so clearly there is a substantial time lag in expectations. Your analysis is quit sound but there has been a monumental shift in the dynamics in the last three years IMHO. I’m sure you are aware of the record setting NG rates we’ve the last 24 months or so. There is no mystery that the development of the unconventional NG plays was the cause of this growing deliverability. You’ve rightly pointed out the potential for even greater volatility in the NG market as a result of this rapid increase in NG supply. Ultimately the key element will be the relationship of the pricing model I mentioned above and the production characteristics of the UNG plays. To the best of my knowledge this relationship has never existed in the US NG business at such a significant level. Combining the high initial flow rate of a typical UNG well with the very near term price model has been, and will continue to be, the driving metric of future NG deliverability IMO. The revenue from the UNG wells more than 4 or 5 years out has become irrelevant to almost all operators. This is the more true with public companies. The increased initial flow rates of these wells have come at a high price. Thus the only way to generate a satisfactory rate of return is to recover the cost within the first 2 years or less of the well life. Declining production rates beyond that point, even in a good price environment, offer little incentive for drilling. This is vastly different then past NG exploration environments. Previously large discoveries made in conventional NG fields could generate significant cash flow 5 to 10 years into the future. Even offshore discoveries with their higher operational costs can generate significant net present value beyond Year 5. But that is not the future of NG development in the US today. The UNG plays are the future. Deep Water GOM NG may have some impact also (see below).
And thus, IMHO, we’re back to the defining limit of future UNG development programs: a two year price forecast. Though drilling costs will decline as rigs are stacked, companies will not reenter the UNG play until there is a clear sign of such price support. And even in the face of significant price increases I’m concerned we won’t see a very quick response for several reasons. First, there will be fewer players. In the next 12 months or so we will likely see a significant contraction in the number of players. Acquisition of the weak by the stronger will be the most likely mechanism. Second, companies won’t expand their efforts as quickly as we just witnessed IMO. The current price collapse has sent a shockwave through the industry it will not forget in just a few years. Third, I doubt the capital sources will be as free with their checkbooks as before. They won’t be forgetting their present sleepless nights either. A lot of capital was borrowed based upon $8 NG. Fourth, there will be a lot less equipment available and fewer experienced folks to run the operations. I forget the exact numbers but both the geological and engineering have grayed significantly. A disproportionally large percentage is within 5 to 8 years of retirement.
And one side note on Deep Water GOM NG production. By shear luck a significant amount of the NG production loss from hurricane damage was offset by the Independence Deep Water NG Hub coming online. I seem recall it quickly began delivering almost 1 BCG per day. As damaged production came back on line it added to the excess supply scenario you paint so well. But most here understand that as large as those Deep Water GOM reserves may be, technology now allows depletion at much higher rates then previously seen. I haven’t seen enough detailed numbers to quantify the decline vs. time relationship but it may well happen in the same time frame as the ultimate impact of the slow down in UNG drilling reaches the consumer. Combining that possibility with the worse case scenario of a couple of very high demand winter seasons and we may see a pricing spike/shortage situation on a scale never before seen in this country. Potentially a situation which might force Federal action. Whether such a response by our gov’t helps or hinders the situation is pure speculation at this point IMO.
I think you have pointed out a key factor. I am rather new to system dynamics, but sometimes faster response times lead to bigger oscillations.
When oil associated gas dominated the industry, the prices moved up and down pretty slowly. I think the associated gas provided a huge cushion. No matter how wrong the natural gas drilling companies messed up forecasting, they couldn't drive the system into wild dips and spikes.
But now it is like steering a super sensitive race car. Slight adjustments in drilling rate are causing large over or under corrections. Partly I think because depletion is happening faster, and production can now rise faster (since production happens so quickly after the wells are drilled).
One question I have: It looks like a 2 month delay is typical between when prices fall below drilling cost and drilling companies actually shift the rate of drilling. This is actually pretty quick in my perspective, but I would like to know a little bit more about how does drilling contracting work? Are rigs guaranteed work for X number of wells? Or X number of months? What kinds of delays are typical between wanting to shut down a drilling operation and it actually stopping?
On the flip side, what are the typical delays in starting up operations? Once the rig has been contracted, how long does it take to get on site and drilling?
One question I have: It looks like a 2 month delay is typical between when prices fall below drilling cost and drilling companies actually shift the rate of drilling. This is actually pretty quick in my perspective, but I would like to know a little bit more about how does drilling contracting work? Are rigs guaranteed work for X number of wells? Or X number of months? What kinds of delays are typical between wanting to shut down a drilling operation and it actually stopping?
In my experience, our rigs have been time based and its our drilling team's job to keep a rig loaded with a continuous lineup of future wells until the contract is up. Wells then take longer or shorter durations to drill, but in the end we're paying for time, not performance. There are penalties associated with performance out of spec, but within a certain range, its considered acceptable and not managed financially. Then, renegotiations of time based contracts take into consideration the comparable performance between rigs and can reduce or increase pay rate based on past 12 months.
Our typical cycle for well development was about 2-3 months between SOR agreement and production starting online, but as long as a company has resources for drilling new wells, the drilling team will find new wells to be drilled, no matter how marginal, if only from fear of being seen as unnecessary if they aren't producing prospects and being reassigned. Management then has to spend time in meetings deciding how many "real" prospects there are before breaking teams down and shifting resources. I'd say that probably takes an additional few months when it becomes apparent that the new wells are marginal at best. It probably takes 6 months from the time that last "good" well was selected to the time the last "bad" well is drilled before things are brought back into balance.
My observation from visiting a couple of sites is that the more specialized/state of the art the drilling equipment, the longer the lease is likely to be. BP had special drilling rigs made for them, that were adapted to tight gas drilling locations (need to drill several wells, only a few feet apart, without taking the rig down and put it back together). They had to sign long-term contracts to get them made to order.
Chevron was using vertical rigs that weren't particularly specialized. They said they had them on very short term contracts.
Horizontal drilling rigs were in short supply for a while. I expect that once companies found one of them, they wanted a little longer contract on them.
My guess is that is why we saw usage of vertical drilling rigs peak before those of horizontal and directional. A company will keep its rig until its lease runs out, regardless of how long it is.
New to system dynamics? Thought so, Jon.
I'm a newbie too, but I was looking for items like "producers' expectations of future profit" and "stock of mothballed rigs" in the model. One thing I've got from John Sterman's textbook (Business Dynamics, McGraw-Hill 2000) is that price is such a derived property that it cannot contribute to the transient dynamics of a system.
Another point Sterman makes - how do you know your timeframe is long enough? The rule of thumb is two to three times the longest delay in the system. For gas, I'd guess that the longest delay would be in 'proving' a new field, or perhaps in ramping up rig production.
Your questions above about the physical operation of the system are the right kind of question to ask, I think.
Thank you for this post. A lot of work.
I agree. Looks for stocks. Look for delays. Look for feedback loops.
The problem is getting the data. Just an outsiders perspective here, but it seems like what data does exist comes from outside firms doing surveys and data swaps (a bunch of companies all agree to put in data and they get anonymous data out).
One of the reasons I do these posts is to try to provide a forum for sharing information. If you come across anything that might help, please do contribute. If you have further ideas of what should be in the model, I would love to hear those as well. I think stocks of rigs before scrapping and stock of skilled labor are key. At some point it would be really fun to build a full dynamic model and I have a copy of Stella just to play with it.
I think "expectations" might be an important stock, with the degree to which prices have been above or below expectation controlling (after a delay) the rate at which this stock changes. [key point: what controls the delay? Start by assuming it's fixed, perhaps.]
A lot of the data you need you can't get from econometric-type surveys.
The only way I know how to do this stuff is to hang around (on drilling sites and in board rooms), listening and asking questions. Hard to do, and pretty near impossible if you're not attached to a university (as I'm not).
Rockman freely shares his knowledge of how the industry works - that's really cool. He would be a great collaborator if he's willing.
Ask away anytime Greg. As you've seen I'm not shy about discussing the nasty underbelly of the biz. I view this world from the low end while others here have a clearer view of the big picture. Right now I'm in the process of shifting to the international theater (gotta keep paying those bills) but I'll still share the coffee pot with the domestic gang so I can keep folks here aware of the daily battles stateside.
Jon,
Sorry for the delayed response (spent a very long weekend on a troubled well site). You've gotten some good answers from others so I just flesh out a few points.
Mid-summer 2008: Our geologists were begging the drillers to get more rigs no matter what it took. Oct 2008: our geologists were begging the drillers to get rid of rigs as fast as possible. Dec 2008: Cut 2009 budget from $1.4 billion to less then $700 million. Jan 2009: began cutting 15 of our 18 UNG rigs free. Cost to terminate rig contracts early: $40 million. Since 1 Jan 2009 many 10's of thousands of service company hands and office consultants have been cut loose. (we use the rather benign phrase “sent to the house”).
This gives you some sense of the time factor. In 33 years I've never seen the industry react so quickly. Even in the global demand destruction period of the early 1980's it took the industry a year or two to cut back this far. Several reasons why so fast IMHO: 1) A very high percentage of consultants. I'll include service company personnel who work in-house for the operating companies. With two weeks notice an operator could eliminate 20% to 30% of the functioning office personnel. 2) The obvious drop in commodity prices. As I mentioned above with re: to UNG, profitability occurs in the first 2 - 3 years. When NG prices dropped the economics were destroyed virtually overnight. If one had a large conventional NG wild cat to drill they might proceed knowing that, while it might take longer to reach payout, the longevity of the reserves would eventually make it a viable resource. Not with UNG: sell the near term production cheap and there is no profit. 3) The declining credit market: I think this factor combined with the above led to the unprecedented speed of the slow down. Not only were the technical folks throwing the brakes on but also the CFO's.
You make an excellent analogy to the volatility (as a driver would over steer an overly responsive race car) of the UNG. Just a WAG on my part but I don’t think we’ll see a return of all those UNG drilling operations comparable to the build up we’ve seen the last few years. Too many folks have had the hell scared out of them the last 6 months and most of those folks will still be running the show in the next few years. Add that to an economy with limited ability to fund such expansions and it could turn into a worse case scenario: increasing demand driving up prices in the face of significant shortage without a rapid industry response to add production. And I don’t want to even try to speculate what the gov’t might try to do to “help” us should that situation arise.
That may not be as big a problem as it appears just from the calendar. Since the current economic conditions have caused retirement accounts to lose value, lots of people are delaying retirement.